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Around 12 million unauthorized immigrants live in the United States. This situation 
raises pressing questions that have received four types of answers in academia: 1) the 
response that complains about poor design of immigration policies, 2) the response 
that states that there is a clash between the transnational process of globalization and 
the old nationalistic immigration policies, 3) the response which historicizes the 
process of illegalization of immigrants, and 4) the response that is based on diverse 
forms of citizenship and national membership in which illegalization does not have the 
power of absolute exclusion. The present work seeks to make a contribution to this 
line of responses. My presentation of unauthorized migration as an act of civil 
disobedience is more intelligible within the framework of this debate. In my attempt to 
reframe the migrants’ non-authorized crossing of borders and their remaining in the 
United States, I seek to use civil disobedience as a category that can be given fresh 
significance through the study of the migrants’ struggle for inclusion. I want above all 
to stress the active role of the undocumented and the political significance of their 
actions. This work seeks to offer a perspective that makes visible the political nature of 
actions that are not usually considered such. The questioning that runs through this 
whole study is the following: What moves social change when it appears that nothing 
is moving? What makes for inclusion of this group of the excluded? The first chapter is 
an elaboration of my instruments through a type of archeological work that helped me 
to design the language for the third and fourth chapters. This preparatory work also 
helped me to give a name to the actions, to expose the traditions in which that 
language is inserted, and to reveal the ruptures that deepen the concepts I needed. 
After centuries of thinking with the categories of a tradition that restricts the confines 
of politics, extra effort is needed to give the political elements visibility in those places 
where they have taught us there is no politics. It is for that reason that the first chapter 
dedicates so much space to tracing the tradition back and to analyzing how and why it 
restricted the space for political actions and actors. At the end of the first chapter I 
explain my choice of civil disobedience as a way of framing the noncompliance of the 
immigrants, I reframe the noncompliance of the undocumented as “performative civil 
disobedience”, and I make an attempt at producing the translation between two (or 
more) traditions of thought by reflecting on different theories of civil disobedience and 
situating the contributions of Scott, Bayat, Foucault, Thompson, Rawls, and others 
within a current that breaks with the tradition and expands the field of acts and actors 
that can be considered political.  
The second chapter presents the forces that reject the immigrants: the policies 
and the actors, their interests and their contradictions. I start from the most general—
the policies—and then continue with a thematic development that includes topics of 
more immediate relevance: the importance of geopolitics in migration policies, the 
violence in Central America as a reason for the migrations and for the granting of 
asylum, and the banopticon and the situation on the border. Instead of proposing that 
the anti-immigrant policies and their application provide the macro-vision in a holistic 
text, I present them as a backdrop that helps us to understand the dimensions of the 
challenge faced by an undocumented person. Examination of these policies also serves 
as a counterbalance to chapters three and four, which might give the impression that 
most of the surrounding conditions favor the undocumented. The third chapter is 
  
 
central to the work because it is dedicated to the actions of the immigrants themselves 
and because it is the chapter for which I did the archeological digging of the first 
chapter.  
In the third chapter I explain what I call “civil disobedience in everyday life”: 
those actions which advance the inclusion of undocumented immigrants in U.S. society 
and which therefore counteract the restrictions that impede such inclusion, as 
described in the second chapter. By performing such actions the undocumented 
engage in a daily struggle to gain for themselves the asylum that the U.S. government 
denies them. Such actions are not carried out in a collective or organized way, but their 
cumulative effect gives them decisive political weight. They are the prior condition for 
any pro-immigration activism. The undocumented are not passive subjects. This third 
chapter makes Marx’s politicization of the material world the backbone of my 
recasting of “material” actions as political actions. However, I have tried to enhance 
the Marxist contribution with the thought of authors who pay more attention to other, 
non-material dimensions.  
In the fourth chapter I chose three realms to illustrate how the performative 
civil disobedience of the undocumented is a form of citizenship in the making by virtue 
of its performative effectiveness and that of its support systems. They are support 
systems through whose reiteration and impacts, measured through interviews and 
participatory observation, seem substantial to me. Churches and migrant organizations 
are two of the main supports. The other is state heterogeneity, a recurrent element 
that at times has a visible presence and at other times sneaks in subtly or is barely 
discernible in the background. Addressing them independently allows me to 
complement the second chapter, where the excluding will of the state appears in a 
presentation true to reality – as can be inferred from the collection of data that 
support it, even though it is not complete. Churches, migrant organizations and state 
heterogeneity are three spheres of legitimation, and the lattermost, one of legal 
validation. The way is paved for the neutralizing the exclusions that I analyze in the 
second chapter by a combination of forces: some immigration legislation, 
heterogeneous bureaucratic regulations, discretionary enforcement of regulations, the 
solidarity work of the church, and that of the organizations of migrants themselves. 
In my fieldwork and my analysis I concentrate on undocumented Central 
American immigrants. Even though this study is focused on Central Americans, I 
believe that most of my exposition is valid also for migrants from other places, 
especially for Mexicans, who are the most numerous nationality both among Latinos 
and among foreigners in general. I concentrate on Central Americans in order to make 
a contribution and to set limits. I want to make a contribution because undocumented 
Central Americans in the United States are an immigrant group that, in comparison 
with other Latin Americans in the country, has scarcely been studied. In addition, they 
constitute the fastest-growing foreign group during the period between the last two 
national censuses, faster even than Latinos as a whole. 
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1. The unauthorized migration of Central Americans and its political aspect 
 
Around 12 million unauthorized immigrants live in the United States. Even for a country of more 
than 300 million inhabitants, the presence of this enormous number of undocumented person—to 
whom the government has never given permission to enter, to remain, or to work—raises the kind 
of strong questions that often receive very weak answers, as Boaventura de Sousa Santos 
complained.1 How can a liberal political system in which the rule of law prevails function with so 
many persons consigned to a legal status that ratifies their position of exclusion or, in the best of 
cases, of inequality before the law? Are these elevated numbers of unauthorized persons an 
anomaly of the migratory system or its finest fruit? Is the government losing control? Is the United 
States possibly ceasing to be a “modern rational-legal state, with a clear monopoly of power, able 
to deliver unambiguous rights and duties to its citizens who comprise a nation of strangers”2? Is 
the sovereignty of nation-states and their dominion over a defined territory being eroded? Are 
their policies evidence of excessive tolerance (allowing so many immigrants to enter and remain) 
or of exceptional intolerance (refusing to regularize them)? What interests lie hidden behind the 
policies of exclusion and non-expulsion? What are the major routes or paths by which these 
undocumented persons might cease to be such: general amnesty, gradual and selective 
regularization, massive deportation, or slow and steady expulsion? To what instance can the 
undocumented appeal in order to attain their objective of remaining in the country: a juridical 
system in the process of being globalized, the national interests of politicians and businesspeople, 
or validation of their vital presence in the nation’s daily life? 
 
These pressing questions have received four types of answers in academia:  
1. The first response remains within the limits of the strict rule of law: the present policies do not 
work because they fail to yield the results they were designed to achieve. The growing volume of 
undocumented persons is clear proof of the failure of migratory restrictions. The implementation 
of these policies has thus far been concentrated in the area of expensive, very fallible controls. 
                                            
1 Santos, 2009, p.13. 
2 Urry, 2001, p.163. 
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Policy makers, while recognizing that the market needs immigrant labor, should insist that the 
government must take the bull by the horns and not tolerate what it has not authorized. 
Accordingly, the best policies should focus on the area of employment with three types of 
measures: 1) Apply the full weight of the law by punishing employers who hire illegal workers and 
also by defending the rights of workers independently of their legal status so as to penalize 
employers who hire them for purposes of exploitation. 2) Lighten the burden of the law by 
allowing more flexibility in formal employment and relieving employers of the heavy costs of social 
benefits that motivate them to seek irregular laborers. 3) Finally, take measures to saturate the 
labor market with workers who are already in the country, by incorporating into the labor market 
either a) groups with low participation, such as women, minorities, the elderly, and the poorly 
educated; or b) legal immigrants, by means of temporary migration programs that mimic some of 
the characteristics of illegal migration, with a selection of unskilled workers and with flexibility of 
time periods, application costs, and requirements.1  
Documents emanating from the Migration Policy Institute, a conservative think tank, are 
the best example of this response, and they are one of the steadiest sources of information for 
members of Congress. These studies lavish great praise on biometric tests and new security 
systems, but they also warn about their vulnerability to fraud and errors. Their solution is more 
international collaboration, homogenization of standards, and bilateral and multilateral 
agreements.2 They extol the effort to create a virtual wall along the southwestern border—with a 
combination of towers, sensors, and aerial surveillance—but they criticize the high costs of such 
an effort and its vulnerability to technical faults. Since they recognize that immigration is a variable 
that is dependent on labor demand, they propose that, rather than spend so much effort on costly 
and ineffective control mechanisms (whether physical or virtual), the best way to stop illegal 
migration is to prosecute employers who hire undocumented workers.3  
The diagnosis behind this vision is in harmony with proposals found in neoclassical 
economics: external and internal migrations are caused by geographical differences between labor 
supply and demand. In the case of international migrations, the wage differences activate the 
migratory flow, with workers traveling from low-wage countries to those with high wages, that is, 
to countries with a small labor force and large amounts of capital.4 However, since these 
                                            
1 Sumption, 2011. 
2 Papademetriou, 2011. 
3 Koslowski, 2011. 
4 Rocha, 2006, p.13. 
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advocates of the rule of law are zealous defenders of legality, they differ from the pure 
neoclassicists insofar as they are unwilling to wait for market forces to bring about a point of 
equilibrium. By combining rigorous implementation of immigration law and manipulation of the 
present labor law—a sort of perverse Keynesianism—they seek to induce saturation of the 
market, penalize the hiring of undocumented workers, and eliminate their advantages.  
 
2. The second response, which takes globalizing processes into consideration, proposes “that 
international migrations are a function of larger geopolitical and transnational economic 
dynamics.”1 These factors “have an impact on the formation and direction of migration flows. 
They produce conditions under which poverty, unemployment, or lack of opportunities for 
advancement can become activated as migration push factors. For example, the development of 
commercial agriculture and export oriented standardized manufacturing have dislocated 
traditional economies and eliminated small producers. They also contribute to the conditions 
under which immigrants can enter the labor markets of receiving countries. For example, 
increased competitive pressures from the internationalization of production cause businesses to 
favor low-wage workers at the expense of unions, in order to remain competitive with cheap 
third-world imports.”2 In a world where capital and business pursue the most lucrative strongholds 
with no restraint, labor markets have also become globalized so that, by emitting sufficiently 
attractive signals, they are able to absorb workers from all latitudes. This development negatively 
affects two of the most distinctive attributes of nation-states, their sovereignty and their exclusive 
control over a territory. Sassen argues that “globalization under these conditions has entailed a 
partial denationalizing of national territory and a partial shift of some components of state 
sovereignty to other institutions, from supranational entities to the global capital market.“3 The 
ones most benefited by this de-nationalization are those who have “economic citizenship,” 
namely, the firms, corporations, and financial markets that can operate in tax-free zones and 
fragment their productive processes among many countries by using flexible overseas 
subcontractors.4  
Workers have not been able to benefit in the same way that businesses have because they 
are treated with different norms. They lack “economic citizenship.” This dualism presents a 
                                            
1 Sassen, 1995, pp.66-67. 
2 Sassen, 1995, p.76. 
3 Sassen, 1995, p.XII. 
4 Sassen, 1995, pp.XIII-XIV and pp.8-9. 
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problem: “The existence of two different regimes for the circulation of capital and the circulation 
of immigrants, as well as two equally different regimes for the protection of human rights and the 
protection of state sovereignty, poses problems that cannot be solved by the old rules of the 
game.”1 There are transnational organizations working in this context, and their directives limit the 
sovereignty and autonomy of modern states and whose deregulation initiatives reveal a decline in 
state power.2 However, that does not mean that the nation-state is disappearing; it has been and 
it continues to be a platform of globalization. It does mean, however, that “a national state may 
have the power to write the text of an immigration policy, but it is likely to be dealing with 
complex, transnational processes that it can only partly address or regulate through immigration 
policy as conventionally understood.”3 Each country experiences this complexity in a different 
way. In the case of the United States, there has been increasing openness with successive pieces 
of legislation: the 1975 Helsinki Accords requiring that barriers to the free movement of people 
and ideas be lowered, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1977, the Moynihan-Frank 
Amendment of 1987, and the 1980 Refugee Act.4  Sassen argues that the de facto 
transnationalization of migration policy was evident in several areas: in the increasingly frequent 
recourse that immigration judges had to international legal instruments to resolve migrant and 
refugee cases, in the formation of a privatized regimen for the circulation of service sector 
workers, and in the extensive collaboration in the US-Mexico Bi-national Immigration 
Commission.5 At the other pole, however, individual states reacted by renationalizing immigration 
policies. They complained that, while the federal government decides immigration policies, it pays 
little heed to the substantial costs of providing health services, education, and detention facilities 
for migrants. The states receiving the most migrants claim that they have been disproportionately 
burdened with the putative costs of immigration because of ill-conceived or poorly enforced 
immigration legislation. Their solution has been to renationalize immigration policies, a move 
quite in keeping with the trend to restore powers to the states.6 The implication is that the anti-
immigrant policies were a reaction on the part of the states to the burdens imposed on them by 
the presence of migrants. Such an assumption is valid when policies are decided solely in terms of 
                                            
1 Sassen, 1995, p.XVI. 
2 Sassen, 1995, pp.13-14 and 29. 
3 Sassen, 1995, p.75. 
4 Sassen, 1995, pp.68-69. 
5 Sassen, 1998, p.6. 
6 Sassen, 1998, pp.11-12. 
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perceptions, and in this case the perception is that the migrants are a net cost to the state and not 
a source of revenue. 
Since the texts in which Sassen expounded his ideas about globalization and its effects on 
migration and migratory policies appeared before 9/11,1 they do not take into account the federal 
assault on immigration that came about with the creation of the Department of Homeland 
Security and the belligerent behavior of Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE). 
Nevertheless, his diagnosis regarding the decision of states to pass migratory legislation turned 
out to be a very accurate forecast. The federal government’s failure to pass migratory reform in 
2006 motivated the states to take migratory policies into their own hands. During the first seven 
months of 2007, fifty state senates debated 1,404 bills designed to block undocumented persons 
from having access to social services and the labor market. One hundred seventy of the bills were 
approved.2 In any case, the dynamics deployed at both federal and state level corroborate 
Sassen’s thesis that migratory policies work in favor of re-nationalization. By reinforcing the 
controls and the brakes on labor mobility, such policies form a current which runs counter to the 
new transnationalized economic regimen, to international human rights accords, and to the 
international extension of social and political rights to immigrants.3 Since the phenomenon is 
inextricably connected with the conditions produced by economic internationalization, the 
solution for what many people understand as a “crisis of migratory control” is not to be found in 
conventional migratory policies. Fortunately, this situation contains elements of equilibrium, as 
has been demonstrated by the history of migrations, for these follow patterns and cycles that do 
not ordinarily exceed 20 years.4 At the present time there is evidence that return migration and 
circular migration are larger than is usually thought, and they might possibly be even greater if 
controls were removed. While the cycle is coming full circle, bilateral and multilateral agreements 
in different areas—especially between sending and receiving countries—can help to resolve 
problems in ways that fully respect the human rights of immigrants.5 
In some aspects the points of dissonance between Sassen’s diagnosis and the vision of the 
rule of law are not excessive. There is a lack of control; there are employers who need 
undocumented labor (because of economic globalization in one case, to reduce labor costs in the 
                                            
1 Losing control? in 1995, Globalization and its discontents in 1998, and Regulating immigration in a global 
age in 2000. 
2 Clemens, 2008, p.255. 
3 Sassen 2000, p.73. 
4 Sassen, 1999, p.XV. 
5 Sassen, 2000, pp.74-75. 
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other); there are bad policies, which for the Migration Policy Institute are expensive and fallible 
and which for Sassen are inadequate because they do not respond to the complexity of 
international dynamics. The solution in both visions is framed within the rule of law and brought 
about by bilateral and multilateral agreements. For the consultants of the Migration Policy 
Institute, however, those agreements serve mainly as instruments for improving the controls. They 
are merely secondary elements that complement the forceful line of action: making individual 
employers and workers responsible for compliance and punishing them for infractions.1 Sassen 
discounts policies based on individual responsibility and places the emphasis instead on 
transnational accords: bilateral and multilateral treaties aimed at guaranteeing human rights and 
providing legislation for a globalized world. 
 
3. The third response, which historicizes the process of rendering migrants illegal, is most fully 
expounded by Nicholas de Genova and Aviva Chomsky. Sassen and the Migration Policy Institute 
examine the economic causes of migration and understand illegality in terms of faulty policies. 
They claim that the policies are scratching where there is no itch: they focus on the borders 
instead of on the workplaces, and they blame individuals instead of the processes of economic 
globalization. In both cases illegality is a given, an independent variable, a problem to be solved. 
Calling into question this naturalization of illegality, De Genova and Chomsky explore its origins in 
their effort to dismantle a political construction whose main aim is to pave the way for dominating 
and exploiting migrants. As Chomsky expresses it, “increasingly convoluted webs of laws, 
restrictions, and discrimination ensure that migrants remain in a subject position, exploitable and 
exploited. Today, the system works by drawing or forcing them into a status deemed illegality.”2 
De Genova also views the category of “illegal alien” as tremendously useful and lucrative; 
it serves to create and maintain a reserve labor force that is legally vulnerable since it lives under 
threat of deportation and is therefore cheap and highly malleable.3 It is the threat of deportation 
and not deportation itself that makes migrant labor a disposable commodity.4 But De Genova goes 
beyond considerations of political economy, understanding the production of “migrant illegality” 
as a process profoundly rooted in the racialization practices which have historically molded 
                                            
1 Workers in general, because the policies which reduce employers’ obligations by introducing greater labor 
flexibility will affect all workers. 
2 Chomsky, 2014, p.86. 
3 De Genova, 2005, p.214. 
4 De Genova, 2005, p.247. 
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“Americanness” by means of inclusions and exclusions.1 Whiteness and citizenship were fused 
together from the moment in 1790 when the first Congress of the United States decreed that any 
person who wished to become naturalized as a U.S. citizen should be white.2 The indissoluble 
connection that exists in the United States between white supremacy and “Americanness” leaves 
Mexicans—the population De Genova studied in Chicago—without any realistic hope of being 
assimilated and assured a future as “Americans.”3 The same can be said of Central Americans and 
South Americans. These “brown” populations occupy a contested space between “whites” and 
“blacks.” In order to contest this intimate amalgamation of whiteness and citizenship, there is a 
need not only to condemn the idea of whiteness as a product of racist ideology, as Roediger 
proposed,4 but also to repudiate the very idea of “Americanness.”5 De Genova holds that the 
whiteness/citizenship fusion is ultimately sustained not just by the intervention of law; it is also 
the ideological effect of a discursive formation that encompasses both political struggles and the 
whole realm of public debate.6 
The exclusion founded on “Americanness” produces exploitation: “The law has always 
been utilized to exclude some people from rights—often to the advantage of employers, who can 
then exploit those who are excluded.”7 Labor power that has been arriving in the country over 
many years is labeled “illegal” by the government as a service to employers. In order to make sure 
that immigrants remain a source of cheap labor, legislation has historically deprived the children 
of immigrants of access to education.8 Immigrants have been placed outside the law so that they 
can be more effectively exploited. In view of this, De Genova believes, “the predicaments of 
migrant labor invoke the analogies of slavery and apartheid.”9 
The theses of Chomsky and De Genova go beyond the findings of Sassen because they 
show that there is not only globalization but also illegalization. What Sassen calls 
“renationalization of migration policies” is only one piece of the illegalization posited by Chomsky 
and De Genova. Renationalization is an anti-immigrant reaction that becomes crystallized in 
juridical instruments and in policies that naturalize illegality “as an irreductible social fact, 
                                            
1 De Genova, 2005, p.216. 
2 De Genova, 2005, p.216. 
3 De Genova, 2005, pp.208-209. 
4 Roediger, 1994. 
5 De Genova, 2005, p.209. 
6 De Genova, 2005, p.228. 
7 Chomsky, 2007, p.XVIII. 
8 Motomura, 2014. 
9 De Genova, 2012, p.144. 
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produced as an effect of the practical materiality of the law.”1 Sassen overlooks the fact that the 
undocumented are not a problem that the laws need to deal with; rather, they occupy a status 
produced by the laws. The illegalization precedes the status of being undocumented. In other 
words, lack of documentation is not a category outside the law; rather, it is precisely the labeling 
device that is used to criminalize certain acts which were not previously considered offenses and 
which at some junctures were even encouraged by the government. De Genova and Chomsky fail 
to see that that this process exists within a global dynamic and that U.S. migration policies are 
perhaps inadequate to deal with this phenomenon. The policies are instead falling under the sway 
of an inveterate racism since they are reacting to—and going against—the forces of economic 
internationalization. Combining both theories could yield a position which advocates 1) mutual 
reinforcement of the labor flows produced by globalization and 2) illegalization of part of those 
flows as a way of regulating them. 
But De Genova adds racialization to the mix, thus making the combination problematic. By 
presenting racialization as a historical constant, De Genova introduces static into a theory that is 
seeking to explain a relatively new process. His theory would be more consistent if he were to 
assume Johnson’s thesis about the “huddled masses” myth2 and Kanstroon’s ideas about an ever-
existing “deportation nation.” With these theories and others it is possible to understand the 
historical circumstances in which successive U.S. governments—making use of racialization, but 
also of gender discrimination,3 anti-communist hysteria, and the craving for purity that seeks to be 
rid of the sick, the poor, and the sexually “deviant”—have argued for and implemented 
illegalization.4 
If racialization has always been a dominant and decisive element of U.S. migration policies 
throughout the country’s history, not only would it cease to be a factor explaining some present-
day particularities—which I believe it is—but it would be difficult to explain why we are witnessing 
the increasing deterioration of the situation of Latinos in the United States (or of Mexicans, which 
is the group that De Genova has studied). Also, if the combination of whiteness and Americanness 
leaves no room for integration and the equitable exercise of social, civil, and political rights, then 
the immigrants would be caught up in a spiral of discrimination and unspeakable exploitation, 
                                            
1 De Genova, 2005, p.227. 
2 Johnson, 2004. 
3 On this topic: Luibhéid, Eithne, Entry Denied: Controlling Sexuality at the Border, University of Minnesota 
Press, Minneapolis and London, 2002. 
4 Kanstroom, 2007. 
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forced to deal with a government that “has refined those tactics to generate even more severe 
constraints for the undocumented,”1 constraints from which they could be delivered only by a 
deus ex machina. There is no doubt about the overwhelming power of that combination of 
whiteness and Americanness. We will see its mordant aspect when we analyze the situation on the 
border, where many Latinos—including some who are U.S. citizens—are treated as undocumented 
persons. Although my historical review will not be exhaustive, I hope to show that the history of 
migrations has left behind sediment that will impede the spiraling effort to exclude, and that it 
also has other elements that are not directly linked to racialization. 
I believe that De Genova’s historicization is a fallacy that misinterprets historical reality. 
His review is circumscribed to the significant but limited sphere of internal policies: the 
Constitution, migration policies, and legislation. There is no doubt but that the close association of 
whiteness and citizenship in those legal instruments has increased the rigor of the conditions 
allowing the integration of migrants, but as I explain in the second chapter, it is necessary also to 
historicize the foreign policy of the United States and its strategies for defending its geopolitical 
interests in Mesoamerica. These factors are additional explanatory elements that do much to 
determine people´s reasons for migrating and the discourses and actions of pro- and anti-
immigration actors. This “external” historicization must be complemented by “internal” 
historicization of the legislation beneficial to migrants that is the fruit of struggles waged by civil 
society. These struggles are a factor that sometimes breaks the ascending spiral of discrimination. 
We realize this when we scrutinize the history of how already established groups support new 
generations of migrants: the more migrants there are in a group, the more likely it is that there 
will be informal networks and formal organizations that pave paths or even major highways 
toward inclusion. It is precisely these other types of internal and external historicization that 
deliver us from the funnel through which an ever increasing discrimination negates the 
possibilities of integration. In this way we can understand the back-and-forth swings between 
policies of illegalization and policies that open the way toward amnesties, asylum quotas, family 
reunion measures, temporary worker programs, temporary protective status, and gradual 
regularization processes that eventually include the millions of now undocumented persons. We 
could speak of an instrumental opening, as happens when the admission of migrants is inspired by 
a country’s geopolitical interests or by the pressure of groups that want to make sure that 
politicians and parties have the ethnic clientele they need. We could also speak of an opening of 
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solidarity, as when groups of civil society succeed in abolishing anti-immigrant policies and even 
pass laws that allow for the massive admission of refugees. 
Neither the quota law of 1924 nor the “revolving door policy, whereby mass deportations 
would be concurrent with an overall, large-scale importation of Mexican migrant labor”—which 
De Genova explains and stresses1—can be considered policies that best characterize U.S. 
migration policies longitudinally, at least if we understand by migration policies not only their 
mechanisms of selection and rejection but also their concessions of refuge, asylum, residency, 
citizenship, temporary permits, sanctuary cities, and other consequences deriving from the 
diversity of state laws. And that is without mentioning the policies which Sassen2 with good reason 
considers to have affected migratory flows, such as commercial treaties and political and military 
activities oriented by geopolitical interests that range from invasions to dollar diplomacy. Indeed, 
if the policies that sought to maintain the proportion of whiteness of the 1890 census had 
prevailed, or if they had been even more rigorous and were the only force shaping immigration 
flows, Latinos would never have come to constitute 16.6% of the population of the United States, 
nor would they represent 39% of all foreigners naturalized, nor would they have obtained 42% of 
the permanent residencies extended to foreigners between 1920 and 2013.3 Neither would it be 
the case that in the capital of the United States Salvadorans are the most numerous nationality 
among Latinos despite coming from a small country and being relatively recent migrants.4 In 
synthesis: the process of legalization/illegalization functions in ways and produces results that 
cannot be explained simply by exclusion and racialization. Illegalization has to do with the 
instrumental opening of the country and with the opening in solidarity. 
I consider the diagnoses of Chomsky and De Genova to be very incisive in their exposition 
of the dynamics that are essential for understanding the reason for the huge number of 
undocumented persons in the United States and for the persistence of same. However, their 
diagnoses give rise to disproportionate affirmations, such as when Aviva Chomsky observes that 
“people without documents live behind another kind of border, a baffling and sometimes 
terrifying border that separates them from those around them and the country and society in 
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which they live.”1 In another text Chomsky seems to find no exit from the iniquitous system: “It’s 
no coincidence that in periods when rights have been expanded to previously excluded sectors of 
the population, businesses have sought new sources of exploitable labor.”2 As I will show, the 
labor scene is more complex: there are not always unscrupulous employers on one side and 
helpless workers on the other. As we will see, a large proportion of the undocumented are self-
employed, or they are employed by other own-account immigrants who have no influence on 
migration policies, or they are employed by persons whose profits are closely linked to assuring 
that immigrant workers are treated with dignity. The panorama painted by Chomsky, for all its 
value as critique, is easy to visualize, perhaps because it oversimplifies. There is a great temptation 
to segment workers by class and productive sector, but except for a couple of significant instances, 
such as the weapons industry and private prisons, it is impossible to align an entire sector in a 
monolithic anti-immigrant position, and there are entire industries that actively promote amnesty 
for immigrants. 
We could say that the presentations of both De Genova and Chomsky neglect to consider 
the actions of the dominated against their domination. De Genova makes use of Agamben’s 
category of “bare life,” indicating a life lived “in contrast to the plenitude of ways in which human 
beings really live.”3 He maintains that “bare life” should not be understood as a biological entity 
existing in the state of nature prior to sovereign power; it should rather be understood as a 
product of political machinery: “Bare life, in other words, is for Agamben the degradation and 
debasement of the species specificity of human life.”4 De Genova points out that “human 
existence, while yet alive, is nonetheless stripped of all the encumbrances of social location and 
juridical identity, and thus bereft of all the qualifications for properly political inclusion and 
belonging.”5 “Bare life” is a type of political dispossession that indicates a tendential horizon, but it 
has no empirical exemplars to represent it. Therefore, the position of those who “go hunting for 
convincing exemplars of an ‘authentic’ bare life”6 is inadmissible. Although there is some 
plausibility in discounting an essentialist position, no theory can be exempted from what 
Thompson calls the “necessary empirical dialogue” without being subjected to his criticism of 
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Althusserianism, namely, that it is a position that “offers an a-historical theoreticism”.1 If the 
tendency to strip people of every political attribute does not find expression in a political system, 
then it lacks explanatory validity, no matter how valuable it might be as a metaphysical wake-up 
call. Even if we consider the relevance and correctness of De Genova’s historicizing the 
illegalization of migrants as a process (for me, only partly) linked to racialization, his conclusion—
that we are dealing with “bare lives” devoid of the encumbrances of social location and juridical 
identity and lacking all qualifications for proper political inclusion and belonging—does not reflect 
the situation of the undocumented in the United States.  
At the macroeconomic level, on the other hand, the thesis that unauthorized international 
migrations contribute to the enlargement of a reserve army which allows capital to avoid union 
turmoil and to pay depressed wages has a sound scientific basis. But concentrating exclusively on 
the economic dimension, and on this aspect in particular, in order to explain the role played by 
unauthorized migrations both internationally and in the U.S. would be as reductionist as arguing 
that the Central American guerrillas of the ’70s and ’80s were mainly (or only) puppets of the 
prosperous arms industry. Such a reduction is possible only by shuttering the window that views 
the political dimension. When expounded without further commentary, both the “bare life” thesis 
and the thesis of the “reserve army” and the submissive proletariat convey the idea that the 
dominated engage in no action against their domination and that they do nothing to oppose their 
illegalization and to favor their inclusion. It was by examining structures that Marx was able to 
explain the proletariat’s protagonistic role and to justify paying attention to their development as 
the core of his methodology. In a contradictory turn, attention is now being paid to overall 
tendencies but without the benefit of Marxist dialectic; all the protagonism of the proletariat is 
thus transferred to big capital, leaving a migrant proletariat that is reduced to being merely a 
victim and a marionette of structural forces. In Marx the master/slave dialectic implies the 
subjection of capital to a dynamic that constrains its dominance and eventually confounds it 
completely. Why must we think of workers simply as puppets of the globalizing forces who are 
doing nothing to escape from being recruited into the reserve army and from being confined by 
national capital to the narrow limits of their native countries and the even narrower ones of their 
rundown slums and rural villages? With no absolute certitude about the future but with a more 
nuanced vision of the present, the fourth response offers a vision that completes the panorama by 
giving the full picture and answering the questions: what are the migrants and other forces are 
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doing to promote inclusion and oppose total illegalization? what degree of inclusion they have 
already achieved? and what is the resulting situation of political dispossession in which the 
undocumented actually find themselves? 
 
4. The fourth response, then, is based on diverse forms of citizenship and national membership in 
which illegalization does not have the power of absolute exclusion. This is a vision that can absorb 
the theses of Sassen, Chomsky, and De Genova. It is not incompatible with including either the 
structural forces of globalized markets and other globalizing forces or the processes of 
illegalization. Its inquiries are only momentarily concerned with why the undocumented exist and 
how they came to be so numerous, for its attention is focused instead on how integrated the 
undocumented already are and how well they succeed in being included despite the government’s 
rejection. The 12 million undocumented persons are not a lapse in the migratory system; they are 
a demonstration of how it is currently functioning. From their perspective, the government is not 
the decisive forces in the processes by which citizenship is achieved. Gaining membership takes 
other paths in this age when the government is not the only speaker. 
As far as I have been able to trace, Yasemin Soysal, in her analysis of European migration, 
was the first person to speak of a “post-national model of membership”: she showed how 
guestworkers are incorporated into many of the rights and privileges that constitute the basis of 
citizenship. From that finding she deduced that “national citizenship is no longer the main 
determinant of individual rights and privileges, and that these rights are now codified in a different 
scheme, one that emphasizes universal personhood rather than nationality.”1  Her discovery was 
of capital importance for subsequent reflection on the theme, but her post-nationalism was not 
taken up by the other authors I will mention. In analyzing migration in the United States, a 
presentation focused on post-nationalism would have to leave aside not only Martin’s valuable 
reflection on the models of migration policies that have been in competition in space and time 
throughout U.S. history2 but also Zolberg’s study on the filters used by the government apparatus 
to “design” a nation.3 
Susan Bibler Coutin subsequently studied other forms of membership, such as the 
“illegitimate” citizenship that the undocumented create for themselves: “Undocumented 
immigrants have sometimes assumed the authority to make these decisions themselves, and 
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sometimes have even authenticated their actions (such as a decision to work without 
authorization) by manufacturing their own documentation. When individuals who have engaged in 
such illicit practices acquire legal status at least in part because of these activities, then illicit 
practices are themselves at least somewhat legitimized.”1 Coutin argues that illegal practices are a 
step prior to legal migratory status and that the undocumented—before acceding, and precisely in 
order to accede, to “legitimate” nationalized citizenship—live in a denationalized, extra-state, 
and/or transnational domain of “illegitimate” citizenship.2 It may be that the original intuition for 
this finding was suggested to Coutin by the sector that opposes migration because in another text 
she states that “advocates of restrictive immigration measures argued that migrants exhibited 
illegitimate forms of agency, that migrant women, for example, sneaked across the U.S.-Mexico 
border to have U.S.-citizen children.”3 Coutin views such behavior as something positive and 
recognizes the proactive role of immigrants. 
Following Coutin and Soysal, Sassen speaks of “informal citizenship” and of an “informal 
social contract” to refer to the fact that the undocumented are “unauthorized but still recognized” 
since they manage to legitimize effective extra-state forms of belonging: “The everyday practices 
of these undocumented immigrants are in some way the practices of citizens, and their identities 
as members of a residential community take on some of the traits, the practices, and the identities 
associated with the condition of citizenship. Their civic practices are in fact sufficient to make 
them worthy of full membership.”4 For Sassen as well, irregular status is a step prior to formal 
citizenship, but she does not mention that it is a step filled with illegal practices. Sassen adds by 
way of conclusion: “What is first and most important from my viewpoint is that we are witnessing 
the strengthening, or even a process of constitutionalization, of new civil rights that allow citizens 
to make requests and demands of government and to claim new forms of autonomy in the formal 
political scene. This process can be viewed as a further widening of the distance between the 
formal apparatus of the state and the truly proper institution of citizenship.”5 In her mention of 
constitutionalization and making requests and demands of government, we can see that Sassen 
has already taken some distance from Soysal’s post-nationalist position, a distance that could 
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already be seen in her Losing Control. 1 She has adopted a more nuanced position based on the 
recognition that “the epochal transformation we call globalization is taking place inside the 
national to a far larger extent than is usually recognized” because “territory, law, economy, 
security, authority, and membership all have largely been constructed as national in most of the 
world, albeit rarely with the degree of autonomy posited in national law and international 
treaties.”2 This valorization of the national is also present in Sassen’s opposition to the viewpoint 
which understands “immigration as the consequence of emigrants’ individual actions” and views 
the “receiving country as a passive agent, one not implicated in the process.”3 
Stressing the receiving country’s importance and adhering closely to the constitutional 
historians, Bosniak interprets citizenship as a divided construct. His aim is to establish that 
citizenship is not an all-or-nothing affair, but a construct that is internally complex and segmented: 
“This notion of citizenship as divisible, compromisable—indeed, fragmented— helps to capture 
the relationship aliens maintain to constitutional citizenship. The fragmentation of citizenship 
results in diverse sorts of partial citizenship identities, including the anomalous identity of the 
alien citizen.”4 Even when they lack formal citizenship, the undocumented can exercise partial 
forms of citizenship, which entail a wide range of entirely distinguishable sorts of entitlements and 
protections. They can be visualized better by making “distinctions between civil, political, social, 
and (more recently) economic conceptions and practices of citizenship.”5 Citizenship is a practice 
that implies rights and the formal status of national membership. It is possible to exercise the 
former even while lacking the latter. 
Hondagneu-Sotelo and Ruiz observe that “binary categories of legal and illegal no longer 
accurately describe, if they ever did, contemporary realities that include many ‘in-between’ 
categories” and that “modern societies of immigrant and refugee destination are complex nation-
state bureaucracies that produce a panoply of official state-sanctioned legal-status categories.”6  
Cecilia Menjívar probed deeper in theorizing the diverse categories. She coined the concept 
“liminal legality” to “blur the black-and-white distinction between legal and undocumented 
statuses and…to examine what living in this gray area may be like for immigrants.”7 This liminal 
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legality is an in-between status that affects the individual’s social networks and family, the place of 
the church in the immigrants’ lives, and the broader domain of artistic expression. Menjívar makes 
use of Victor Turner’s classic concept of liminality to capture the transitional-being of 
undocumented immigrants and “to express the temporariness of this condition, which for many 
Central Americans has extended indefinitely and has come to define their legal position.”1 But that 
does not mean that the transition is unidirectional and linear nor that it is, as in the case of Coutin 
and Sassen, a phase in the movement from undocumented to documented status, because some 
persons can at a determined moment move in a reverse direction, such as when they gain 
temporary legal status which then expires. Menjívar’s position is that “what states do through 
their immigration policies still matters a great deal.”2 
Although Menjívar has many points of agreement with De Genova and with his emphasis 
on illegalization, I situate his theses in this fourth group because his concept of liminal illegality 
places us on the same plane of complexity regarding the condition of the immigrants as 
included/excluded, and also because it rescues the artistic creations and the church participation 
of the undocumented as their means for resisting exclusion and for highlighting the role of the 
society in the receiving country.3 Among other achievements, Menjívar states that “religious 
institutions have been pivotal in easing the anxiety of these immigrants’ legal limbo.”4 Besides 
freeing us from “black-and-white distinctions” and from the conception of citizenship as an “all-or-
nothing affair,” all these theories agree in attributing to the migrant subjects a greater role in 
achieving their integration into society, although the emphasis and the empirical material differ 
considerably from one author to another. All of them refrain from presenting immigrants as inert 
pieces that can be moved indifferently about by chess players such as the economic system and its 
rich capitalists or the political system and its bureaucrats. Instead of “bare lives,” therefore, what 
we find among the undocumented are illegitimate forms of agency, authority to make decisions 
for themselves, liminal legality, and forms of citizenship that are illegitimate, partial, or informal. 
Insofar as these theories and findings highlight the actions of both migrants and the receiving 
society, and insofar as they illustrate the diverse forms of membership and exercise of rights, they 
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provide what Butler was calling for: “We need more complex ways of understanding the 
multivalence and tactics of power to understand forms of resistance, agency, and 
countermobilization that elude or stall state power.” Butler adds that if our language uses words 
like “sovereignty” and “bare life” as key terms, then “we deprive ourselves of the lexicon we need 
to understand the other networks of power to which it belongs.”1 These theories have provided an 
indispensable lexicon for understanding better the complexity of what it means to live in the U.S. 
without official authorization—and also for understanding how that country has accumulated 12 
million undocumented residents. 
The present work seeks to make a contribution to this line of responses. My presentation 
of unauthorized migration as an act of civil disobedience is more intelligible within the framework 
of this debate, precisely as a contribution that seeks to emphasize the following thesis: if the 
illegalization of migrants does not submerge us in an “all-or-nothing affair,” it is because the 
actions of the migrants, the receiving society, and the government do not allow that to happen. I 
want above all to stress the active role of the undocumented and the political significance of their 
actions. De Genova and Chomsky show how illegalization takes precedence over the existence of 
the migrants who are categorized as undocumented. That is a chronological fact. A longitudinal 
truth, however, is not an immediately pertinent truth. To mistake one for the other is a variant of 
the etymological fallacy, because it is to assume that the historical meaning of illegalization is 
necessarily equal to its actual enactments and circumstances. The present reality is that 
undocumented persons are now fully aware that their entry is prohibited. They assume that they 
will be committing a crime from the moment they decide to migrate to the United States. If the 
fact of talking about “illegal immigrants” has the effect of naturalizing that status and of making 
law seem an unchangeable, transhistorical reality that is taken for granted,2 then historicization 
which emphasizes only the relative, ephemeral character of laws makes transgression seem 
innocuous and lessens its defiant character. But it also runs the risk of forgetting that the 
immigrants’ opposition to and noncompliance with certain laws—a noncompliance that is not 
always open but is always practical—is a very effective form of contributing to the broad public 
debate and the political struggles. However, those efforts of the immigrants have not been taken 
into account, perhaps because we academicians sometimes fail to distinguish between our being 
activists and our being analysts. Such failure can be seen when the negation of the validity of a 
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principle—illegalization, for example—leads to the denial of some of the consequences of the 
principle as social facts, such as the defiance involved in unauthorized border crossings. 
Illegalization not only shapes the conditions in which some people migrate, but it is also contested 
and challenged by the immigrants. The migrants’ entry into and remaining in the country are no 
longer intrinsically legal acts on which the government arbitrarily places the external label of 
illegality. They are acts that were unauthorized at birth. That is what I am referring to when I say 
that longitudinal truth is not immediately pertinent truth: the first deals with how illegalization is 
produced, the second with migrants who become illegalized. The migrants’ challenge to 
government authority is immediately obscured when the two levels are confused and when it is 
assumed that historicizing illegalization negates the fact that the migrants are acting in a context 
in which illegalization has been naturalized. It matters not that the migrants’ unauthorized 
presence in the United States “does not involve a crime against anyone” and “stands only for a 
transgression against the sovereign authority of the nation-state”.1 The fact is that there is a 
violation of the law. If a group of activists burn the United States flag, they cannot argue, “It was 
just a flag, we did not hurt anyone”. Since the burning of the flag was a provocation, they will 
assume the gravity of their crime and will not seek to belittle it. Depoliticization impoverishes the 
understanding of reality and disempowers those who undertake political actions. In the case of 
migrants, it is understood that they act out of need and with no intention to provoke. That is why 
their defenders excuse their offense as if it were the act of a hungry person who steals a couple of 
apples from the teeming garden of Donald Trump. However, the material motivation of their 
actions should not blind us to their defiant nature or to their intrusion into the realm of politics, a 
theme I will treat more fully in the first chapter. 
The struggle to establish the principle that the unauthorized border crossings should not 
be treated as felonies is quite just, but it should be treated as just one more datum in the political 
debate about migration. It should not be considered the historical reality of illegalization make the 
act of crossing the border innocuous. I agree with De Genova’s point that the enforcement of 
migration legislation makes the “illegality” seems an objective “thing in itself.”2 However, for 
reasons of social action and the consequences and reactions it provokes (analysis among them), 
this fetish is an objective entity in itself. The tradition of studies on the theme, like Anderson’s 
works on nationalism, have shown us that we are dealing with very weighty cultural artifacts that 
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possess objectivity insofar as “they have come into historical being” and “command such profound 
emotional legitimacy”.1 Illegalization also has a historical existence and an emotional legitimacy.  
Serious consideration of the objectivity of this political-juridical artifact helps us to 
visualize the objectivity of noncompliance. If illegalization is discounted, noncompliance is made 
something banal. As I will explain in the second chapter, illegalization is an exclusionary political-
juridical construction that is linked to the fierce economic interests of the security industry. Its 
objectivity is consequently more visible and more palpable. It is also longer lasting. There are 
strong private interests molding government action and dictating who can be included and who 
must be excluded. But the interests of the security industry do not represent all the reactions of 
the business world, and not all government policies are exclusionary. The pluralist character of 
government and civil society is what makes politics possible: there are always disagreements, 
debates, opposed positions. That is why there are various kinds of membership and why the 
integration of American society is not an “all-or-nothing affair.” In this context the noncompliance 
of the migrants—their entering without permission and remaining without authorization—takes 
on political meaning because it is the first step toward dissent as the different forces take their 
positions. The support the migrants receive helps to sustain that first provocation and to make it 
snowball until it becomes dissent. The undocumented status of 12 million persons is not just the 
effect of illegalization, inadequate policies, or the contrivances of businesses. It is an expression of 
dissent. It shows that society is divided regarding its options for inclusion and the means to 
achieving it. But the ones producing that dissent are the migrants who are entering without having 
been authorized. It is among them that the originating political action is to be found. Their 
noncompliance is not a one-time action: it takes place along with other actions which day by day 
achieve inclusion, although not in its fullness. That is what I aim to explain with this work: the 
profoundly political challenge of everyday actions embedded in material life. 
I want to make it clear that I, like Coutin, consider that illicit practices are the path toward 
regular status but that those practices need to be seen as embedded in the world of material 
production and as presenting a challenge to government power. Like Menjívar, however, I am 
aware that this process is not unidirectional in individual cases and that there si no historicist 
determination that guarantees either massive or gradual regularization for the major part of the 
undocumented. Moreover, the achievements are not transferable from one generation to 
another: the struggle is never definitive. It is not a struggle to change the system. My thesis is that 
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each new generation of undocumented persons, feeling the need for inclusion, reactivates the 
struggle for the recognition of their right to have rights. All the same, the reactivation does not 
start each time from zero. The new generations are reaping some of the gains won by their 
predecessors. 
In my fieldwork and my analysis I concentrate on undocumented Central American 
immigrants. By “undocumented” I understand those immigrants who do not have a valid 
permission to remain in the United States, independently of whether they entered the country 
with the permission of the migration authorities or without it. I will use the terms 
“undocumented” and “unauthorized” interchangeably. Even though they represent two different 
situations, the law treats them equally. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) considers 
both categories to be liable to apprehension, imprisonment, and deportation. The 
“undocumented” are those who lack documents. But the diversity of situations in the United 
States means that no immigrants are totally without documents: some have driver’s licenses, 
others have tax numbers, etc. In one way or another all the persons I interviewed had 
accreditation with some government entity. The case of someone with absolutely no documents 
cannot exist because all migrants can go to the consulates of their native countries to obtain a 
passport. The “unauthorized” include a wide and varied gamut: persons who entered with a 
student or tourist visa and stayed longer than the time allowed by the visa, persons who were 
detained and are awaiting a decision regarding their migratory status, persons who entered 
without authorization but then gained a temporary permission or asylum that subsequently 
expired. In any case, the undocumented and the unauthorized are overlapping categories: both 
lack authorization to reside in the United States, and both lack valid documents to authorize their 
presence before the immigration authorities. 
By “Central Americans” I am referring exclusively to Guatemalans, Salvadorans, 
Hondurans, and Nicaraguans, the national groups of the isthmus which have the greatest presence 
in the United States. Central American are the foreign group that has grown fastest during the 
period between the last two censuses, faster even than Latinos as a whole. Latinos are responsible 
for over half of the 27.3 million population increase in the United States between 2000 and 2010. 
In contrast with a total U.S. population growth of less than 10%, Latinos increased by 43%: from 
35.3 million to 50.5 million.  Mexico contributed over two-thirds of that growth, adding 11.2 
million more Mexicans to the US population. But the relative growth of Mexicans (54%) was lower 
than the 137% relative growth of Central Americans—from 1.7 to nearly 4 million.  Nicaraguans 
  
27 
doubled their presence, from 177,684 to 348,202, and the next greatest relative growth was of 
Hondurans (191%), despite being the nationality most harassed by roundups and most filtered by 
migratory controls; they were followed by Guatemalans (180%) and Salvadorans (152%). Part of 
that growth is due to natural increase, but the most important part is due to immigration. The US 
immigrant population grew at a rate of one immigrant every 45 seconds; or put differently, 1,920 
immigrants a day and 57,600 a month.1 The major part of this growth has been of undocumented 
persons. According to official estimates, there are 11,510,000 unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. 
(34% of the total number of foreigners), of whom 6.8 million are Mexicans (58% of all immigrants 
born in Mexico), 660,000 Salvadorans (54%), 520,000 Guatemalans (63%) and 380,000 Hondurans 
(73%).2  
Even though this study is focused on Central Americans, I believe that most of my 
exposition is valid also for migrants from other places, especially for Mexicans, who are the most 
numerous nationality both among Latinos and among foreigners generally. I concentrate on the 
group of Central Americans in order to make a contribution and to set limits. I want to make a 
contribution because undocumented Central Americans in the United States are a group that has 
been very little studied. The valuable studies of De Genova are focused on Mexicans; his frequent 
mention of Central Americans are limited to the most readily available information. The still 
unsurpassed works of Susan B. Coutin3 and Cecilia Menjívar4 on Salvadorans and the just published 
work of Sussane Jonas and Néstor Rodríguez5 on Guatemalans are examples of the kind of work 
that needs to be done, and they are also the exceptions that prove the rule. In other works that 
follow thematic lines—religion, care of gardens—Central Americans make sporadic appearances, 
but they move offstage before their presence is very noticeable. I believe that it is important to 
study this group of migrants that showed the fastest growth in the last intercensal period; such 
study can provide a strategic perspective on this latest surge of migratory growth. The study of 
Central Americans as a specific group is important for four reasons: 1) there are laws and policies 
in the United States which since the ’80s have given distinctive treatment to migrants from the 
                                            
1 U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. and World Population Clocks. Downloaded on October 31, 2011, from 
http://www.census.gov/main/www/popclock.html 
2 The figures on undocumented migrants were taken from Hoefer, Michael; Nancy Rytina, and Bryan Baker, 
2012, p.5. The figures of those born abroad (11,711,103 Mexicans, 1,214,049 Salvadorans, 830,824 
Guatemalans and 522,581 Hondurans) are official figures of the US Census Bureau, 2006-2010 American 
Community Surveys (ACS), Table B05006 "Place of Birth for the Foreign-Born Population." 
3 Coutin, 2007. 
4 Menjívar, 2000. 
5 Jonas and Rodríguez, 2014. 
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region and from particular nations in the region; 2) Central Americans have developed their own 
informal networks and their own organizations; 3) in some important localities of the United 
States they are beginning exercise considerable influence, with settlement patterns that differ 
significantly from other groups that surpass them in number and antiquity, such as Mexicans, 
Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, and Cubans; and 4) some of the dynamics driving the migration reflect 
the specific politico-economic situation of the isthmus and the particular relation the United States 
has historically maintained with Central America. I concentrate on Central Americans also in order 
to set some limits. Researching figures, laws, interviews, and studies on other Latin American 
nationalities would have been a desirable endeavor, but also titanic. I believe that by 
concentrating on Central Americans I have been able to get to know a representative volume of 
the bibliography, the statistics, and most importantly, the migrants themselves. 
2. Methodological considerations concerning the fieldwork and the handling of 
information 
 
This is a theoretical work. It seeks to offer a perspective that makes visible the political nature of 
actions that are not usually considered such. This does not mean that the work is lacking an 
empirical basis. It means, rather, that it is not enough simply to use the same instruments and to 
follow a series of research protocols in order to reach similar conclusions, just as there are no 
procedures that can lead us to inescapable conclusions about the existence of alienation, 
modernity, the Protestant ethic, or the fungible nature of money. In order to see these 
phenomena we need conceptual frameworks that have been constructed both in continuity and in 
discontinuity with one or several traditions of thought. Without well defined conceptual 
frameworks those phenomena are not “visible.” Kant observed that “thoughts without content are 
empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.”1 This work attempts to create a framework that 
overcomes our blindness. But the framework by itself is not enough. Lest this theoretical work be 
empty of content, I have amassed information from diverse sources. Included is a review of the 
relevant literature, whose extent will be seen as the work develops. 
 All the empirical material that I use comes from fresh fieldwork: it was gathered during 
two and a half months of fieldwork in different cities of the United States, between February and 
April 2014 and in September 2014. The criterion I used for selecting the localities was the high 
concentration of Central Americans or, in the case of the border cities, the intensity of their transit 
                                            
1 Kant, 2000, pp.193-194. 
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through them. My sample was poor as regards Nicaraguans, a deficiency I had foreseen from the 
start and could have corrected if I had included the city of Miami. But the time I had available was 
limited, and I was familiar enough with the literature about Nicaraguans in Miami to know that 
they are a group that enjoys relatively privileged conditions; including them in the sample would 
have been like loading the dice. At the beginning of my fieldwork I spent time in Washington D.C., 
Maryland, and Virginia (Fairfax County and Prince William County), and toward the end I was in 
Los Angeles and San Francisco. Between the work in the east and the work in the west, I traveled 
from the Gulf coast to the Pacific coast along the southwestern border: Brownsville, El Paso, 
Nogales, and San Diego. Twice I had to take flights to save time, and twice I took long trips on the 
same buses that the migrants use, having as companions some undocumented persons who had 
just recently entered the country. In Fairfax County and Los Angeles I lived among undocumented 
Central Americans: in Fairfax County with immigrants from Honduras and Guatemala, in Los Angles 
with Quichés from the Guatemalan highlands. When I visited the more “exclusive” gathering 
places of migrants, such as McArthur Park, my Latino look—a reverse type of “profiling”1—
guaranteed that they would take me for an undocumented person and make me all kinds of 
offers: false documents, prayers to “la Santa Muerte,” health services, and legal advice. 
In all I conducted 105 interviews, 98 with individuals and 7 in a group. Fifty-five of the 
interviews were with NGO functionaries (promoters, directors, lawyers, religious workers), and 50 
were with immigrants, most of them undocumented. Twenty-nine interviews were not recorded, 
and 76 were, yielding a total of 79.5 hours of recordings. Among the 54 NGO personnel 
interviewed, about one-third were also immigrants, and I asked some of them questions about 
their dual role as functionaries and as immigrants. Of the 50 interviews with immigrants, 44 were 
with individuals: 33 with men and 11 with women. There is much variation in the duration and the 
quality of the interviews. All the interviews with the NGO personnel were semi-structured. The 
discussions revolved around the same themes, but they varied depending on the type of work and 
the past experience of each person. The interviews with lawyers were especially enlightening and 
provided me information on legal topics about which I had no prior knowledge. Among the 
immigrants I conducted a number of formal interviews, in which interviewer and interviewee were 
guided by a structured or semi-structured questionnaire. However, most of my interviews with 
undocumented persons were a type of “ero-epic” dialogue.2 
                                            
1 Foucault, 2012, p.174. 
2 Girtler, 2015. 
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As can be deduced from the number of quotations taken from the interviews, the cited 
material is only a small part of the whole, but all the material collected has been subjected to 
analysis. Finding himself in a similar situation, the anthropologist Nigel Barley wrote: “I 
remembered having read somewhere that gold-mining consisted of shifting three tons of rubbish 
for each ounce of gold extracted; if this was true, fieldwork had much in common with gold-
mining.”1 Obviously, 105 interviews provide a gigantic quarry to mine. Instead of saturating the 
reader with repetitions on the same theme, I have decided to make a selection of clear statements 
that give something of the “flavor” of the experience of undocumented persons. These were my 
nuggets. The criteria for my selection were these: the relevance to the theme, the representative 
nature of the experiences described, the clarity of formulation, and the granting of consent both 
before and after. All the persons consented to be interviewed, and when the interviews were 
recorded, they gave their consent to the recording. All those who are cited extensively—migrants 
and functionaries—received copies of the complete section where their words appear. They were 
able to read their own words and my interpretation of what they said. All of them confirmed their 
statements, and some expressed great satisfaction with and interest in the way I used their 
contributions. In the trial of the researcher that Duneier imagines, if they were to ask me the 
question, “Are there people or perspectives or phenomena within the sample that, when brought 
before the jury, would feel they were caricatured in the service of the ethnographer's theory or 
line of argument?”2, I hope that these interlocutors who gave their prior and posterior consent 
would be witnesses for the defense, even if possibly they do not share all my views.  
In this study no balances of any type were sought: not of genders, not of ages, not of 
occupations, not of places of residence, not of national origins. The selection of persons for 
interviewing followed the method of “chain referral sampling” or “snowballing.”3 Some 
immigrants recommended me to others. Except for the case of a soup kitchen for migrants in 
Nogales and that of the Dreamers at the University of San Francisco, my conversations with 
migrants were not arranged through formal institutions, nor were they programmed ahead of 
time. This procedure involves risks, and it has a price, but it also brings delightful surprises. When I 
arrived in Los Angeles, I had only two phone numbers of persons I didn’t know and a vague 
response to an electronic message. After just two hours I had a full agenda that kept expanding so 
that I was busy from 7am to 1am during the whole week. 
                                            
1 Barley, 2000, p.108. 
2 Duneier, 2011, p.8. 
3 Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981, pp.141-163. 
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Organizations were selected with a view to including different types: grassroots 
organizations, grasstops organizations, universities, law offices, pro bono attorneys, and churches. 
I sought out institutions that were in contact with the undocumented, independently of whether 
their vision and mission required such contact or not. I believe that this decision, at first intuitive 
and later premeditated, helped me to get a more complete panorama of the many kinds of 
support that the undocumented receive. My interaction with the organizations was usually limited 
to the interviews, but there were a few exceptions: the University of San Francisco gave me 
lodging, provided several contacts, and asked me to give a talk; a parish in El Paso gave me 
lodging; and the soup kitchen/hostel in Nogales, Sonora, hosted me for a week while I helped 
them attend to migrants who were in transit. 
Participant observation was an instrument I used to describe either positions that were 
not verbalized by the subjects or practices about which the subjects had not reflected a great deal 
or which they thought were irrelevant for a researcher. For this reason I had to devote time to 
working with the migrants, to accompanying them to the doctor’s office, and even to melding into 
the masses as one more participant in the annual independence celebration in Los Angeles, which 
starts out from Pico Union—cradle of the notorious Central American gangs, la 13 and la 18—and 
ending at McArthur Park, the principal market, meeting place, and networking hub for Central 
Americans. That celebration was perhaps the moment when my own perceptions diverged most 
from those of my interviewees: where they saw only a festive celebration, I perceived the panoply 
of negotiations that lay behind the event, and I was able to feel how power was being contested in 
that counter-theater of the dominated. Another aspect that set me apart was their assimilation to 
what I call Edison’s creed, that is, their conviction that in American society a retributive justice 
prevails that rewards effort and fierce competition. In the course of the interviews I collected 
many value judgments that immigrants made about themselves and about others that reflect how 
much they have internalized Edison’s belief. Also, much of their discourse was sprinkled with racist 
and male chauvinist comments. My aim in the section titled, “A day in the life of three Central 
American migrants,” is to give at least a little evidence of such comments.  
 That was one of the many choices I had to make in dealing with the enormous amount of 
material I had. Very often my interlocutors expounded their views with complete liberty, their 
discourse guided by nothing more than their everyday concerns. Lucien Febvre was opposed to 
the doctrine prevailing in his student days, which prohibited historians from choosing among facts. 
Choosing was seen as the negation of scientific work. Febvre claimed that all history involves 
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selection, either because happenstance destroys some facts and preserves others; or because 
documents inevitably simplify, abbreviate, or introduce emphases; or because “the historian 
creates his materials or recreates them.” The historian—and the social scientist in general—
operates like the histologist: “The essence of his work consists in creating”; therefore, “describing 
what is seen is not a big deal, but seeing what is to be described—that is what is difficult. 
Establishing the facts and then working with them.”1 Febvre immediately adds: “To elaborate a 
fact is to construct. It is to provide solutions for a problem, if you will. And if there is no problem, 
there is nothing.”2 My concern is to show that there are political actions and political actors where 
supposedly there are only compulsive acts and worker-consumers. I have used facts taken from 
everyday life but examined under a different prism, with the knowledge that concepts help us to 
view everyday actions as political deeds—and to make them such. I obtained the facts I describe 
by engaging in conceptual archeology. That is, I finally succeeded in seeing what I had to describe. 
3. Structure, logic, and some limitations of the text 
 
Analysis is one thing, the order of exposition is another. As regards the presentation, rather than 
making a selection, I have separated the facts into excluding forces and including forces. I hope 
that this division is an aid to pedagogical clarity and that it will help to move the reader little by 
little from more familiar themes and approaches (chapter two) to a less common treatment of the 
facts (chapter three). The first chapter is an elaboration of my instruments, which is placed at the 
beginning even though the instruments are designed to treat the material and the themes of 
chapter three, namely, the ways in which immigrants carry out their noncompliance in everyday 
life and the significance of those actions as political struggle. As I reviewed the literature on 
migrations and attempted to extract the nuggets from my material, I became aware that most of 
the concepts being used did not allow me to demonstrate the political character of those actions. 
It is for this reason that the first chapter engages in a little archeology of Western political 
thought, the purpose of which is trace the origins of the reductions in the political sphere that 
have historically defined labor, the actions of the dominated, and everyday material as outside the 
realm of politics. This archeological investigation was not foreseen at the start, but I judged it 
essential as I went about assembling facts that were not considered political.  
                                            
1 Febvre, 1982, p.22. 
2 Febvre, 1982, p.23. 
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After centuries of thinking with the categories of a tradition that restricts the confines of 
politics, extra effort is needed to make the political elements apparent in those places where they 
have taught us there is no politics. It is for that reason that the first chapter dedicates so much 
space to tracing the tradition back and to analyzing how and why it delimited the space for 
political actions and actors. 
At the end of the first chapter I explain why I chose the reflections on civil disobedience as 
a way of framing the noncompliance of the immigrants, and I make an attempt at producing the 
translation between two (or more) traditions of thought that Sousa wanted. I hope that I have 
succeeded in situating the contributions of Scott, Bayat, and others within a current that breaks 
with the tradition and expands the field of acts and actors that can be considered political. 
The second chapter presents the forces that reject the immigrants: the policies and the 
actors, their interests and their contradictions. I start from the most general—the policies—and 
then continue with a thematic development that includes topics of more immediate relevance: the 
importance of geopolitics in migration policies, the violence in Central America as a reason for the 
migrations and for the granting of asylum, and the banopticon and the situation on the border. 
Instead of proposing that the anti-immigrant policies and their application provide the 
macro-vision in a holistic text, I present them as a backdrop that helps us to understand the 
dimensions of the challenge faced by an undocumented person. Examination of the policies also 
serves as a counterbalance to chapters three and four. In the second chapter I tried to 
concentrated on my strong points, the aspects about which I am most knowledgeable: the history 
of Central Americans seeking refuge in the United States, and some aspects of U.S. foreign policy. 
The situation of the undocumented is a spatialized sociopolitical condition,1 and that is why so 
much of my analysis is dedicated to the border. 
The third chapter is central to the work because it is dedicated to the actions of the 
immigrants themselves and because it is the chapter for which I did the prior archeological digging 
of the first chapter. I believe that its major challenge is that of avoiding the facile tautology of 
presenting every act of the undocumented as an act of defiance and civil disobedience. I agree 
with Bayat that “the lack of a clear concept of resistance … often leads writers in this genre to 
overestimate and read too much into the acts of the agents. The result is that almost any act of 
the subjects potentially becomes one of ‘resistance.’”2 The same applies to civil disobedience, 
                                            
1 De Genova, 2005, p.215. 
2 Bayat, 2010, p.55. 
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even when it is considered as an ideal type. That is why I refer to and apply some of the findings of 
the theories of civil disobedience, always keeping in mind that they can be discarded depending 
on how we view the reality. Parodying a little Woody Allen sketch about Abraham Lincoln, I can 
say: “How long must a theory be? Long enough to reach the ground!” Concepts were a criterion 
for avoiding tautology, but they were meaningful and had that effect only when they could name 
realities. That is, they were effective only when they could point out practices of parrhesia, 
legitimization, massification of noncompliance, similarities with traditional acts of civil 
disobedience, attainment of perlocutionary effects, and the exercise of rights that express the 
efficacy of civil disobedience and proclaim de facto inclusion. 
The fourth chapter includes the forces which validate and support the immigrants’ civil 
disobedience in day-to-day life. I do not offer a history of the organizations of Central Americans in 
the United States because that is not my precise theme. However, I could not avoid expatiating a 
bit because even books on Salvadorans as significant as Susan Bibler Countin’s Nation of Emigrants 
make no mention of the Central American Resource Center (CARECEN). Also, I felt a need to show 
that the immigrants are constantly creating new, informal, autonomous institutions with agendas 
molded by their everyday needs and free of the influence of the big foundations.  
The section on the heterogeneity of state policies is professedly aimed at refuting the 
thesis that illegalization is the government’s basic position and that the immigrants encounter only 
hostile forces in the area of law enforcement and the public sector in general. It can be shown, as I 
make clear in the second chapter, that undocumented immigrants are a segment of the working 
class that is “subjected to excessive and extraordinary forms of policing [and] denied fundamental 
human rights,” as De Genova maintains.1 Nevertheless, the evidence collected does not 
corroborate the thesis that undocumented persons (not to speak of the group of Mexican 
immigrants studied by De Genova) are “consigned to an always uncertain social predicament, 
often with little or no recourse to any semblance of protection from the law.”2 Among the first to 
refute this affirmation would be the tens of thousands of lawyers who earn their living by taking 
the cases of undocumented persons in the immigration courts and other venues. They belong to 
an industry that has prospered thanks to the great complexity and the many restrictions of 
immigration legislation. They often despair that their work can succeed in such complicated 
conditions, but they manage to win cases against the ICE, the prosecutors, and abusive employers. 
                                            
1 De Genova, 2005, p.229. 
2 De Genova, 2005, p.229. 
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If the government were a monolithic entity uniformly hostile toward the immigrants and if having 
recourse to the law were useless, then their small individual battles would be lost causes, and the 
telephone directory would undergo a severe procedure of liposuction. 
As is obvious, when I present information about the opinions of Border Patrol officers or 
ex-officers, I depend exclusively on secondary sources. If I had had direct contact with those “on 
the other side,” there is no doubt that valuable elements would have been added to the analysis 
and these would have given more vitality to the exposition. But I do not believe that they would 
have persuaded me to make any substantial changes in my arguments. On the other hand, I regret 
that I did not interview any functionaries whose social work put them in contact with the 
undocumented. The section on street-level bureaucracy contains both intuition and concept, as 
Kant desired, and it also has the life that the migrants breathed into it in the interviews, but it is 
lacking the other perspective, which in this case would have been decisive. I became aware of 
these missing elements too late, only when I was reflecting on the interviews. But let the defect be 
taken as a benefit: having the Atlantic between us was an excellent disincentive, preventing me 
from adding interminable annexes to the fieldwork and enabling me to bring this work to a happy 
conclusion.  
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CHAPTER 1. POLITICAL ACTS AND THE POLITICS OF THE PEOPLE WITHOUT 
POLITICS 
 
A tradition of thought that extends far, in both time and space, has placed ordinary 
persons on the fringes. The recovery for history and for political consideration of the everyday 
activities of common people has been a long, slow process, and it is still far from being a smooth, 
well-traveled road to political analysis. The activities of plain folk are the object of study, but with 
labels such customs, moral codes, consumption, exchange, forced migration, street violence, 
superstition, or religious practice. Such labels set the activities apart from the political sphere, 
unless perhaps they are seen as the effects of other more important factors, or as purely 
dependent variables, or as activities whose effects are of interest to economists only because they 
can be distilled into an aggregate, measurable form. There is little comprehension of how those 
activities, despite their marked ambivalence, can harbor an emancipatory potential. For the 
longest time—and still, in the dominant worldview—those activities have not been considered as 
simply places where power is gestated, negotiated, and challenged.  A cinematographic vision of 
politics has become commonplace: the plot is what is done by a few protagonists (practiced 
politicians, organized groups) while the masses are extras that are slaughtered in battle; they are 
in the background, the guests who are either boisterous or quiet but in either case 
indistinguishable; they are the passersby who hurriedly move about to give a realistic touch to the 
story but whose actions hardly ever affect the turn of events. This indifference to the world of the 
everyday, which in my view forms part of what Boaventura de Sousa Santos calls the waste of 
experience fostered by the hegemony of reason, results from a choice that is made on the basis of 
the (not always explicit) demarcations that define what is to be considered the object of political 
analysis and what is thought suitable for entering into history. These demarcations are:  
 
a) a hierarchical classification of the human faculties, a classification that feminists identify –
according to Federici1- as a powerful instrument of domination that reinforces patriarchal 
power and consolidates the submission not only of women but of diverse other groups;  
b) the distribution of social labor on the basis of that categorization: there are three great 
fields—contemplation, action, labor—that have their proper specialists—intellectuals, 
politicians, workers—whence it is inferred that both thinking and properly political action 
                                            
1 Federici, 2009, p.15. 
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are beyond the competency of workers, or that, at best, workers can engage in them only 
in exceptional circumstances; 
c) the reduction of the sphere of politics to the public, as opposed to the private, realm—a 
reduction that has had the effect of restricting theoretical reflection on the emancipatory 
potential of the everyday (private) activities of the common people.  
 
The actions of common people have been disqualified on the grounds of the three reductions: 
domestic tasks are private and inferior; they are nearly automatic acts, proper to persons removed 
from the world of politics and thought; in a word, determining the inscription on a gravestone is a 
pedestrian act without public repercussion. I will call the first a “verticalist” reduction, the second 
a “reduction into watertight compartments,” and the third a “dichotomous reduction.” The object 
of this chapter will be to analyze the roots and the mechanisms of these reductions and to 
propose their dismantlement. 
With the attention being paid to the people’s habits, customs, and practices and with the 
attempts being made to impose a new order of day-to-day life (an area in which the Christian 
churches had abundant experience in the western hemisphere, exercising their dominion over the 
most recondite parts of the private sphere, such as sexual practices), there were unsystematic 
suspicions that the control and the direction of history were not being disputed solely on the fields 
of battle and in palace intrigues but also on marriage beds, in servants’ protocols, in clothing 
styles, and in eating habits—that is, in what the masses were doing every day. 
 
1. The tradition of Western political thought and the people without politics  
 
In a brief article written in 1890, Peter Kropotkin deplored the hierarchy that produces a division 
between manual labor and intellectual labor. 1 Arendt explores this theme in Karl Marx and the 
Tradition of Western Political Thought. Carrying her archeological research into the origins of 
Western political thought, Arendt found that “politics in the original Greek sense of the word 
began with the liberation from labor, and in spite of many variations [it] remained the same in this 
respect for nearly 3,000 years.” Slavery freed a certain group of men from the tedious task of 
earning their daily sustenance; it “was therefore not a part of Greek political life but the condition 
                                            
1 Kropotkin, 1890, pp.456-475. 
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of politeuein.”1 The citizens could develop a political existence by virtue of their rule over the 
slaves, whom Aristotle classified as “live tools” and “live articles of property.”2 Work was disdained 
as an activity “low in the scale of humanity”3 because physical labor was associated with a poor 
use of language; it was the labor of other gregarious animals who have no capacity for language, 
or else the labor of barbarians governed not by deliberations but by violence.4 Work was also 
associated with the lack of freedom of discourse (parrhêsia)5, a quality that slaves lacked but that 
made men into political animals who could express their ideas about what was good or bad, right 
or wrong.6 Merely being subjected to work was degrading “for the mechanic or artisan is under a 
sort of limited slavery.”7  Workers never managed “to escape the coercive necessities of biological 
life.”8 
A reading of Aristotle shows us how highly esteemed was emancipation from those 
compelling needs. A person’s distance from the constraints of coercion was indicative of the 
stratum he occupied in the hierarchic scale of social differentiation established among the 
oligarchs. Among free men a distinction was made between slaves and those who were genuinely 
free, those “who did not need to work and did not depend on another person for their living but 
had the means to devote their lives to a ‘liberal education,’ ‘free occupations,’ politics, and service 
to the community.”9 For Aristotle the contemplative life was the most perfect life. The active life, 
which was inferior to the contemplative, consisted more in business and other affairs that had 
nothing to do with the peace and calm of understanding, or indeed with its independence, for 
“contemplative virtue would also seem to need little in the way of external equipment, or less 
than does moral virtue.” 10 After all, just and generous persons need money to exercise their 
virtues, and brave persons need power. Activities dictate needs: “the greater and nobler the 
actions are, the more things would be needed.”11 Contemplation has no need of things; it requires 
no equipment. Rather, things are an impediment. Through its independence of things, 
contemplation leads to happiness. Of course, the highest category of active life was the political 
                                            
1 Arendt, 2002, p.285. 
2 Aristotle, 1959, p.15. 
3 Aristotle, 1959, p.9. 
4 Arendt, 1961, p.23. 
5 Raaflaub, 2004, p.43. 
6 Aristotle, 1959, p.11. 
7 Aristotle, 1959, p.65. 
8 Arendt, 2002, p.303. 
9 Raaflaub, 2004, p.42. 
10 Aristotle, 2011, p.226. 
11 Aristotle, 2011, p.227. 
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life, intermediate between contemplation and work. Politics was considered more dignified than 
work because it was oriented to doing things that were ends in themselves, not to making things 
that had use value alone.1 Greek thought, Arendt tells us, cast a curse on the sphere of private life, 
“whose ‘stupidity’ consisted in being exclusively dedicated to survival.”2 
 According to Arendt, the most serious problem was the abyss that immediately opened 
between thought and action and that has never since been closed.3 As a result, action “became 
meaningless, the realm of the accidental and haphazard upon which no great deeds any longer 
shed their immortal light.”4 In her view, the Roman experience gave the lie to this argument, but it 
did not prevail since Christianity adopted the Greek categories and hierarchies. Starting in the 
fourth century after Christ, free men dedicated themselves to the contemplation of eternal truths 
and the salvation of their souls. The Greek hierarchy had transcended the centuries and received 
strong backing from convention and the dominant ideology. 
 These distinctions and hierarchies reached the liberalism of the 19th century almost intact. 
We find them without substantial modifications in the three ways of life identified by Benjamin 
Constant: the common life which, with its common duties and pleasures, was a mirror of the 
active life; the intellectual life, corresponding to the contemplative life and to Aristotle’s bios 
theoretikos; and the combination of these two, uniting the disadvantages of each of them so that 
“the intellectual faculties turn into a dreaded light illuminating the plainness of common life, while 
the duties and concerns of common life weigh painfully on the intellectual faculties and suffocate 
them.”5  
The French Revolution was the time when these and other counterpoised points of view 
were disputed—with words and muskets. “Universal” suffrage proved no hindrance for keeping 
access to formal politics limited. Citizens were classified into the two great categories adopted by 
the French National Assembly in 1789: passive citizens and active citizens. The former were 
excluded from the right to vote but not from the right to own property. My concern here is to 
stress that the French Revolution was a time of extreme tension and debate which brought the 
struggle for inclusion/exclusion not only into the courtroom but onto the barricades, and it was a 
struggle whose terms were not deducible from the tradition of Western political thought. The 
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4 Arendt, 2002, p.297-298. 
5 Constant, 2008, pp.93-94. 
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three restrictions that the Western tradition had imposed on politics were called into question: 
domestic work was not degrading and did not close the door to politics; politics was everybody’s 
business; and the public/private dichotomy no longer allowed for compartments that restricted 
the sphere of politics. The debate about these restrictions, however, did not reach a consensus; it 
was a disputed terrain. It formed part of a debate in a moment of strong and lethal dissension, 
which is, as I will explain later, the essence of politics. There was no closed case then, as there was 
not in classical antiquity—and as there can never be if the topic is made political.  
2. Marxism as rupture and return to the Western tradition: the entry into 
history of those without politics 
 
When Napoleon with his cannons was fanning the winds of the French Revolution across most of 
Europe the politico-juridical conditions were created for the rupture of the restrictive aspect of 
Western tradition since it could not be harmonized with a world in which the working class could 
take part in politics without considerations of property or personal qualifications.1  The industrial 
revolution had now created the material conditions. Marx grasped this development and did 
everything possible to deepen its radical aspects. According to Arendt, “the emancipation of labor, 
both as the glorification of the laboring activity and as the political equality of the working class, 
would not have been possible if the original meaning of politics—in which a political realm 
centered around labor would have been a contradiction in terms—had not been lost.”2 Marx 
detected that the conditions had been created that made feasible the emancipation of the 
working class, and that realization distinguished him from the socialists he criticized as utopian. 
According to Arendt, the principal defect of the utopian current was not its lack of scientific 
method, as Marx believed, but “its assumption that the laboring class was an underprivileged 
group.”3 Marx did not view workers as helpless. He fiercely attacked Max Stirner for identifying the 
proletariat with impoverishment.4 He was firmly convinced that human labor had undergone a 
decisive change: it was not only the source of wealth but the destiny of all human beings since 
everyone who wished to avoid being judged a mere parasite was destined to become a worker, 
regardless of their class of origin.5 The most original and anti-traditional facet of Marxism was his 
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praise of labor and his reinterpretation of the role that was played—in act and not just in 
potency—by a social group that was proverbially despised by the tradition of Western thought: 
the workers.1 
The most radical consequence of this revolutionary position with regard to work, and the 
consequence that reveals the true extent to which Marx wanted to deepen this advance and 
dismantle the tradition, is the reasoning with which he invalidated the three restrictions of the 
political sphere with regard to labor: labor is not an inferior activity, labor does not disqualify a 
person from involvement in politics because there is no specialization in politics, and labor is not 
confined to the private sphere. This was how Arendt expressed it: “It was not the political 
emancipation of the working class, the equality for all that for the first time in history included 
menial workers, that was decisive, but rather the consequence that from now on labor as a human 
activity no longer belonged to the strictly private realm of life: it became a public political fact of 
the first order. By this I do not refer to the economic sphere of life; this sphere as a whole always 
was a matter of public concern. But this sphere is only to a very small extent the sphere of labor.”2 
Nothing qualified a person for politics more than labor. The future belonged to human beings in 
their role as animals who labor3—and by “future” is meant the protagonism between history and 
politics. 
Marx and Engels found a new formulation for the abyss which, according Arendt, opens up 
between thought and action. They attributed the abyss to the impoverishment of knowledge and 
the falsification of consciousness and political action. They held that the division in labor reached 
its clearest and most complete manifestation in the separation of physical from intellectual labor.4 
The tradition of Western thought deriving from Plato and Aristotle experienced a shocking reversal 
when Marx reassessed ordinary day-to-day affairs and made Queen Philosophy a handmaid of a 
reinstated Cinderella: “The end came with Marx's declaration that philosophy and its truth are 
located not outside the affairs of men and their common world but precisely in them, and can be 
‘realized’ only in the sphere of living together”.5 
For Marx the world of labor was at the heart of the processes of social change, and class 
struggle was the engine of history. It is for this reason that Arendt, who considered Marx “the 
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greatest of the labor philosophers,”1 asserts that he inverted the traditional hierarchy that placed 
the vita contemplativa above the vita activa when he wrote about “elevating action above 
contemplation” and about “changing the world instead of just interpreting it.”2 
The novelty of Marx was his discovery of the political protagonism exercised by the 
proletariat within the sphere of production rather than in conventional politics, and he discovered 
this by treating systematically the same materials and intuitions that others also had at their 
disposal. Marx did not create the concept of social classes or that of the proletariat. The 
superiority, if one can speak of it as such, is the superiority that derives from a group’s 
protagonism in social changes. It does not refer to the consciousness of the proletariat or to the 
qualities of the individuals who make up that variegated group; it refers rather to their position in 
the productive process (and it must be added: in the circuits of consumption, to which Marx did 
not pay enough attention even though the French Revolution featured countless confrontations 
between consumers and speculators).3 
Marx should not be accused of having inverted the hierarchy by exaggerating the role of 
the proletariat: “When socialist writers ascribe this world-historic role to the proletariat, it is not at 
all, as Critical Criticism pretends to believe, because they regard the proletarians as gods. Rather 
the contrary.”4 It was because they were so immersed in the task of satisfying their basic needs. 
Marx stressed instead that the inversion he proposed was based on the proletariat’s productive 
role and its position in the world of labor: “Not in vain does it go through the stern but steeling 
school of labour. … It is a question of what the proletariat is, and what, in accordance with this 
being, it will historically be compelled to do. Its aim and historical action is visibly and irrevocably 
foreshadowed in its own life situation as well as in the whole organisation of bourgeois society 
today.”5 
In some aspects relative to political reflection, Marx’s rupture was wasted. By saying it was 
wasted, I am not referring to insufficient exploration and exploitation of the new vein for political 
thought, namely, what dominated groups do on a day-to-day basis, given their position as a social 
group, to subvert the established order or to reinforce it. It was an opportunity lost partly because 
of the failure of Marxists to perceive the nature of the tradition with which Marx had broken and 
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so to understand the implications of that rupture, and partly because of certain lacunae and twists 
in Marxist thought itself. Marx did not penetrate sufficiently into the cultural aspects of labor and 
the fascinating world of consumption; these would have opened up for him revealing vistas of how 
the popular sectors used those platforms of domination and resistance. More serious still was 
Marx’s yielding to what we now, with hindsight, can consider a classical temptation of technocrats 
and political leaders: making concrete individuals responsible for achieving the great ends of 
humanity, as if they were the “final product of a manufacturing process, in the same way that a 
table is clearly the final product of the activities of a carpenter.”1 People can more or less 
successfully plan some of their goals, but they cannot “produce” their destiny. 
 Marx sacrificed his great discovery—the force for change and the power relations 
exercised by workers because of their place in the productive structure—to his vision of history, 
which required a visualizable goal and some visionary messiahs. This happened because Marx was 
able to challenge the tradition, but he could not do so in terms that were radically different from 
those provided by the tradition. That task was left for other thinkers who penetrated further—and 
in different directions—the breach that Marx had opened up.  
The Marxist legacy of rupture with tradition was not taken up straight away within the 
ranks of Marxism. Giving continuity to the rupture required waiting for historians with the stature 
and originality of Eric J. Hobsbawm and E.P. Thompson. In a wave of revised ideas about the role 
of the pariahs in history, Hobsbawm performed a tremendous feat by showing that the efforts of 
the Luddites was not as destructive, irrational, or ineffective as historians had thought until then.2  
What interests me most about this discovery of the entry of the pariahs into history is the 
emergence of a new way of viewing politics, another form of conceiving what is threatening and 
what constitutes subversion against power. 
 
3. Concepts for broadening the notion of political actions and political actors 
 
As the political scientist Guillermo O’Donnell observes, political analyses are generally focused on 
“questions referring to institutions, the Congress, political parties, elections, and public opinion.”3 
Such depoliticized analyses prescind from power and evince an “empiricism that is sophisticated 
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but quite hollow and ultimately conservative with respect the idea of imposing limits.”1 
Unfortunately these studies, which are the “principal or dominant currents of contemporary 
political science,” demonize or ignore the state or reduce it to a monolithic, bureaucratic 
apparatus. No mention is made of the broader complex of relations, the short-term or long-term 
exogenous factors, the state’s legal dimension and its co-constitution by diverse relations of 
power, or the actions of ordinary people who are endowed with rights and freedoms.2 This last-
mentioned dimension of politics is extremely important because “the micro-foundation of 
democracy is the citizens and not simply the voters,” as a more conventional view of politics would 
have it.3 Concentrating on the diverse interests of citizens, those beyond the narrow formalities of 
representative democracy, means working on “the dynamic frontiers of politics.”4 O’Donnell 
attributes the impoverishment of political analysis to the imposition of rigid limits on the ambit of 
politics. He maintains that “there is not and there will never be an a priori agreement or a final, 
decisive agreement about where such limits should be placed. On the contrary, the central focus 
of political struggle is where those limits are situated, how they advance, and how they often 
recede.”5 Political struggle consists partly in challenging the borders of what is considered political, 
and only a very conventional vision will reduce the sphere of politics with its actors and actions. 
For O’Donnell there is no definitive border: “I believe that this uncertainty inherent to democracy, 
this dynamic of its borders, this permanent contest to see how far the borders can be stretched, 
unsettles and angers certain simplistic mentalities that want to resolve the problem with some a 
priori equation that gives a definitive answer to these uncertainties.”6 
 French philosopher Jacques Rancière understood this and explained it clearly, going even 
further than O’Donnell in identifying the struggles for the limits of politics with the struggles for 
political inclusion/exclusion: “Tracing a line between a political sphere of citizenship and a social 
sphere ruled by private arrangements also means deciding who is able and who unable to address 
public affairs.”7 To show how decisive the dividing line is, Rancière has recourse to the same 
example O’Donnell used: the prolonged prohibition of labor unions on the grounds that politics 
should not reach that point because “the labor contract was considered a free and private 
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agreement between free worker and capitalist and therefore belonged to the sacrosanct realm of 
the private, into which the politics of the state had no reason to enter.”1 The restriction of the 
world of labor to the private realm and its exclusion from politics had its source, as we saw, in the 
Greek tradition and was rationalized by Aristotle. 
 Much time was needed to break down the frontiers of politics and to reach the point 
where the struggle of labor unions was considered an explicitly political matter. Something similar 
is happening now with regard to gender relations. In the case of labor struggles we are dealing 
with a realm that Marx had already shown to be the scene of political struggle and the object of 
analysis that was not satisfied with epiphenomena. I am going to call that realm the “world of 
labor,” a term I take from historian Eric J. Hobsbawm in order to keep my distance from the 
economism of orthodox Marxism. Accordingly, I do not speak of the economy and the mode of 
production as determining factors, and I avoid the fatalism and defeatism of those who treat the 
theme of production only for the sake of revealing the abuses committed by capital against the 
laboring masses. Hobsbawm does not give a precise definition to the “world of labor,” but the 
variegated content of the themes included under this umbrella gives some idea of its complexity 
and of the many angles from which it is possible to treat the relations of workers among 
themselves, with capital, and with the state. These include the enormous variety of the traits and 
interests of the diverse groups that make up the world of labor, the formation of class 
consciousness, the role of religious beliefs in labor dimensions, the rituals of work, the peculiar 
idiosyncrasy of each trade as an element explaining the forms it adopts, the resources employed 
by each labor group in its political activity, the pressures of the labor market, etc.2 By displaying 
this broad spectrum that includes many cultural elements, Hobsbawm demonstrates to us the 
benefits of expanding the borders of political struggle so as to include the world of work.  
 This form of understanding politics and its dynamic borders is especially important in the 
case of undocumented immigrants, whose ordinary activities appear to take place outside of 
politics but whose condition of being included/excluded places them at the heart of the political 
sphere. Rancière called the immigrant “the newcomer, whose inclusion defines the horizon of a 
'democracy to come'.”3 Rancière agrees with Arendt’s thesis that politics deals with inclusion and 
that, therefore, situations where the tensions of exclusion/inclusion come into play, as is the case 
with migrations, are clearly political matters: “Politics exists when the natural order of domination 
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is interrupted by the institution of a part of those who have no part.”1 I believe that 
undocumented migrants carry this political dynamic to an extreme because, besides being 
newcomers, they are considered illegal by the state and even suffer persecution. Moreover, they 
arouse a series of reactions in the receiving societies which expose shared and unshared values; 
they give rise to the most profound kinds of consensus and dissension. 
But there is still another reason. Rancière claims that democracy raises a fundamental 
political question, “that of the competence of the ‘incompetent’, of the capacity of anybody at all 
to judge the relations between individuals and the collectivity, present and future.”2 What 
happens, he asks, when everyone can pass judgment and express himself about what is good and 
bad, correct and incorrect? Considered from the perspective of political and juridical 
qualifications, no one is more incompetent than the undocumented with regard to having a say 
about the administration of collective affairs. They can claim neither birth nor wealth, not even a 
document that certifies their recognition by the state. Nevertheless, every day by their very 
presence they are passing judgment about their inclusion. That is why their actions—and the 
reactions they provoke—are a privileged vantage point for understanding how politics and 
democracy function. By their activities and the diverse forms in which their judgments are 
expressed, they take part in a struggle in which they obtain what they exercise because a key 
aspect of political struggle is the recognition of who has the right to speak and the extent to which 
they exercise it. For that reason it is important to know not only what forms of speech are 
legitimized as political speech, but also what times and spaces are appropriate for speaking, 
painting, singing, or acting out those forms of speech. Arendt held that the possibility of exercising 
speech is at the heart of political activity.3 The denial of people’s right to express their own 
opinions has the effect of depoliticizing subjects. The forms speech can take are quite varied. 
Those who are dominated, as well as those who dominate them, can utter speech in various 
forms: clear, occult, satirical, comical, and theatrical. All forms offer opportunities for negotiating, 
for expounding their own worldview, and for challenging hegemony.  
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3.1 Foucault: the courage to be a parrhesiast 
 
Foucault has rescued and restored the concept of parrhesia (fearless speech), which was quite 
current in the cultured world of ancient Greece from the fifth century B.C. onward.1 Euripides 
coined the neologism in the tragedy “The Phoenician Women,” in which Jocasta and Polyneices 
discourse about the political conditions of exile: “Jocasta: What is an exile’s life? Is it great 
misery?/(…) Polyneices: The worst is this: right of free speech does not exist./Jocasta: That’s a 
slave’s life—to be forbidden to speak one’s mind.”2 
The absence of parrhesia, “free speech,” is due to the fact that those who find themselves 
in a political entity of which they are not citizens are deprived of their rights and so cannot 
participate in the political arena or put any limits on power. Having or lacking parrhesia was a 
consequence of political status. By that measure, foreigners were on the same plane as slaves: 
they could not oppose the power of the rulers.3 Parrhesia was an essential characteristic of 
Athenian democracy, constituting a right and an ethical attitude of citizens. The agora was the 
place for exercising parrhesia in a democracy, and the court was the place for exercising it in a 
monarchy.4 
Foucault’s reflections on parrhesia provide good support for a broadening of the political 
sphere because they describe well the many risks and challenges involved in having something to 
say about power and discovering that such speech can be enunciated by very diverse means. For 
Foucault the essence of parrhesia is speaking frankly, without adulation, without concern for the 
rules and ornaments of rhetoric, and without the rules of philosophical demonstration. Unlike the 
rhetoricians, the parrhesiast believes in what he says and says only what he believes.5 The 
parrhesiast “is opposed also to demonstration, to the rigor of proofs.”6 
 Foucault emphasizes that the Cynics practiced parrhesia by their lives and by their 
dramatic gestures, an example of which was Peregrinus who, to show his indifference to death, 
committed suicide by setting himself on fire immediately after the Olympic games in the year 167 
A.D.7 The specific aim of the Cynical philosophers’ parrhesia was “to proclaim the truths they 
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accepted in a manner that would be accessible to everyone; they thought that their teachings had 
to consist in a very public, visible, spectacular, provocative, and sometimes scandalous way of 
life.”1 Their practice was the discourse and technique of communication. Their life was their 
means for expressing their opinions about matters that affected the community. Their life was 
their politics. This is Bayat’s view, as we will see. That is why Foucault maintains that “cynicism 
appears as this way of manifesting the truth, of practicing alethurgy, the production of truth in the 
form of life.”2  The point here is that the procedures for telling the truth are multiple. Foucault’s 
theories are the basis for an epistemological structure that makes use of the diverse ways in which 
the dominated speak their truth; this is a structure that has been developed by Scott. As we will 
see, Scott agrees with Foucault in identifying verbal and non-verbal procedures of alethurgy, but 
he also includes hidden procedures, which Foucault considers opposed to parrhesia. Hidden 
discourse and its relation with public discourse are important for understanding the political 
participation of the dominated.  
 
3.2 Scott: the weapons of the weak, the infrapolitics of hidden transcripts 
 
Anthropologist James C. Scott starts off from the fact “that most subordinate classes throughout 
most of history have rarely been afforded the luxury of open, organized, political activity.”3 Open 
rebellions, which usually have a high cost in the lives of workers and peasants, are short-lived . 
Most of the time the struggle against the system is carried on using little known paths that 
traverse the terrain of infrapolitics, which “is essentially the strategic form that the resistance of 
subjects must assume under conditions of great peril.”4 Scott also defines infrapolitics as the 
“insubordination of the powerless”5 that encompasses a “wide variety of low-profile forms of 
resistance that dare not speak in their own name.”6 Infrapolitics is quite elusive because it “is the 
silent partner of a loud form of public resistance.”7 It is therefore very difficult to determine where 
submission ends and resistance begins, “as the circumstances lead many of the poor to clothe 
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their resistance in the public language of conformity.”1 Since infrapolitics includes a large part of 
the cultural and structural support for the most visible political actions on which our attention is 
focused,2 studying it will help us to move beyond epiphenomena and to glimpse as well the more 
open and belligerent rebellions of the future.3 Researchers who fail to observe carefully what is 
happening here or who lack appropriate conceptual instruments will run the risk of inferring that 
the dominated are a political nonentity. This is the position of those who let the experience of 
everyday rebellion go to waste. Countering this wastefulness, Scott prefers to dedicate his study to 
“the prosaic but constant struggle between the peasantry and those who seek to extract labor, 
food, taxes, rents, and interest from them.”4 Their regular weapons are “foot dragging, 
dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, 
and so on.”5 Some of these forms have been frequently used by the lumpen-proletariat that Marx 
despised. Such methods of struggle require little or no coordination; they rely on implicit 
understandings and informal networks; they often take the form of individual self-help and avoid 
direct confrontation with authority. 
 As an example of earlier interest in these forms of struggle, Scott cites the focus on the 
millenarian movements, whose defiant character is recognized by Marc Bloch. Such forms of 
resistance are not like those waged against slavery by great heroes like Nat Turner or John Brown. 
They do not appear in the headlines of newspapers. Rather, they are like the millions of polyps 
that create a coral reef: “the multiple acts of peasant insubordination and evasion create political 
and economic barrier reefs of their own.”6 Their activity is rhyzomic, similar to the activity that 
Castells describes in the social movements that make use of communications media as tools.7 
Perhaps the internet has accelerated and made more evident to middle-class social strata various 
forms of rebellion that formerly relied on more rudimentary and less visible devices. Old-fashioned 
rumors and scandalous gossip nowadays parade around as Tweets. 
 For Scott class resistance “includes any act(s) by member(s) of a subordinate class that is 
or are intended either to mitigate or deny claims (for example, rents, taxes, prestige) made on that 
class by superordinate classes (for example, landlords, large farmers, the state) or to advance its 
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own claims (for example, work, land, charity, respect) vis-a-vis those superordinate classes.”1 He 
considers this definition to have the advantage of focusing on the intentions of the dominated and 
not on their achievements. He finds, however, that discerning a clear and consistent intention is 
complicated by the fact that a theft, a work slowdown, or a desertion from an army led by a 
despot can have immediate benefits that sully the purity of intention required of rebels. What is 
worse, even the fall of the czarist regime—the result not of dubious everyday resistance but of a 
famous revolution waged by identifiable protagonists—could be devalued since it resulted from 
massive desertions from the army. That is why Scott states: “there is no necessary relationship 
between the banality of the act of self-preservation and of family obligations, on the one hand, 
and the banality of the consequences of such acts, on the other.” 2  Therefore, “to ignore the self-
interested element in peasant resistance is to ignore the determinate context not only of peasant 
politics, but of most lower-class politics. 
It is precisely the fusion of self-interest and resistance that is the vital force animating the 
resistance of peasants and proletarians.”3 Nevertheless, Scott also considers the consequences to 
be problematic: strikes called to increase wages can bring about job-eliminating mechanization, 
revolutions can lead to dictatorships, etc.4  Intentions and results can serve the purpose of 
comparative analysis but not as criteria for determining what constitutes resistance. The principal 
criterion is that these are not rare and isolated acts but fit within a consistent pattern in which 
personal need and defiance of the system are intertwined: “The intrinsic nature and, in one sense, 
the ‘beauty’ of much peasant resistance is that it often confers immediate and concrete 
advantages, while at the same time denying resources to the appropriating classes, and that it 
requires little or no manifest organization. The stubbornness and force of such resistance flow 
directly from the fact that it is so firmly rooted in the shared material struggle experienced by a 
class.”5 
 As we have seen, one of the principal weapons of the weak is their discourse, but it is 
discourse that rarely allows itself to be openly insubordinate. Rather, it seeks ways to disguise 
itself so as to avoid penalization by the dominators. Scott speaks of public and hidden transcripts. 
The former are destined for onstage performance while the latter are recited backstage or 
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become public only in cryptic form. Every subordinate group has a hidden discourse that contains 
a critique of power which it speaks behind the backs of the dominators, but it also possesses a 
public discourse that expresses submission. The impact of power can be observed on a daily basis 
in acts and discourses that show deference, express subordination, and seek to gratify the 
powerful.1 
 The hidden transcripts are a constellation of discourses that put us on the track of social 
changes. I am interested in them not only for their hidden character but as a form of infrapolitics, 
that realm where everyday resistance gets expressed in ways that are not usually considered 
political. Such expressions of resistance do not always pretend to be such; they are uttered in 
everyday life, in spheres that are apparently non-public and not explicitly political. In this sense 
Scott supersedes the restrictions imposed by the tradition of Western thought on the political 
realm. Although Scott does not trace the history of the long tradition from which he is breaking, he 
has the advantage of being the first to mention explicitly his interest in exploring the infrapolitical 
realm. 
3.3 Bayat: the silent encroachment of non-movements yields “life as politics” 
 
Bayat advances the expansion of the scope of political action in four basic aspects. First, he makes 
explicit a broader conception of politics, as expressed in the title of his major work, Life as Politics. 
Politics consists of the daily acts of survival in the world of labor (migrants who work without 
authorization), in the world of consumption (squatters who appropriate lots and connect to the 
electrical system illegally), and in the gender struggles (Muslim women who do not dress as the 
imams prescribe). Without dealing with political action in the relations of production, Bayat carries 
the break with tradition to the point of reconsidering the broadening of politics. Both Bayat and 
Scott raise to the condition of political act the actions performed by persons “driven by the force 
of necessity,”2 that is, the actions that Aristotle had located on the level nearest to pure animality. 
While Scott speaks of acts done out of self-interest, Bayat claims that “these actors carry out their 
activities not as deliberate political acts; rather, they are driven by the force of necessity—the 
necessity to survive and improve life. (…) Yet these very simple and seemingly mundane practices 
tend to shift them into the realm of contentious politics.”3 
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 Second, Bayat establishes as political subjects the non-movements, which he defines as 
“collective actions of non-collective actors; they embody shared practices of large numbers of 
ordinary people whose fragmented but similar activities trigger much social change.”1 The 
inclusion of the noun “movements” indicates that non-movements are embarked on social 
change, but unlike what happens in social movements, the individuals who “participate” in non-
movements do not need to reach agreement or be guided by a program or an ideology. They are 
more flexible and fluid and produce their individual strategies.2 They do not lobby or publish flyers. 
Their main instrument is the “art of presence,” which presupposes prolonged actions.3 Non-
movements do not engage in a politics of protest but in a politics of practice. Their power rests on 
their great numbers because a practice becomes normalized and acquires legitimacy when many 
individuals do it, even if in an atomized way. The sum total of these oft-repeated acts creates 
spaces for cultivating, consolidating, and reproducing counter-power.4 The numerical force in 
repeatedly performing the same action has an impact in itself; it operates without symbolic 
intermediations “through direct actions in the very zones of exclusion.”5 Bayat is more optimistic 
than Foucault: once inserted in the mass of a non-movement, the individual achieves freedom of 
speech; in other words, the parrhesiastic subject is the mass itself, that political non-actor 
disdained by tradition and its aristocratic minions. 
 Third, the street emerges as a metaphor for the descent of politics to the domain of the 
masses; it becomes the locus of politics. Bayat insists that the street is a privileged—and 
politicized—place for expressing discontent. Public spaces are used not only passively but actively 
in a manifestation of what Bayat calls “street politics,” the alternative for those who lack 
institutional channels for communicating and making themselves heard.6 By street politics Bayat 
means “a set of conflicts and the attendant implications between a collective populace and the 
authorities, which are shaped and expressed episodically in the physical and social space of the 
‘streets’, from alleyways to the more visible street sidewalks, public parks, and public sport 
facilities.”7 We could say that parrhesiastic practice is made possible by the selection and 
appropriation of strategic venues. The street is the agora where the pariahs can have their say or, 
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as in the case of the sidewalk vendors whom Bayat uses as an example, secure immediate 
improvement in their living conditions. 
 Fourth, the direct action of the masses, their quiet encroachment, gets direct results 
instead of just making symbolic gestures of defiance. Quiet encroachment “describes the silent, 
protracted, but pervasive advancement of the ordinary people on the propertied, the powerful, or 
the public, in order to survive and improve their lives.”1 Like Scott, Bayat thinks that such action of 
the dominateds can subvert the dominant ideology that renders them second-class citizens.2 But 
he is more optimistic than Scott for he insists that non-movements succeed in determining the 
destiny of the dominated, improving their living conditions, and transforming cities.3 The poor 
provide for themselves what the state denies them: “in non-movements actors directly practice 
what they claim, despite government sanctions.”4 Separate individual actions obtain immediate 
benefits. At the same time, the impact of such actions transcends their practical, immediate, 
individual nature and makes itself felt in the social order: the more women project themselves in 
public spaces, the more besieged will be the patriarchal bastions; the more squatters invade urban 
premises, the less control the elites will have in the governance of cities. That powerful dynamic 
surpasses the sum of individual acts.5 Non-movements can reduce the state’s ability to govern by 
disregarding the instruments that the state employs: norms, rules, institutions, and relations of 
power.6 However, these achievements do not in themselves guarantee social transformation. Here 
Bayat takes a turn toward conventional politics, stating that only “the larger national movements 
have the capacity for such a transformation.”7 
 Although I think Scott has until now offered the most complete framework for orienting 
our incursions into the diffuse field of infrapolitics, I believe that Bayat makes substantial 
contributions to a more inclusive analysis of a politics of action (quiet encroachment), of actors 
(non-movements), of methods of struggle (art of presence), and of spaces (street politics). These 
conceptual tools allow us to get a better grasp of the silent advance of social changes. 
3.4 Thompson: the theater of the gentry and the plebeian counter-theater 
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The works of Thompson and Bajtin can be considered to be, avant la lettre, essential contributions 
to this exploration of the diverse manifestations of infrapolitics. They advanced two forms of 
parrhesia, theater and folklore, whose political character remained invisible. Their exceptional 
richness attained the utopia that Hobsbawn longed for: “to produce the historical equivalent of 
those Picasso portraits which are simultaneously displayed full-face and in profile.”1 I will not do 
justice to these riches here since I will limit myself to reviewing succinctly those ideas of theirs that 
complement the analytical framework of Scott. Thompson deepened the Marxist rupture with 
tradition by separating himself from prevailing Marxist thought. With his thesis that there is class 
struggle even when no class exists,2 he undertook a heterodox return to the Marxist thesis 
regarding the power of the proletariat by reason of its position in the system of productive 
relations, but he complemented it by paying unusual attention to the cultural elements—the great 
silence of Marx, Thompson thought3—which showed traces of the ideological battles. The premise 
of his approach was that it is not possible to consider relations of power and strategies of social 
change while abstracting from culture.4 
Thompson revealed that many struggles of the industrial revolution were waged as much 
about customs as about wages and working conditions, for “in the eighteenth century custom was 
the rhetoric of legitimation for almost any usage, practice, or demanded right.”5 When the culture 
of the dominated was rendered opaque to the prying eyes of the upper classes, the customs also 
became less visible; they formed part of the hidden manuscripts, and appeal was made to them 
only furtively, by acts that reinstated the custom or penalized its violation. Thompson thus 
broadened the conception of political action so that it included all acts of resistance to the order 
imposed by capitalism, including acts that demonstrated moral conscience and creative 
imagination.6 
 Such acts included “theater,” a notion that Thompson developed in Customs in Common. 
Theater served as an instrument of political control because “much in the political life of 
contemporary societies can be understood only as a contest for symbolic authority.”7 The effort to 
control draws on theatrical expression in order to regain dominion over minds: “Such hegemony 
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can be sustained by the rulers only by the constant exercise of skill, of theater and of concession.”1 
The most dramatic settings for this type of theater were the 18th-century gallows and other sites 
where criminals were subject to public punishment and even execution—but not all criminals, only 
those whose punishment could be used to exemplary effect. According to Thompson, the 
terrorizing effect that theater had on class control depended on local advertising,  which was 
provided by the crowd’s witnessing of the procession to the gallows, the subsequent gossip in 
market and workplace, and the sale of leaflets with the victim’s “last words before dying.”2 
  Thompson uses the concept of “theater” to examine the forms of political control 
employed by the dominant class in the 18th century, but he warns that “theater is an essential 
component both for political control and for protest, including rebellion.”3 The dominated also 
responded with theatrical political actions. One counter-theatrical action of the poor consisted in 
having letters published in the newspapers. Shielded by anonymity, in a sort of braid woven of 
hidden/public transcripts, the working class issued warnings, made plain their discontent, and 
reminded high officials of their obligations.4 No sooner would the powerful assert their hegemony 
with their calculated theatrical style than the dominated would establish their own presence on 
the stage through threats and acts of sedition: burning of effigies, hanging of boots in the gallows, 
illumination of windows (or breaking of those not illuminated), ballads with political double 
entendres, and other acts—part satire, part threat—replete with ritual significance. In the streets 
the people made known their approval or repudiation of officials, of laws, and of judicial verdicts. 
Using the cover of the anonymous masses, they could declare their opinions publicly in the streets 
and thus avoid the repression reserved for organized movements. With such a shield they could 
destroy machines, damage mills, and intimidate employers and contractors.5 These acts of 
sabotage, like those mentioned by Scott as an example of the weapons of the weak, were effective 
because of their theatrical effect. 
4. Civil disobedience as everyday politics and ideal type of expressing the 
struggles for inclusion 
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The concepts of Scott, Bayat, and Thompson, as well as the prisms of Marx and Hobsbawm, are 
useful tools for rescuing the political experience of the dominated from the trashcan to which they 
are consigned by a restricted conception of political actors and actions. Those concepts and prisms 
are inadequate, however, because they were conceived in geographical and historical contexts 
very different those in which the Central American migration is taking place. Their potential for 
rescuing the political speech of these actors can be exploited best if they are made concrete by 
focusing on the chronotope. 
4.1 Why civil disobedience? 
 
I chose civil disobedience for several reasons. The first has to do with the need to provide a 
category that is sociological and political but at the same time susceptible to a connection with 
juridical logic. Until now the juridical treatment of the cases of immigrants who violate U.S. laws 
has been decisive, but it unfortunately has had an individual focus. It does not matter whether the 
migrants are seeking family reunification, improvement of living conditions, or safe refuge from 
violence—or even all three. In the courts their cases are examined with some attention to context 
but with absolutely no consideration—despite its collective character—of the trait that is shared 
by millions and the very one that put them on the dock of an immigration court: the fact that they 
entered illegally and stayed without authorization. Juridical logic refuses to recognize their 
spontaneous membership in a group, preferring to see each case as an individual transgression. 
Such treatment has historically constituted a warrant for giving legal recognition to civil 
disobedience.  
 When viewed as acts of civil disobedience, we can group together these spontaneous, 
atomized behaviors, as Bayat did with his non-movements, under a juridico-political label that 
defines the type of struggle by the insertion that unifies them. And it unifies them to the point 
where they appear to be operating with a common objective. 
 My second reason for focusing on civil disobedience relates to the role it has played in the 
United States whenever legal dilemmas produced a political split: the Northerners who defied the 
Fugitive Slave Act by creating an elaborate logistical infrastructure to help fleeing slaves, the 
persistent refusal of Jehovah’s Witnesses to salute the flag, the struggle for civil rights, and the 
protests against the U.S military intervention in Vietnam.1 If we include the Boston Tea Party (the 
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original one), we find that disobedience was one of the founding acts of the republic. In the United 
States civil disobedience has been a mechanism for expressing dissent which, according to 
Rancière, is active at the core of politics and negotiation to produce a new balance of power. 
Although its validity is still debated—and nothing is better than debate to make clear its political 
value—civil disobedience has been a privileged locus of politics in the United States. Considering 
the place that the tradition has won in political life, Dworkin in the mid-‘80s argued “that 
Americans accept civil disobedience as a legitimate if informal place in the political culture of their 
community.”1 Arendt had gone further years earlier when she stated that “although the 
phenomenon of civil disobedience is today a world-wide phenomenon and even though it has 
attracted the interest of jurisprudence and political science only recently in the United States, it 
still is primarily American in origin and substance; no other country, and no other language, has 
even a word for it; and that the American republic is the only government having at least a chance 
to cope with it—not, perhaps, in accordance with the statutes, but in accordance with the spirit of 
its laws.”2 In summary, civil disobedience in the United States has developed a reputation as a 
political tradition which makes it a form of struggle—sometimes exceptional, sometimes 
ordinary—especially suited to demonstrating political behaviors. In American society it serves to 
frame “life in politics” so as to make its political aspect more evident.  
I have a third reason that complements the preceding one: civil disobedience is an 
expression of dissent about who should be included in the great national community. 
Disobedience has historically been a mechanism for expressing dissent about exclusion and for 
gaining the inclusion of those who have been left out. This is the case with migrants who enter and 
who remain without authorization. The undocumented are striving day by day to be recognized as 
members of the national community of the United States. They are the largest group seeking 
inclusion, and they have the potential for stymieing the political possibilities of the two major 
political parties. Civil disobedience has been the form of struggle used by African Americans, 
women, and gays and lesbians to achieve all the rights that belong to truly included members of a 
society. Kevin R. Johnson’s summary historical review makes it clear that the exclusion and 
deportation of racial minorities, political undesirables, poor people, delinquents, lesbians and 
gays—as well as the marginalization of women under the Immigration and Nationality Laws—do 
not correspond to the verses of Emma Lazarus’ poem, “The New Colossus,” that are inscribed at 
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the foot of the Statue of Liberty: “Give me your tire, your poor,/ Your huddled masses yearning to 
breathe free.” But it is no less true, as Johnson also states, that such treatment is inextricably 
linked to the efforts of domestic minorities “to remove the racism, political censorship, classism, 
sexism, and homophobia from the U.S. immigration laws.”1 Civil disobedience has been an 
important resource of these groups for securing civil rights and full membership in U.S. society. It 
has also been a mnemonic for making society aware of who exercises real sovereignty and whom 
the state must include in order to embody a genuinely representative collective will. The excluded 
sectors that make use of civil disobedience are in the same position with respect to the state as 
the undocumented are, and that is what creates politics according to Rancière: “It is this exclusion 
of what 'is not' that constitutes the police-principle at the core of statist practices. The essence of 
politics consists in disturbing this arrangement by supplementing it with a part of those without 
part, identified with the whole of the community. Political dispute is that which brings politics into 
being by separating it from the police, which causes it to disappear continually either by purely 
and simply denying it or by claiming political logic as its own.  
4.2 Civil disobedience as an ideal type 
 
I use the concept of civil disobedience in the same way that Bauman and Arendt use the concept 
of republic: as a concept that denotes an ideal horizon and at the same time as a phenomenon 
that has had historical embodiments. Those embodiments have been and are so diverse that, as 
we will see in the next chapter, they do not always appear to have come out of the same mold. 
The conceptual form I will use corresponds to the function of the ideal types of Weber. They are 
ideal images of an event. Weber knew that the basic principles of an exchange economy, such as 
free competition and rigorously rational behavior, help us to think in terms of a consistent system, 
though this is simply a construct, a sort of utopia at which we arrive by accentuating only certain 
elements of the reality. Its relation with empirical data is confirmed by the fact that there are 
political or socioeconomic relations which to a certain point exist in reality and whose existence 
the abstract construct helps us to discover or surmise. The role of the social scientist is to make 
the characteristics of those relations pragmatically clear and comprehensible by referring them to 
the ideal type. Weber recommends this procedure for heuristic and expositive purposes. He warns 
that the ideal type is not a hypothesis but a guide for the construction of a hypothesis. It is not a 
description of the reality but a means for disambiguating the forms in which that description is 
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expressed. The concept of a modern society based on an exchange economy or that of a medieval 
“city economy” are ideal types. They do no pretend to reflect an average of all the economic 
structures of the actually existing cities. The ideal type is formed by accentuating one or more 
points of view and by synthesizing many individual phenomena that are concrete, diffuse, more or 
less present, occasionally absent; these are organized by one-sidedly emphasizing certain 
viewpoints until a unified analytic construct is achieved. In its conceptual purity, Weber warns us, 
the mental construct (Gedankenbild) cannot be found empirically in any part of reality. In that 
sense it is a utopia. The task of historical research is to determine to what point each specific ideal 
type approaches or diverges from the reality.1 
Thompson understands social classes as a kind of ideal type, to cite a previously 
mentioned example: the working class does not have “a real existence, which can be defined 
almost mathematically— so many men who stand in a certain relation to the means of 
production”.2 It is not possible to find an “average proletarian.” But there can be no question that 
the concept was of great heuristic value, besides being a powerful political spur. Such also is the 
function that Stéphane Dufoix assigns to the concept of diaspora: “the ideal type was not a 
description of reality but a conceptual tool used to better understand it. Such a usage of 
‘diaspora,’ which is more conceptual than descriptive, makes it possible to stress a population’s 
common characteristics without giving it a global definition as a ‘true diaspora.’”3 In keeping with 
this form of objectivity, I am not seeking some “average disobedience” in the empirical behavior of 
the migrants: civil disobedience is an ideal type that I use for analytical and expositive purposes to 
reveal the aspects of the infrapolitics and the undocumented migrants’ defiance of the state in 
actions which are normally characterized in ways that divest the subjects of their political role: as 
performed, for example, simply to satisfy basic needs or in dutiful obedience to the great 
macroeconomic variables or other irresistible forces. I therefore make use of civil disobedience in 
the same sense in which Laclau uses the notion of populism: as “a certain way of construing what 
is political.”4 Just as populism breaks with the administration of the status quo that Laclau calls 
institutionalism, civil disobedience is opposed to the status quo of exclusion. In the following 
sections I will review the practices and the conceptualizations of civil disobedience, keeping in 
mind that in order to break with the status quo there is a need for “actors who were not 
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contemplated in the traditional scheme of things.”1 In the case with which I am concerned, those 
actors are the unauthorized migrants. 
4.3  Historicization of the concept of civil disobedience and its practice 
 
4.3.1  Its relation to the politics of those without politics: Henry David Thoreau and 
Mahatma Gandhi 
 
Thoreau’s exhortation to civil disobedience appears in print for the first time in May 1849, three 
years after the experience that inspired it: his confinement in the Concord prison for refusing to 
pay the tax for the electors in the talks discussing the slave status of Texas and the U.S. war with 
Mexico, which ended with the annexation of the California and New Mexico territories to the 
United States.2 Thoreau knew that his taxes were not going to make much difference in the matter 
of slavery or the war with Mexico, but his imprisonment did have great effect. The son of his friend 
Emerson intuitively interpreted that theatrical touch: “It was the act of a poet rather than a 
logician.”3 But he had made his statement, and although it was an act of individual conscience, 
Thoreau did not renounce the perlocutionary effect of his private/public action. Thus, when his 
friend Emerson came to visit him and greeted him with the words, “Henry, why are you here?”, 
Thoreau replied with another question: “Why are you not here?”4 
Thoreau sought that perlocutionary effect more explicitly in Civil disobedience (1849), 
Slavery in Massachusetts (1854), A plea for Captain John Brown (1859), After the death of John 
Brown (1859), The last days of John Brown (1860), and Life without principle (1863). In these texts 
Thoreau urged people to follow his example in order to save lives: “If a thousand men were not to 
pay their tax-bills this year, that would not be a violent and bloody measure, as it would be to pay 
them, and enable the State to commit violence and shed innocent blood. This is, in fact, the 
definition of a peaceable revolution, if any such is possible. If the tax-gatherer, or any other public 
officer, asks me, as one has done, ‘But what shall I do?’ my answer is, ‘If you really wish to do 
anything, resign your office.’”5 Obedience presupposes an obligation, and the only obligation that 
Thoreau recognized was that of doing what was right. We are human beings before we are 
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citizens. The justification for disobedience is that “It is not desirable to cultivate a respect for the 
law, so much as for the right.”1 The authority of the state is restricted by the conscience of 
individuals and the will of the governed. 
 That limit can be embodied in a minority that is opposed to the laws that the majority has 
approved. The electoral game, to which Thoreau conceded no more dignity than to a game of 
backgammon,2 usually imposes the will of the majority, but not because the majority has reason 
on its side: if the majority is permitted “to rule it is not because they are most likely to be in the 
right, nor because this seems fairest to the minority, but because they are physically the 
strongest.”3 However, a government in which all issues are decided by the majority cannot 
function justly unless it possesses mechanisms that allow individuals in the minority to manifest 
the dictates of their conscience. In Thoreau’s judgment, since government failed to provide 
channels for this to happen, “its very Constitution is the evil.” When forced in such a situation to 
collaborate with injustice, Thoreau exclaimed: “Break the law. Let your life be a counter-friction to 
stop the machine.”4 He also urged people to carry the fight to the arena of consumption, pointing 
out that readers’ subscriptions were supporting journals that were in favor of the support 
Massachusetts was providing for the fugitive slave law.5  
 Thoreau’s writings contain the essential elements for justifying civil disobedience that 
have been taken up by later theorists: the struggle against injustice, the primacy of individual 
conscience over law, the limits that must be placed on every government, and the right of 
minorities to make their petitions heard through non-compliance when legal means have been 
exhausted. At the center of his reasoning on civil disobedience is a subjectivist justification that is 
based exclusively on individual conscience. This pivot presents a weak flank: the always feasible 
situation that the conscience of another person is not bothered by that with which I cannot live. If 
civil disobedience derives its status as such and its political force from individual conscience, it is 
difficult to understand how an egalitarian would be more assisted by the law than a segregationist. 
In politics the force of numbers that Thoreau despised is decisive. The disobedient measure their 
strength in the size of the group. A reasoned argument—as just as it may be—is no more than an 
opinion when confronted with the mass of humanity. As such, Arendt would say, it is 
                                            
1 Thoreau, 1906, p.358. 
2 Thoreau, 1906, p.363. 
3 Thoreau, 1906, p.358. 
4 Thoreau, 1906, p.368. 
5 Thoreau, 1906, p.399. 
  62 
indistinguishable from other opinions, and its force is not derived from conscience but from the 
number of persons with which it is associated. That is why Arendt thought that the greatest fallacy 
in the debate over civil disobedience was the supposition that it was best exemplified by 
individuals acting subjectively.1 Political effectiveness requires collective exposition in the face of 
social pluralism. In other words, if disobedience is not embodied in a movement or a non-
movement, it is simply conscientious objection or a private, isolated case of non-compliance 
without political significance. Nevertheless, the social character of the act does not negate the fact 
that the judgment and the decision are made by an individual. 
 
A follower acclaimed and despised: Mahatma Gandhi 
Gandhi first developed his form of struggle in South Africa. When he returned to India, his 
campaigns were directed against three main impositions: the imperial monopoly of salt production 
(1930-34), India’s involvement in the Second World War (1940-41), and British domination of India 
(1942).2 The heroism with which Gandhi opposed them is widely acknowledged. Seeking a name 
for his form of struggle, he called it satyagraha (truth force), and its morally and physically 
courageous and disciplined practitioners he referred to as satyagrahi.3 But in a 1942 letter to 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Gandhi confessed how much he had profited from reading Thoreau and 
Emerson.4 In an open letter to Americans he acknowledged: “You have given me a teacher in 
Thoreau, who furnished me through his essay on the ‘Duty of Civil Disobedience’ scientific 
confirmation of what I was doing in South Africa.”5 Gandhi formulated his disobedience in terms 
that unmistakably evoke the words of Thoreau: “It is my firm belief that in the complex 
constitution under which we are living, the only safe and honourable course for a self-respecting 
man is, in the circumstances such as face me, to do what I have decided to do, that is, to submit 
without protest to the penalty of disobedience. I venture to make this statement not in any way in 
extenuation of the penalty to be awarded against me, but to show that I have disregarded the 
order served upon me not for want of respect for lawful authority, but in obedience to the higher 
law of our being, the voice of conscience.”6 
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 Despite the bold efforts of many biographers, there is a patina of skepticism about 
Gandhi´s effectiveness. The British historian Judith M. Brown passed the following judgment: “In 
retrospect it is clear that civil resistance never made British rule impossible (…).It was essentially 
the Second World War which drove the British to grant independence to the subcontinent.”1 
During Gandhi’s lifetime as well, some sectors of the left rejected the method of non-violent 
disobedience. In an explanatory letter addressed to Reverend Iorwerth Jones in April 1948, George 
Orwell noted the criticism of Gandhi’s ineffective methods: “It was always admitted in the most 
cynical way that Gandhi made it easier for the British to rule India, because his influence was 
always against taking any action that would make any difference.” And the writer added: “As to 
the conquest of England, Gandhi would certainly advise us to let the Germans rule here rather 
than fight against them—in fact he did advocate just that. And if Hitler conquered England he 
would, I imagine, try to bring into being a nationwide pacifist movement, which would prevent 
serious resistance and therefore make it easier for him to rule.”2 Orwell wrote this letter five years 
before the end of British rule of India. Seven years later and one year after Gandhi’s death, he 
repeated the same arguments, adding that for the Indian multitudes Gandhi’s calls to conversion 
were preferable to the confiscations of socialists and communists.3 Orwell ended by recognizing 
that Gandhi’s “main political objective, the peaceful ending of British rule, had after all been 
attained.”4 However, this final verdict of his did not dispel the fog of skepticism and ridicule 
contained in Orwell’s article about that “humble, naked old man, sitting on a praying-mat and 
shaking empires by sheer spiritual power.” Nor did he fail to mention that “the things that one 
associated with him—homespun cloth, ‘soul forces’ and vegetarianism—were unappealing, and 
his medievalist programme was obviously not viable in a backward, starving, overpopulated 
country.”5 
4.3.2  The contemporary development of concepts about civil disobedience 
 
Contemporary reflection on civil disobedience has centered on a) the justification of disobedience 
and its legal status in the juridico-political system; b) the features that accredit it as such, with 
fierce differences about whether it can be violent; c) its penalization, whether it applies, and 
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whether the disobedient should accept it; d) the social order on which it has an effect; and e) its 
typology. In what follows I will present the principal arguments in each of these debates. 
 
Justification of civil disobedience and its juridical status 
The main question regarding justification is whether there is a right to civil disobedience or not. 
How is it possible to admit the existence of a right to disobey laws? Legitimizing that right appears 
to be an oxymoron. The theory of civil disobedience has centered on distinguishing this type of 
noncompliance from other forms of illegal activity, such as those that occur in criminal gangs, civil 
wars, or anarchist groups. A basic division exists between those who justify disobedience by 
reason of its content and those who seek to make its justification a basic principle of the 
functioning of the political system. An exponent of the first type is the Italian philosopher 
Norberto Bobbio, who emphasized the civil character of disobedience, as something inspired by 
the duties of citizens and their right to resistance.  He was convinced that to be a good citizen, one 
should in some circumstances disobey rather than obey. For Bobbio disobedience is justified when 
it defies laws that are unjust, illegitimate (decreed without due authority), or invalid 
(unconstitutional). In the first case the law is not substantially a law, in the second case it is not a 
law in any sense, and in the third case it is not a law formally. These are situation in which juridical 
reciprocity is broken: if the legislator has the right to be obeyed, the citizen has the right to be 
governed wisely by established laws.1 Joseph Raz coincides with Bobbio: in a liberal society the 
legitimacy of civil disobedience depends on whether the motivating cause is correct. Its plausibility 
is based on the justice of the political goal. Otherwise it is not justified, because a liberal society 
offers diverse legal mechanisms for expressing dissent. There should be no need to go to the 
extreme of breaking the laws in order to demand their modification.2 
Arendt pointed out the Achilles’ heel of this justification: any given cause can find 
convinced defenders and also convinced opponents. Both can disobey: “the result is that 
conscience will stand against conscience.”3 For Arendt, it is obvious that this subjective principle 
cannot be generalized. If we place this objection within the trajectory of Arendt’s reflections, we 
will be able to see the direction in which she is moving. As with many other topics, the theme of 
disobedience is one in which Arendt was immersed by her own life experience, for she could not 
understand what had happened to the friends who during the Third Reich had helped her as a Jew. 
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As a result of this tragedy, Arendt proposed the principle of not complying with authority when it 
requires conduct that goes against one’s conscience. Responsibility and judgment are at the heart 
of disobedience. In “Some Questions in Moral Philosophy,” she postulates the same motive for 
disobedience that she rejects as a justification for civil disobedience: since the substance of each 
person is rooted in his memories and thoughts, the awareness that he has to live with himself 
imposes limits on what he allows himself to do.1 Without formulating it as such, Arendt obviously 
believes that she is dealing with two very different phenomena: one is the situation of disobeying 
an oppressive regime, such as the Third Reich, and the other is the situation where it is possible to 
change the law, such as in the civil rights struggles or the protests against the war in Vietnam 
(when the results were still uncertain). Arendt’s experience in the United States made her 
compare these two experiences. In the state of emergency imposed by the Third Reich, thinking 
ceased to be a marginal affair in political matters.2 There was no question of changing the law but 
only of preventing a criminal law from being implemented.  
In the United States the struggle was to change the laws in a context that was relatively 
favorable. Arendt starts from the fact that the law is not immutable and that the possibility of 
changing it is always available to the citizens. She knew this from her analysis but also because of 
the obligation she had, once naturalized as a U.S. citizen, to serve on a jury. As she declared in a 
letter to Jaspers, the judge told the jury: “If you don´t like the law, there is nothing you can do 
about it as a juror. You still have to decide by it. You can change the law as a citizen but not now in 
your role as juror.”3 Certainly Arendt heard in the judge’s statement the echoes of Kant’s 
distinction between the public and the private: in their private role as functionaries, they must 
obey the laws; in their public role as citizens, they can change the laws. That public role has its 
own demand, namely, that conscience be transformed into the sum of consciences. Only in this 
way can conscience have political weight because “what had been decided in foro conscientiae has 
now become part of public opinion, and although this particular group of civil disobedients may 
still claim the initial validation –their consciences- they actually rely no longer on themselves 
alone.”4 To use the language of Scott, Bayat, and Gramsci: it is only in this form that the unified 
murmurings pose a challenge to hegemony.  
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Such justification displaces the debate about civil disobedience from its content toward 
the principle that legitimizes it. Michael Walzer elaborates an interesting justification based on a 
group foundation. He bases his proposal on a theory of consent, which suggests a non-substantive, 
procedural ethics; in other words, he is not concerned with the moral content of obligations but 
with how persons acquire what they consider to be their obligations. This means focusing on what 
an individual has agreed to do, but it tells us nothing about what he should or should not have 
accepted to do.1 Using this procedural focus, Walzer makes us realize that laws make up only 
some of the rules we should observe and some of the obligations we incur. Moral obligations 
emerge from a moral biography. This means that persons determine their obligations by 
examining their own consent or various conflicting consents. Walzer states that governments 
derive "their just powers from the consent of the governed," adopting the same phrase that 
Jefferson used to rationalize the overthrowing of tyrants who governed without the consent of the 
people but that would later come to form part of an ideology compliant with the established 
order.2 If we assume that democracy is based on such consent, we are induced to obey. Walzer 
turns the argument around: we have consented to disobey the law because democratic pluralism 
allows for the formation and flourishing of groups with their own rules and values. Some of these 
groups can claim that their rules, at least on certain occasions, have greater binding force that 
some legal rules, even though they recognize the supremacy of most of the rules of the legal 
system. Although membership in some of these groups may be inherited and then reinforced by 
voluntary participation, the hereditary character can give it more force.3 These groups may be 
analogous to the state in their structures; they have constitutions and may possess very elaborate 
structures for formulating their rules. They differ from the state mainly in that they can claim 
authority over only a limited fragment of the inhabitants of a country and then over only a portion 
of their conduct. Belonging to one of these groups involves obedience to its rules with equal or 
greater force than to the laws of the great group called the state. Walzer even argues that, 
although the Constitution establishes that the federal government is legally superior to all other 
governments, there is no clause regarding the moral supremacy of the government in relation to 
non-governmental groups. The state can be described as an external limit of group action that 
sometimes overreaches its proper sphere and needs to be restricted.4 On this basis Walzer thinks 
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that each person can decide when he should disobey a law that enters into conflict with the laws 
of his particular group. 
Walzer’s theory was criticized as superficial and even absurd.1 And it is superficial and 
absurd if it is considered to be a justification, because in that case his enthusiasm for civic 
associations, which Tocqueville anticipated, reaches the extreme where associations are not just 
complementary powers counterbalancing state power; they are parallel, alternative powers. Since 
for Walzer the state is simply one group among many, the resultant procedural ethics conceding 
primacy and autonomy to different groups can be used to justify both the suicidal People’s Temple 
sect2 and the civil rights movement. In fact, the former can be more easily justified than the latter 
since its membership had a greater sense of belonging and a more sophisticated canon of beliefs. 
But Walzer’s argument makes sense and has force if it is considered to be an analysis of the 
justifications for disobedience. His argument is a theory that proposes not an ideal horizon but a 
procedural explanation. It is totally realistic in that it describes what happened and what is still 
happening in the churches that welcome migrants: since the churches are not limited by the 
borders that correspond to the nation-state, they grant primacy to the duty of welcoming their 
neighbor over the federal laws that reject that neighbor. Walzer explains an important element: 
the disobedient share a system of values, and they obey norms that they hold in higher esteem 
than they do government directives. But he assumes that the groups exist previous to their 
noncompliance. The advantage that Arendt has over Walzer is that she does not assume that the 
groups are previously constituted. Her perspective allows me to concur more with authors who do 
not submit to the rationalist paradigm. 
Another theorist who opted for a procedural justification was Habermas. As a justification 
for civil disobedience in liberal regimes, he claims to provide an argument that is not juridico-
political but juri-philosophical: the exceptional claims to legitimacy made by the rule of law, which 
requires free and voluntary acceptance of juridical order, assume that the laws are debated, 
approved, and promulgated by competent bodies. By means of this procedural legitimization the 
laws obtain positive validity and a sphere of application. What is legal becomes legitimate. The 
underlying principle here is that only those norms can be justified that express an interest 
susceptible to being generalized, that is, they are norms which in theory receive the voluntary 
                                            
1 Horowitz, 1970, p.174. 
2 Urged on by their leader, James Warren, 909 members of his sect committed collective suicide in 
November 1978, killing in the process almost 300 children. 
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approval of all those affected by them. This means that the democratic rule of law does not base 
its legitimacy on pure legality and so can demand only qualified, not unconditional obedience.  
This limitation which the rule of law places on itself is an expression of the precautions it 
takes against itself due to its recognition of the fallibility of reason and corruptibility of human 
nature. The rule of law therefore relies on mechanisms of self-correction: parliamentary 
discussion, juridical findings, strikes, plebiscites, etc. Civil disobedience is one of the mechanisms 
by which the rule of law seeks to legitimize itself. By practicing it, citizens exercise a plebiscite 
function which makes an appeal to the majority in order to correct errors and find innovative ways 
of applying the laws. Without practices of this type, the living republic loses legitimacy and the 
ability to innovate. That is what Josiah Ober pointed out when writing about the ideological 
function of Homonoia (being “of one mind”) in ancient Greece’s political system. Ober argued that 
“Homonoia was the very antithesis of freedom since perfect and long-term political consensus was 
not only impossible but dangerous. (…) If the citizenry is of a single mind, debate and discussion 
become irrelevant. But without debate, how could the Athenians be sure they had considered all 
options and selected the best policy? A politics of pure consensus could easily lead to stagnation 
and the loss of political initiative, since only simplistic or unimportant issues were likely to yield a 
complete consensus.”1 
As we saw, at the opposite extreme from Habermas is Raz, for whom there is simply no 
justification for the practice of civil disobedience in the rule of law except in cases of provable 
injustice. Raz states that civil disobedience is usually and wrongly justified on the grounds of the 
right to dissent, an idea which some theorists have used as a justification for breaking the law for 
moral or political reasons. If such a right exists, it is reasonable to assume that it should be given 
juridical recognition, but Raz believes that it should not be granted that status. 
Raz is in agreement with Bobbio who, though he considers civil disobedience to be one of 
the new political practices along with self-determination and exercise of the veto, refuses to grant 
it the status of a right because that would be meaningless: laws establish the obligation of 
obedience. General and constant obedience to law is the condition and the proof of the legitimacy 
of a political order or what Weberian language would describe as a legitimate power, one whose 
orders are obeyed as such, independently of their content.2 But that does not prevent either civil 
disobedience or the veto from being used as de facto powers: “In the case of civil disobedience, 
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for example, one could cite a situation where the number of people who refuse to comply with an 
order issued by the authorities, or for that matter a parliamentary law, is so great that it makes 
repression practically impossible.”1 Numerical force imposes itself, as Bayat points out and Arendt 
also established. That status implies that “precisely because de facto powers are involved such 
tactics require either extreme force or particularly favourable exceptional circumstances to be 
effective.”2 
The English philosopher Ronald Dworkin also opts for a procedural justification, basing it 
on reasonable doubt and the necessarily changing nature of laws. Dworkin does not base the right 
to civil disobedience on the premise that some laws are unjust. The appropriateness of civil 
disobedience does not derive from the faultiness of the laws. Such a supposition would engulf 
reflections on disobedience in an interminable discussion, one  in which every analyst would insist 
on his own opinions—favorable or unfavorable—regarding particular laws. There is no way to 
know beforehand which side is right. But that does not mean that the opinion that sides with the 
law is the correct one: Dworkin is opposed to the positivist aphorism according to which “the law 
is what the courts say it is” because “though the courts may have the last word in a particular case 
about what the law is, the last word is not for that reason alone the right word.”3 Nevertheless, 
disobedience is based on conscience because conscientious motivation is what distinguishes it 
from mere violation of the law.4 Civil disobedience is a right because independent persons with a 
sense of justice can disagree about “the substantive moral and strategic conviction in play.”5 Laws 
may be dubious, hovering between validity and non-validity. Laws change, sometimes very quickly, 
giving evidence of their relative character. Such a situation leads to reasonable doubt: it is 
permissible to disagree reasonably about different political directives and juridical principles. If a 
law endangers moral convictions—contravening, say, a principle of equality, justice, or freedom—
then it brings up constitutional questions. The law and the constitution enter into conflict. If it can 
be reasonably assumed that a law violates a constitutional principle or that it will soon lapse 
because of citizen pressure and a court ruling, then disobeying it is legitimate. What this means in 
the case of the undocumented, as we will see in the section on state heterogeneity, is that one 
modality of civil disobedience consists in finding support in state or corporate bodies that ignore 
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3 Dworkin, 1985, pp.115-116. 
4 Dworkin, 1978, p.206. 
5 Dworkin, 1985, p.106. 
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the question of migratory status and grant the same rights to the undocumented, to residents, 
and to citizens.          
Typologies of civil disobedience 
In Bobbio’s typology, civil disobedience is a form of rebellion, encompassing a broad category of 
actions that can be omissive or commissive, individual or collective, clandestine or public 
(depending on whether they are announced or not before being executed), violent or non-violent, 
aimed at changing a norm or an entire social order, passive or active (depending on whether the 
agents are opposed to a law but recognize the right of the state to punish them, or whether they 
are also opposed to the preceptive and punitive part of the law and seek to escape punishment). 
The combinations and permutations of these types are numerous. Conscientious objection to 
military service is omissive, individual, public, pacific, partial, and passive. Regicide is commissive, 
individual, clandestine, violent, total, and active. Civil disobedience is omissive, collective, public, 
pacific, not necessarily partial (Gandhi’s was a revolutionary action), and not necessarily passive 
(those fighting discrimination did not recognize the right of the state to punish them).1 According 
to Bobbio’s typology, Thoreau’s resistance does not qualify as an act of civil disobedience despite 
his appeal to the conscience of other citizens.2 Bobbio made other interesting distinctions apart 
from those mentioned. Disobedience in itself can be negative or positive depending on whether it 
involves omissive or commissive behaviors. Not obeying a law which forbids a positive action 
(doing something which others have a right to do, such as blacks sitting in a part of the bus or 
eating in restaurants reserved for whites, or demonstrators assembling despite being denied 
permission to do so) is not the same as not executing a binding law; the latter consists in an 
omission or an abstention, such as refusing to pay taxes or do military service. Likewise, not doing 
what is ordered is not the same as doing the opposite of what is ordered, for example, sitting on 
the ground when ordered to leave a public square. The different forms of civil disobedience should 
be distinguished from non-violent pressure tactics that directly attack economic interests, such as 
strikes or boycotts or the occupation of land, dwellings, or factories. Also belonging to another 
species are what Bobbio calls exemplary actions, such as a prolonged fast or self-immolation, 
which involve exercising extreme violence on oneself. Despite their differences, all these forms of 
struggle have in common the principal goal of paralyzing, neutralizing, and obstructing the 
adversary rather than vilifying or destroying him. The aim is to prevent him from attaining his 
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objectives or to make it more difficult for him to do so. In a word, they do not confront power with 
counter-power but reduce power to impotency.1 
Joseph Raz uses the term “disobedience” to describe three forms of rebellion: 
revolutionary disobedience, civil disobedience, and conscientious objection. Revolutionary 
disobedience is when the law is broken for political motives and the goal is to change the 
government or the system of government. Civil disobedience pursues changes in laws or in 
policies, or it expresses protest and dissent with respect to laws and policies. The conscientious 
objector contravenes a norm because he considers it morally wrong to obey it. This nomenclature 
is a simplified version of Bobbio’s. I find more original his distinction between civil disobedience 
which is effective (since it forms part of a plan that can directly change a law) and that which is 
expressive (since it is ineffective but is justified as an expression of protest).2 Also interesting is his 
distinction between disobedience in liberal societies and disobedience in non-liberal societies. In 
the latter there is a moral right to exercise disobedience because the state denies citizens the 
political rights that are the normal channels for settling political differences. In the former an 
exceptional political action like civil disobedience can be justified only by a just end. The 
disobedience should be exceptional because in liberal states it is an action to which there is no 
right: if the legal system provides for pluralism, then in principle there should be no need for 
dissent from the law. However, that does not mean that civil disobedience should be an extreme 
recourse. It may better—or at least less harmful—than other licit means, such as a national strike.3 
I will return to this line of reasoning in the third chapter because it is an argument conceived in a 
liberal framework that proves to be inconsistent in the case of the immigrants, who are persons 
denied their political rights by a pluralist society. 
The German theorist Theodor Ebert started out from a slightly narrower perspective than 
did Bobbio and Raz since he was concerned only with non-violent forms of rebellion. Although he 
was inspired by the American civil rights movement,4 he made some interesting distinctions that 
were not part of the U.S. theoretical tradition. Distinguishing between confrontative and 
constructive actions (I will use boldface for the latter), he defined three levels of non-violent 
campaigns: 1) bringing the issue into the public arena (protesting by demonstrations, vigils, 
petitions; presentation of alternatives, demonstrating alternatives, teach-ins); 2) legal actions 
                                            
1 Bobbio, 1991, pp.199-200. 
2 Raz, 1979, pp.264-265. 
3 Raz, 1979, pp.272-275. 
4 Grosse, 2015, pp.65-80. 
  72 
(non-cooperation in the form of strikes or consumer boycotts;1 legally innovative activities such 
as fair trade, free schools, alternative economy); and 3) illegal actions aimed at redirecting power, 
which can take the form of civil disobedience (confrontative actions that include sit-in 
demonstrations, blockades, tax resistance, strikes, and war resistance) or civil usurpation 
(constructive actions that include the sanctuary movement, pirate radio, reverse strike, 
nonviolent intervention).2 I will return to some of these distinctions in the third chapter.  
Ronald Dworkin concentrates exclusively on civil disobedience and distinguishes three 
types: integrity-based, justice-based, and policy-based. The first is the disobedience practiced by a 
person who, guided by conscience, disobeys a law that obliges him to act immorally. People 
helping fugitive slaves who called at their door and soldiers refusing to fight in unjust wars were 
faced with situations in which their personal integrity was at stake. In such cases, one cannot wait 
until the legal recourses for annulling the law are exhausted, as Raz supposes. There is a need to 
make a decision and act. This is the kind of disobedience that Arendt would like to have seen 
spread in Third Reich Germany: people judge a situation and act according to what their 
conscience dictates and not according to the law. It was this choice that Arendt explicitly 
associated with civil disobedience;3 it is the option of those who prefer to die rather than “to live 
together with murderers—themselves.”4 The second type, justice-based disobedience, is exercised 
for the purpose of opposing or reversing programs and laws that are thought to be unjust. 
Dworkin’s example is picturesque: when blacks sat next to whites in restaurants where they were 
not welcome, their integrity was not at stake. Their objective was not the dubious privilege of 
enjoying greasy hamburgers elbow to elbow with people who despised them; it was rather to 
frustrate compliance with a law that allowed an oppressive majority to discriminate against a 
minority. Finally, policy-based disobedience is exercised by those who oppose policies not because 
they are immoral or unjust but because they are stupid and dangerous, both for the majority and 
the minority. An example of this type is the opposition to the installation of U.S. missiles on 
German soil. The activists did not think that their government by making this decision was favoring 
a majority and harming a minority but rather that they were harming everybody. They were 
                                            
1 These are what Bobbio calls non-violent pressure techniques that focus directly on economic objectives.   
2 This classification is based on Eric Bachman’s translation from German into English of the “Chart of 
escalation of nonviolent actions” on page 37 of Gewaltfreier Aufstand — Alternative zum Bürgerkrieg 
(Nonviolent Rebellion — Alternatives to Civil War) by Theodor Elbert, Waldkircher Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, 
1978. War Resisters’ International, 2009, p.48. 
3 Arendt, 1972, p.63. 
4 Arendt, 2003, pp.44 and 47-48. 
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appealing not to people’s sense of justice but to their common sense.1 Dworkin admits that these 
distinctions are useful mainly for analysis and have obvious limitations since groups practicing civil 
disobedience are made up of persons with differing motivations; it is even possible for one 
individual to have various motivations, such as opposing the war in Vietnam as being both unjust 
and stupid.  
Justice-based obedience and policy-based disobedience can each be subdivided into two 
categories, persuasive or non-persuasive, depending on the strategy used. The persuasive type 
“hopes to force the majority to listen to arguments against its program, in the expectation that the 
majority will then change its mind and disapprove that program.” The persuasive type is 
equivalent to Ebert’s constructive actions. The non-persuasive type “aims not to change the 
majority’s mind, but to increase the cost of pursuing the program the majority still favors, in the 
hope that the majority will find the new cost unacceptably high.”2 When persuasive strategies do 
not work because of an unfavorable context and when non-violent non-persuasive techniques 
have the possibility of succeeding without being counterproductive, non-persuasive civil 
disobedience is justified.3 Normally persuasive disobedience is more justifiable because it does not 
violate the principle that the majority decides: it appeals to the majority not with force but with 
reasoning, seeking to change their way of thinking and to convince them with arguments.4 
It should be noted that neither Bobbio nor Ebert consider non-persuasive strategies to be 
part of civil disobedience. Bobbio allows only non-violent pressure tactics, and Ebert allows only 
confrontative actions that are legal; they differ in that Bobbio excludes from the category of civil 
disobedience some actions, such as blockades and refusal to pay taxes, while Ebert includes them. 
These are only a few of the discrepancies that exist among the different typologies. No less 
important is the disagreement about whether civil disobedience should itself be considered as a 
strategy, a technique, or a modality of rebellion (or only of resistance). The diverging views about 
the justifications and the features of civil disobedience reappear here as criteria that determine 
what actions are not civil disobedience and why they fall into another category of the forms of 
rebellion. To repeat: this way of manifesting dissent entails dissent—political struggle—about its 
very definition. Nevertheless, all the typologies help to illuminate the different aspects, nuances, 
strategies, and means of struggle of civil disobedience and other forms of rebellion. I will treat 
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some of these distinctions in an attempt to name and highlight the politically disobedient 
character of some of the actions of the undocumented. 
4.4  Performative civil disobedience as infrapolitics of resistance, quiet 
encroachment, and street politics 
 
Except for some brief comments, the abovementioned typologies do not touch on the role of the 
excluded in the exercise of disobedience. For example, the actions of the abolitionists are 
discussed but not those of the slaves even though it is obvious that the flight of the slaves was the 
prior condition of the abolitionists’ moral dilemma and that the slaves’ disobedience had 
potentially lethal consequences for the fugitive slaves and for other slaves who collaborated with 
them.1 Similarly, no mention is made of the extreme strategies the slaves used to sabotage their 
masters economically or to deprive their masters of control over them by suicide.2 These theorists 
generally use the America civil rights movement as a point of reference, but their commentaries 
on it do not give details about its various modalities and its forms of struggle.  
It is perhaps because of that bias that most of the abovementioned authors speak of 
disobedience in a negative and selective sense (not doing what is ordered) and not in a broad and 
positive sense (doing what is prohibited). As a result, some of their justifications are rather 
contrived. In an effort to simplify the difficulties presented by the justifications and to reconcile 
them, I propose to start from the acknowledgment that the excluded have a right to demand the 
same rights as the majority, to suppress the privileges monopolized by a minority, and to eliminate 
the deprivations imposed on particular groups.  This is a perspective that places the persons 
affected and the struggle against exclusion at the heart of civil disobedience. Disobedience is 
justified when exclusion exists and the action undertaken seeks to eliminate it and to provide for a 
minority the same rights that the majority possess. This implies collateral actions aimed at forcing 
inclusion and achieving a perlocutionary effect.3 
                                            
1 Flight implied the collaboration of other slaves and their subsequent punishment, according to the 
testimony of Harriet Jacobs, who in 1861 authored one of the first biographies written by African Americans. 
Jacobs, 2000, p.123. 
2 The Louisiana Insurance Company used to insure slaves according to the principal reasons for their loss: 
insurrection, elopement, suicide, and natural death. Bonnell Phillips, 2004, pos.176. 
3 This formulation eliminates scholastic discussions about what conscience dictates to different people. It 
also moves the discussion toward a criterion that is both more political and more morally defensible, at least 
in presumably liberal societies. Some of the criteria mentioned earlier seem quite plausible, but they do not 
meet the test for diversity of types of noncompliance. To take just one example: was it licit to violate the law 
of prohibition? According to the criteria of Dworkin it was indeed licit since the law was finally suppressed. 
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On the basis of this assumption, I use several criteria to distinguish between forms of civil 
disobedience. From the perspective of their objectives, we can divide acts of civil disobedience 
into reformist-permanent (those acts seeking a permanent change in some law, such as in the 
struggle for assisted suicide or legalization of marijuana), reformist-episodic (those seeking to 
change a temporally limited law or policy, as with the war in Vietnam),1 remonstrative (those 
seeking to create awareness about key aspects of the system, such as the actions of Occupy Wall 
Street), partial-revolutionary (those proposing to change at least one key aspect of the system, 
such as the length of the workday or the right to unionization), and inclusive-revolutionary, which 
is where I locate those acts aimed at gaining for a marginalized group the civil rights of an 
established group; these are acts which expand the recognition of citizenship, such as the struggle 
for civil rights or the granting of those same rights to immigrants and the granting of residency and 
citizenship to the undocumented. From the perspective of the relation between the nature of the 
protest and the content of the law, I distinguish between positive-proactive disobedience (doing 
what the law prohibits without causing further problems, such as the Israeli woman who would 
not sit behind the rows reserved for men),2 positive-obstructive (doing what the law prohibits and 
causing further problems, such as blocking traffic), and omissive (not doing what the law requires, 
such as not serving in the military or not paying taxes).  
I want to propose one additional typology that is based on the relation between means 
and ends. Besides being simple, this typology allows me to connect better with the justification of 
civil disobedience I proposed, to dialogue more effectively with some of the concepts that 
broaden the definition of political actions (Foucault, Bayat, Thompson, Scott), and to stress the 
importance of the ordinary actions the excluded perform in order to become included. I 
distinguish four ways of relating the means employed and the ends desired.  
1. The indirect-instrument relation is one in which there is no intrinsic connection between means 
and end. The acts of disobedience are disconnected from the change itself but are carried out as 
                                                                                                                                     
We can show, after the fact, that the dubious benefits of the law were rightly questioned by those who 
broke it. To understand the change in legislation, however, it is obvious that many things need to be 
considered before conceding that the violation of the law was justified, such as the crimes to which the law 
led, the economic interests involved, and the pragmatism of the legislators’ reasoning. 
1 This struggle was inspired partly by pacifist principles, but in the interest of gaining broad support, it did 
not oppose all wars. 
2 Such actions can have costs, but the costs do not derive directly from the action but from the reaction. 
When Tanya Rosenblit, considered the Rosa Parks of Israel, boarded a bus and sat in one of the front rows, 
the uproar and the arguments of the Orthodox Jews brought the bus to a halt. Lemberg, 2011. 
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means to bring about the change: blocking a street (which does not have permanent blocking of 
traffic as a goal), sitting-in in front of the White House, etc. These are examples of the illegal 
actions that Ebert groups together under the umbrella of civil disobedience. They are mechanisms 
for applying pressure to provoke change; Dworkin classifies such pressure tactics as non-
persuasive disobedience since they are aimed at increasing the cost of maintaining policies that 
the disobedient activists oppose.  
2. The direct-instrumental relation, which is a variation of the previous one, involves exerting 
pressure directly on the arena of conflict; it is applied as a way  of punishing—generally 
financially—those who hold power and refuse to change policies or even to negotiate. Examples 
are abstaining from payment of taxes to advance a cause, or striking to force management to 
grant a wage increase or to recognize the right to unionize. The best example is the bus boycott 
carried out by African Americans in Montgomery County in their struggle for civil rights. The losses 
of Montgomery City Lines, averaging 22 cents a mile or $12,000 a month, plus a decline in 
purchases of merchandise by African Americans led to the formation of a businessmen’s group 
known as the Men of Montgomery, which speeded up the negotiations. Many housewives 
contributed to the boycott by providing transport for their maids and cooks.1 
3. The symbolic relation is one in which the actions are executed as emblems, previews, or 
representations of the change desired. For example, an interracial banquet or mass would 
announce and symbolize the end of segregation. Such actions do not bring an end to segregation, 
but they anticipate it and prefigure it in a ritualized, homeopathic form. This is what Raz call 
expressive disobedience, that is, disobedience that is not effective in itself but has a persuasive 
function such as Dworkin, Rawls, and Habermas proposed. Many of the actions that Ebert 
classifies as constructive fall within this category. Symbolic disobedience can contain much that is 
theatrical, including the counter-theater of the excluded; it can also contain the alethurgical 
elements, which Bobbio calls exemplary actions though he also excludes them from civil 
disobedience. 
4. The relation is performative when the means of civil disobedience achieve the object of the 
disobedience directly and immediately. In such cases the disobedience consists in behavior that 
simply disregards legislation that excludes people. The political actors—who are mainly but not 
exclusively made up of the persons affected—behave as though the legislation they are attacking 
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has already been abolished. Their behavior makes actual something that is still only potential. I call 
this a “performative relation” by allusion to the theories of Austin as applied by Butler to the 
concept of gender. Butler speaks of gender as performative to indicate that its character is 
conditioned by what is done and what is said: the “appearance” of gender is confused with an 
inherent truth, thus obscuring the fact that the reproduction of gender is a disputed territory in 
which persons can call into question compliance with the norms that reproduce gender and 
require definitions in a binary mode. Gender is not a metaphysical substance that precedes its 
expression.1 Expressions are what expand social existence, though they do not exhaust it. If gender 
does not impose itself until there are expressions that achieve its enactment, the act of excluding 
is neutralized when those who are supposed to be excluded do not act as such, with the 
collaboration of others. This is what happens with performative disobedience: it inhibits exclusion, 
that is, it deprives it of its effectiveness. My use of the category “performative” is not restricted to 
acts of speech. The disobedience I call “performative” consists of acts that actually produce what 
they are demanding by being performed: they bring about the end by performing the means. The 
disobedience is a pronouncement, but one that consists in annulling de facto, but not de jure, the 
prohibition that weighs upon the excluded. This form of disobedience has the effect of creating a 
situation similar to the eschatological tension of the already/not yet.2 
The exclusion has been neutralized by one sector of society, but it has not been 
corroborated by law. The inclusion has legitimacy already, but it does not yet have legal validity. 
The depth reached by that “already” depends on its performative efficacy. There are many 
performative acts that fail: orders that nobody hears or obeys, promises that are addressed to 
nobody. They are acts without effects. Performative acts are effective when they bring about what 
they say and when a sum of effects derive from those acts.3 Those who practice civil disobedience 
usually seek such a perlocutionary effect because disobedience is not successful unless it shapes 
public opinion so as to oppose exclusion.  
Using Raz’s terminology, this performative efficacy can also be called effective civil 
disobedience. More precisely it is immediate-effective disobedience because, although it forms 
part of a plan to change the situation in the future, it also bring about the change ipso facto. The 
actors behave as if the change has already occurred; they adopt as customary what the law still 
defines as noncompliance. Examples would include African Americans who sit in the part of the 
                                            
1 Butler, 2010, p.147. 
2 This formulation comes from theologian Geerhardus Vos. Menn, 2013, p.34. 
3 Butler, 1997, pp.16-17. 
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bus assigned to whites, those who eat greasy hamburgers in restaurants they are not allowed to 
enter, conscientious objectors who resist recruitment, homosexual couples who have de facto 
unions, etc. This is the type of obedience that has greater performative effectiveness. The action 
stages the change that is desired. Moreover, it is perlocutionary because it requires the 
participation or contribution of others to make the change effective. 
Racial segregation on the buses of Montgomery County was subjected to two forms of civil 
disobedience, direct-instrumental and performative. The first was led by Martin Luther King, who 
used the bus boycott as his touchstone: the Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA), 
established in 1955,1 organized a complex system of donations to keep in circulation the car pools 
that replaced the buses as a means of transportation for the African Americans.2 The disobedience 
had a powerful perlocutionary effect because it called attention to segregation and the struggle to 
abolish it, it generated a spirit of solidarity, and it even provoked the self-interested reactions of 
housewives and the business sector. Performative civil disobedience is what was practiced by Rosa 
Parks on that afternoon of December 1, 1955, when, returning home after a hard day’s work and 
some Christmas shopping, she ignored the threats of the driver and refused to give up her seat to 
some white who had just got on the bus.3 
The foregoing examples were drawn from practice. Unlike the cases studied by Habermas, 
Walzer, and Arendt, the group identity in these examples did not emerge from an organizational 
program. If we can speak of any type of cohesion in such spontaneous disobedience, it is the 
cohesion that emanates from shared suffering rather than concerted principles. That is why the 
disobedience practiced by the African Americans targets the very heart of exclusion. They attack it 
directly. According to Habermas, who in this point follows Rawls, civil disobedience has a symbolic 
character and should be practiced only as a way of appealing to the reasonableness and the sense 
of justice of the majority. In many cases, according to him, the disobedience ruptured norms in a 
calculated way.4 This way of thinking forgets about Rosa Parks and many of the others who have 
disobeyed, especially those excluded persons whose disobedience consisted in appealing to the 
majority’s sense of justice by acting as if the excluding norm did not exist. Such performative civil 
disobedience was effective and not only expressive; it was not instrumental but direct since 
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breaking of law was not only a means but it embodied the very practice for which legalization was 
being sought. Moreover it was positive because it did what the law prohibited. 
The disobedience of undocumented migrants is of the same sort. It is not defensive or 
negative but positive-proactive. It consists in doing what the law prohibits: entering, remaining, 
and working where they are not allowed to do so. They are seeking and forcing inclusion, and 
since they want to avoid punishment, it is active. Just as Rosa Parks remained in her seat in 
violation of the Jim Crow laws and despite the threats of the driver, the migrants enter the United 
States and remain there in violation of the migratory laws and in defiance of their enforcement by 
the Department of Homeland Security. Their perseverance in making use of rights that are denied 
them has the overpowering effect of a non-movement and spurs diverse movements to act in 
solidarity with them. The spontaneity of their acts resembles more the improvised noncompliance 
of Rosa Parks than the planned boycott of Martin Luther King, as if these represented two 
modalities of civil disobedience: spontaneous and atomized or organized by a group, performative 
or direct-instrumental. Both can be taken as what they in fact were: two stages of the same 
struggle. The quiet encroachment of the undocumented resembles the civil disobedience that was 
practiced during the civil rights struggle in at least three important ways: 1) the state prohibits 
people and treats them unequally; 2) there is confrontation with the state; 3) there is a struggle to 
escape from a segregated political status.  
Bobbio’s categories help us to think about this kind of disobedience. Making use of his 
distinctions, we can say that performative disobedience is that which is commissive and 
commissive: it does what is permitted to others, and it tries to avoid punishment. Even more 
significant than those traits are two qualities that Bobbio attributes to civil disobedience and that 
we find most clearly in performative disobedience: rendering power impotent and then paralyzing 
the adversary. When people behave as if no exclusion existed and sway public opinion by living “as 
if” they were already legally admitted, they are practicing a non-movement strategy for 
neutralizing opponents and preventing them from achieving their objectives. There are 
opponents. Their resources, tactics, and activities will be developed at length in the following 
chapter. Those opponents are not the Republicans nor xenophobic public opinion nor white 
racism. Not even Donald Trump with his anti-Hispanic cackling presents an obstacle. The 
opponents are U.S. migratory policies (including an outdated refugee policy that fails to recognize 
the impact of geopolitics, the war industry, and the U.S. drug market on the Central American 
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countries), and the industrial complexes that profit richly from the militarization of the border and 




CHAPTER 2. THE STATE AND THE IMMIGRATION POLICIES 
 
Of the almost 52 million Latinos living in the United States, 2 million were born in El Salvador or 
can trace their origins to Salvadoran ancestors (in 3rd place among Latinos), 1.2 million are 
Guatemalans (in 6th place), 702,000 are Hondurans (in 9th place)1, and 395,000 are Nicaraguans.2 
This accumulation has been the product of a prolonged quiet encroachment which has had to face 
migratory policies shaped by the geopolitical agenda, swerves and ambivalences in asylum 
concessions, a booming obsession over national security intersecting with the interests of the 
great capital invested on the security industry, and the predicaments of party politics. This is part 
of the background – the adverse side – in which undocumented migration occurs. Through its 
recount I want to show how the illegalization described by De Genova and Chomsky spells out, and 
why racial discrimination is not enough to explain illegalization, even though it is an element 
without which it cannot be explained.  
 The treatment of these policies and actors adverse to migration is thematic and not 
chronological because I consider that in this way I can make a more comprehensible discussion 
and also offer a clearer indication of which are my specific contributions to the knowledge about 
the constrictions suffered by Central American migrants. I begin with the policies that explicitly 
target Central Americans, touching on their well-known connection to geopolitical interests. My 
contribution here consists in underscoring this connection, and its results, by contrasting policies 
directed to Nicaraguans with those directed to the rest of Central Americans (Salvadorans, 
Guatemalans and Hondurans). Afterwards, I turn to the most burning issue in current migration: 
the massive arrival of unaccompanied Central American children, which has taken place during the 
last six years. After playing down some of the activists’ assumptions, I historicize the topic of 
refuge, asylum and refuge quotas in the United States in comparison to other countries’, and 
above all, the violence in the Central American isthmus, which has increased migration. My 
contribution is the historization and contextualization of the arrival of new refugees: the 
connections of the current violence with American imperial geopolitics and arms and drugs 
markets. Neither the texts that I quote below, nor the most recent publications3 establish this 
connection. Hence, activists are losing the opportunity of making the vindicatory claim proposed 
                                            
1 López et al., 2013, p.3. 
2 Brown and Patten, 2013, p.1. 
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by Bosniak so that immigrants are presented as “victims rather than malefactors.”1 Bosniak’s 
argument, which includes all undocumented and is based on their contributions to American 
society, applies with even greater force to the specific group of victims of violence and is based on 
what the United States has done and still does in their countries of origin.  
 In the section about the border I offer a vivid image of what policies of expulsion mean in 
the setting where they are applied with greater roughness. I have applied the most recent 
theorization about “irregular mobility”, “enlarged borderzones” and surveillance, perspectives 
that I have complemented with my own explanation for the Border Patrol’s poor results, a topic 
that needs further exploration judging by insufficient explanations and gaps I identified. Finally, I 
address the Gordian knot of the links between migratory policies and party politics: who can take 
hold of – and who is afraid of – the Latin vote. I consider this as the source of the main obstacles in 
the concession of a general migratory amnesty, and a topic that the literature on the 
undocumented has overlooked. The undocumented are exposed, day to day, to the decisions of all 
these actors, to their interests and to the application of the policies here described. But these are 
not the central themes of my thesis. I have given them a relatively detailed treatment because 
they are the background without which one cannot understand – nor perceive the dimensions of – 
the challenge of undocumented migration. By presenting in this chapter the constraints 
immigrants have to deal with, I aim to facilitate a better appraisal of their achievements, to be 
presented in the following chapter: the overcoming of the excluding forces during the 
undocumented crossing and in their day to day. 
1. Geopolitics and immigration policies toward Central Americans  
 
1.1 The intersection of foreign policy and asylum policy 
 
I’ll concentrate on certain socio-demographic features and, above all, migratory status and its 
causal factors and consequences, a field we could call “the juridical conditions of migration,” 
because it’s the legal area that has supported the oscillating but—in recent years—unstoppable 
tendency to outlaw migration, as affirmed by Daniel Kanstroom with overwhelming 
historiographic evidence in his Deportation nation: Outsiders in American history (2007)2 and 
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Nicholas De Genova in Working the boundaries: Race, space and “illegality” in Mexican Chicago 
(2005).1 The cumulative amounts for each Central American nationality, which I mentioned at the 
beginning, are the result of unequal policies. I will contrast them in order to show some features 
of American migratory politics, mainly the potent influence of geopolitical strategies. The first 
divergence to be emphasized is that in the early 1980s Nicaraguan migration to the United States 
was largely by the upper and middle classes, which expanded with members of the working class 
at the end of that decade it.  Salvadoran and Guatemalan migration, in contrast, began with poor 
refugees. Moreoever, the first three waves of those Nicaraguan immigrants benefited from anti-
Castro Cubans lobbying their Republican politician friends as an expression of solidarity toward 
those with whom they felt ideological affinity as opponents of the Sandinista regime.2  This was a 
pristine example of what Susan Gzesh, from the University of Chicago, called the intersection of 
foreign policy and asylum policy3, which, in turn, is an example of how realpolitik conditions the 
various branches of governmental policy and how, as Dutch sociologist Saskia Sassen explains, 
“…international migrations are a function of larger geopolitical and transnational economic 
dynamics.”4 
 As a corollary, although migration policy has rarely been explicitly recognized as a 
component of US foreign policy, imperialism’s foreign aid and military ventures have had a wide-
ranging impact on migration.5 The policy of welcoming Nicaraguan migrants was a domestic 
complement to the foreign policy of providing technical assistance and financial support to the 
armed counterrevolution actively undertaken by the Reagan administration in Nicaragua within 
the framework of the Cold War’s death throes. This geopolitical opportunity harvested beneficial 
conditions for the Nicaraguan immigrants with effects we can still trace today.  We see the 
importance of a regularized initial migratory wave as a basis for future migrations in the fact that 
70% of Nicaraguans who obtained permanent residency in 2012 did so by claiming immediate 
family ties with previously nationalized Nicaraguans.  That step towards permanent residency was 
only used by 59% of Hondurans, 45% of Salvadorans and 43% of Guatemalans.6 This long 
protective shadow of Nicaraguan migrations from the eighties has also had other visible impacts.  
                                            
1 De Genova, 2005. 
2 Portes and Stepick, 1993. 
3 Gzesh, 2006. 
4 Sassen, 1995, pp.66-67. 
5 Sassen, 1995, p.73. 
6 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, Office Statistics, Table 10: 
Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by broad class of admission and region and country of 
birth: fiscal year 2012. 
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For example, 20% of Nicaraguans in the United States aged 25 and older have a university degree, 
compared with 7% of Salvadorans and Guatemalans and 8% of Hondurans1; and 62% of 
Nicaraguans aged five and older speak fluent English, compared to 48% of Salvadorans, 47% of 
Hondurans and 43% of Guatemalans.2 
 Although the Nicaraguans’ favorable situation in these indicators is partly due to their 
mostly urban and middle or upper class origins, Nicaraguans have tended to be less subjected to 
deportations and more likely to be granted permanent residence and citizenship, as the figures in 
the table eloquently show. There are two ways to demonstrate this relative privilege in 
proportional terms.  The first is to expand the number of deported Nicaraguans in line with that of 
each of the other Central American nationalities’ residents.  Applying a simple rule of three and 
taking into account the proportional number from each country living in the United States: 1,383 
deported Nicaraguans in 2013 would be equivalent to 4,201 Guatemalans, 2,457 Hondurans and 
7,000 Salvadorans being deported.  But these numbers are in sharp contrast with the 47,769 
Guatemalans, 37,049 Hondurans and 21,602 Salvadorans who actually were deported in 2013.3 
This indicator’s greatest explanatory weakness is that it doesn’t adjust for the dimensions of the 
current flow, as it is based on an aggregate over time that doesn’t necessarily coincide with 
today’s influx of migrants.  Nor does it take into account any other immigrant policy apart from 
deportation, despite a legal environment where “illegal” and its complementary antithesis 
“regularized” are at play in the granting of residence and citizenship, and in the temporary 
protection and temporary workers programs, refugee and asylum-seeker quotas, etc. The 
combination of these two limitations leaves this indicator based on a figure (the total of those 
currently living in the US) that is the result of policies, not a reflection of flow: if there are only 
702,000 Hondurans in the US, it doesn’t mean that the flow of Hondurans has been just 35% of 
the flow of Salvadorans.  The dimensions of the aggregate reflect a combination of factors: the size 
and longevity of its flow as well as selection and rejection policies.  But even with these 
precautions, this indicator provides us some interesting pointers.  There’s a clear disparity in the 
yardstick by which Nicaraguans and the other Central Americans are measured. 
 A second method of calculation, which attempts to overcome these weaknesses, is to 
compare the numbers of Central Americans who have been granted permanent residence with the 
number of deportees.  This calculation can be complicated through the inclusion of those receiving 
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temporary protection status, temporary worker programs, naturalizations, etc., but the contrast 
between the numbers of deportees and those receiving permanent residence is enough to give an 
idea of how the migration policy filter is treating each nationality at any given time. This 
comparison is preferable because it measures the two extremes of the anti-migrant mood: the 
narrowing of acceptance (relative decline in residents) and the expansion of rejection (increase in 
deportees).  And it has the advantage of sidestepping the thorny, hard-to-resolve issue of 
measuring the volume of migration flows, assuming that both positive and negative contact with 
migration authorities is proportional to the volume of migrants: the greater the flow, the more 
migrants in contact with migration authorities, both to regularize their status and for deportation. 
Admittedly this contrast is impossible to measure “at a given moment.”  Deportations are dealt 
with by only relatively expeditious processes, which could take a few days, months or even more 
than a year.  The latter was the case with 3% of those detained by US Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) in 2009.  Including the days before and after the deportation order, the whole 
process took 114 days on average in 2009.1 On the other hand, the process of obtaining 
permanent residency often lasts several years and varies depending on the applicants’ virtues and 
defects: the way they enter, family ties with US citizens or residents, their work situation, their 
interests as an investor and their relationship with different US government bodies (especially the 
Army) and other background information.2 Taking that time gap into account, my indicator 
contrasts the quotient of residencies granted in 1999 and deportations in 2002 with the quotient 
of deportations in 2013 and residencies issued in 2010.  The results are reflected in this table, with 
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From 1999 to 2002, 1.2 Hondurans obtained residence for every 1 deported.  From 2010 
to 2013, the situation was reversed in which the implementation of migration policies resulted in 
5.8 Hondurans deported for every 1 granted residence.  At the other extreme are the Nicaraguans, 
who obtained 39 residences for every deportation in the first period. Their numbers never “went 
into the red” in the second period but they did drop to 2.5 residencies obtained for every 
deportation.  This is the only nationality where the last column of the table continues to represent 
the number of residencies granted for every deportation.  For their regional neighbors to the 
north, that column records deportations for every residency. Although this rate is quite imprecise 
and may seem an exceedingly defective reflection of the effects of migration policies (among 
other reasons because of the elastic time gaps explained above), it is consistent with figures from 
the Pew Hispanic Center based on the 2011 American Community Survey’s tables: 53% of 
immigrants with Nicaraguan origins have US citizenship, a rate placing them far above Salvadorans 
(29%), Guatemalans (23%) and Hondurans (22%).1 Consequently, as there’s a correlation, albeit 
surely ambiguous, between migration status and household income, it also needs to be looked at.  
The average annual income per household among Nicaraguans in the United States is $46,700.  
Although it doesn’t greatly exceed the $40,000 of Salvadorans, it leaves the Guatemalan $36,400 
and Honduran $31,000 in the dust, and is close to the national average of $50,000.2 The poverty 
rate among Nicaraguans is 18%, over 10 points below Guatemalans (29%) and Salvadorans (33%).3  
Finally, while 31% of Nicaraguans say they don’t have social security, 46% of Hondurans and 
Guatemalans say they don’t.4 
The roots of these double standards must be unearthed from the thorny ground of the 
eighties, which was fertilized by Cold War geopolitics.  As with the Afghanis and Iraqis today, 
Nicaraguans in the eighties benefited from adhering to the Republican government’s anti-
communist creed.  The Salvadorans and Guatemalans who began to arrive as refugees weren’t as 
well received because the Reagan administration reckoned, rightly so, that most of them didn’t 
                                            
1 Brown and Patten, 2013, a2013, b2013, c2013. 
2 López et al., 2013, p.10. 
3 López et al., 2013, p.10. 
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share its belief.  Furthermore, admitting as citizens the refugees from countries whose 
governments were receiving US military and economic support would have been a tacit admission 
that the Reagan administration had established alliances with human rights violators. In Nations of 
Emigrants: Shifting boundaries of citizenship in El Salvador and the United States, the much 
published socio-cultural anthropologist, Susan Bibler Coutin, points out: “The State Department, 
which was required to weigh in on asylum cases, routinely advised INS [Immigration and 
Naturalization Service] district directors to deny Salvadorans and Guatemalans asylum cases. 
These recommendations were generally followed.”1 
As with migrations by other Latin Americans, Central American migrations were, as 
investigative journalist Juan González noted so well in Harvest of Empire: A history of Latinos in 
America2, the harvest of an Empire’s major intervention in the economic, political and military of 
the Central American countries’ affairs, in which the migration policies were responsible for 
separating the anti-Sandinista wheat from the revolutionary chaff.  Salvadorans, lacking sponsors, 
hardly obtained 2-3% approval rates from their asylum applications.3  Guatemalans were even a 
percentage point lower.  Nicaraguans, on the other hand, were rewarded with high approval rates, 
reaching a peak of 84% in 1987. A State Department spokesperson backed this prerogative by 
stating: “The Sandinistas, however, have developed Nicaragua’s legal system, mass organizations 
and armed forces into instruments of repression.  The State Security Directorate in the Ministry of 
Interior has institutionalized human rights abuse with the national police system and the security 
prisons.”  These substantial approval rates were reduced to a meager 19% in 1990, as soon as 
government officials noticed that the new applicants were “only” fleeing economic conditions or 
seeking family reunification.4 In fact, the attitude was modified by the Sandinistas’ electoral defeat 
and the change in the Nicaraguan government’s political-ideological model. 
1.2 The three migration models and the consequences of going from one model 
to another 
 
Migration expert and professor at Georgetown, Susan F. Martin, states in A Nation of Immigrants 
that the United States was populated during British colonization using three different migration 
models that persist right up to today.  In the Virginia colony immigration was equivalent to the 
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arrival of workers, who had few recognized rights.  Massachusetts received with open arms those 
who shared the same religious vision as the founders but excluded all those whose beliefs 
challenged the prevailing orthodoxy.  Pennsylvania, in contrast, had a high regard for pluralism, a 
trait that made it the most diverse colony with respect to religion, language and culture.1   US 
migration policies in the eighties followed a secular version of the migration selection model 
applied in Massachusetts.  It was Reagan’s sieve, which strained out rebels and welcomed fugitives 
from communist regimes. Besides the contrast between nationalities, recent figures also show a 
marked descent from the pedestal on which migration policies had earlier placed Nicaraguans and 
a deteriorated situation for all Central Americans.  Nicaraguan deportations went from 468 in 2002 
to 1,383 in 2013.  In the same period they made an Olympic leap from 5,396 to 47,769 for 
Guatemalans, from 4,946 to 37,049 for Hondurans and from 4,066 to 21,602 for Salvadorans.  In 
total, deportations from these Central Americans countries went from 14,876 to 107,803.2 And 
those figures aren’t about a greater flow producing more deportations.  With more migrants, 
proportionally fewer residence applications were successful, falling from 56,271 to 38,667.  At 
each end of the funnel, migration policies exacerbated its dominant traits: narrower to enter and 
wider to expel. 
The decline of the “Massachusetts model” didn’t clear the way for a more balanced model 
with policies less welcoming to Nicaraguans and less antagonistic to Salvadorans, Guatemalans 
and Hondurans.  Rather it was replaced by the “Virginia model,” that of workers with very few 
rights, applied with indiscriminate severity. Nicaraguans stopped being pampered by migration 
policies.  Despite what the figures indicate at first glance, they are now as hard hit as the region’s 
other nationalities. The positive indicator of 2.5 residents for every deportee only expresses 
inertial movement: a relatively high volume of legal migration has been maintained through family 
reunification based on a large group of previously established, authorized migrants.  Among all 
admission categories, authorized migrants’ family members represented about 66% of those 
admitted as permanent residents for all nationalities in the broad span between 2002 and 2012.3 
This means that today’s migrants are reaping the fruits sown by previous migrations.  That’s why 
Hondurans seem to be the most affected by deportations and have less access to residence. Unlike 
Nicaraguans, Guatemalans and Salvadorans, Hondurans weren’t included in the Nicaraguan 
Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997, better known as the NACARA law.  Nor were 
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they included in the ABC law, so called because it derived from American Baptist Churches v. 
Thornburgh, the suit the Baptist Churches won in 1990 against the US attorney general and the 
INS director for violating national and international laws by denying asylum to Salvadorans and 
Guatemalans who arrived in the US fleeing political repression in the eighties.1 The ABC ruling ipso 
facto stopped deportation of these nationalities, benefiting those who hadn’t been included in the 
amnesty known as the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986.  It covered some 
190,000 Salvadorans and 50,000 Guatemalans.2 ABC and NACARA were forms of amnesty, 
belligerent regularization processes that between 1990 and 2000 officially reduced the number of 
undocumented Nicaraguans from 50,000 to 21,000 and of Salvadorans from 298,000 to 189,000.  
The arrival of new migrants, however, increased the net number of undocumented Guatemalans 
from 118,000 to 144,000 in that same time period, while the number of undocumented 
Hondurans, excluded from these initiatives, jumped from 42,000 to 138,000.3 
We can hypothesize from these figures that the policies are no longer favoring 
Nicaraguans, even in an attenuated way, are moderately affecting Salvadorans and Guatemalans 
and hitting Hondurans the hardest.  While some deportations may be proportional to the flow and 
have some chance of regularization depending on the situation each nationality’s migrants have 
accumulated over time, the United States, simply put, didn’t want to pay, in migration legislation, 
for the services Honduras provided as a military base during the eighties. As the operational base 
and R&R area for US soldiers and armed anti-Sandinista counterrevolutionaries, Honduras didn’t 
figure as a war zone.  Today, its migrants are at a relative disadvantage as the residue of 
geopolitical-migratory history.  Certain nationalities are less affected due to favorable remnants: 
established migrants on which family reunification can be built, greater familiarity with 
bureaucratic procedures and greater networks to communicate this knowledge.  Countering 
disproportionate faith in public policies, it is due far less than assumed to their governments 
lobbying US politicians. 
Migration to the United States began to decline in 2009, the year after the onset of the 
financial crisis and what has been called “the job drought.”4  But that decline has been less drastic, 
fluctuating between 26% and 32% a year. In February 2011, researchers from the Pew Hispanic 
Center talked about a decline in the number of undocumented migrants, attributed to a fall in 
                                            
1 U.S. Department of Justice, 1990. 
2 Eig, 1998. 
3 Office of Policy and Planning, p.17. 
4 Krugman, 2012, p.16. 
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Mexican migration.1  A year later they spoke about “zero migration” of Mexicans and a slowdown 
in Central American migration.2 The Mexican Interior Ministry’s National Institute of Migration said 
the flow of Central Americans was stabilizing, which it attributed to the effect of restrictive 
policies.3 Anti-migrant policies, specifically the implementation of the Department of Homeland 
Security’s “Secure Communities Program,” were identified as the decline’s causal elements. The 
resurgence of Operation Gatekeeper was of high importance.4 The volume of deportations had 
allegedly reached a historic peak of 395,000 in 2009.5  The economic crisis was also assumed to 
have given potential newcomers negative signals and encouraged their voluntary return, according 
to findings from a workshop on economic cycles, demographic change and migrations that the 
International Organization for Migration quickly put together.6 
However, regarding migration to the United States, subsequent evidence showed that 
Central American migration to this country had not necessarily begun a new cycle but rather had 
perhaps entered a small depression within the great, long and ascending, migration wave.  In 
September 2013 the Pew Hispanic Center released a new report in which it announced a migration 
surge of undocumented non-Mexican groups in 2011 and 2012, with a strong presence of Central 
Americans.7  This was due to the economic crisis motivating migration through its effects on 
Central American countries, whose economies are dependent on the US; especially El Salvador, 
whose symbiosis with the US economy has been firmly fixed by dollarization of its currency since 
2001. Another spur to migration was shown to be the growing levels of violence in Honduras, 
Guatemala, and El Salvador, statistically associated with intentions to emigrate.8 A December 2013 
survey by the Jesuit’s Reflection, Research and Communication Team (ERIC) in Honduras revealed 
that 36% of those interviewed wanted to emigrate.9 We will see this in detail in the following 
section about asylum and violence.  
If the illegalizing machinery fails to stem migration even in times of crisis, what does it 
achieve?  Policies are a sieve, not a dike.  What do they strain out and what do they let through? 
                                            
1 Passel and Cohn, 2011. 
2 Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera, 2012. 
3 Rodríguez, Berumen and Ramos, 2011. 
4 Nevins, 2010. 
5 López et al., 2011, p.11. 
6 IOM, 2012, p.36. 
7 Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera, 2013, p.16. 
8 Hiskey, Malone, and Orcés, 2014. 
9 ERIC, 2014, p.12. 
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There are clear indications that there’s a filter, but we don’t know how much systemic/automatic 
premeditation and/or malice aforethought is embodied in the policies.  Does the destination 
impose a requirement that means only those who can afford a coyote’s expensive services and, 
therefore, those who have had access to more education tend to go to the US?  Or does illegality 
work like a “scarlet letter” limiting access to better paid neighborhoods, schools, incomes and 
occupations?  We can see this in information that comes from my fieldwork. Up to now, this 
inquiry does show that there was a filter with ideological criteria in the eighties: an open door to 
those who shared the same beliefs.  Geopolitical criteria continue to be applied to nations at war, 
such as Iraq and Afghanistan, and are blatantly flaunted in the expedited path to residence for 
Iraqi or Afghani interpreters who assisted US officials and those employed by the US government 
for at least one year since 2001 (for the Afghanis) or since 2003 (for the Iraqis), as established in 
the Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009 and the National Defense Authorization Act, a federal law 
stipulated in the Defense Department’s budget.1 But this filter has ceased to be applied to Central 
Americans, whose “illegalization” or acceptance has undergone an ideological change in migration 
policy: From a geopolitical to a nationalist/racist focal point?  To a focus on class?  To the “Virginia 
model,” where the market imposes its demand for labor or for “clients” in private migrant 
detention centers? 
An increase in undocumented migrants is connected to a shift in the legality line, reflected 
in chronological evolution.  The dark side to the increase in undocumented migrants is that it 
provides an opportunity for big capital to avail itself of a reserve army while holding down salaries.  
As anthropologist Nicholas De Genova pointed out, the “illegal alien” classification is enormously 
profitable because it serves (not always) to provide cheap labor. This crucial finding is so well 
established it’s irrefutable, but in itself, this isn’t enough because it doesn’t examine—and 
therefore normalizes—the origin of this legal status, which De Genova calls the “illegalization” of 
the migrant.2 This illegalization also has a flip side: it increases the number of those who defy the 
State, with the census revealing that Nicaraguan migrants react by assuming illegality, not avoiding 
it.  In this illegalization process, migrants have assumed illegality, with all its risks and challenges.  
Some experts’ appeals for universal citizenship, and the semantic battle attempting to eliminate—
                                            
1 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Green Card for an Iraqi Who Assisted the U.S. Government, 
http://www.uscis.gov/green-card/green-card-through-job/green-card-through-special-categories-
jobs/green-card-iraqi-who-assisted-us-government U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Green Card 
for an Afghan Who Assisted the U.S. Government, http://www.uscis.gov/green-card/green-card-through-
job/green-card-through-special-categories-jobs/green-card-afghan-who-assisted-us-government 
2 De Genova, 2005, p.214. 
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or delegitimize, so showing its spurious origin—the stigma of “illegal” that the State stamps on 
undocumented migrants can’t erase the fact that the foundational act in the relationship of most 
Central American migrants with the United States is a transgression of that country’s laws. 
2. Violence and Central Americans in search of asylum 
 
The peace accords that the conflicting forces signed between 1988 and 1996 appeared to have 
tossed the concept of refugee into the corner reserved for anachronistic junk.  The “Contra” and 
the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) opened that string of accords in Sapoá, while the 
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) and the government of Guatemala tied it off 
with the “Firm and Lasting Peace Accord” whose pompous yet encouraging name stressed the 
rhetorical opening to an unprecedented era that would make continued talk of refuges irrelevant. 
But contrary to all forecasts, asylum-seeking has returned.  The expelling compulsion attributed to 
the market’s invisible hand is ceding importance to the visible—although unpredictable and 
therefore more dangerous—armed hand of the military, drug traffickers, hit men, common 
criminals and youth gang members. 
The refuge is the United States.  Those fleeing are Hondurans, Guatemalans and 
Salvadorans, including children.  The evidence for this tendency is overwhelming.  The United 
Nations’ refugee agency, UNHCR, and the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) 
are the most conspicuous, although by no means only, actors to have noted the abrupt jump in 
the average annual number of unaccompanied minors detained by US immigration authorities 
from 6,800 in 2004-2011 to 13,000 in 2012 and more than 24,000 in 2013.1  A figure of between 
60,000 and 90,000 was expected in 2014, according to an interagency memo from a Border Patrol 
official quoted in The New York Times.2 There were 68,631 in 2014. The arrival of undocumented 
minors in early June 2014 was so great it outstripped the capacity of the institutions that usually 
receive them.  With that, the Pentagon converted the military bases of Fort Sill (Oklahoma), San 
Antonio Lackland (Texas) and Ventura County (California) to house 1,800 unaccompanied minors. 3  
Under pressure due to the sudden increase, President Obama called for a coordinated federal 
effort to address what he called an “urgent humanitarian situation.” 4 
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In 2014, 75% of the unaccompanied minors apprehended were Guatemalan, Honduran 
and Salvadoran, a percentile whose disproportionate weight is only evident when compared to the 
fact that these same nationalities only represented 49% of 486,651 apprehended by the Border 
Patrol.1  In the 2008-2011 period the number remained relatively stable—between 4,444 and 
3,304—but then shot up to 10,146 in 2012, doubled to 20,805 in 2013, and more than doubled to 
51,705 in 2014. 
 
Unaccompanied immigrant minors who were apprehended by the Border Patrol 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
El Salvador 1,391 1,221 1,910 1,394 3,314 5,990 16,404
Guatemala 1,388 1,115 1,517 1,565 3,835 8,068 17,057
Honduras 1,578 968 1,017 974 2,997 6,747 18,244
Total of Central Americans 4,357 3,304 4,444 3,933 10,146 20,805 51,705
Total of unaccompanied minors 8,041 19,668 18,634 16,056 24,481 38,833 68,631
Percentage of Central Americans 54 17 24 24.5 41 54 75  
Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection2 
 
Mexico’s National Migration Institute also registered an increase, although a much less 
marked one, of unaccompanied minors among the Central Americans it deported from that 
country, with the figure rising from 1,946 in 2009 to 5,389 in 2013.  The total number of minors 
deported in the same period rose from 3,985 to 8,180, with 44% of them from Honduras.  The 
weight of minors in the total number of deportees jumped from 6% to 11% and the proportion of 
unaccompanied minors among the total number of minors rose by 17%, from 49% to 66%.  The 
country with the highest percentage of unaccompanied minors among its total minors is 
Guatemala, with 74% in 2013.3 
There is a correlation between the migration of minors and the polymorphous violence 
currently affecting Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador.  A USCCB report revealed that over 50% 
of the children from those three countries detained by the US authorities in 2010 said they were 
fleeing violence.4  The same report showed that 25% of a random sample of all minors placed in 
USCCB Migration and Refugee Services care between 2007 and 2011 had directly witnessed 
                                            
1 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2013, p.4. 
2 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2012, 2014.  UNHCR, 2014, p.16. 
3 Centro de Estudios Migratorios, 2013, pp.128 y 131. 
4 USCCB, 2012, p.7. 
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violent crimes, generally committed with firearms.  This rate reached 50% among the Hondurans.1 
The report also mentions an increase in female migration from Guatemala to the United States, 
attributable to the need to escape violence, rape and torture, a tendency the United Nations 
Children´s Fund (UNICEF) detected in 2009, with organized crime and youth gangs causing panic 
and anxiety among the under-18 population.2  In 2013, the USCCB conducted a new survey among 
detained children and sent a delegation headed by the archbishop of El Paso, Texas, to Mexico and 
Central America to visit migrant shelters and do interviews.  The delegation found that of a total of 
140 minors from Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras benefited by the USCCB’s family 
reunification services in 2011, 41% said they had emigrated to flee from violence.3 
But these findings run up against a persistent insistence in Central America itself that this 
emigration is economic in nature.  For example, an opinion survey by the Jesuits’ Reflection, 
Investigation and Communication Team (ERIC) in Honduras revealed that 55.1% of the young 
people interviewed didn’t want to emigrate, while 44.8% did.  Among those who indicated a 
preference for emigrating abroad, the largest percentage of both females (78%) and males (82%) 
said the reason was “the bad economy and lack of opportunities to improve their income in the 
country.”4  A survey by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and UNICEF, conducted 
in 2010, also found that 51.7% of Guatemalans migrated to improve their economic situation, 
37.2% in search of employment and only 0.6% due to violence.5 
The interesting study titled “La esperanza viaja sin visa” (Hope travels without a visa) by the 
Central American University of El Salvador and United Nations Population Fund reveals that 
Salvadorans emigrate due to “lack of opportunities for employment, a decent life or education; 
violence does not always appear as a direct expelling factor, but rather as a macro conditioning 
factor.”6 This vision was partially corroborated by the Americas Barometer Insights 2014 issue 
dedicated to “Violence and Migration in Central America.”  While it concludes that crime does 
appear to contribute to the migratory wave, particularly if increased numbers of people directly 
experience it, it also notes 2012 figures showing limited victimization levels among Hondurans 
(23.2%), an extremely low propensity to feel unsafe in their own neighborhoods (18.9%) and 
minimal intentions to migrate (11.4%).  Paradoxically, this report found victimization only (17.5%) 
                                            
1 Ibíd., pp.8-9. 
2 Ibíd., p.4. UNICEF Guatemala, 2009, p.8. 
3 USCCB, 2013, p.6. 
4 Cardoza, 2014, p.9. 
5 UNICEF-OIM, 2011, p.62. 
6 Gaborit, 2012, p.12. 
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higher in Honduras, considered the most dangerous country in Central America, than in Costa Rica, 
generally regarded as one of the safest but where the perception of insecurity (29.7%) is 6.5% 
higher than in Honduras.1 On the face of it, this implausible contrast between Honduras, which in 
2013 earned the sad reputation of being the most violent in the world (with 90.4 homicides per 
100,000 inhabitants)2 and Costa Rica, renowned as “the Switzerland of Central America” (with 8.5 
homicides per 100,000 inhabitants)3 suggests that Hondurans are the most irresponsibly 
unapprehensive people on the planet and Costa Ricans the most jumpy. A less subjective 
possibility is that the surveys were badly designed or, in an excessive desire for statistical 
representativeness, not designed to take the geography of fear into account. 
 
2.1 Figures on the geography of fear: The relationship between violence and 
migration 
 
National perception averages are usually misleading because violence tends to have a very 
unequal geographical distribution within a country.  Although Guatemala and El Salvador—with 
39.9 and 41.2 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively—appear far removed from the 
scythe-bearing Grim Reaper hovering over Honduras, it should be borne in mind that the homicide 
rates in the three countries’ capitals are all very high and not so different: 116.6 in Guatemala City 
(2010), 102.2 in Tegucigalpa (2011) and 89.9 in San Salvador (2011).4  It is therefore reasonable to 
suppose that many Salvadorans and Guatemalans also emigrate to escape violence, and that 
national averages dissimulate an unequal distribution of that violence. 
As for Honduras, prioritizing a territorially balanced sample in the surveys could cover up 
the fact that violence is concentrated in what drug trafficking-related jargon terms “hotspots.”  For 
this reason, a sample in which San Pedro Sula, located in the northern coastal area, is considered 
only relative to its demographic weight and not its victimization levels and weight in the migratory 
flow will produce an incomplete image of the specter of violence and its influence on migrations. 
For the third consecutive year, San Pedro Sula nailed its position as the world’s most violent city in 
2013 with 187 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.5  Considered Honduras’ economic capital, San 
                                            
1 Hiskey, 2014, p.3. 
2 BBC Mundo, 2014. 
3 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2014, p.126. 
4 Ibíd., p.146. 
5 Ortega, 2014. 
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Pedro Sula hit first place in 2011 with 125 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants and remained there 
in 2012 with an increase to 174 homicides. Its reputation has earned it sinister headlines in 
internationally circulating newspapers: “San Pedro Sula convulsed with violence,” “Seven at night, 
the most dangerous time in San Pedro Sula,” “Central America’s kidnap capital,” “An earthly hell 
called San Pedro Sula,” “A city turned morgue”...   
The population couldn’t remain indifferent to San Pedro Sula’s “heating up.”  Signs of this 
include, for example, that 51 of the 238 Honduran migrants (21%) fed at the Kino Border 
Initiative’s soup kitchen in Nogales in the Mexican state of Sonora between September 2013 and 
March 2014 were from San Pedro Sula.  That is clear over-representation given that projections 
based on the last census indicate that only 9% of Hondurans live in that city.1 There’s a correlation 
between this over-representation and another, according to 2005 data: 27% of the total arms 
registered in Honduras were located in San Pedro Sula.2  Yet another sign of the correlation 
between violence and migration explained by the geography of fear is the fact that the most 
Hondurans attended by the Kino Border Initiative come from the most violent departments 
identified by Honduran sociologist Julieta Castellanos in 2011 based on the number of murders per 
100,000 inhabitants: Atlántida (149), Cortés (127), Copán (114), Colón (103), Ocotepeque y Yoro 
(97) and Francisco Morazán (88).3 
Another reason national public opinion or even victimization averages require a 
disaggregated analysis to establish their impact on migrations is the very diverse distribution of 
victimization and risks by sex and age groups, which the following figures for El Salvador evidence 
clearly: in 2005, the general death rate per 100,000 inhabitants was 392 for males between the 
ages of 15 and 29 in El Salvador, compared to 84 for females of the same age range. This 
difference is more pronounced when the homicide rates for that age range are examined: El 
Salvador’s overall homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants was 62.2 for the same year, but for males 
it was 223 and for females only 20.45 In Honduras, all we know is that young men and women 
between the ages of 15 and 24 accounted for 25.7% of the total homicide victims in 2007.6 
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Homicides throughout Latin America are concentrated among young people between the 
ages of 15 and 29, which is the same age range of those who migrate most.1  But that doesn’t 
mean that only youths or even only young men have violence-related motives for emigrating.  
Violence doesn’t only have the face of a hit man with a revolver in his hand.  It also has the face of 
a rapist, very occasionally superimposed over that of a youth gang member and far more often 
camouflaged beneath the “protective” visage of a father, stepfather, cousin or uncle.  Or else it 
has the face of a pimp, in which case girls and female adolescents are its most frequent victims, 
although it can be suspected that machismo gags any accusations from boys. 
In El Salvador, most victims of abuse and commercial sexual exploitation are females aged 
10-17 years old.2  In Honduras, a daily average of two cases of the rape of under-14s was 
registered in 2010 in Tegucigalpa alone.3  Of the cases reported the following year—as always a 
small proportion of those actually committed—only 31% ended up investigated by the public 
prosecutor.4  The picture for Guatemala is very similar, where a report by Médecins Sans 
Frontières says that 93% of rape survivors cared for in 2011 were female and 64% were 12- to 17-
year-olds for whom the rape was their first sexual experience.5 
These are precisely the ages of the unaccompanied minors arriving in such large numbers 
in the USA.  In other words, they are the demographic dividend in which the technocrats place 
such vaunted and vain hopes.6  And given that the Central American countries are “heating up,” 
they are moving away in search of “cooler” places. My conclusion regarding the underestimation 
of the relationship between migration and violence is that national percentages can’t be used to 
weight variables being correlated with migration.  Migration is a phenomenon whose actors don’t 
represent the national averages, but rather have a certain profile being chiseled out by the 
multiple faces of violence and certain opportunities. 
When survey-takers armed with questionnaires containing variables that aren’t mutually 
exclusive press the migratory subjects themselves to exclusively identify a simplifying reason for 
having left their country, it puts them in a real predicament. Among the emigrants cared for by the 
Kino Border Initiative in a seven-month period starting in September 2013, only between 4% and 
7% said they migrated due to violence.  The rest focused on lack of work and family reunification.  
                                            
1 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, p.28. 
2 Consejo Nacional de la Niñez y de la Adolescencia, 2013, pp.81-82. 
3 Silvestrucci, 2010. 
4 Casa Alianza, 2013, p.37. 
5 Médicos Sin Fronteras, 2011. 
6 ECLAC, 2008, pp.143-169. 
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But my long one-on-one conversations with young migrants there showed me a repeated 
archetypal story: the plan to be reunited with a mother who has been living for years in Los 
Angeles or Maryland because in Guatemala or Honduras they’re more likely to get a bullet in the 
head like other people they knew than to get a decent job, which almost nobody they knew ever 
ends up with. These three motivations—to avoid violence, find employment and reunite the 
family—can coexist in the same emigrant.  Sometimes motives are so tightly braided they’re 
interwoven into a single strand, as observed by Jeremy Slack, a researcher at the University of 
Arizona, who often finds it nearly impossible to clearly delimit the motivations.  For example 
extortion—the various “taxes” different groups charge back home for “protection” or other 
“services”—overlaps both violence and economics.1 
While some downplay violence as a motivation for the migration of Central Americans, 
other sources corroborate the current link.  Based on a survey of 404 unaccompanied 12- to 14-
year-old migrants in the custody of the US Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of 
Refugee Resettlement, the UNHCR report “Children on the run” revealed that 44% of the 
Hondurans said they had been threatened by or were direct victims of armed criminals, including 
youth gang members, cartels and thieves.  The same was true for 66% of the Salvadorans who, like 
the 35% of Salvadorans attended by the Kino Border Initiative, could well have come from San 
Salvador, El Salvador’s most violent city.2 The method UNHCR used to establish the link between 
violence and migration is obviously more effective than the sophisticated statistical models of 
Americas Barometer Insights.  UNHCR gathered the testimonies of people who had already 
migrated rather than the perception of people still in the country expressing migratory intentions.  
Moreover, its design encompasses the plurality of motives for migrating. 
2.2 USA: A none-too-generous Mecca for Central America asylum seekers 
 
According to a 2013 UNHCR report, of the 612,700 asylum petitions registered in the 44 
industrialized countries in 2013, the 88,400 requests in the United States make that country the 
second most sought by asylum candidates after Germany.  The 25% increase in the US total for 
2013 over 2012 (17,590 more requests) was due to an increase in Hondurans seeking asylum 
there. The report states that “About 30% of all asylum claims in the country were lodged by 
asylum-seekers from Mexico and Central America.  Violence generated by transnational organized 
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crime, gang-related violence and drug cartels in some parts of Central America may be among the 
contributing factors leading to the consistent high number of individuals from this region 
requesting refugee status in the United States of America.”1 
Rated according to its geographical dimensions with a little help from a UNHCR indicator 
that reflects the willingness to welcome asylum seekers, the US doesn’t seem a particularly 
generous or hospitable host.  In 2009-2013 it received only one asylum petitioner per 1,000 
inhabitants, which placed it 29th in a ranking headed by Malta with 20.2 applicants per 1,000 
inhabitants and Sweden with 19.2.2  From the perspective of another index based on territorial 
dimensions, the US position doesn’t get any better: it had 28 refugees per 1,000 km², which is 
insignificant compared to Malta (26,351), Lebanon (12,968), Jordan (3,359), Rwanda (2,300), 
Holland (2,049), Pakistan (1,869), Bangladesh (1,686), Germany (1,657), Burundi (1,545), 
Switzerland (1,233), Luxemburg (1,114), Kenya (966), Uganda (816), Belgium (720), Serbia (649), 
Austria (618), England (614), Yemen (563), Ecuador (481), Togo (411), Turkey (342), Ethiopia (332), 
Panama (231), Sweden (208) and Norway (134), among many other countries great and small, rich 
and poor and with high and low population densities that have acted with greater largess, 
overcoming territorial, demographic or economic pressure to grant asylum.3 
The Central American migrants running from violence have headed toward a tree that 
shelters few refugees.  And the backing their aspirations receive from international organizations 
is dangerously varied.  The response to their hopes blow hot and cold.  In an interview with the 
Univision Spanish language television network, IOM spokesperson Niurka Piñeiro said her 
organization promotes campaigns “to inform both the young people and their parents of the 
dangers and of the truth about the United States.  And that means that there isn’t going to be such 
an amnesty.”4  On the other hand, UNHCR reported that 56% of the minors it interviewed require 
international protection.  Meanwhile, Central Americans continue arriving in the US, including an 
increasing number of children.  In the next installment we’ll examine the chances of their hopes 
being satisfied and whether the violence in Central America provides a basis for their asylum 
demands. 
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There have been Central American refugees in the United States for a long time.  The large 
numbers of children currently crossing the Mexico-US border are what have caught the world’s 
attention and triggered statements by international organizations, churches, the media, NGOs and 
political officials in several countries.  The attention was deserved and the statements urgently 
needed. Nonetheless, we shouldn’t forget that the 20,805 Guatemalan, Honduran and Salvadoran 
minors arrested by border guards in 2013 only represent 19.5% of the total number of detainees 
from these three countries.  On top of that are all the immigrants who haven’t been arrested, 
some children and many more adults, and are spread out throughout the US, swelling the ranks of 
the undocumented but dynamizing the economy of a country that by turns treats them like 
indispensable enemies and criminals or the core of the national creed. 
The “irregular” US population is still growing, with two new undocumented migrants for 
each deportee.  With the State’s grudging consent or evading the Immigration and Customs 
Service patrols, sensors and helicopters, children and adults have continued a tradition 
significantly heightened if not begun by Central Americans in the 1980s. They are fulfilling the 
prediction that Susan George put in the mouth of the experts charged with saving capitalism in her 
fact-based fictional document, “The Lugano Report II”: “We are going to see an increase in 
migration pressure, millions of people will try to escape from their places of origin when 
conditions become impossible.  The majority will move to other regions of their own countries but 
many will try to reach rich northern countries.  Up until now, Europe and North America have 
responded forcefully to migrations, exclusively using the military and the police.  Nevertheless, 
estimates of the number of migrants who have illegally crossed their borders suggest that those 
efforts have failed: at least 11 million illegal immigrants from Mexico and the rest of Latin America 
in the United States and tens of thousands in the European Union.”1 
Many arrested immigrants request “defensive asylum” in their hearings with immigration 
judges, the narrow door to asylum for those who are caught.2  The problematic circumstances of 
these requests lead to lower approval rates than for “affirmative asylum” requests made through 
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voluntary presentation to the asylum offices.1  Immigration lawyers, including those who provide 
their services pro bono and who can be assumed to have the best intentions, know that gang 
victims or those escaping drug traffickers and street violence have very little chance of being 
granted asylum. Mimicking the first article of the UN Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees2, the US Refugee Act demands that those requesting asylum demonstrate that they have 
been persecuted or have a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion.3  Lilia Velásquez, lecturer 
at the California Western School of Law and a practicing immigration lawyer in San Diego, is well 
aware of the difficulties faced even by the victims of multiple traumas.  “A 37-year-old man wrote 
to me from prison.  He is transgender, has no money, is poor and his family wants nothing to do 
with him.  He told me he had been raped by his cousins since he was seven and by police officers 
when he was 12.  He’s HIV positive; that is, he has the virus.  He asked for asylum and was refused.  
They deported him.  Afterwards he returned and was kidnapped.  Now he’s in jail and doesn’t 
qualify for bail.  He has been arrested everywhere.  Because there’s torture in his home country, 
which has been documented, they can’t send him back.  Deportation and asylum cases are 
incredibly complicated.”4 
The instability of legal resources makes the cases very difficult to argue.  The common law 
system increases the lawyers’ work and their number of sleepless nights.  Originating in England 
then exported to the colonies, this system gives enormous weight to legal precedent in 
establishing law.  Immigration lawyers have to keep up to date with new decisions that, by 
establishing precedents, shift the balance one way or another.  The results of a number of trials 
have made being targeted by gangs less and less admissible as a reason for being granted asylum.  
In some cases, being the victim of homophobia is accepted but there’s no guarantee of success 
and even less of cases being dealt with urgently.  It’s quite normal for a year to pass between 
hearings before an immigration judge. 
                                            
1 Affirmative asylum cases granted have always exceeded defensive asylum cases. They raised from 5,672 in 
1990 to 17,506 in  2012. Nowadays, in the same period, the number of defensive asylum cases has increased 
quickest from 2,800 to 11,978. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013. Affirmative asylum was sought 
by Central Americans mostly in the first half of 90s. Between 1990 and 1996, citizens from Guatemala, El 
Salvador and Nicaragua presented first or second time 441,296 asylum applications before the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1997, p.79. 
2 UNHCR, 1967. 
3 U.S. 96th Congress, 1980. 
4 Interview with the author, March 31, 2014. 
  102 
The statistics speak eloquently about the complicated nature of the cases.  In 2013, 11,598 
Central Americans requested asylum in the US: 4,649 Salvadorans, 4,314 Guatemalans and 2,635 
Hondurans.1  Their countries of origin were in fourth, fifth and seventh place, respectively, on the 
list of nationalities requesting asylum.  The United States is Central Americans’ “natural” refuge 
and priority destination, receiving 95% of the 12,197 asylum requests made to industrialized 
countries by citizens of these three nationalities.  In the cases of El Salvador and Guatemala, the 
numbers of applications are very close to those in the mid-1990s, just after the official end of the 
internal conflicts. 
Hondurans are facing a relatively new but explosively growing phenomenon.  In 1996 
there were 1,266 new asylum requests by Hondurans then between 2000 and 2005 the numbers 
ranged from only 236 to 373.  A watershed moment came in 2011 when the number of requests 
more than doubled the previous year’s figure, jumping to 1,351, but that was moderate compared 
to the 2,066 requests in 2012.2  Nevertheless, only 141 applications for affirmative asylum and 93 
for defensive asylum were accepted in 2011.  The next year, 11,598 Guatemalans, Salvadorans and 
Hondurans applied but only 1,097 were accepted.3  Some Central Americans explored a less 
random route, requesting refuge before arriving in the US: under US law, asylum requests are 
made once in the country, refuge is requested from outside.  The Central American refugee 
centers in the US are empty. Central Americans aren’t eligible for refugee status a priori, so they 
seek it a posteriori.4 
2.3 The United States bears great responsibility: Our violence must be 
historicized 
 
The loud refrain in defense of children fleeing chaotic violence has the effect of making the US 
seem no more than a chance oasis, whose only relation to the dramatic situation is that it is a 
prosperous nation and a peaceful haven.  Nevertheless, there is no escaping the relationship 
between the US and violence in Central America. The US government has direct responsibility for 
the production of the anti-insurgent orientation that permitted the growth of the criminal forces 
that foment and use violence, as can be shown from the testimony of migrants and any serious 
effort to historicize violence and its instruments, both weapons and humans.  Violence must be 
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historicized so the continuity can be seen.  A focus on “minors” glosses over this historicization 
and its political causes.  It allows the new refugees to be treated as people with no history, who 
aren’t asked what caused the problems they’re trying to escape. 
Optimism about the peace dividend, both financial and social, is based on the assumption 
that violence is a feature of primitive stages of human development and that, insofar as a society 
advances to higher stages of civilization, high murder rates and other types of violence become a 
thing of the past.  These are ideological assumptions without any empirical basis, mere wishful 
thinking. The pogroms, the Nazi holocaust and, to cite a recent example, the war in Kosovo have 
demonstrated the reality of the theoretically unthinkable coexistence of modernity and brutality, 
civilization and holocaust, democracy and increasing murder.  Sociologist Hans Joas recommends 
that those who investigate violence should not only distance themselves from faith in progress but 
should also seek to immerse themselves in the history of violence, “which makes clear the 
tortuous and insecure nature of all roads to progress and how the retrospective tracing of straight 
lines from the past to a good present or an even better future are more often than not nothing but 
optical illusions.”1 
Central American countries are suffering the paradox of Brazilian democracy as analyzed 
by James Holston: just when democracy is trying to put down roots, violence, injustice, corruption 
and impunity have grown dramatically.  As a result, many Brazilians, and Central Americans, feel 
less safe under representative democracy, achieved with such difficulty, and are more physically 
threatened by everyday violence than they were by repressive dictatorships and military regimes.  
A similarity with a previous era presents an ominous sign of the times: from 1982 to 1984, in the 
middle of the armed struggle, the murder rate per 100,000 young Salvadoran men was 249.3.  
Two decades later, in 2005 in times of “peace,” it was 223.2 According to Holston, at the same 
time that a generation of insurgent citizens was democratizing urban space and key aspects of 
planning, creating unprecedented access to resources in Brazil, public spaces began to be 
permeated by a climate of fear and incivility, leading to their abandonment, the fortification of 
residential areas, criminalization of the poor and support for police violence.3 
The principal manifestations of violence from which the elites are escaping to their 
marble-barred citadels and lower-income people to the US are very complicated.  They can’t be 
                                            
1 Joas, 2005, p.14. 
2 The ranks do not make a perfect match: the rank in 2005 was made to include 15 to 29 year olds, while the 
rank in the 80s included 15 to 24 year olds. CEPAL, 2008, pp.57 y 355. 
3 Holston, 2009, p.13. 
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explained just in economic, moral or developmental terms. In our secularized world, material 
motivations such as poverty, greed, inequity, competition for limited resources and others present 
in violent societies have gained relevance as explanations of social actions1, but they don’t have 
much explicative value regarding the “how” or the meaning of violence for the protagonists, nor 
do they explain how their victims experience and deal with it. 
The characteristics of violence are as important as its causes.  One of the most significant 
is the democratizing of violence as a consequence of increasing numbers of weapons and the 
decline of the State.  Dutch academics Dirk Kruijt and Kees Koonings argue that the end of the 
wars in Latin America was followed by a period in which the State lost its monopoly on violence 
and we entered a stage in which the means and exercise of violence became widely disseminated.2  
The war provided the means and the know-how.  The postwar period brought the reduced role of 
the State as an employer and weakened in its both its harsh patriarchal and motherly welfare 
aspects, losing coercive power and reducing its social spending. 3 
This characteristic highlights the lack of “motives” that can be offered as a rational basis 
for asylum requests.  Materialistic explanations are insufficient.  Salvadoran Jesús López explains it 
this way: “Before, people weren’t happy if nobody died.  When people heard there had been a 
death they said it meant fresh meat, because there were tamales and coffee at the wake.  That 
was the only happiness people had in that town.  Do you think those people feared God?  They 
didn’t love life.  The military used to arrive with bombs.  Boom!  They tossed a bomb into a party: 
suddenly people with no eyes, no feet, dead bodies without their guts, some with extra guts.  
There’s a canton called El Palón [in Lolotique, San Miguel] where not long ago five people were 
killed with an AK-47.  Drunks.  Just some of those bums who play cards in the street, who sit 
around in little groups.  They’re people accustomed to looking for a little place with rocks they can 
sit on to play cards.  A group of those gang members went by and killed five people with an AK-47.  
It’s their only motto: kill people.  Nobody knew who did it or why.” 4 
This democratization has consequences for refuge.  The migrants are “innocent” but in the 
sense used by Arendt: a total absence of responsibility, the mark of a lack of rights and loss of their 
                                            
1 Waldmann, 2007, p.62. 
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political status. 1  They haven’t been involved in political activities that could lead to their 
persecution but their bigger problem relative to current asylum laws is that they can’t allege that 
they belong to any of the groups that are the specific target of persecution.  The democratization 
of violence, the characteristic that makes it so unpredictable and ubiquitous, gives it the terrifying 
particularity that it strikes anyone without distinction.  What Arendt calls the “all-pervading 
unpredictability” of violence can be seen here in full force. 2  No religious, political or ethnic group 
can convincingly claim to be at the center of the spiral of violence.  Consequently, each case has to 
be dealt with individually.  The requirement of group prosecution a priori blocks any attempt at 
mass asylum. 
Many of the testimonies I heard during my interviews in the United States are like that of 
Sofía Villatoro from Quetzaltenango, stories of escape from depoliticized, democratized and 
ubiquitous violence, signs also of a communitas in a process of recomposition… or decomposition.  
“I came here in 1999 when I was nine. My granny sent me with a coyote.  She thought it was 
dangerous to stay in Guatemala and that I was old enough.  More than anything, I never went out 
of the house because my granny was worried I would be kidnapped because people knew my 
parents were here in the US.  We had already been robbed at gunpoint in our house five times.  
That’s why my granny was very concerned about me.” 3 For the time being, Sofia is protected by 
the Convention Against Torture (CAT), the measure the judge used to close her deportation case; 
not because she was a minor but rather because of her violent environment in Guatemala, and 
possibly also because her case had been publicized in the local media. 
 
The mass dissemination of weapons 
Arendt said that violence “always needs implements.” 4  The democratization of violence is made 
possible by the spread of weapons.  Castellanos5 and Godnick6 have argued that the Central 
American peace agreements and subsequent disarmament failed to anticipate the degree to 
which weapons would flow from the rebel groups, paramilitaries and military into the hands of 
private citizens. 7  The result is an unknown number of unregistered private weapons.  Many of 
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3 Interview with the author, April 14, 2014. 
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5 Castellanos, 2000. 
6 Godnick, 2002. 
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those currently circulating among criminals, gangs, hit men and ordinary citizens are left over from 
the war. For anthropologist Jon Wolseth, a specialist on Honduras’ variant of the particularly 
virulent Central northern American gangs known as “maras,” these remnants of the war explain 
how criminals can supplement the omnipresent pistols, revolvers and home-made guns with 
heavy automatic and semi-automatic weapons such as AK-47s, Uzis, grenades and even bazookas. 
1  But the weapons aren’t just war leftovers.  There’s a bustling illegal weapons trade that defies 
regulation and channels ammunition and weapons from law enforcement agencies to the public. 
Mexican journalist Diego Enrique Osorno explains that “the gun shows in frontier cities are the 
principal sources of AK-47s, AR-15 rifles and Beretta pistols.  This is no secret.  We aren’t talking 
about underground groups.  Over 100,000 permit holders legally sell weapons all along the 
border.” 2   And from there they flow to the drug traffickers and further south. 
In her book El tráfico de armas en México, Magda Coss Nogueda relates how “it is easier 
to buy a gun than to get gasoline in Texas, close to the Mexican border,” how “almost two 
thousand firearms enter Mexico every day, coming mainly from the US” (five million illegal 
weapons entered between 2000 and 2008) and how many of those that were traced have been 
found in Guatemala.  The Tepito cartel has at least 35 places where it sells weapons, either coming 
from the US or stolen from Mexico’s National Defense Secretariat (SEDENA), which amount to 60% 
of the ones seized.  In 1994, “40 tons of weapons acquired by SEDENA in the US and transported in 
military airplanes went to drug traffickers.” Of the weapons traced after being illegally introduced 
into Mexico, 40% came from Houston, Dallas and McAllen, Texas.3  But weapons from Asia and 
Europe also reach Central America, where Guatemala and Nicaragua are the two countries that 
Coss Nogueda says has the most gaps in their surveillance. 4 The US also has an important and 
growing role in the region’s legal arms trade, particularly in El Salvador where military supplies 
spending increased from US$473,000 in 2006 to US$3.3 million in 2013, accounting for 47% of all 
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3 Coss 2011, pp.74, 103, 110-111 y 117-120. 
4 Ibíd., p.126. 
5 Global research, 2014.  
  
107 
Are gangs the biggest threat? Where did the maras come from? 
Taking advantage of the availability of weapons, the region’s maras have cultivated a fearsome 
reputation, making it easy for their critics to create a dark legend that has spread around the 
world in documentaries, BBC reports, terrifying profiles on the History Channel and books like De 
los maras a los Zetas by Jorge Fernandez Menendez and Victor Ronquillo.  Unscrupulous hacks 
claim that mara members have received terrorist training in Afghanistan and are creating a 
corridor from Colombia to Los Angeles for drug and people trafficking.1 The maras have been 
presented officially to public opinion as the main threat to public security and even as new urban 
insurgents capable of taking control of the State. 2  The creation of these exaggerated ideas is 
intentional, leading to the criminalization of young people out of all proportion to their actual 
participation in violence.  Above all, it is intrinsically related to certain national myths3, to the 
generation of stereotypes to mold public discourse4 and to a wish to revive the militarized State of 
the recent past. 5  It also avoids proper consideration of a very poorly understood phenomenon6, 
instead painting the darkest of pictures and fueling a punitive populism that makes or breaks 
political careers. 7 
As we now know, the maras came about through the hybridization of local gangs with a 
transnational strand. 8  The term was first applied to the Mara Salvatrucha, formed by Salvadorans 
in Los Angeles.  For a cohort of Salvadorans who emigrated during the final years of the civil war 
and received a hostile welcome from Latino groups already established in the Pico-Union area of 
Los Angeles, this gang became an institutional means of reasserting themselves.  It eventually 
came to control the area of 13th Street, becoming known as Mara 13, and engaged in 
confrontations with the 18th Street gang members (Barrio 18, which had existed since the 1960s) 9 
in a rivalry that turned a nationalist focus into a territorial one.10 
Through a thus far poorly understood process, these maras absorbed the small gangs that 
previously existed in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador until their trans¬national corporate 
                                            
1 Fernández 2007, pp.40 y 178. 
2 This is stated in the document that Westpoint uses to train privates on the issue. Manwaring, 2005. 
3 Oettler, 2011, p.274. 
4 Hume, 2009, p.24. 
5 Torres-Rivas, 1981, pp. 71-112. 
6 Bellanger and Rocha, 2008, pp.137-152. 
7 Also know as penal pupulism. Roberts, 2003. 
8 Rodgers and Rocha, 2013, p.47. 
9 Wolf, 2009, p.86. 
10 Lara, 2006. 
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brand imposed itself on the myriad of local gangs.  This process gave birth to what were perhaps 
the first “glocal” gangs; functioning like a network of small local gangs that maintained their 
autonomy despite their transnational relations. 1  This fusion was facilitated by the massive 
deportation of mara members among the Central Americans facing criminal charges who were 
expelled from the US between 1993 and 1998: 7,223 Salvadorans, 4,274 Hondurans and 3,638 
Guatemalans, who respectively made up 41%, 25% and 24% of the deportees of those 
nationalities.2  This origin left vestiges in an umbilical cord that continues to link the Central 
American maras to their counterparts in Los Angeles through the active circulation of members, 
rules, directives, international backing and funds to purchase weapons. 3 
In the context of this glocal reorganization, those stigmatized made that stigma into a 
badge of honor.  Zygmund Bauman explains some aspects of their violence as a reaction by 
excluded youths to the changes in the postmodern world that discriminate against and marginalize 
them as outsiders, stripping them of their personal uniqueness, the only thing that obstructs the 
stereotypes and overcomes or mitigates the reductionist impact of the law, including criminal law. 
4 Given that rejection and exclusion by the commissar-State actively seeks that those who are 
rejected and excluded come to accept their imperfection and social inferiority, Bauman finds it 
unsurprising that the victims defend themselves. Rather than submit to their rejection and convert 
the official act into an act of self-rejection, they prefer to reject those who have rejected them. 5 
 
Drug traffickers: a legacy of the 1980s 
Organized crime uses violence as a selective tool to regulate the market in an industry the State 
classifies as illegal. 6  In simple terms: when one group exercises a market monopoly or there is 
equilibrium between several players, the level of violence is considerably lower.  Drug-related 
violence is neither inevitable nor unpredictable.  It obeys a fairly easily observable pattern: the 
struggle to control the market leads to the decapitation of cartels and the groups arranged around 
them and consequently to a recurring shift in the correlation of forces. This is a powerful 
explanation for the relative lack of violence in postwar Nicaragua as compared to neighboring 
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countries, as one group has monopolized the market and levies “tolls” on the various cartels.  High 
levels of drug-related violence tend to be found in places where the market is actively disputed. 
Drugs trade expert Eduardo Buscaglia holds that the Mexican “narcocracy” has extended 
its tentacles and its fights beyond its borders.  As he described in 2010, “When Mexican criminal 
groups such as Los Zetas enter Guatemalan territory and go to places such as Zacapa, the first 
thing they do is buy off the local authorities.  Not only that but, given that it is a country with very 
weak governance, they also go to the office of Alvaro Colom [President of Guatemala at the time 
of his writing] and buy his advisers and close officials; they even bug his office.  This causes 
political instability.  There have been attempts to carry out a coup against Colom by political 
groups bought by Los Zetas or, alternatively, by the Sinaloa cartel, two groups that have been 
vying for power in Guatemala for a long time.” 1 In this deadly quicksand, many Central Americans 
struggle to earn their daily bread with their lives hanging by a thread.   
DEA agent Héctor Berrelles, who led Operation Leyenda, also witnessed the links between 
the CIA and drug trafficking.  When he informed his superiors about the bases where CIA planes 
transferred drugs, they told him in no uncertain terms: “Keep away from those bases.  They are 
training camps, special operations.” 2  A little further south, Carlos Lehder Rivas, co-founder of the 
Medellín cartel, confessed that his “company” had been given access to Mena airport in Arkansas 
by the CIA in exchange for providing the contras with US$10 million. 3 
We should remember that, in 1989, when current Secretary of State John Kerry was a 
senator, he led a commission that revealed the sharp white tip of the iceberg.  Under oath, 
Colombian drug trafficker Jorge Morales told Senator Kerry that in 1984, when he was being tried 
for drug trafficking, two CIA agents offered him freedom in exchange for a monthly payment of 
US$250,000 to the contras.  By the time the war ended, Morales said he had given them US$3 
million.  Kerry confirmed the truth of this statement.  Morales’ pilots made repeated flights 
carrying weapons to Central America and drugs to the US, giving the contras profits of at least US$ 
40 million. 
 
Companies made in the USA: Kaibiles & co., Atlacatl Inc., Escuadroneros Ltd. 
The nexus between US anti-insurgent policy, militarism and drug traffickers is the missing link 
between the past and present of the Central American drugs trade.  The death squads and the 
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elite military forces (Guatemala’s Kaibiles and El Salvador’s Atlacatl Battalion) trained by the US 
Army to conduct operations against rebel forces are nowadays key pieces of the regional drugs 
jigsaw. 1 Given that the growth of militarism went hand in hand with the growth of US military 
presence, Robert Holden prefers to talk about US-Central American military power.  In this he 
makes clear the true extent and reach of US military power in the region, with which the empire 
supported and fomented the Central American oligarchs’ counter-offensive. 2 
The US provided US$1.2 billion in military aid to El Salvador during the 1980s and half that 
amount to Honduras.  From the 1960s, Guatemala received almost all its pistols and rifles from the 
US before Israel became its principal supplier.  In total, the US provided US$2.3 billion in direct 
military aid. 3 This support led to a fusion between the State and militarism.  “From a long-term 
perspective, the Guatemalan State has been a military power” and during “thirty years of 
systematic anti-popular repression (1954-1985) and fewer years of armed conflict … the military’s 
role was redefined as the Praetorian guard of the bourgeois order.” 4 
Both the armed conflict and the peace process were possible not only because of internal 
factors but also because they suited US interests. 5  In the first place, Latin America was a bastion 
against communism but with the fall of the Berlin Wall it stopped being a Cold War battlefield. 6 
Consequently, Torres-Rivas concludes that “democratization wasn’t a transition but rather the 
result of pacts between factions of the military, business and political elite guided by ‘the 
Embassy’s’ initiatives.” 7 But it wasn’t possible to stop the war dynamic with a decree.  Central 
America’s armies had grown.  Guatemala’s, which had 27,000 members at the end of the 1970s, 
had reached 55,000 by the mid-1980s, not counting members of the militarized police or the 
paramilitaries. Its reduction to 15,500 soldiers in 2004 was a time bomb. 8 What should be done 
with the demobilized men? 
While there were 55,000 soldiers, the number of paramilitaries reached 1.2 million, most 
of them, according to Dutch social scientist Dirk Kruijt, “indigenous auxiliary troops licensed to kill, 
rape, burn and destroy.” 9  What could be done with those even more uncontrollable paramilitary 
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forces and with the wake of resentment and potential vendettas?  Kruijt estimates that around a 
third of the combatants from both sides—soldiers, paramilitaries and guerrillas—went to the 
United States as either legal or undocumented immigrants to escape their desperate situation.1 
Other ex-combatants remained, forming part of an unwanted legacy.  Viewed from the 
second decade of the 21st century, this legacy doesn’t seem clear, unlike in the mid-1990s when 
Edelberto Torres-Rivas wrote: “One of the most expressive forms of disorder in several of the 
region’s societies can be seen in the violent acts of warriors who don’t want to rest because they 
consider themselves, at the limits of subjectivity, the victims of unrewarded heroism.   Dozens of 
young men went to war expecting some kind of recompense.  The demobilized Nicaraguan 
contras, both the Sandinista and Salvadoran soldiers discharged following the Peace Accords and 
the retired FMLN guerillas make up a negatively defined homogenous group: they are formerly 
young, largely ex-peasants who had no chance to gain any kind of professional qualification.  They 
are the human results of negation by a system they defended or threatened that now can’t 
incorporate them.  Contrary to their rights, they constitute a factor of repeated disorder.” 2 
What makes the legacy even more ominous is that the collaboration between drug 
traffickers and the military isn’t limited to retired soldiers.  Francisco Goldman points to the cross-
fertilization of the military and organized crime: “Members of Guatemala’s Army grew rich 
through criminal activities such as drug trafficking, kidnapping, car theft, smuggling, extortion and 
others.” 3 According to reporters for the Mexican magazine Proceso, “Out of reach of the Mexican 
government, Joaquín el Chapo Guzmán moved freely in Guatemala and Honduras with “military” 
protection, personally directing the movement of drugs from Central America to Mexico and the 
US. 4  
 
Regional re-militarization: Putting out fires with gasoline 
The numerical reduction of the Central American militaries didn’t imply an associated 
dismantlement of their political influence or culture.  Their bayonets throw a long shadow.  
Wolseth holds that the presence of American military advisers in Honduras created an 
environment in which authoritarian and armed tactics were the norm among Honduran military 
and police (bodies that were separate until the 1990s). Recently declassified CIA information 
                                            
1 Ibíd., p.232. 
2 Torres-Rivas, 1996, p.160. 
3 Goldman, 2009, p.315. 
4 Carrasco, 2012, p.151. 
  112 
reveals that, while US ambassador in Honduras during the 1980s, John Negroponte had 
encouraged the military to use dirty military tactics against the Honduran population and arranged 
for Argentine military to train the Honduran forces.  According to Wolseth, this training and dirty 
war are commonplace in today’s Honduras in the form of extrajudicial executions of poor, 
homeless children and youths. 1  The zero tolerance policies and use of the special ops police “Los 
Cobras” give formal backing to this legacy of authoritarianism and exercise of power through 
violence.  From this point of view, violence is a legacy and extension of the war.  The perpetrators 
of violence reproduce a culture based on the know-how they absorbed in the 1970s and 1980s.  
The de facto powers can accept being out of the limelight but not the abandonment of their 
methods or the loss of the levers of control that enable their primitive accumulation of resources. 
A curious, paradoxical effect of the increasing violence and drug-related activities is the 
buttressing of the power of a military that still, as in the past, enjoys Uncle Sam’s blessing and 
patronage.  Everything happens under the ideological umbrella of public security, which feeds on 
mixophobia, liquid fears and uncontrollable surveillance, leading to the loss of autonomy of penal 
justice, now subordinated to punitive populism.  The 2010 edition of the Comparative Atlas of 
Defence in Latin America and the Caribbean reports that the Salvadoran defense budget increased 
by almost 20% between 2006 and 2010.  In the same period Guatemala’s defense budget 
increased by almost 16% and Honduras’ by 64%.2  During 2011, the Pentagon increased its military 
spending in Honduras by 71% over the year before, spending US$53.8 million.  According to the US 
State Department, Washington’s annual aid to Central America to fight drug trafficking increased 
by 75% from 2008 to 2012, reaching a total of US$496 million, with another US$107 million in 
2013 bring it up to more than US$600 million. 3  This funding provides the foundations for the 
region’s remilitarization.  Given that it reinforces the base of the disease the US says it wants to 
cure, it’s a strategy of putting out fires with gasoline. 
Guatemala has many symptoms that presage a return to the past of rifles, cartridge belts 
and bayonets, or at least show it’s resisting its demise.  The Peace Accords’ key actors failed to 
internalize the norms of transitional justice.4 The murder of Bishop Juan Gerardi in April 1998 
made clear the Guatemalan military leadership’s resistance to these agreements and to the 
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clarification of crimes and responsibilities. 1  Other examples include the murder of businessman 
Edgar Ordóñez Porta, who was competing with the military in oil refining; the extrajudicial 
execution and disappearance, respectively, of Quekchí peasants Rosa Pec Chub and Carlos Coc Rox 
by land-grabbling property owners; the disappearance of Mayra Gutiérrez for revealing illegal 
adoption networks; and the numerous victims of social cleansing and other epidemic 
manifestations of the corporate mafia State, that nefarious alliance between traditional oligarchs, 
some ‘new businessmen,” elements of the police and the army and common criminals. All this was 
denounced by Amnesty International in its significantly titled report “Guatemala’s Lethal Legacy: 
Past Impunity and Renewed Human Rights Violations.” 2  It provides a homeopathic sample in the 
21st century of the anti-insurgent cures of the 1970s and 1980s.  The ascent to the presidency in 
2012 of retired General Otto Pérez Molina, responsible for repression in the 80s, was the 
institutional consecration of the option for the model "firm hand, head and heart", as was 
trumpeted by his campaign slogan. 
In Honduras, the coup of 2009 put together the more conservative sectors of 
bipartisanship and the Armed Forces3, which subsequently resulted in increased amounts of 
power from the military, perceptible in the creation in 2013 of the Tropa de Inteligencia y Grupos 
de Respuesta Especial de Seguridad (Tigres) and the Military Police commissioners for the fight 
against drug trafficking and beneficiaries of training programs by US and Colombian agents. 4 The 
Coup scratched in the rhetorical veneer of security discourses and showed that the resources of 
the new model of public safety did not differ from those applied by the model of national security: 
disproportionate use of force by the coercive apparatus of the state, arrests illegal and arbitrary, 
repeated application of torture, indiscriminate introduction of states of emergency and 
suspension of constitutional guarantees, inefficient justice system and drastic censorship of 
freedom of expression.5  
The anti-mara policies, whose hooks destroy gang members and non-members alike, are 
another dimension of Central America’s remilitarization.  In El Salvador, they are a sign that the 
National Civilian Police—which emerged from the Peace Accords but from the outset included 
                                            
1 Hernández  Pico, 1998. 
2 Hernández Pico, 2002. Falla, 2012. Amnistía Internacional, 2002. 
3 Barahona, 2014, p.114. 
4 U. S. Department of State 2014. 
5 Chinchilla Mejía 2014, pp.151-155. 
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many ex-soldiers who had fought the guerillas with torture and massacres—follows a tradition 
marked by authoritarianism, disdain for human rights, lack of investigative capacity and abuse. 1 
First outcome: militarism has gained ground.  It hasn’t regained the ability to call all the 
shots but its logic and methods, superficially renewed with the conceptual varnish of public 
security, have imposed themselves as the most expeditious means of bringing order to Central 
America’s unstable and tumultuous postwar environment. Second outcome: in the grip of multiple 
fears, many Central Americans have turned to private security, a permanently buoyant business 
administered, advised and/or owned by current and former members of the military.  In 
Guatemala in 2008, there were 120,000 private security guards compared to only 19,974 police 
officers.  In Honduras the respective figures were 60,000 and 12,301 and in El Salvador, 21,146 and 
16,737. 2  With 611 private guards per 100,000 inhabitants in 2008, Central America was one of the 
areas of the continent with the greatest hiring of private security, well ahead of Mexico with 435, 
Colombia with 427 and Venezuela with 240. 3 Third outcome: the gains in these two areas place 
the military in a better position to strengthen their drug business. Violence continues, and so does 
asylum seeking. 
The object of this catalogue of dramas, which may seem like a drawn-out digression, is to 
explain that the cruelest manifestations of violence in Central America are associated with the US 
relationship to the region and the events that have marked it: deportation of gang members; the 
drug market (the consumers are in the US and the CIA acted as godmother); the empowering of 
the military; the creation and training of repressive organizations, first engaged in “legitimate” 
crimes then dedicated to illegal crime; and an arms trade that supplies organized crime. If the right 
to asylum could be claimed on the basis of moral responsibility and the historical record, the 
leading role of the US as a drug market, arms supplier and “narco-military” trainer would make it 
an almost exclusive and obligatory refuge.   
 
2.4 The Central Americans’ dilemma: give themselves up to the Migra or disobey 
 
Many Central American migrants who recently crossed the Mexican-US border as well as those 
who have lived in the United States for months or even years now face a dilemma:  give 
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themselves up to the Migra or make their own way at their own risk; apply for improbable asylum, 
betting on the lottery represented by the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials, 
or run from them like the plague, living with the uncertainty of being undocumented, not knowing 
if tonight will cut short their American dream.   
The combination of thistles that bristle with obstacles and petals that are smoothing 
immigration policy has created this dilemma; it’s hard to give a definite answer to everyone.  
Benito, a Guatemalan Quiché who has lived in Los Angeles for more than seven years, asked me:  
“What do you think will happen if I go to the Migra and give myself up so I can apply for asylum?  
My people experienced genocide and are still suffering violence.”   I took his question to a lawyer 
who’s a migration expert highly committed to helping Central Americans.  He didn’t hesitate in 
answering: his recommendation is to hold out, carry on as is until the immigration reform helps 
them regularize their status.  
The Law only makes an exception for clear DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals) 
cases.  This is the memorandum Obama used to suspend deportation for migrants aged 15 or over, 
high school graduates (or those about to become so) who arrived in the United States before they 
turned 16 and before June 2012 who pay the $465 application fee.  Fewer than 10% of 
undocumented migrants are potential DACA beneficiaries.  What the lawyer’s opinion indicates—
absurd to some and even an excuse for the crime of sidestepping it to others—is that something 
that might be a solution for some migrants isn’t necessarily one for all. 
 
The 1980 refugee act: Few admissions, many rejections 
The history of the institution of refuge and its figures shows us that official acceptance as asylum 
seekers or refugees is not a benefit to which the bulk of Central Americans arriving in the United 
States without papers can aspire.  The refugee is a relatively recent figure.  It appeared after the 
First World War when peace treaties and the fall of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman 
empires changed the demographic and territorial order of east central Europe.  In a very short 
time, a million and a half white Russians, 700,000 Armenians, 500,000 Bulgarians, a million Greeks 
and hundreds of thousands of Germans, Hungarians and Romanians left their countries.  In the 
United States, refuge was legally validated very late on.   
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The 1980 refugee act was the first comprehensive amendment of the immigration act in 
the United States.  According to Maurice A. Roberts, known as “the dean of immigration law,” 1 it 
was designed to provide a clear-cut policy and flexible solutions to meet the rapidly shifting 
developments of new armed conflicts in a turbulent world.  Nonetheless, success rates for asylum 
applications and arguments put forward by humanitarian organizations, which appeal to pity for 
migrant children who arrive at the border unaccompanied rather than to the substance of the 
refugee act, are not an indicator of its clarity and flexibility.  Nor do immigration lawyers share the 
optimism of the man who was one of the brains behind this law.  Figures show that asylum cases 
won by Central Americans are almost insignificant compared to the thousands of applications. 
 
Asylum cases granted to Central Americans in 2003-2012 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
El Salvador 121 162 248 593 556 487 322 303 259 327
Guatemala 320 383 387 632 675 546 507 460 480 536
Honduras 43 51 83 91 105 95 85 116 132 234
Nicaragua 16 7 24 35 43 51 39 35 32 35
Total 500 603 742 1,351 1,379 1,179 953 914 903 1,132  
Source: United States. Department of Homeland Security. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 
2012. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, 
2013 
 
In general terms, admission rates for asylum and refuge in the United States are low and 
have shown a marked downward trend.  President Carter ended his term with 55% and averaged 
50% throughout his administration.  In 1980 he granted refuge to 207,116 people fleeing different 
armed conflicts, a historical record unbeaten to this day.   Reagan reduced admissions to 27% in 
his first term and ended his second with 37%, despite the fact that his office started after the 1980 
refugee act came on the scene. 
 The membrane that filters refugees has become less porous during the last two 
administrations, with the US government appearing to have decided that the era of refugees is 
over.  Although Salvadorans, Guatemalans and Hondurans are among the ten nationalities most 
benefited by asylum in the United States, together with Chinese and Mexicans (a deplorable 
ranking if we consider the gap between the size of these two countries’ populations and the 
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populations of the tiny Central American nations), diminishing admissions resulting from an ever 
increasing number of applications indicates an insufficient willingness to receive them.   
As the table above shows, in the ten years between 2003 and 2012 the United States 
approved a meager 9,656 applications from the four countries most affected by wars in the 
eighties and by today’s violence.  During those ten years it deported 623,408 people belonging to 
these nationalities.  This gives us an idea of their message: refugee status is not a gateway but 
rather a miniscule hatch for the selected few. To appreciate just how narrow the selection is, let’s 
look at the series between 2006, the year in which the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees started providing enough detailed data, and 2012.  During that period, the United States 
received 48,550 applications for asylum from Salvadorans, Guatemalans and Hondurans, 
approving only 7,541 applications, 15.5% of the total.  The number of applications increased every 
year, but admission rates fell from 27% in 2006 to 9% in 2011 and 10% in 2012. 
In some ways, US asylum policy can be associated with a tacit admission of its 
responsibility in the conflicts.  For this reason, granting asylum is linked to geopolitical calculations 
and to the pressure of internal conditions.  In the absence of pressure, immigration courts haggle 
over asylum, appealing to the demanding intricacies of the law rather than its flexibility.  For this 
reason, the US government granted refuge to as little as 3% or fewer Salvadoran and Guatemalan 
applicants in the eighties on the grounds that they weren’t refugees.  That continued until a civil 
society coalition led by Protestant churches filed a petition approved in January 1991: American 
Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh Settlement, known as the ABC Agreement. After nearly six years of 
tough, complex arguments, the churches twisted the arms of the attorney general and migration 
director just to get them to apply the refugee act, a triumph supported in essence by the 
barbarous repression Guatemalans and Salvadorans were suffering in their countries, which the 
US government hadn’t acknowledged until then.1 
It isn’t clear whether the current approach to unaccompanied minors reaching the 
border—a minority among Central Americans fleeing violence—is a better tactic.  The only thing 
that is clear is that this one point scored by US civil society in favor of Salvadoran and Guatemalan 
refugees aimed at the heart of the refugee act: to receive victims of violence. William, a 
Salvadoran who lives in Los Angeles and advises a group of young Quiché Guatemalans, appealed 
to the ABC agreement.  He came to the United States when he was 16 and is now 50.  Whenever 
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he could, he took advantage of ABC rather than any initiative that might benefit underage 
migrants. 
The insistence on the minors’ drama has so muddied the waters of the immigration 
debate that, for the moment, only Republicans have obtained any gains.  When Attorney General 
Eric Holder announced that a partnership with Ameri¬Corps, a federal program offering legal 
representation to undocumented minors, would guarantee “the rights of the most vulnerable 
members of society” and that “how we treat those in need, particularly young people who must 
appear in immigration proceedings—many of whom are fleeing violence, persecution, abuse or 
trafficking—goes to the core of who we are as a nation,” 1 he didn’t make an effective statement.  
Rather he fanned the xenophobic flames of those such as Ryan Lovelace, a columnist in the 
National Review, who are of the opinion that these statements and the possibility of suspending 
deportation processes by using DACA would act as a magnet for attracting undocumented 
migrants. 2   
Perhaps Mr.  Lovelace isn’t wrong: the disproportionate number of minors detained in the 
United States and Mexico is remarkable.  Unaccompanied minors from Guatemala, Honduras and 
El Salvador represent a much greater percentage of the total number detained in the United 
States.  In 2013, they represented 20,805 of 106,420 deportees (19.5%), and 5,389 out of 77,232 
(7%) in Mexico.  The previous year the percentages had respectively been 11% and 4% in the 
United States and Mexico. 3 Does this mean that some migrants are putting themselves in the 
hands of the migration authorities, appealing to legislation and some temporarily benevolent 
procedures?  It’s possible.  If so, it was an effective tactic until the Obama administration backed 
down and once again made a show of the rigor with which it can apply the law, insisting that 
children be returned to their country of origin. 
 
To become without voice as asylum seeker or to go without papers? That is the question 
In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt stated that “the fundamental deprivation of human rights 
is manifested above all in disallowing people to have a place in the world where their opinions 
mean something and their actions are effective.”  Those who lack human rights are deprived “not 
of the right to think whatever they please, but of the right to opinion.”4 This vision returns to the 
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portrait of banishment portrayed by Euripides in his tragedy The Phoenician Women, in the 
dialogue between the banished Polyneices and his mother Jocasta on the hardships of exile: 
Jocasta: “What is it like? What is it galls the exile?”  
Polyneices: “One thing most of all; he cannot speak his mind.”1 
Parrhesia, a figure of speech that means to speak freely, to say everything without 
restrictions, implying not only freedom of speech, but the obligation to speak the truth for the 
common good, even at personal risk, distinguished Greek citizens from slaves and barbarians.  
According to Foucault, a parrhesiastes, i.e. a person who says what must be said, disconcerts 
others not so much because of what is being said, but because it calls them to task and transmits 
an incitement that requires truth to enter into action towards oneself, obtaining conditions for 
one’s own care, like a friendly hand that accompanies and challenges.2 
But a parrhesiastes can speak the truth because he or she has the right.  The circumstance 
of exiles is that they are denied that right.  Those without papers become those without voices.  
They are denied the right even to voice the words that concern their own destiny, which is the 
thing Polynieces considers their greatest deprivation.  If you don’t have the right of free speech, 
Foucault holds, detailing Polynieces argument, you are unable to exercise any kind of power and 
thus are in the same situation as a slave.3 
This is what happens, according to Giorgio Agamben, in the nation-state system where 
“the so-called sacred and inalienable rights of man show themselves to lack every protection and 
reality at the moment in which they can no longer take the form of rights belonging to citizens of a 
state.”4 The supposed universality of human rights thus remains constrained by historical function: 
the inscription of natural life in the juridical-political order of the nation-State. For the purposes of 
this bio-politics, birth is the immediate bearer of sovereignty but the human being as such, the 
supposed bearer of these rights, dissolves into a different category: the citizen.5  Birth appears as 
the basis of all rights, but their exercise is associated with the nation.  Thus the refugee, in whom 
birth and nation are at odds, displays the hidden vulnerability of “bare life,” according to 
                                            
1 Eurípides, 1979, p.114. 
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Agamben, “representing the first and only real appearance of the man without the citizen’s mask 
that constantly veils him.” 1  
The refugee is an unsettling figure because it shows how the judicial ordering of the 
nation-State breaks the identity between human being and citizen.  Starting with the premise that 
the exile is the life figure in its immediate and original relation with sovereign power, Agamben 
maintains that the refugee is the only category in which we can glimpse today the forms and limits 
of the political community to come.  The refugee could, in his opinion, be the only figure based on 
which political philosophy can be rebuilt, once we unreservedly decide to abandon the 
fundamental concepts by which, up till now, we have represented political subjects: human 
beings, citizens with rights, the sovereign people, the worker... 2 Agamben’s argument loses its 
capacity to explain not because it’s useless when he talks about the total lack of rights, as the 
critics who refute him maintain, calling on the inalienable right to possess rights which, according 
to Arendt, helps everyone. 3  It is rather for having chosen the wrong metaphor: the condition of 
exile doesn’t refer to bare life but to lack of a voice, to being unable to discuss and decide one’s 
own destiny, to a political condition beyond politics, like that of the slave in ancient Greece, 
according to what Euripides maintained through Polynieces’ mouth over 2,400 years ago.    
Most Central Americans who enter the United States opted not to give up this voice; that 
was their choice when faced with the dilemma of “seeking asylum” or “going undocumented.”  
The difference between the millions of undocumented who evaded immigration control and the 
thousands of applicants for asylum is that the applicants have given immigration judges and other 
officials the last word on their possibility of staying in the United States. Undocumented migrants 
didn’t give up this word.   Most Central Americans are becoming refugees by their own hand.  The 
undocumented women and men scattered through thousands of cities in the United States have in 
common the fact that they haven’t given up speaking their word.  They refuse to be “homo sacer” 
(sacred man), consecrated to the death their deportation sometimes becomes.  They didn’t give 
over to the State all rights to decide on their immediate future.   
Agamben states that “only in a world in which the spaces of states have been thus 
perforated and topologically deformed and in which the citizen has been able to recognize the 
refugee that he or she is—only in such a world is the political survival of humankind today 
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thinkable.” 1 What’s happening is that it is the undocumented migrants who perforate and 
penetrate the spaces of the States and recognize the potential citizens they themselves are.  In the 
meantime, they are taking over spaces by their own hand.  The 11,598 Central Americans who 
sought asylum in the United States last year probably represent a bare 3% of those who entered 
without papers the same year.   Mexican migration authorities calculate that for every detainee, 
three migrants escape from the elongated sieve Mexico has become, thanks to the will of its 
politicians. 2  In the United States, an average of 180,000 migrants a year was expelled between 
1990 and 2010, but 8 million managed to enter during that same period, almost 381,000 a year. 3  
Nor is asylum the main penultimate rung before residency: the 3,623 Salvadoran 
refugees/asylum seekers who obtained an adjustment to their status as residents barely 
represented 2.5% of the 146,980 Salvadorans who settled legally in the United States between 
1991 and 1996.  Not even in its golden age with the implementation of the 1980 refugee act was 
asylum/refuge a wide open road to legal settlement in the United States.  Between 1987 and 
1996, only 31,921 Central Americans refugees and asylum seekers achieved permanent residence. 
4 This figure represents barely 5% of the 589,577 Central Americans admitted legally, a figure that 
includes Central Americans who entered through the big open door for immediate family 
members of US citizens (spouses, children or parents).  It is also equal to only 3.5% of the 
undocumented in 1996, which gives an idea of how far this adjustment to status was from being a 
solution to the lack of documents.   In fact, Central Americans who between the 1970s and 2004 
used the refugee route as a way to achieve residency equal barely 6% of the 660,000 
undocumented Central Americans in 1996.5 While Republicans and Democrats are locked in a 
continuing battle, Central Americans who deserve refuge for so many reasons and to whom it is 
granted with lukewarm stinginess continue winning those spaces for themselves, with their own 
voices and hands. 
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3. Solid and liquid border vigilance 
“Liquid” vigilance: The banoptic model 
The surveillance operations of the policies designed to repel immigrants have both “solid” and 
“liquid” expressions, often more theatrical than effective, that are executed to “thicken” the 
borders. “Solid” vigilance draws on the idea of the panopticon: a form of architecture that allows 
surveillance, imprisonment, monitoring, confinement and control.  According to sociologist 
Zygmunt Bauman, that model is alive and well and has been electronically reinforced, but is no 
longer the universal pattern of domination, as it is now restricted to prisons, psychiatric hospitals, 
camps and other institutions.  It’s no longer used to incapacitate bodies.1 
When the poor escape their neighborhoods and flee their countries, the surveillance 
efforts add another strategy, known as the “banopticon,” a model applied to the world’s 
marginalized.  This neologism, coined by Didier Bigo, Professor at King’s College London 
Department of War studies, and based on the word “ban” (exclusion), refers to a strict vigilance 
exercised through profiling using computer technology.2 The banopticon fulfills two functions: 
building exclusion and applying measures.  Using the terminology of feminist philosopher Judith 
Butler, we can describe it as “performative exclusion,” in which the excluded group is created by 
applying a certain treatment to it.  The administrative measures subject those who are excluded so 
as to label them and that subjection in turn generates a duly classified group. 
The banopticon allows those of artisanal origin to be reproduced and expanded until they 
achieve greater sophistication and become tools of the bureaucracy in the search to build an 
ordered universe: a nation that is not a random collection of individuals, but rather a coherent 
community of citizens.3 In that imagined community, Mexicans have played a role in the US 
hierarchical racial organization in different ways throughout history.  De Genova has studied them 
as being in the crossfire of the polarity between whites and blacks established by the US racial 
economy.  In the past three decades, Central Americans have been incorporated into that group.  
Migrating to the United States subjects them to racialization as Mexicans and to similar measures 
of control and rejection.  In other words, it subjects them to the panopticon and the banopticon.  
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Bauman sustains that “the surge in the global mass of exiles, refugees, asylum seekers—or 
seekers of bread and drinking water—may indeed boost both kinds of surveillance technology.”1  
But each of them has different mechanisms and effects. The panopticon is useful for controlling 
those already identified and confined, for keeping them inside and fenced in, disciplined in 
confinement, while the banopticon repels them at a distance, excluding them with security 
measures.2  The panopticon used to be accompanied by physical violence, which implied visual—
albeit asymmetrical—and physical contact, while the banopticon privileges computerized contact, 
based as it is on the meticulous classification of populations into categories destined for different 
treatments.3 Banoptic mechanisms are more useful for containing migration because their 
function is “to promptly spot individuals who show signs of unwillingness to fall into line or who 
plot to breach those binding patterns.”4  Those that most challenge such control are migrants and 
coyotes.  That’s why the laws on illegal trafficking and their dissemination through organizations 
such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and UN agencies, which operate under 
the glossy varnish of a heroic campaign against trafficking, form part of the long legal and 
organizational arm implementing the banopticon and seeking to subject those disobedient people.   
The way the banopticon complements the panopticon is not merely a question of added 
value.  It implies a qualitative transformation because it restores vigilance in the field of liquid 
modernity, which is the paradigm Bauman uses to explain the specificities of what others call 
postmodernity, late modernity, the risk society or cognitive capitalism. It’s in this field in part 
because it’s exercised in a de-localized way.  According to David Lyon, surveillance power, as 
exercised by government departments, police agencies and private corporations, is more liquid: 
national borders no longer have just a geographical location; they now appear in databases.5 
These bases are ubiquitous; they levitate in cyberspace.  Lyon sustains that “although the 
paraphernalia of checkpoints or Customs and Immigration offices may be at border crossings, the 
use of remote databases and telecommunications networks means that the crucial—and 
consequential—checking happens extraterritorially or at least in multiple locations whose actual 
whereabouts is immaterial…”6  
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The three characteristics of the banopticon—de-localization, remote acting and 
automation—become the most comprehensive product of bureaucratic government’s 
impersonality, according to Hannah Arendt’s famous characterization: “bureaucracy, or the rule by 
an intricate system of bureaux in which no men, neither one nor the best, neither the few nor the 
many, can be held responsible, and which could be properly called the rule by Nobody.”1 
Automation, distance and de-localization remove passion from the control; they depersonalize it.   
But we will see that, as Lyon accurately observes, solid vigilance still exists and matters 
because, although power is global and extraterritorial, politics continues to be local and incapable 
of acting at a planetary level.2  To compensate for that weakness, borders have been extended 
inward and outward for each nation-State. In the post-9/11 world in which experts and politicians 
from the liberal democracies assume that security is a central value threatened by global 
terrorism, migratory policies tend to build thicker borders.3  Inside, the State applies military 
technology in the desert areas next to the border4, performs national espionage operations that 
violate basic citizens’ rights5 and breaks down the barrier between public and private by 
appropriating private information to track criminals and terrorists.6 Outside, the US government 
has been resoundingly successful in transnationalizing (in)security through a series of military and 
diplomatic alliances that allow it to engage in long-distance patrolling.  It isn’t just a question of 
inspections in airports and globalized police round-ups, or biometric techniques that allow 
disciplining and punishment beyond its borders.7 
3.1 The United States as a Border Patrol Nation 
 
The over 2,000 miles that divide Mexico and the United States make up the most extensive 
binational border and have the greatest movement in the world.8  Its natural barrier of rock and 
sand and its artificial, 687.3-mile wall9 reinforce the division of two zones already separated by 
one of the world’s most gigantic income gaps.10  In a given year, 350 million cross this border 
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legally and an unknown number cross without documents.1 In a not totally failed attempt to shape 
the surroundings and migration flows, US immigration authorities have divided the southwestern 
US border with Mexico into 9 sectors and 71 Border Patrol stations in order to manage the 
surveillance of this vast and diverse territory.  From west to east we have the San Diego sector (60 
land and 114 coastal miles with 8 stations including San Diego, the sixth most populated city in the 
United States);  El Centro (70 miles and 4 stations), Yuma (126 miles, 3 stations, sand dunes and 
military reserves); Tucson (260 miles, 8 stations including the cities of Tucson, Phoenix and 
Nogales); El Paso (268 miles including 88 miles along the Rio Grande, which at that point starts 
being the border line, 11 stations, some in New Mexico and others in Texas); Big Bend (whose 510 
miles of land border make it the largest sector and 10 stations), Del Río (210 miles and 9 stations,  
dotted with farms and ranches); Laredo (171 miles and 9 stations, which includes the city of Dallas 
and numerous rivers that flow into the Río Grande); and Río Grande Valley (currently the most 
transited by Central Americans, with 316 miles of border between river and coastline on the Gulf 
of Mexico, 9 stations and the cities of Brownsville, Río Grande City, Corpus Christi and Kingsville).2 
The region is being punished economically by the surveillance obsession.  Prolonged and 
unpredictable waiting periods at customs have impacted the competitiveness of many border 
industries and some have opted to relocate in Asia.  The consequences are multiple.  Bilateral 
trade grew at a rate of 17% between 1993 and 2000, then dropped to just 4.5% between 2000 and 
2008.3  In the midst of a depressed zone with unemployment rates higher than the national 
average (11.9% versus 9.6% in 2010), unemployment in Imperial Valley reaches almost 30%.4  The 
percentage of people living under the poverty line in these border states is also higher than the 
15.3% national average: New Mexico 20.4%, Texas 17.9%, Arizona 17.4% and California 15.8%.5 
Another point of contention is the treatment of indigenous communities, which are 
subjected to repeated insults by border patrol agents.  They are the brownest of the brown in a 
region where being brown isn’t just perceived by skin color but also by language, clothing, social 
life, places frequented and other practices and customs. Inhabiting a nation that includes 76 miles 
of border with Mexico (29% of Tucson’s migratory), their lands have been identified as among the 
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most vulnerable areas for non-authorized entrance onto US soil and as a total threat to national 
security.1 
The testimonies of Jaime Diaz, other migration attorneys and citizens—indigenous, Latinos 
and even Caucasians—who live on the border as well as the declarations of activists who, like 
Michael Siefert, promote demilitarization of the border reveal various transformations. First is the 
application of the banoptic: being brown and non-English-speaking are the factors that most alert 
the border vigilance bureaucrats.  Application begins in public spaces with street bureaucracy.  In 
this terrain of its first application, new technologies are not needed.  The banoptic is in the 
memes—replicators of human conduct2—of the Border Patrol agents, whose racial prejudices, at 
times exacerbated because they are members and seek to distinguish/distance themselves from 
the ethnicity that so torments them, put in motion a process in which a certain feature becomes a 
stigma.  The citizenry’s genotype is somewhat hidden.  The Border Patrol agent has before him 
only a phenotype of brown.   On the basis of this preverbal presence, the first unfavorable 
hypothesis is formed.  When an identity document is shown on demand, the authenticity of the 
genotype “citizen” is investigated. The first indicator is language.  More scrutiny is applied if the 
person carrying the identity document speaks defective English.  If investigation reveals that the 
person came into this world with the assistance of a midwife, not in a properly accredited hospital 
or clinic, the suspect has now passed the threshold of a lengthy legal process that can result in 
expulsion. Only in the second moment does the banoptic consist of a review of documents passing 
through the screen of identification statistics based on particular, potentially criminal, behavior 
and features: not speaking English, born with a midwife or in hospitals where registries were lost, 
can’t explain their situation, parents aren’t native-born, etc.  The system receives this information 
with the automation of a soda machine dispenser, emitting cancelations of citizenships.  
The second transformation of the border is the combination of browning and the 9/11 
attacks.  The browning of the border—the sustained increase of the Latino population to the point 
of becoming the majority, a feature all US border populations have in common—has been 
accompanied by a deterioration of the treatment for native-born, legal residents, tourists and 
undocumented alike.  Some academics, among them Tony Payán, have concluded that the issue of 
security and the resultant vigilance has injected more vulnerability and loss of rights into the US 
migration legal system than ever before and has given rise to a generalized caste system among 
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various social groups, where whiteness and money are key factors. Tijuana/San Diego and Ciudad 
Juárez/El Paso, which are sites for maquilas [assembly plants for re-export across the border] and 
residences for workers and administrators, are and have been points of numerous and everyday 
border crossings.  But these crossings are accompanied by inspections at the border and its 
surrounding areas.  This means daily discrimination and a distrusting use of urban spaces: streets, 
buses and shops are sites where one risks being taken for undocumented.1  Color, associated with 
race and social class, carries more weight than ethnicity.  There are academics who consider that 
ideas about race, class, ethnicity and nationalism are fluid categories that have changed with time, 
while the color hierarchy has been passively and silently maintained since colonialism: “colorism” 
is more resistant that racism. The prison of color persists in our times with a long tradition that 
reinforces the stigma.2  Visitors’ common compliment to the border’s inhabitants is mention of 
their whiteness. History books emphasize that not only on the gringo side but also in Sonora there 
were women famous for being tall, white and the most beautiful in all of Mexico.  Nineteenth-
century visitors such as Marie Robinson Wright contributed to this image, writing that Sonoran 
women had “light colored hair, predominantly blue eyes and many beautiful heads full of brown 
hair like Cleopatra.”3 
Historian Kelly Lytle Hernández coined the expression Mexican Brown as a rhetorical and 
conceptual tool to underscore the fact that “regardless of immigration or citizenship status, it was 
Mexican Browns rather than abstract Mexicans who lived within the Border Patrol’s sphere of 
suspicion.”4  According to Hernández, all documents related to the Border Patrol, from 
correspondence and official archives to cultural artifacts—humoristic vignettes, jokes and 
autobiographies—reflect the tacit distinctions of gender, class and complexion that constitute the 
Border Patrol’s target. In the sarcastic words of one agent: the primary objective of the Border 
Patrol is “a Mexican male; about 5.5” to 5.8"; dark brown hair; brown eyes; dark complexion; 
wearing huaraches… and so on.”5 
A third transformation of the border: the plenary powers granted to the DHS have 
resulted in a degradation of the sovereignty of local powers and ethnicities with the most dramatic 
effect being the expulsion of citizens. The fact that local documents are worth little to nothing to 
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the statistical filters of border vigilance not only relegates the state authorities that issue these 
documents to second place as effective governors and guarantors of the official identity of citizens 
but also nullifies the authority, credibility, actions and words of other bureaucracies: police who 
opt not to collaborate with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), churches bearing witness 
for members of their congregations and giving shelter to the homeless regardless of migratory 
status and law firms representing the cases of their clients, among others. 
The upshot of applying the banoptic—a brown border in the post 9/11 era and the 
nullification of local bureaucracies—is the expulsion of one’s own people who haven’t been 
entirely incorporated.  Based on interesting case studies, Payán sustains that citizenship makes 
those who possess it immune from deportation: even if they are carrying drugs, trafficking arms, 
“they will never be deported”1, but we can establish the contrary: even full-blown citizens with a 
Mexican Brown phenotype are far from immune in a region subjected to racial prophylaxis.   
The fourth transformation of the border is militarization.  The banoptic, war on crime and 
persecution of the undocumented couldn’t exist without militarization, which is blatant in the 
growing use of drones and other military technologies.  Clausewitz points out: “Fighting has 
determined everything appertaining to arms and equipment, and these in turn modify the mode 
of fighting; there is, therefore, a reciprocity of action between the two.”2 In the military sphere, 
means shape the end and the nature of the actions.  More than an official declaration, the military 
implements and the number of troops and their conduct are what advise us of war and 
militarization.  The perception of the Tohono O’odham people of the Border Patrol as an 
“occupation army” finds an empirical base in its implements, prerogatives and determination to 
subordinate local powers. The militarization of the border as if it is a war zone, with the de facto 
suspension of civil rights, warrants scrutiny.  While CNN and other big television networks turn 
their cameras and microphones to abuses committed by Putin in Russia, Castro in Cuba and 
Maduro in Venezuela, the critical situation of people living on the southwestern border of the 
United States is not newsworthy, becoming as foreign as Ugaritic Bible to the average US citizen.  
The war being waged on the border barely captures major media attention even though—or 
perhaps because—it compromises real democracy and is linked to financial interests that want to 
prolong it.  
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In his essential book, The militarization of the US-Mexico border 1978-1992, Timothy J. 
Dunn documents the increasing investment in border control by the US federal government during 
the eighties to stop Central American migration.  Between 1978 and 1992 the Border Patrol team 
grew from 2,580 to 4,948, while its funding increased from US$78 to US$326 million.1  Of that, the 
funding for border patrol agents increased by 92%, for border patrol by 317% and for deportations 
355%.  These operations and new laws produced even greater growth.  Between 1992 and 2005 
the number of Border Patrol agents doubled, reaching nearly 11,000, of whom 9,633 were on the 
southern border and only 1,031 on the northern border. There was another 83.5% increase in 
Border Patrol members between 2005 and 2014 on the southern border alone, where the legion 
grew to the 18,156 agents it currently has.  In the 21 years between Operation Blockade and 2014, 
the number of Border Patrol agents on that border increased 427%, almost four times the 111% 
increase it registered in the 44 years between 1941 and 1985.2 Militarization of the border isn’t 
really new, but it was very gradual for most of the 20th century, making a substantial jump only in 
the early 90s, right after the fall of the Soviet bloc marked the end of what Eric Hobsbawm 
designated in his 1994 book by the same name “The Era of Extremes: The Short 20th Century.3  
3.2 The Mexico-US border: A very lucrative theater of surveillance 
 
To enter the United States, Central American migrants must pass through one of the most 
patrolled regions on Earth.  They’re confronted by an armed legion of massive proportions at 
distinct levels of both the territory and the anti-migrant bureaucracy. Not only are there about 
20,000 Border Patrol agents.  The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has some 200,000 staff 
members, which journalist Todd Miller contends must be added to the 650,000 police officers 
trained or working under the command of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in order to get an idea of the immense army dealing with the 
country’s security.  It has become a kind of second Department of Defense.4 This army for 
domestic security can only be maintained through investments that nurture a network of 
companies, has quite rightly labeled the Border Security Industrial Complex.5  In the decade 
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following 9/11 the US government spent $90 billion on border security, most of which came to 
rest in these companies’ bank accounts.1 
 
The market of fear and the Border Security Industrial Complex 
The Border Security Industrial Complex is a term that parodies Eisenhower’s oft-quoted 
speech at the end of his presidential term on January 17, 1961.  Current ties between the 
Pentagon and private contractors—such as Lockheed Martin and General Atomics, who provided 
military equipment and services in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars—are a small example of how we 
haven’t yet turned the page of history warned by Eisenhower. The spy operations contracts he 
arranged flourished, protected by the almost non-existent restrictions of the Pentagon’s 
clandestine programs.2 
What’s been imposed on the southwest US border is a war economy.  The Sun Belt has 
become the Gun Belt: The Costa del Sol is now the Costa de Colt, producing, selling and using 
weapons in its territory. In 2002-2013, trade in guns and military services grew 45.5% worldwide, 
amounting to US$402 billion in sales.  The United States is the world’s biggest dealer, absorbing 
more than half this trade.  Six of the largest armaments and military services companies are 
headquartered in the US: Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman and United 
Technologies.  A large part of their production is for domestic purchase—by the State—but not for 
domestic use: they’re for firing overseas.3 Some of these companies have invested in lobbying for 
more stringent migration laws and include reinforcing border militarization.  Dennis L. Hoffman, a 
professor at Arizona State University specializing in the defense industry’s future market potential, 
has concluded: “This push towards border security fits very well with the need to create an 
ongoing stream of revenue.”4 
The armaments companies are chasing after the DHS budget: US$61 billion dollars in 
2014.5  The DHS has been contracting them since at least 2006, the year Boeing was chosen to 
build a virtual wall on the border.  In 2013, The New York Times showed a photograph of a Border 
Patrol agent alongside a tower with radar facility, a laser pointer and surveillance cameras that 
work day and night. The ensemble was built and sold to the DHS by Boeing, the second largest 
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armaments-producing company in the world and the largest producing military appurtenances 
and providing military services.  It boasted of 168,400 employees in 2013 and a total sales volume 
of over US$86.6 billion, US$30.7 billion of it in armaments sales.  Profits: US$4.585 billion.  
The US armaments industry has suffered a decrease in sales since 2011 due to the decline 
in the Pentagon’s military spending.  In this adverse climate, Boeing continued growing because it 
exploited another niche in the market: security on the southwest border.1 
 
Game of Drones: “Between dirty hands and empty bellies” 
General Atomics, ranked 44th in the military industry’s market, negotiated a US$443 million 
contract with the DHS in 2015 so that its reconnaissance drones—field tested in mapping Iranian 
military bases—could comb the border.2 This company positioned its brand in the border security 
niche with the provision of Predator and Reaper drones, devices the CIA used in 2006-2013 against 
the Al Qaeda3 high command and over 1,900 insurgents in tribal areas of Pakistan.4  Its new 
contracts are a window to the future of border vigilance.  General Atomics has already sold 10 
Predators B to CBP at a cost of $4,500 million. The cost of maintaining these drones in the air is 
US$3,234 an hour, bringing each one’s sustained flight for one year up to $28.5 million.  CBP 
intends to have 18 drones in 2016 and 24 in subsequent years, according to the agreement signed 
in 2012 with General Atomics.5  Perhaps it’s banking on the 58% US public approval of the drone 
strikes in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, according to the Pew Research Center.6  
Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) included as wars both 
extermination processes and simple armed observation, which is what takes place on the border.7  
That’s why it’s legitimate to point out that this war economy is creating war zones.  That shift is 
evident in the treatment of migrants as enemies, patrolling increasingly being conducted as a 
military action and the border administered as an occupied zone. This dynamic’s end isn’t in sight, 
fueled as it is by numerous economic interests.  Border Patrol and its activities are only a part of 
this industrial chain.  Its steel links must provide some detainees—raids and immigration courts 
provide others—for the prison-industrial complex’s thriving migration branch, filling beds 
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mandated and budgeted for by law: 34,000 of them, on average.  Reducing the number of 
detainees would result in budgetary reduction, which ICE wants to avoid at all costs.  And, so far, 
the detainees are paying this cost, facing onerous bureaucratic procedures aimed at prolonging 
their captivity until Migration hunts down another one to fill the bed. The private prison industry is 
investing in towns from New Mexico to New Jersey, which are eager for detention centers to be 
installed so federal money will flow their way, creating jobs.1  Many others are also involved in the 
border vigilance industry with solid—and also liquid—financial interests: the wall’s construction 
companies, those who train patrol officers, those who develop vigilance technologies and others.  
All prosper.  However, some Border Patrol results are inversely proportional to their budgetary 
voracity. Rousing panic about an unprotected border, the DHS makes scurrilous appeals on its 
webpage to raise public support for its corporate sustainability.2  A question emerges: Does 
curbing migration really depend on increased budget and patrols? 
How can so much ineffectiveness be explained? 
In 1956 C. Wright Mills warned that the military “has become the largest and most expensive 
feature of government, and, although well versed in smiling public relations now has the grim and 
clumsy efficiency of a sprawling bureaucratic domain.”3 Border Patrol presents this same clumsy 
efficiency of a sprawling domain.  Its border vigilance has undergone qualitative transformation 
and obtained quantitative staff and budgetary support without achieving the promised increase in 
effectiveness.  On the contrary, there’s been a remarkable decrease in its performance.  
In 1926 Border Patrol made 22,326 detentions on the southwest border and apprehended 
33,159 immigration law violators on both borders4; with 104 agents at the time, that means a 
productivity of 319 apprehensions per agent.5  Productivity remained steady over the decades, 
with 322 in 1992 and 352 in 1993.  Since then—precisely when the number of agents multiplied 
and its budget soared—productivity plummeted. In two decades (1993-2012), the southern 
border’s number of agents and budget respectively increased 438.5% and 874%.  In contrast, 
effectiveness recorded an inverse growth rate: in 2012, Border Patrol agents on this same border 
only made 29% of the 1993 captures and their productivity was only 5.5% of 20 years earlier, going 
from 352 to 18 per agent.  This means that the cost of each capture went from $150 in 1993 to 
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$2,754 in 2012, if calculations were based on a single agent’s $53,000 salary and immigrants were 
the Border Patrol’s exclusive mission.1  But the increased bureaucracy and the cost of the vigilance 
technologies provided by the large armaments companies, among other direct and indirect costs, 
means that the cost of each capture actually rose from $300 to almost $10,000.2 No private 
company could support such dire extravagance for long. The strongest and most sustained budget 
increase was between 2006 and 2013, which is also the period of greatest decline in productivity. 
Although Border Control had been showing signs of declining productivity since 1993, it was 
precisely in 2001—the 9/11 year—that its budgetary endowment parted company from 
effectiveness and crossed over to declining achievements and growing budget. 
 
 
Source: Own calculation based on the U.S. Customs and Border Protection statistics3 
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Source: Own calculation based on the U.S. Customs and Border Protection statistics1 
 
Despite the much-vaunted Central American exodus, the fall in productivity continued.  
The average patrol agent needs almost two weeks to make an apprehension.2 The apprehension 
rate varies according to sector and station, ranging from 50 apprehensions in Río Grande Valley to 
4.2 in El Paso.  In the latter, each agent needs three months to identify and detain an 
undocumented person, a rate presumably reflecting the migrant flow.3 The hypothetical 
correlation between apprehensions and illegal crossings is the main premise in concluding that the 
decline in captures is due to a decline in migration flow caused by the economic crisis and the 
persuasive effect of border patrolling, a theory held by governmental consultants4 and echoed by 
civil society organizations.5  But if there’s truly a dwindling flow, why increase patrol agents? The 
truth is that this theory doesn’t hold up if we compare apprehension figures and the number of 
undocumented persons as calculated by the Pew Research Center, an institution that bases its 
migration flow calculations on its own surveys and not on apprehensions.  There is no such 
correlation.  The numbers of undocumented migrants are decreasing not necessarily because 
fewer are arriving but because those who already did are gradually becoming legalized through 
temporary or permanent residence, through DACA, TPS, etc. 
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Source: Own calculation based on the U.S. Customs and Border Protection and Pew Research Center statistics1 
Like any other figure concerning a somewhat clandestine population, this data has to be 
taken as a rough guide.2  And apprehension data must be taken with no less care: the figure shows 
events, not individuals. Congressional consultants favoring migration controls contemplate that 
apprehensions may over-represent the number of people crossing3, but seem to ignore that they 
may also underestimate it: migrants sometimes manage to use blind spots for a long time before 
Border Patrol detects them.   They also sometimes make fewer crossings per year, as was the case 
with temporary Mexican migrants who changed status to being permanent migrants.  They’re an 
example of why the number of unauthorized crossings can diminish but not the number of 
unauthorized migrants who cross each year. Douglas Massey, a US sociologist specializing in 
immigration, noted that Mexicans have stopped visiting their families for Christmas and Easter.4 
He also showed that in the 1990s one in every three migrants returned to Mexico every year, 
which implies that 70% of Mexican migrants returned within five years.5  Here we have an 
unsuspected and ironic effect of migration control: temporary migration changing into permanent 
settlement.  The costs and dangers of crossing the border lead many migrants to opt for a 
permanent crossing.  We would therefore have fewer migrants crossing but more unauthorized 
migrants. 
An additional element in the fallibility of apprehensions as an indicator of flow is the fact 
that Mexico’s National Migration Institute recorded an increase of 121% in the flow of Central 
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Americans between 2002 and 2005.1  Yet in that period, apprehensions of Central Americans by 
Border Patrol increased by only 26%.2  What was the real flow: 121% or 26%?  From these figures 
and considerations we can infer an indisputable fact: if the flow has declined, it hasn’t necessarily 
done so in the same proportion as apprehensions.  Other explanations for Border Patrol’s 
declining productivity are needed. I’ll discuss some explanations by way of hypothesis.  The first is 
a variant of what economists call the fallacy of composition3, which in this case is expressed as the 
impossibility of 18,546 agents making 6.5 million apprehensions where 3,444 agents made 1.2 
million.  It isn’t only because the migrant flow isn’t that big or because inevitably there’s been a 
decline in flow—in which case the increase in agents would be superfluous—but because the 
increase in agents doesn’t directly and necessarily translate into more thorough and widespread 
coverage. Irrespective of increases in the number of agents, inhospitable areas will remain poorly 
patrolled and migrants will continue entering using false or authentic but rented passports, or 
other fraudulent means of seeking vigilance-free access.  A large staff increases the probabilities of 
agents being situated in safe areas and less rational use being made of man-hours.  It’s proven 
that the number of agents doesn’t affect some crossing strategies (false documents, tunnels, 
secondary roads)4 and that not enough hours are spent patrolling the border.  
Patrolling has many weak points.  The checkpoints aren’t permanent and Border Patrol doesn’t 
even record the hours an agent spends at a specific checkpoint.5  Federal investigations have 
shown that migrants wait in the area covered by Border Patrol for the 8-hour closing—which takes 
place every fortnight—so as to cross without risk of being captured.6 
Golash-Boza argues that a mere increase in agents isn’t enough, because ICE is working 
flat out but lacks vehicles, and detention centers as well as the judges, lawyers and other 
migration laws operatives needed to increase deportations.7 But the reality is simpler: there aren’t 
enough detentions.  It’s not just about a predictable decline of marginal utility—there wasn’t a 
proportionate increase in captures for each agent added8—but of absolute utility: there’re more 
agents and fewer captures. Only a vigilance-obsessed State can afford to ignore the curve of the 
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marginal product of labor: the relationship between costs and the amount of labor.  A rational 
businessman, eager to maximize his profits, would choose the number of employees whose 
marginal product of labor equals the market’s wage rate.1  Instead of that, Border Patrol increases 
the number of agents and uses new technologies that—against all predictions—need more staff:  
20 Border Patrol agents are needed to operate a single drone2 and up to 2,000 analysts are 
required to process the information it collects.3  Border Patrol is in no way governed by capital’s 
logical paradigm: the cost-benefit calculation.  Its possibilities of maintaining this sprawling 
domain policy is played out in an arena that has nothing directly to do with economic logic. 
Added to the reasons given for the decline in apprehensions is that migrants and their 
coyotes are always searching for paths untraveled by agents.  They relocate to areas where 
vigilance is more complicated.  They take advantage of the reduction in air patrols.4 They find 
small roads and local byways where they can dodge the patrols.   They change their routes faster 
than Border Patrol changes its strategies.  And this partly explains why more agents and more 
migrants aren’t mutually exclusive: patrol agents weren’t situated on the migrants’ new routes, 
where there were more Central Americans. Judging by the apprehensions of non-Mexican 
undocumented migrants—of which Central Americans are the majority—the Río Grande Valley 
sector (which covers McAllen and Brownsville) has risen in importance as a port of entry: 10,742 
to 192,925 captured by border patrols in 2000 and 2014.  The Tucson sector—whose main 
customs point is in Nogales—rose from 2,201 to 19,045.  Laredo jumped from 3,336 to 17,509.5 
The Río Grande Valley sector is also, along with Big Ben, the one with the highest percentage of 
known successful entries:  39% in 2009 and 31% in 2013.6 Migration hasn’t shown the same 
flexibility in moving its troops: it stubbornly stays in Tucson, where it had 4,052 agents in 
September 2014, and doesn’t patrol much in the Rio Grande Valley sector, where it only placed 
3,064 agents.7 
Guided by the volume of apprehensions in 1998-2012—a period when Tucson was the 
main unauthorized port of entry—Border Patrol placed 22% of its agents there in 2014 and made 
18% of its captures, while the 17% of its agents placed in the Rio Grande Valley were responsible 
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for 53.5% of the apprehensions on the southwest border. In 2003-2006, the numbers of Mexicans 
captured averaged over 1 million a year and in 2014 just 226,771.  But in 2003-2014, captures of 
Guatemalans went from 10,355 to 81,116; Hondurans from 16,632 to 91,475 and Salvadorans 
from 11,757 to 66,638.1  Those of Nicaraguans rose from 1,055 to 2,712 in 2003-2013.2  In 2014, 
the numbers of Central Americans apprehended exceeded those of Mexicans for the first time in 
Border Patrol history.3  If captures are an indication of flow, as the official position claims, Border 
Patrol should have located its agents at the crossing points of the group of nationalities with 
increasing entries.  But it continues over-patrolling Tucson, as in the old days (1995-2010) of high 
Mexican migration and numerous crossings in this area. 
Another far from negligible element explaining Border Patrol’s poor performance is 
corruption, facilitated by the fact that agents usually patrol alone and their closest colleague may 
be 10-20 miles away.4 Border expert Tony Payán argues that US agents’ corruption—although less 
widespread and systematic than in the Mexican police—has a huge impact: one corrupt Border 
Patrol agent is enough to enable the introduction of tons of drugs generating hundreds of millions 
of dollars for a cartel.5  The corruption of US agents is much more profitable than that of Mexicans. 
If we apply Payán’s findings about drug trafficking to migrants, we can see that one agent making 
deals with a few coyotes can clear the way for thousands of migrants in a matter of days or even 
hours.  This is the subject of the film “The Border” (1982), where agent Charlie Smith (Jack 
Nicholson) faces a group of corrupt Border Patrol colleagues in El Paso who have a trafficking 
network and detain and kill the competition’s traffickers. 
 Attrition among patrol agents has shown an upward trend since 1995, adding more than a 
little grain of sand to Border Patrol’s desert of effectiveness.  The dropout rate averaged 5% in 
1990-1994 but exceeded 10% in 1995-2001.  The following year it jumped to 18%.  In 2005 it fell to 
4%, only to rise back to 10% in 2007-2009.  The slight increase in agents in 2011-2013 and 
decrease from 2013 to 2014 wasn’t scheduled but followed the impact of attrition6: the new 
contracts didn’t add agents; they merely replaced those who had decided to stop being “the US 
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frontline” and “protecting the United States against terrorists and the instruments of terror.”1 A 
congressional investigation identified four main reasons for desertion: dissatisfaction with the 
type of work, low wages compared to other enforcement branches, poor working conditions and a 
lack of vertical and lateral mobility.2 There’s evidence that abuse and the climate of mistrust are 
other, not insignificant factors.  For example, in July 2009 agent Bryan González became victim to 
Border Patrol’s prevailing climate of mutual vigilance, Cold War and partisan thinking.  He was 
dismissed for commenting about how the demand for drugs in the US boosts drug trafficking in 
Mexico and other opinions indicating a certain level of sociological thought and comprehension of 
the migrants’ motivation. 
Finally, I offer another important factor bringing down Border Patrol’s effectiveness: the 
dramatic evolution of the southwest border.  Borders aren’t static: they expand and contract 
according to economic, social and military dynamics, in keeping with the pressures of capital and 
xenophobia. The 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) tripled trade between the 
United States and Mexico, with border crossings multiplying in the last 20 years.3  In 2010 some 
300,000 Mexican workers (“transnational citizens”) crossed the border every day or at least once a 
week with work permits and thousands more crossed with border passes.4 Between 1995 and 
2014 the number of trucks checked on the US borders with Mexico and Canada went from almost 
8 to over 11 million and pedestrians from 33.5 to 41.6 million.5  More than $1 billion in 
merchandise crossed the border every day.  Binational trade by land went from $71 billion in 1995 
to $255 billion in 2010.6 
To avoid losing control of this dynamic, Border Patrol increased its agents from 4,945 to 
20,863 at that time, a privileged and exceptional situation in a state agency that nationally 
reduced its employees from 4.4 to 4.2 million.7  This body of patrol guards and their colleagues in 
                                            
1 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “America’s frontline” U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Vision and 
strategy 2020. U.S. Customs and Border Protection Strategic Plan, 
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4 Nevins, 2010, p.8. 
5 U.S. Department of Transportation, Border Crossing/Entry Data 
http://transborder.bts.gov/programs/international/transborder/TBDR_BC/TBDR_BCQ.html [25/02/2015] 
6 Lee et al., 2013, p.31. 
7 U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Data, Analysis & Documentation, Federal Employment Reports, 
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  140 
CBP have had a sustained increase that in recent decades has no correlation with border 
movement. After 9/11, the flow of merchandise and passengers shows a sharp decline: from 49.6 
to 41.6 million pedestrians between 2003 and 2014.1  The slight increases in other areas are offset 
by the increase in agents, so that if in 2003 a CBP official oversaw 72 loaded containers, 471 trucks 
and 2,129 pedestrians, in 2014 he was only dealing with 34 containers, 188 trucks and 699 
pedestrians.  However, these flat figures don’t reflect qualitative changes: 678,941 people entered 
every day in 2014 by one or other of the land borders. With more border miles to cover and very 
diverse activities to be monitored—from controlling disease in imported meat to finding cocaine, 
from intellectual property rights to permits for importing pharmaceuticals and the neutralization 
of Osama Bin Laden’s disciples—the processing of these entries was the responsibility of 59,544 
officials spread over 328 ports of entry.2 Land vigilance’s profusion of functions has produced 
changes on the border.  It hasn’t just become longer with respect to passengers and miles to be 
covered; it’s also become more banoptic, armed, metallic and multicolored: traffickers, smugglers, 
migrants, drug dealers, terrorists, etc.  In 2005, Border Patrol agents only had effective coverage of 
288 miles (15% of the border) while in 2010 it was increased to 1,107 miles (57% of the border), a 
figure that arouses confusion about the decline in apprehensions.3 
The growth of the border and Border Patrol’s post-9/11 tasks makes the scrupulous check-
ups—on which territorial control depends—materially unfeasible or at least incompatible with the 
demands for accelerated mobility of merchandise.  In 1995, a senior Migration officer said of the 
not yet so congested border: “If we examined every truck for narcotics arriving into the United 
States along the southwest border… Customs would back up the truck traffic bumper-to-bumper 
into Mexico City in just two weeks….  That’s 1,177 miles of trucks, end to end.”4 It’s no secret that 
NAFTA greatly boosted the cocaine trade.  Let’s bear in mind that over 70% of the colossal 
Mexican-US trade crosses the border in trucks.5  NAFTA paved the way for illegal drugs to cross 
into the United States in those thousands of trucks, and Border Patrol is only able to inspect a very 
small fraction of them.6 The same is true of migrants, who not only enter through the blind 
spots—now almost non-existent because of the new technologies—but also hidden in trucks or 
                                            
1 U.S. Department of Transportation, Border Crossing/Entry Data 
http://transborder.bts.gov/programs/international/transborder/TBDR_BC/TBDR_BCQ.html [25/02/2015] 
2 U.S.Customs and Border Protection, January 2015. 
3 Rosenblum, 2012, p.23. 
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very visibly in cars, waving from the passenger seat, showing their false passports or rented real 
passports, putting themselves in the hands of fate and the border lottery. 
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CHAPTER 3. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN EVERYDAY LIFE 
 
What I call “civil disobedience in everyday life” are those actions which advance the inclusion of 
undocumented immigrants in U.S. society and which therefore counteract the restrictions that 
impede such inclusion, as described in the last chapter. By performing such actions the 
undocumented engage in a daily struggle against the banopticon, and in this way they gain for 
themselves the asylum that the U.S. government denies them. Such actions are not carried out in 
a collective or organized way, but their cumulative effect gives them decisive political weight. They 
are the prior condition for any pro-immigration activism. Without quiet encroachment and its 
cumulative effect there can be no successful activism. The undocumented are not passive subjects 
hoping to receive alms like the blind man of Jericho (to cite the apt analogy used by an 
undocumented person to describe the situation he is trying to avoid). The coalescence of 
disobedient immigrants into a non-movement is something the political parties both crave and 
fear. Their desires either to win that force over or to make it disappear have not caused a 
stalemate in immigration policies; rather, they have given rise to ambivalent dealings at the 
federal level, so that there are noticeable differences among the various federal institutions and a 
kaleidoscope of policies at all other levels.  
The scenario in which the non-movement of the undocumented will crown its efforts with 
success is envisioned in various ways by the different actors, as we will see in the fourth chapter. 
In this chapter my aim is to show that maintaining the day-to-day disobedience is a great 
achievement because it enacts the “already but not yet” that forms the raw material of citizenship 
in the making. The sustainability of that non-compliance and the multiplication of the ways of 
achieving inclusion—as well as neutralizing the exclusionary forces—lead toward more elaborate 
forms of organization (from non-movement to movement) and of disobedience (from 
performative civil disobedience to explicit civil disobedience). In order to show this sequence I 
have divided this chapter into three sections. The first treats of making the decision to cross and 
actually crossing the border. This is the moment when the migrants, without using the term “civil 
disobedience,” let themselves be carried by the “wind of thought” and, obeying the dictates of 
their conscience, decide to break the migration laws of several nations. Their reasoning is closely 
related to that of the great theorists of disobedience insofar as they formulate the right that 
justifies them even as they nullify the laws and institutions that would exclude them. The second 
section begins with the journey of three Central American immigrants; it gives an account of a 
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single day that I spent accompanying them, reproducing what they said and describing what they 
did. This offers us a concrete micro-vision of actions that are performed massively, and it allows us 
above all to penetrate into the migrants’ thinking, which is less trammeled with concepts. It also 
provides a rough idea of how I drew close to the lives of migrants during my fieldwork. Considering 
the statements of those migrants and my own observations, as well as the statements of other 
migrants, I reassert the Marxist intuition which maintains that the position one holds in the system 
of the material reproduction of life has all the force of a political position. Here I divide the 
position one holds in the system into 1) the position one has in the world of work and 2) the 
position one has in the world of consumption. One’s position in the world of work is in turn 
subdivided into work as commodity and work as a structure of collective life. The third section 
treats of the use that immigrants make of two platforms (churches and public spaces) and of the 
movement formed by one segment of the undocumented, the Dreamers. These three instances 
provide the occasion or the space for the undocumented to receive support, to practice parrhesia, 
and to become conscious of their disobedience, sometimes in very explicit ways. In summary, 
then, this chapter treats 1) the decision by which the migrants win control of mind and body, 2) 
the material aspect of civil disobedience (the immigrants as workers and as consumers), and 3) 
civil disobedience as an exercise of parrhesia in public spaces. I begin with the world of work and 
consumption, where the disobedience is more sustained and effective but less explicit than it is in 
the murals, the demonstrations, the church practices, or movements like the Dreamers, where the 
counter-theater of the dominated displays a multiplicity of highly creative talents. 
1. Challenging the mental barriers and the physical frontiers 
 
In his interesting review of new forms of social change and political struggle, the Spanish 
sociologist Manuel Castells argues that “power relationships are constitutive of society because 
those who have the power construct the institutions of society according to their values and 
interests.”1 From this premise, Castells distinguishes two areas of change and struggle between 
power and counter-power: “Power is exercised by means of coercion (the monopoly of violence, 
legitimate or not, by the control of the State) and/or the construction of meaning in people’s 
minds, through mechanisms of symbolic manipulation.”2 These dual aspects of power—persuasion 
and coercion, hegemony and violence, manipulation and physical subjection—mostly work 
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together. I have separated them only for chronological and analytical reasons, taking advantage of 
the fact that it is more obvious that in the country of origin the potential migrants’ desire for 
mobility must exceed, above all, the barrier of mental control, and the entry to the United States 
involves the trespassing of a physical barrier that has been augmenting its means and capacity to 
detect, capture, detain and reject migrants through the numerous and increasingly voluminous 
mechanisms possessed by the national security industry, the conglomerate of enterprises 
specialized on the control of bodies that I analyzed in the second chapter.  According to Castells, 
overcoming both mental and physical borders is in itself counter-power’s deployment and 
confrontation with power, i.e. an exercise in “the capacity of social actors to challenge the power 
embedded in the institutions of society for the purpose of claiming representation for their own 
values and interests.”1 Below I will discuss how people do come to consider that the imperative of 
improving their living standards preempts the ban on crossing several borders and settling in 
another country without the requisite authorizations. 
1.1 The making of the decision and the expansion of the possibilities: 
Challenging the construction of meaning in people’s minds 
 
Unquestionably, the State’s power to monopolize legitimate violence is an indispensable core 
element of power. However, as Castells notes, “the construction of meaning in people’s minds is a 
more decisive and more stable source of power…the way people think determines the fate of the 
institutions, norms and values on which societies are organized. Few institutional systems can last 
long if they are based just on coercion. Torturing bodies is less effective than shaping minds.” 2 
When people change their thinking in a way that contradicts the State’s norms and values, the 
implementation of policies faces an impasse and produces social change, although, as Castells 
points out, not necessarily in the direction and manner expected by the agents of change. In any 
case, this change can achieve the neutralization Italian philosopher of law and politics Norberto 
Bobbio, a liberal socialist, spoke about: it renders the State unable to achieve its objectives. 
The banoptic starts as ideological rather than physical and operates on minds before it 
does on bodies. This intangible banoptic is embodied in some campaigns and programs. In its 
tiresome proliferation of “development” programs that criminalize migration by presenting it as 
inextricably linked to AIDS and organized crime networks trafficking in people and drugs, the US 
                                            




Agency for International Development uses campaigns, studies, research and films to infuse 
terror.1 An example of this can be found in a text by Luis Mora, an UNFPA official, who states that 
“results show that most migrants are youth who travel alone and adopt risk practices that favor 
the dissemination of HIV in urban frontier contexts where sexual commerce is habitual. It is also 
interesting  to observe the indirect vunerability of house wives whose partners cross the border 
and resort to sexual workers and, occasionally, to sex with men.”2 Another example of these anti-
migration campaigns, dressed up as humanitarian campaigns, was the promotion of the film – 
fictional but with a documentary flair – “El camino”, promoted by the IOM to show how migration 
pays off: a little boy ends up lost in the frontier jungle and the girl ends as a sexual slave to a 
paedophile foreigner. 3 Campaigns, studies and movies are artefacts employed to imbue terror. As 
Georgi and Schatral point out, the United Nations and the IOM, in alliance with different 
governmental administrations, have not hesitated in promoting the anti-trafficking perspective, 
working on minds rather than bodies and promoting this anti-trafficking approach at the expense 
of migrants’ human rights, such as the right to free mobility and to not be coerced with frightening 
publicity.4 Those campaigns are disseminating the uncertainty that brings an element of danger to 
every change, as Boaventura de Sousa Santos would say.5 
This isn’t the first or most ideologically resistant barrier migrants have to overcome, 
although it’s very significant and results in well-planned action. The first is usually internalized and 
reinforced by “organic” intellectuals in what German sociologist Ulrich Beck calls “the national 
outlook.”6 The life project of teachers, priests, pastors, development project promoters and 
political party activists, among many others, is contained within the limits of the nation, parish or 
village. Their work and often their utopic projects are territorially circumscribed and don’t extend 
beyond the nation-State’s borders. Their project is to build a better society within the reduced 
geographic space assigned to them by their church, party or NGO.  
Migrants have to break away from this perspective. Through talking with many of them 
I’ve seen that this break means understanding that loyalty to the homeland—the mythology of 
which is cultivated in Central America through the extremely fervent independence celebrations—
                                            
1 US Census 2000 y CDC HIV Surveillance Report 2003 quoted in UNIDOS Network of Capacity Building 
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2 Mora, 2003. 
3 Rocha, 2013, p.42. 
4 Georgi and Schatral, 2012. 
5 Santos, 2006, 2006, p.30. 
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doesn’t exclude seeking other horizons to improve their living conditions. The conviction that we 
belong to the place where our umbilical cord was buried or, put another way, where Providence 
destined us to be, doesn’t entirely disappear but migrants perceptibly struggle to break with the 
hegemonic rationale that anchors possibilities within the boundaries of their original nation-State. 
This isn’t about celebrating migration per se, but rather about considering the creative 
potential of new possibilities resulting from mobility that transcends borders; the willingness to 
overcome what Portuguese sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos calls “the limited horizon of 
possibilities.” Santos maintained that “considering the three modal categories of existence—
reality, necessity and possibility—hegemonic rationality and knowledge focus on the first two and 
neglect the third entirely.”1 Migrants dare to exceed their horizon of possibilities in a space 
forbidden to them. To better show the agony and reflections involved in this endeavor, I collected 
the testimony of Ernesto Serna, a 40-year-old Honduran immigrant with two sojourns in the 
United States: the first from 2005 to 2007 and the second from 2013 to date, both times in Fairfax, 
Virginia, a county with 58,591 Central Americans, 8,898 of them Honduran. Both times he shared a 
9 x 6-foot room with a brother and sister, maximizing austerity to stretch their savings. When 
travelling he stayed in Mexican religious communities, where he received room and board, 
telephone calls and money.2 On his second trip he was responsible for two 16-year-old boys who 
were fleeing from violence. Ernesto is a peasant from the mountains. He was born in Dulce 
Nombre de Culmí, department of Olancho, and grew up in Minas de Oro, department of 
Comayagua. He handles a machete with the skill of someone who has worked with one all his life 
and can husk a coconut in a blink of an eye. He has a candor that’s raw and unrelieved. In 
Honduras, he was a development project promoter in a Catholic NGO and his wife directs a 
vocational training school for the same Catholic congregation. 
“Why did you decide to emigrate?” I asked him. “Normally, you can look at people’s 
environment and see it in them,” he began. “I had two people as reference points on work issues. I 
looked at them and thought: ‘when I get older, I’m gonna end up just like that, with no economic 
base to survive on.’ And I told myself: ‘I have to live from my own resources and work because I 
want to.’ I don’t like being forced to do a job because I need money so I can eat and whenever the 
boss feels so inclined, he says that’s it and I’m out on the street, drifting where chance takes me or 
takes pity on me. If people feel compassion, that’s fine, but normally they feel pity and ask you to 
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do a day’s or half a day’s work, chopping out and cleaning a piece of land. That what got me 
thinking and I made up my mind. I had to work on my family gradually, explaining to them that 
things were tight economically and we didn’t have enough to live on. Both my wife and I were 
earning but it wasn’t enough. She earned 7,500 lempiras (US$375) and I earned 8,000 (US$400). 
But both of us were studying in the university, my daughter Vilma was in fifth grade and Marcela 
was in third grade. We also helped my son Alfonso. The money wasn’t enough for educational 
expenses, food and the house. We had enough to survive on but the global economic crisis came 
and they had to let some people go in our workplaces. Furthermore, there was the threat that 
those funding the social projects were looking to Africa where there are droughts, famines and 
wars. You know, they teach you to smell reality and on that basis to make decisions. Also, I don’t 
think my decisions were so hare-brained. I had my study plan. I wanted to get a degree in 
sociology but because I had to take distance courses I had to study pedagogy. Anyway, I needed to 
know some pedagogic issues for my work. I studied on Saturdays after 2pm and on Sunday 
mornings. But this distance education takes a really long time. I had only finished 3 out of 50 
subjects. When I told my colleagues I was going to the United States again, they criticized me. The 
strongest comment was: ‘Curses! Now this one’s going! Instead of forming him we’ve de-formed 
him.’ They thought there was a “deformation” in the accompaniment they had given me… You’d 
have thought those who said this were discerning people since the administrator made this 
comment in front of the deputy director. At the time you feel annoyed because you know they 
have their life all set up; they have visas and can go to the US whenever they want; they can go to 
Spain because they have a visa and have built up an economic base that enables them to move 
about. They can travel whenever they plan to. What I’m really sure about is that it isn’t de-
formation. Quite the opposite, it’s the training they’ve given me that enables me to see reality as it 
is. But they want to keep me like the blind man of Jericho, with my hand outstretched forever. 
They’d prefer not to let this guy go find out if he can build what his perspective is telling him to do. 
I used the NGO’s motorbike to get around but when the crisis hit they sold it to me so I had to do 
the maintenance and put in the fuel. I had activities in some very distant communities, even on 
weekends and I paid for all the fuel. Then I saw that contracted intellectuals were coming and 
began earning US$1,000. This really annoyed us Hondurans who’d been working there some time. 
Just look how it’s going for me here. Dreaming costs nothing, it’s realizing those dreams that 
costs.” 
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The context motivating Ernesto’s emigration was repercussions from the economic crisis 
on the NGO where he worked, the cutbacks they made and were anticipating making. Ernesto was 
one of many thousands of Hondurans who emigrated in 2013 and also one of the 36,526 of them 
who were deported from the US that same year.1 Some—like Ernesto—didn’t wait long before 
heading north again. He had also been one of 2,173,746 unauthorized immigrants who managed 
to enter the United States between 2006 and 2013.2 For them the crisis wasn’t a factor that made 
the US less attractive; it didn’t mark a turning point in the migratory cycle, interwoven into the 
recipient country’s economic phases.3 The effect of the crisis on the Eurozone, the funding source 
for the NGO Ernesto worked for, rebounded on a sector very dependent on external cooperation. 
Ernesto didn’t lose his job and his salary was over the 6,822 lempiras (US$341) assigned to his 
sector (which was communal, social and personal services).4 But he made a forecast peppered 
with class unrest: his salary compared to that of his intellectual colleagues made him unhappy 
given his level of expenses and he was also unhappy with the staff cutbacks affecting his class, 
those he rightly identifies as his reference points. 
Over the course of our interviews, Ernesto talked again and again about the class conflict 
with a countryman’s freedom of speech and with a test—I’m going to call it “the social 
commitment test”—to which he subjected even the NGO’s director. “I wanted to see if you can 
really count on people who say they’re intellectuals and practice social accompaniment. I did an 
experiment to see if they walk the walk or just talk the talk. I’m not convinced by talk for its own 
sake. I like to see whether they really try in practice. That’s why I invited them to the hill where my 
mother lives. There’s a road for vehicles, but I took them on foot in order to evaluate them better. 
There’s a man called José who walked up carrying a 100-lb. sack of corn, while we were only 
carrying a little backpack. You can’t make it with just a little backpack yet you say reality has to 
change, has to transform; that we need commitments? Transform how, from an office? Or visiting 
people from the communities on a motorbike or in acar, forgetting about their reality? I don’t 
think so. I think that we have to know the reality of the people who live there to be able to make 
real proposals.” 
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The subject of the harsh reality of real men and women compared to the comforts and 
inconsistences of the NGO’s best-paid officials—with an “economic condition that enables them to 
move about”—was too recurrent a theme to take a back seat in Ernesto’s decision. This class 
struggle, which Ernesto could only openly engage in with his social commitment test, usually took 
place in whispers (hidden transcripts) among similarly situated employees. The test was his 
response to an institution that applied the neoliberal model of reducing costs through 
outsourcing1 while demanding conscientiousness from its employees. It was his “experiment” to 
expose inconsistencies in an institution that’s progressive in some aspects but engages in markedly 
unequal treatment. But it only offered a fleeting moment of denunciation that distanced him from 
the thick and thin versions of false consciousness.2 Ernesto refused to consent or resign himself to 
the subordinate position of the blind man of Jericho. Ernesto couldn’t change this situation but he 
wanted to broaden his horizon of possibilities and break with what Nicaraguan political scientist 
Andrés Pérez-Baltodano calls the “resigned pragmatism” rooted in Latin American culture.3 
Migration was for Ernesto a pivotal moment where the struggle resulted in a decision, but still not 
one free of inner conflict, as is apparent from the fact that he is committed to philanthropy and an 
interest in community development, because he’s been instilled with the Christian and leftist idea 
that decisions for personal gain are selfish and despicable. The conflict arising before and after 
taking the decision is that there’s an uncertainty at the very heart of that ethos, which isn’t based 
on conforming to binding and well-nigh universally accepted norms but on the enormous personal 
cost of resisting them.4 
Lest Ernesto start forgetting the lesson, his bosses reminded him. His senior colleagues in 
the NGO couldn’t understand the needs of a man like him and made him pay for his “de-
formation” with comments before he left. When Ernesto told them he had arrived safely in the US 
they told him “Remember, don’t forget your family” and other comments loaded with undisguised 
disapproval: “The first time I came they were certain I had done so because I wanted to leave my 
wife. They actually said I didn’t have the guts to leave her back there and came here to separate 
from her. I get the impression they still think I came because I wanted to avoid responsibilities, 
when it’s quite the contrary. “I came here because I want them all to get a university degree and if 
at any time my family has to leave the country, it be because they want to and not out of 
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economic need. I want to give them a foundation so they can study as far as they want to go. I 
don’t want them to leave their family to come to make money.” The desire for independence, the 
Aristotelian ideal of liberating oneself from the forces of mere compulsion—and in Ernesto’s case 
of liberating his daughters and son—launched him into a maelstrom. However, it also showed a 
critical independence that German-born US political theorist Hannah Arendt identifies with: “The 
manifestation of the wind of thought is not knowledge; it is the ability to tell right from wrong, 
beautiful from ugly. And this indeed may prevent catastrophes, at least for myself, in the rare 
moments when the chips are down…. The consequence of this peculiarity is that thinking 
inevitably has a destructive, undermining effect on all established criteria, values, measurements 
for good and evil, in short on those customs and rules of conduct we treat of in morals and ethics. 
These frozen thoughts, Socrates seems to say, come so handy you can use them in your sleep; but 
if the wind of thinking, which I shall now arouse in you, has roused you from your sleep and made 
you fully awake and alive, then you will see that you have nothing in your hand but perplexities, 
and the most we can do with them is share them with each other.”1 By daring to think beyond the 
boundaries set by his NGO and against some of its values, with the cool wind of thought, Ernesto 
broke the mind control, the “governa¬mentality’ as French philosopher Michel Foucault called it, 
that limited his horizon of possibilities to a national universe. His mainstay was the contrast 
between the ideals they preached and what he calls the reality of actual people. 
In Ancient Greece, the concept of parrhesia (freedom of speech) was homonoia: 
consensus, literally “same-minded-ness.” Although held in high esteem by the Athenians and 
valued by Demosthenes as a core social virtue, homonoia implied that all citizens thought alike 
and their social and political differences were submerged in a unified community of interests—
such as in nationalism with its false homogeneity and neoliberalism when it reduces problems to 
technical issues and denies class conflicts. The State could then function as if one mind and will. As 
the US classical political theorist Josiah Ober warns: “Homonoia is the very antithesis of freedom. 
When the citizenry was ‘of one mind’ there was no need for freedom of speech, thought or 
action…. But perfect and long-term political consensus was not only impossible but dangerous. If 
the citizenry is of a single mind, debate and discussion become irrelevant.”2 Automatism, the 
acritical acceptance of customs and rules, is the most apolitical and depoliticizing. Ernesto broke 
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with that homogeneity of mind and his independent criteria led him to formulations against the 
sovereignty principle: 
“I believe that they’ve no right to stop us. It’s been said that borders shouldn’t exist, that 
there should be free transit of people, just like the free transit of rice, beans, sugar, soap and 
produce. I think they should be concerned about whether a person wants to cause harm or not. 
That of course should be prevented. But who comes here from our countries to cause harm? 
Those who come usually only want to improve their economy and their life, for themselves and 
their families. And this is being frustrated. There are thousands of frustrated people. Those of us 
who were lucky enough to not be mistreated, raped, killed, kidnapped or deported… here we are.” 
Ernesto’s statement, that of a mountain man from Olancho, is very similar to that of the 
Dutch-US sociologist Saskia Sassen. It shows the spread of a counter-hegemonic way of thinking 
about migrations that clashes with policies and ideologies. Sassen says: “The clash of two very 
different regimes—one for the circulation of capital and one for the circulation of immigrants—
poses problems that cannot be solved through the old rules of the game.”1 For Ernesto that clash 
is another form of inconsistency: in Honduras it was propounded by officials who didn’t know the 
reality of the people they said they were working for; in the US it embodies a set of rules that are 
unevenly applied. This is the basis of his disobedience: he can’t obey what isn’t consistent. 
Inconsistency invalidates the law. María García, a Salvadoran immigrant, gave me an historical 
argument to justify her disrespect for US migratory law: “This is a country of immigrants. The only 
natives are the Indians. All the rest have come from somewhere else. California, San Francisco, Los 
Angeles and San Diego were part of Mexico. All were taken from the Mexicans by trickery, just as 
they took Alaska from the Russians.” This is most likely an a posteriori justification. María reveals 
another aspect of this counter-hegemonic thinking being spread to ideologically underpin the 
entry and stay of unauthorized immigrants. 
Ernesto and María justified their entry into the United States by appealing to the 
illegitimacy of nation-States’ sovereign control principle and questioning the “native” population’s 
right to consider itself as such. They didn’t ask for asylum, which is the right of those coming from 
extremely violent countries such as theirs; they knew they don’t qualify under the refugee law’s 
strict criteria. In 1985 María didn’t apply nor even think of applying for asylum, even to get legal 
residence for her daughters, who were brought in two by two. Neither did the young men Ernesto 
was responsible for in 2013. They were granted the shelter they needed, believing that their 
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action could be motivated by values they placed above those of the State. They made their 
determination independent of the ideological forces that confined them in one country and 
rejected them in another. The immigrants placed what was right for them above what is legal. 
María García’s disrespect for migratory law was based on the dictates of her conscience, which 
many share, as Arendt and Dworkin insist, but in this case it is a conscience shared by a multitude, 
a series of group convictions, as Walzer states, which oppose the principle of territorial 
sovereignty. In this case the group to some degree precedes the act and to some degree succeeds 
it. It precedes it in a Marxist sense: these individuals share a series of positions in the productive 
system and consequently there’s a coincidence in their convictions about the law that helps them 
and the needs driving them. It doesn’t matter that Ernesto was a promoter and had begun 
studying for a degree in pedagogy. The fragility of his economy was more akin to that of the bus 
fare collectors Celvin Paguada and Zacarías Orellana, mentioned in the second chapter, than to 
that of his professional NGO colleagues. They belong to the same group. But this group also comes 
afterward because not all those who share this fragility migrate. The non-movement of 
undocumented immigrants only holds until the series of disparate decisions converge in actions 
whose similarity and coincidence in time and space confers on the actors a group character. In this 
sense, the group of disobedient migrants only manages to “meld” a posteriori. 
1.2 The rupture with legality: Challenging the banopticon’s control of the body 
 
According to Israeli historian Reviel Netz, “areas enter into history through impeding movement.”1 
Areas are politicized in the sense Max Weber meant: power is exercised by administering the ways 
space is used and some manage to impose limits on others the location of their bodies in an 
“inside” and “outside.” Barbed wire has played a fundamental role in this administration of spaces. 
In the US barbed wire was an instant commercial success. Just six years after being patented, 100 
million pounds of barbed wire already fenced in some 50,000 miles. 2 At the far southern end of 
the continent the situation was no different: “It’s estimated that in 1907 there was already enough 
barbed wire in Argentina to wrap around the perimeter of the republic 140 times.”3 According to 
Polish historian and journalist Ryszard Kapucinski, the barbed wire surrounding the Soviet Union 
formed a tangled mass “so thick that not even a mouse could squeeze through” to Poland, China 
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or Iran. Its continuous replacement was an endeavor that enabled Kapuscinski to “assume that a 
major part of the Soviet metallurgical industry is only dedicated to the manufacture of barbed 
wire.”1 Noting the overwhelming success of this and other enclosures, Netz added: “The enormous 
scope of barbed wire throughout history (ranging from agriculture to war and human repression, 
and from one end of the world to the other) is due to the simple and immutable equation 
between flesh and iron. Flesh necessarily yields to iron and its inevitable consequence is pain. The 
history of violence and pain transcends species, and also did the history of modernity.”2 It’s that 
violence and pain that undocumented immigrants must overcome. The history of crossing borders 
is one of overcoming pain and that’s why it’s a history of the ploys to avoid pain and circumvent 
fences, walls and enclosures. 
During its 28 years of existence, the Berlin Wall was the setting for the killing of only 
between 863 and 126 people, according to different, never exact estimates. Three quarters were 
shot when they tried to escape and the rest died in the crossfire or by accident.4 The 1960s were 
the worst years: 1,000 wounded and 72,000 confined for trying to escape.5 But the Berlin Wall was 
also the setting for successful escapes. It was breached by thousands of people who attempted 
illegal crossings by excavating 39 tunnels, flying balloons and homemade planes, piloting a 
submarine, buying fake passports, hiding in compartments of vehicles, availing themselves of 
pulley systems or crashing trucks, trains, excavators and armored buses against the wall.6 It was a 
wall that served the panopticon. Intuitively, Ronald Reagan knew the difference between 
panopticon (to keep locked inside) and banopticon (to exclude and keep out) and in his memoires, 
before he lost his memory to Alzheimer’s, he recalled saying to Gorbachov that American fence 
“was meant to stop illegal immigration by people who wanted to join our society because it 
offered democratic and economic opportunities—that was hardly the same thing as building the 
Berlin Wall, which imprisoned people in a social system they didn’t want to be part of.”7 Reagan 
didn’t mention that the zeal of the US barrier’s banoptic surveillance—intended to keep out and 
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prevent the entry of those who wanted to enjoy the democratic and economic opportunities—has 
been much more lethal than the Berlin Wall.1 
There are hundreds of deaths every year on the Mexican-US border. There’s enormous 
violence and pain there. Just in the area covered by the Medical Examiner’s Office of Pima County, 
Arizona, they have examined the mortal remains of 2,413 people, presumably immigrants, who 
perished crossing the border between 1990 and 2013.2 One study estimated there had been 1,034 
deaths in the five years from 1993 to 1997 along the whole southwestern border.3 The study 
covering the most remote period calculated 3,676 deaths between 1984 and 1998.4 If we add to 
those the 5,766 deaths Border Patrol recorded in 1999-20135, we get a total of 9,442 deaths from 
1984 to 2013. The principal and immediate causes of the deaths between 1999 and 2003 were 
primarily heat exposure (35%), drowning crossing the river (21%), car accidents (11%) and 
exposure to cold (3%).6 As the main cause of death is hyperthermia, most of the deaths occurred 
between May and August (55%).7 These are the material causes. The policies and surveillance are 
the efficient causes, to use Aristotle’s term. Others perish beyond the border, as did 19 migrants 
who died in 2003 from asphyxiation, dehydration and heat in a trailer trying to pass the second 
border: the checkpoints between the border line and cities such as Houston, Dallas, Phoenix and 
Los Angeles.8 To these dangers must be added aggression by immigration agents: physical abuse 
(4.76% of immigrants), verbal abuse (12%), permanent confiscation of their belongings (3.17%) 
and the less common but existing cases of sexual abuse and use of lethal force.9 Then there are 
the dangers in Mexico, which the expelled doubly endure when the US Immigration Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) deports them to areas controlled by drug traffickers, as it often does.10 
Very few of the Central Americans I interviewed said they had passed through the desert. 
Perhaps they’re avoiding its dangers, which is why we see that only 7.5% of those apprehended in 
2014 in the Tucson sector—where the desert is the scariest—were Central Americans. On the 
other hand, it’s where 30% of Mexicans detained on the southwest border fell into the 
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immigration authorities’ hands. Among Mexicans, at least since 2000, this sector remains the 
primary unbeatable port of entry into the United States. It only attained percentage significance 
for Central Americans between 2008 and 2011, years when it peaked at 32% and didn’t drop 
below 24%. For Mexicans the San Diego, El Centro and El Paso sectors have a diminished but 
persistent importance: respectively 12%, 5.5% and 4% of Mexicans were captured at these points 
while less than 1% of Central Americans were picked up in any of them. This means that Central 
Americans don’t blindly follow the Mexican migration routes or follow them in different volumes. 
Most arrests of Central American took place in the Río Grande Valley (76%), one of the two 
sectors—the other is Del Río—where in 2014 more Central Americans were detained than 
Mexicans: 192,925 versus 63,468, a number that was decisive in making 2014 a milestone as the 
first year when total apprehensions of Central Americans exceeded those of Mexicans: 252,600 
versus 226,771.1 The evidence provided by my interviewees shows that many Central Americans 
travel almost exclusively with Central American coyotes or else risk it alone. Central Americans 
have also switched their entry points more. Perhaps because Mexicans comprise a large number 
of temporary workers who have entered and left several times, they are more faithful to their 
routes and less likely to change their entry patterns, which often rely on accumulated knowledge 
and contacts.2 
Changing routes doesn’t avoid all the dangers, which are multiple and also 
metamorphose, but it is one of the many strategies that avoid and reduce their impact and one of 
many ways immigrants make the banopticon ineffectual and neutralize the forces denying them 
entry. In response to the fabulous resources deployed to block their entry, immigrants use tactics 
that have managed to wrest control of the border from the State: coyotes, false documents, 
clandestine routes... María García used one such tactic to cross the border. She always went 
through Tijuana/San Diego, a less dangerous area than most women immigrants must now pass 
through.3 Neither the Border Patrol before nor the wall today are impassable barriers, although 
immigrants have to make many attempts, just as this Salvadoran woman did. María arrived in the 
US 40 years ago when she was 29 years old, fleeing from the war, and has been living there ever 
since. Back then the Mexican police levied a toll on Central American immigrants: every time a 
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police officer stopped the bus she was travelling in with other Salvadorans she paid $20 and 
continued on her way. 
“Do you know how much they charged you to cross the border then? US$200. Now it 
costs$5-10,000. The first time I couldn’t pass because they left me lost in the middle of the night 
and we’d only got about halfway there, two and a half hours. It was night and cloudy. I’d wanted 
to go pee and they gave me permission, but when I got back, the group was gone. They thought I’d 
fallen asleep on the way. But I hadn’t. My God, you come from El Salvador and know nothing 
about how it goes; what to do. I knew the US was ahead and Mexico was behind. I decided to go 
back. It began to rain and I suffered a lot alone but I walked and walked. Day caught me and I was 
alone. I could hear the helicopters: they went up and down, like now, but today they have cameras 
everywhere so it’s worse. I remembered the neighborhood we’d stayed in and the house number. 
As it was already dawn, I hid behind some little trees. I waited all day without eating, without 
water to drink. It rained and I opened my mouth and drank. I waited until night and walked 
another two hours. I went through puddles, into holes full of mud. Suddenly I saw a road and in 
the distance were some signs in Spanish: here is Mexico. A taxi passed and I made a sign. It was 
about two in the morning. I told him a lie: I came to visit an aunt and got lost. He didn’t believe 
me. He saw that I was all muddy. When I got to the house everyone was amazed. The next night 
we crossed the border again. Immigration authorities caught us all because they were in 
helicopters and the trucks came. I didn’t give them my right name. I kept really quiet. Back then 
they used to send you back to Tijuana, not to El Salvador. The third time, the same thing: they 
caught me again. By now they knew me. I was well-known in the immigration offices. I knew 
where to sit. ‘Are you back here again? Here’s your chair,’ they told me. I said my name was María. 
When they called me, they said María García. Even when I was sleeping, I knew that was me. I had 
learned. I also said I was Mexican. I was very smug and even said I’d lived in Chapultepec. The 
problem was that one day I said I was from Guasaca. Write ‘Oaxaca’, they said. I still don’t know 
how to write. One of the immigration officials took me aside and said: You aren’t Mexican. I want 
you to know you haven’t fooled me. You aren’t Mexican and your name isn’t María. I kept quiet. 
By then I had begun to lose my fear of them and I said: ‘I can’t read much. I don’t know how 
because I come from the country. I didn’t learn to read much.’ I was very humble, fearful; I wasn’t 
brave but, as God is my witness, the five children I had left behind gave me courage. They caught 
me four times and let me go. After each attempt I had about three days’ rest because I suffered a 
lot: going like that, running, diving down, coming back… it’s horrible.” 
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“Crossing is horrible. The fourth time I managed to get through. It wasn’t through the 
backcountry, but through the immigration checkpoint, with false papers, a false resident’s ID we 
used to call the mica, which could be a driving license or a social security or green card. They made 
them with your own photos. They had all that back then. They put your photo on top of another’s 
or of someone similar. They were real IDs but for someone else. That’s how they do passports 
now. I had to say what the card said my name was while they were looking at me. I managed to 
pass but then I stupidly stayed looking to where the coyote was and made signs to him. I know it 
was really foolish. I don’t know how I picked myself up again afterwards, perhaps through the 
knocks life gives. It was nerves that got me caught again, the fourth time. They put me back in the 
office and even laughed. All the immigration officials knew me by then: Here’s this girl back again, 
María García. I have to cross, I thought. After borrowing the money and with five children, you 
have to cross... The fifth time we went through the backcountry, always at night. We passed 
through some barbed wire and I got cut. I was bleeding. The coyote came and took off his shirt 
and I put it on. I was bleeding but I got through on the fifth try. After that I lost my fear. I went 
back to El Salvador to see my children every two years, always wetback, but by then I went 
through the immigration checkpoints with false documents. When I came back I brought two 
others who wanted to come with me. I already knew the way and told them what to say. The first 
time I brought two women, a friend and a cousin. I told them everything because I’d noticed 
everything and had my strategy: don’t think we went straight to Tijuana; we said we were going 
elsewhere; we made detours but came back to the route to Tijuana. Every two years I brought 
more people. Many paid me for the trip. On my second visit to El Salvador it was already wartime 
and I brought my three oldest children. I’d already lost my fear by then and if they caught me, so 
what? If anything happens to you, you have to say ‘So what.’ That was my mantra and it gave me 
strength. If they caught me, it didn’t matter; it’s not the end of the world, they aren’t going to kill 
me; they aren’t going to do anything to me. Of course, if those who thought I was a coyote had 
caught me, I would have got about five years in prison. Now I look on those interviews with 
immigration as a game: they interview you and you have to answer. Now that I’m older, I see it as 
a game. I was gaining experience in all this and that’s why it was easier for me to bring in other 
people. You know how to read what I said between the lines and can imagine the rest, the truth.” 
Maria doesn’t boast of her audacity nor is hers an exceptional case in migratory history. 
However, she didn’t take long to become an unrepentant rebel. She made an unusual transition 
from being a timid first-time immigrant to becoming an experienced coyote who knew and even 
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created stratagems to circumvent the Mexican and US immigration authorities. She became 
expert in the least risky method of crossing: using the green card or passport of a relative, friend 
or even stranger who rented it to her.1 At first she succumbed to small pitfalls but only two years 
later was ready to become a guide for other immigrants. In her theatrical game with 
immigration—in a typical hidden discourse tactic—she first played a stereotypically dominated 
role (inhibited, illiterate and ignorant) to later give them the slip. In her first attempts she could 
have repeated the same answer as that given by an immigrant about to cross the desert where 
one day earlier they had found a friend’s body: “Our needs are greater than our fears.”2 Later she 
could almost have sung along with Vicente Fernández: “Immigration can’t get the best of me.” 
María’s justification for her repeated disrespect of migratory law is that the United States is a 
country of immigrants who dispossessed the real natives and today the real natives aren’t the 
ones stopping her from entering. Having laid her fears to rest, bringing in more immigrants 
became her mission. 
In saying she eventually saw the immigration interviews as a game, María García concurs 
with the Spanish philosopher María Zambrano: “Especially history, if it’s tragic, has an aspect that 
belongs to the same tragedy, which is the game. Although surprising at first glance, the most 
serious history has at times been made by playing. Games and seriousness aren’t incompatible.”3 
Zambrano added: “Many children’s games have vestiges of very old decisive situations in human 
life. There are certain games that consist in going from one square to another without stepping on 
a line, in a kind of grid drawn on the ground. They’re undoubtedly symbolic of human life, where 
you go from one stage to another, from one age to another, one situation to another: in short, 
symbolic of human life as history. They also indicate that history isn’t always something a person 
wants or invents, but something spontaneously generated by one’s own life. And the more 
spontaneous life is; the more it’s full of stories, the more immersed and determined it is by 
history.”4 María García’s life is full of stories, which she’s thinking of putting in a book. She already 
has the title: That’s the way it was. She’s certain the game with immigration enabled her to pass 
from one stage of her history, in which she stopped being a “foolish” 29-year-old girl to become 
the woman who married a US citizen, gradually brought her five children to the US, was widowed 
early and became a pivotal figure so that the immigrant non-movement could mobilize many more 
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rebels. With her rebellion, María stopped being carried away by the wind of thought, a situation 
diametrically opposed to that of those who follow with blind faith, as Hannah Arendt describes 
them: “If your action consisted in applying general rules of conduct to particular cases as they 
arise in ordinary life, then you will find yourself paralyzed because no such rules can withstand the 
wind of thought.”1 In María’s case, this wind of thought had effects on body control. Her 
experience is significant because it shows us how immigration multiplies upon defeating the 
power’s control devices. 
The groundwork for this defeat was laid decades ago and is still working, yielding 
remarkable results. In 2013, on the border with Mexico, Border Patrol knew about 171,050 
successful illegal crossings. The previous year they recorded 103,811. Between 2006 and 2013, 
there were a total of 549,380 known non-authorized crossings just in the Río Grande Valley sector. 
According to their own records, in these same eight years, not even all the Border Patrol sectors 
bordering with Mexico could prevent the entry of 2,173,746 unauthorized immigrants.2 Those 2 
million-plus immigrants succeeded in making an area—bodies, to be more precise—that escaped 
state control. Such control is unviable because it’s impossible to prevent the existence of blind 
spots and to thoroughly check the enormous number of vehicles, people and documents that 
cross every day. And since crossing the border isn’t the only way to circumvent body control, the 
success of disrespecting the principle of territorial sovereignty is far greater. To these more than 2 
million unauthorized immigrants who successfully crossed the border in 2006-2013 must be added 
those who not only evaded the jails of ICE and its subcontractors, but also its statistics: those who 
entered without Border Patrol having any idea they had passed over the border. And we must also 
add the “overstayers”: those who entered legally and stayed on after the period expired that had 
been assigned them on their visa or on entering. A prepared statement by Bernard L. Schwartz, a 
senior fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations, titled “Measuring the Effectiveness of Border 
Enforcement,” which was commissioned by the US Senate’s Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs in 2013, estimates that over 40% of unauthorized immigrants living in the US 
that year hadn’t illegally crossed the border but had arrived legally with a tourist, student, 
business or other visa then violated the terms of the visa by staying on in the US.3 Another, more 
recent study, titled “Border Security: Immigration Inspections at Ports of Entry” prepared by the 
Congressional Research service and dated January 2015, calculated the overstayers at 30% and 
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50%.1 These figures give an idea of the success of the undocumented immigrant non-movement. 
It’s based on their networks communicating information about reliable coyotes, less dangerous 
routes, shelters, churches, etc., and repeatedly resorting to certain infrastructure, which is its 
assets, the migratory chains’ material base. These channels of communication enable coordination 
and emphasize the spontaneity of the coordinated chain.2 The non-movement is that critical mass 
created—and strengthened by—accumulated migratory processes that develop stable networks.3 
Therefore transnationality doesn’t lead only to “new standards of action, cultural environments, 
local economies, social networks”4, but also to a new social subject, one that refuses to remain like 
the blind man of Jericho with his hand outstretched waiting for the US government to give him 
asylum. 
 
1.3 Unauthorized crossing as massive disobedience: There are millions of 
Ernestos and Marías 
 
I have described and analyzed two challenges. If in the breaking away from mind control we were 
seeing the questioning of hegemony, in illegally crossing the border and staying without 
authorization we’re witnessing what Castells calls challenging the bureaucratic norms on the use 
of space.5 In a sense, the border acts like the revolutionary movements’ barricades: they can’t 
really stop the enemy but they do define an “us” and “them,” an “inside” and “outside.” As the 
experience of dealing with border control contains the inclusion/expulsion relationship, 
considering the border an area of marginality can show its political aspect, because it’s a strategic 
place where there’s transgression and resistance.6 Although the wall is erected by the State, it also 
fulfills the function of uniting the undocumented immigrants in circumventing it, with no need for 
them to belong to a movement or organization. Getting around the wall and dodging surveillance, 
for all that so many stories emphasize its biological and psychological dimensions, has a political 
aspect in which crossing is the message: we know it’s forbidden, but we have the right and we can. 
From a political standpoint, overcoming physical obstacles matters because of the attitude it has 
toward laws: an attitude of civil disobedience, of denying the State the right to stop them. 
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This disobedience occurs massively because the undocumented immigrants’ non-
movement is numerous and, while spontaneous, acts as if it were implementing a series of 
concerted acts. It’s made up of millions of Ernestos and Marías. The undocumented immigrants 
undertake these crossings in a relatively fragmented way, generally in small groups. However, 
these individual actions—implemented without agreement and in some way as rebellious as those 
of the conscientious objectors—add together to acquire a public character and a potential for 
changing the law, as if they were concerted acts of rebellion. When the Iranian political sociologist 
Asef Bayat developed his non-movement concept, he said he “had in mind the protracted 
processes in which millions of men and women embark on long migratory journeys, scattering in 
remote and often alien environs, acquiring work, shelter, land and living amenities.” Bayat 
mentions that “refugees and international migrants encroach on host States and their provisions, 
the rural migrants on the cities, the squatters on public and private lands or ready-made homes, 
and the unemployed, as street subsistence workers, on the public space and business opportunity 
created by shop keepers.”1 According to Bayat, this epidemic of the political use of public spaces 
triggers surveillance and repression by the authorities. But these flows can’t be stopped unless the 
State normalizes the use of violence, erecting walls and check points, which is what the US 
government has done.2 But it doesn’t work either. The liquidity and solidity of surveillance have 
combined to make the crossings more arduous but have failed to prevent them. The State’s alarm 
and reactions testify to the political clout of the migrants’ disobedience. Castells argues that for a 
movement (or a non-movement of undocumented immigrants) to be influential the state actors 
have to consider it capable of facilitating or hindering their own objectives.3 All the security 
gadgetry shows is that the undocumented immigrants’ non-movement has set off an alarm and is 
indicative of the resonance—in some cases negative, in others positive—of its actions. Immigrants 
remain in the global surveillance spotlight. Only by understanding what this implies can we know 
the dimensions of their challenge, which isn’t limited to border crossing. Also—and especially—
their challenge takes place in the terrain of everyday life, in their sustained rebellion of staying to 
live, work, pay taxes, use public services… in a terrain not so controlled by a State that wanted to 
block their entrance and could expel them today, verily as you were reading this text. 
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2. The performative effectiveness of disobedience: the “already but not yet” of 
every day 
 
Most persons of Central American origin who live in the United States were born on the isthmus: 
60% of Nicaraguans and Salvadorans, 64% of Guatemalans and Hondurans. This is in sharp 
contrast to the 36% of the Latino population as a whole who were born outside the U.S.1 In other 
words, the majority of the Central Americans who live in the United States are first-generation 
immigrants. This is not because Central American migration is something recent but because the 
strength of new migration keeps exceeding the slow growth of the already established 
immigrants. Even though there is speculation that the migration is slowing down,2 it continues 
relentlessly and is predominantly unauthorized. Non-compliance has become steadily stronger. 
The migration’s increasingly  massive character, according to Bayat, is a form of self-legitimizing 
because the overall effect of non-collective actions consolidates and reproduces the counter-
power.3 The consolidation is effective, however, only because of what happens after the migrants 
enter: they practice a sustained disobedience which to a certain point consists in acting as if they 
were persons possessing the full rights of citizens. The immigrants’ disobedience is not just 
momentary, an unauthorized crossing; rather, it is sustained because those who enter remain 
against the will of the government. Moreover, they perform a series of illegal acts: they work 
without permission, they obtain licenses for small companies, they manage businesses of various 
sizes, they make use of government resources, and they also pay taxes that increase those 
resources. These are all collective actions of a non-collective actor, and the social implications of 
these actions (access to a certain type of dwelling, a certain level of consumption, cultural 
benefits, a kind of employment) are interwoven with the political implications because they enact 
an illegal citizenship that produces inclusion.4 The immigrants do not disregard authority but 
challenge it boldly in order to compel their inclusion; it is as if they pragmatically declared their 
illegal status and accepted the consequences by reasserting their non-compliance. 
In this section I will show how such disobedient actions, performed out of sheer necessity 
because of the immigrants’ position in the material world, have a significant impact on politics. 
This is true whatever may be the reason: whether it is because the immigrants’ actions effectively 
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delegitimize government authority in daily life; whether it is because they encourage the 
complicity of others who act in favor of the “deportables”; whether it is because they establish the 
undocumented as “indispensable enemies” (like the 19th-century Chinese immigrants1) in the 
marketplace of labor and consuming; whether it is because their work takes on a personalized 
form or develops such obvious connections with social structures as to make all talk of the 
“shadow lives”2 of the undocumented simply ridiculous; or whether it is a combination of any 
number of these factors. All such actions bring about inclusion. All of these cases, including the 
complicity rooted in crass selfishness, involve a display of dissent, which according to Rancière “is 
not a conflict of interests, opinions or values; it is a division inserted in 'common sense': a dispute 
over what is given and about the frame within which we see something as given.”3 In other words, 
what is fundamentally being challenged is the government’s pretension of classifying certain 
workers as illegal. It may be that those who hire them for purely mercenary motives are not 
contributing to the debate on immigration legislation—though some do, and do so significantly, as 
we shall see—but certainly their employers do not consider the undocumented workers to be in 
the state of illegality envisioned by government, nor do they think that they are committing a 
crime in hiring them. They are operating in a different framework and with a different way of 
thinking, quite foreign and even contrary to the coordinates defined by the legislation. In order to 
achieve greater clarity in my analysis of the forms and implications of non-compliance and its 
social validation, I will separate labor from consumption. My analysis of labor will in turn be 
divided in such a way that the modality of self-employment, which overlaps with informal labor 
and other forms of work, is treated separately since it is the modality where immigrants are most 
visible. 
2.1 A day in the life of three Central American migrants 
 
Three migrants, three lives, three windows on the world of Central Americans in the US: Kelvin 
Orellana, Gisel Morazán and Lito Melgar. All three are relatively happy and all are undocumented. 
They work hard, learn about and use the world they move in. They have dreams; they’re bold; and 
they have a future. During my visit to Maryland and Virginia, three Central Americans talked to me 
about the often tightly interwoven areas that burn their souls: work, documents, emotions and 
                                            
1 Saxton, 1971. 
2 This is one of the most frequently occurring images. Burns, Garcia, and Wolgin, 2013. Lowenstein, 2012. 
Passel, 2015. 
3 Rancière, 2010, p.69.  
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God.  I savored their words and took careful notes like a solicitous clerk, asking almost nothing, 
recording almost everything.  I accompanied them during their work days and their rest times, 
learning and, I hope, understanding.  I enjoyed it and hope I was accepted.  Now I want to share 
what I saw and heard, what moved me. 
A day in the life of Kelvin    
I met Kelvin in Maryland, three days after landing at the Ronald Reagan airport at the start of my 
fieldwork this past February.  He went to meet me at a central point at the request of his wife, 
Yadira, whom I’d met over 20 years earlier in the village of Bajo Aguán, Honduras, when she was 
nine years old.   Her father Ceferino was at the time a tireless lay preacher who invited me to 
share exhausting days with him visiting Flores and Jazmines de Oriente, the most remote villages 
on the left bank of Río Aguán, which are accessed by walking hours on dirt roads over several 
hills—dusty in the dry season and muddy in the rainy one—from the point where even four-wheel 
drive vehicles can’t go any further.  Back from our trips I would enjoy succulent Honduran tamales 
called ticucos, crack up at the funny stories pouring out of Ceferino’s mouth and swap jokes with 
the marimba of children God had blessed him and his wife Fernanda with, year after year, with 
unfailing regularity for a dozen years.  Kelvin took me to the apartment he shares with Yadira and 
their three US-born children in a multifamily building inhabited by undocumented migrants and a 
few Afro-descendants.  Our dinner was pure Honduran-style: cabbage and tomato salad, rice and 
refried beans, stewed chicken with potatoes, Copan tortillas and a touch of green courtesy of a 
delightful avocado. 
This is how we eat every day.  We buy everything at a store less than ten minutes from 
here where they have all kinds of Honduran goods, even more than in my village.  That’s why Mr. 
Ceferino and Miss Fernanda don’t get homesick when they visit us.  We make them baleadas [a 
thick wheat flour tortilla folded in half and filled with mashed fried beans and a choice of other 
ingredients], tamales, atol [a sweet cornstarch or masa-based drink served hot], tortillas… Back 
there we have avocados only a few months a year but here we have them all year round. They 
came to stay five months here and, thanks to Ceferino, it was five months of constant joking 
around.  They went to the US Embassy and got a ten-year visa because my brother-in-law, who’s 
got papers and has been living here for 20 years now, gave them a call.  We took them to see a lot 
of places and sometimes Mr. Ceferino went out by himself, to walk about and visit another 
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daughter, but I told him that it’s not like back home here.  You can easily get lost her so we only go 
out in our vehicles. 
We moved into the living room where an enormous Honduran flag covers the wall over 
the flat-screen TV and a towel with the Sacred Heart of Jesus is hung on the next wall.  We settled 
down on two sofas and drank Corona beer, a taste Central Americans have acquired from the 
Mexicans.  The children chattered among themselves in perfect English but only spoke Spanish to 
the adults.  Seven-year-old Bryan, their youngest son, soon worked up his confidence to come 
over to ask me to read him some episodes from Diary of a wimpy kid, a children’s bestseller.  
Kimberley played the clarinet in the middle of the room. 
Kimberley can play clarinet.  They teach it at school and she practices in the evenings.  It’s 
a public school but they learn many things and she likes music.  Bryan’s fanatical about those 
books.  Whenever he sees another in the series he asks Yadira to buy it for him.  See there?  Bryan 
had a heart operation but there was no fuss about paying for the surgery.  The hospitals have 
different rates; we applied for the lowest one and they gave it us.  That’s how it is here.  There’s 
something to suit everybody’s pocket. 
The talking didn’t go on much longer.  Kelvin had a long working day and the next day, 
Saturday, he’d be busy with his own contracts, which often pay better.  After a half-hour Skype call 
to Miss Fernanda in Las Mojarras, Honduras, we said goodnight.  I shared a room with Chico 
Guerra, who’s married to Kelvin’s sister and has two children in Honduras.  Almost all the families 
have a recently arrived brother-in-law, cousin or sister.  Either to summon or deter sleep, Chico 
whispered from his bed recalling for me his transit through Mexico. 
I sometimes traveled on the train, but not always, because it’s hard work and very 
dangerous. You have to keep your wits about you.  I once saw them shoot someone in the head 
because he didn’t have money to pay the toll.  It was eight gangsters who boarded the train.  
Pleading with them made no difference.  There’s no mercy.  You pay or they take it out of you.  
Many get thrown off the train.  They don’t think twice about it or listen to reason.  They get 
drugged up to be able to do it.  In their right mind they wouldn’t dare.  When they get on the train, 
they’re already well loaded. That’s why it’s better to pay. The coyote [facilitator paid to help people 
cross borders/countries illegally] had our payment and he just handed over portions of it at the 
roadblocks to the gangs, the garrotters, the police…  
I slept with those images: the train frantically rolling along, gangsters holding the body at 
their mercy, a youth on the threshold of becoming a statistic of the mutilated, the dead…  The next 
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day, Kelvin surprised me with a kind invitation to join him all day.  We were going with his brother-
in-law and another colleague in one of the many vans the migrants use for interior remodeling.  
We went into a 7 Eleven, which some Central Americans call: “Latino restaurant, gringo bar.”  The 
largest glass wall was covered by a poster showing the 7 Eleven logo on a cardboard cup, haloed 
by signs advertising: $1 medium coffee, Wednesdays, Try our Guatemalan Santa Rosa Blend. A lot 
of solid men in heavy jackets were clustered around the coffee machines.  The weather forecast 
was for six inches of snow, but they knew from experience that the forecast could be ignored if 
there’s an early snowfall. Kelvin paid for the coffees and bread of our choice.  Back in the vehicle, 
he became more talkative with the coffee buzz. 
I arrived here 13 years ago.  Right here, to Maryland.  My wife’s brothers paid for my trip.  
My father-in-law told them ‘Take Kelvin with you,’ so they got together the dough to pay the 
coyote.  That Mr. Ceferino doesn’t mess about.  I owe this life to him.  After three years I sent for 
Yadira and now we have three children, three little gringos who don’t look like gringos: Kimberley 
is 10 years old, Kevin is 9 and Bryan 7.  Now we have my brother-in-law Chico with us in the house.  
He works laying lawns.  He came here four months ago and they’re already paying him over $20 an 
hour.  When he works 12 hours straight, he comes back with $250, almost what he earned in a 
month back there.  But lawn work is bad, it’s seasonal and he’s been laid off for two months now.  
In winter there’s no movement, except if it snows more than four inches, then they shovel snow; 
but once spring comes the money’s going to pour in. This is how it is for people here who put their 
back into it.  At first I was a bit lazy, always asking the boss to explain things to me, until one time 
he said ‘Just do what you can.’  And I did.  ‘You see?  You can do it,’ he told me.  And when I went to 
get paid at the end of the day, he gave me $12 an hour instead of the $9 I’d been getting before.  
He told me that that would be my salary from then on. 
I come from a small town in Danlí.  How I’m living now is nothing like my life before.  I 
remember in the village, old Eleuterio almost always paid us to go buy his cigarettes.  He spat on 
the ground, burning hot in the sun, and told us: ‘If this saliva dries before you return, you won’t get 
paid.’  He’s older now and not so feisty. I knew about hard work from very young.  My uncle had a 
cheese business and kept me busy doing everything: ‘Come load the trucks; Go move that 
handcart; Collect that invoice’…  He later came to the US where he had a daughter living because 
back there they wanted to kill him over his debts...  After three years I got fed up with the low pay 
and all the work.  He came looking for me at my father’s house and tried to convince me, he even 
offered to turn the business over to me in the future.  Pure lies. As I knew how to make cheese, I 
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went to Las Mojarras to work in a cheese business two houses down from Mr. Ceferino.  That’s 
where I met Yadira; we got married and my life changed.  I’d never thought about coming to the 
US.  How could I?  How can you make a web if you don’t have a spider?  But Mr. Ceferino saw I was 
a worker and helped me. 
We drove to a neighborhood where only African Americans live, judging from the people 
we saw on the street.  We went into a four-unit apartment building, one of which was in primeval 
chaos, and began to remove the dust and debris: stained carpets, chipped washbasins, rotting 
cupboards, rusty heaters…  Later Kevlin showed me the neighboring apartment, which was already 
almost finished.  Everything was sparkling: perfect finishes, heating ventilators set into the ceiling, 
gleaming showers, polished washbasins, beautifully plumbed trim, immaculate well-laid carpets… 
This is our work, it’s what we do; I learned it here.  I finally shook off my sloppiness, my lack 
of initiative.  But it cost me.  First I worked for six years in a Korean supermarket.  I didn’t have even 
a day off.  They paid me just enough to keep going.  Then I went into gardening, which I learned 
here too, but by abuse.  There was this Mexican who kept yelling at me: ‘Get on with it, asshole!’  
And me, perched up at the top of a tree, struggling not to fall.  I had been afraid of my uncle and 
now he says it’s thanks to him that I’m here.  Yeah, thanks to me running away. Now my bosses 
here respect me.  They listen to what I say and like my ideas.  The black guy who owns the 
apartment building was upset because he didn’t know where to put the heater and air 
conditioning.  ‘There’s no place for it now,’ he told me.  And I told him: ‘We can put one of them in 
the ceiling.’  But he was still uneasy: ‘We can’t put the AC motor there because it gets too hot.’  
‘We’ll put it on the roof then,’ I said.  You should have seen how happy he was. We just came today 
to do some small jobs.  We still need to connect up the heating and install a lock.  The other small 
jobs are plastering and fixing the damage left by those who put in the heating ventilators.  We’d 
already left everything just about ready, but they came with some slabs and broke the edges.  They 
ought to fix it but they’d rather pay us to do it.  So we get another little contract. 
In the course of the morning we made two trips to the Giant Hardware Store, which lived 
up to its name.  I went as porter, but didn’t know what I was carrying or its purpose.  At the cash 
register some employees wore badges that said “I speak Spanish.”  The parking lot was filled with 
Latino men of over 40, anxiously hoping for a last-minute job. 
They don’t feel any pride in their work.  They drink booze all weekend and get in late on 
Mondays, or don’t go in at all, and do it repeatedly until they get fired.  Or they steal and get 
thrown out.  Or they can’t learn and never grasp what steady work is and stay just doing casual 
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jobs.  If you aren’t lazy or sloppy you can always get work and get ahead.  It’s all about figuring out 
the game. Once you get a van like this you’re on your way: contracts pour in.  I realized that and 
got one that can hold all my tools, ladders and even a work crew.  Then the company that hired me 
helped me get my license.  Now I’m registered with my own company here in Maryland. 
He showed me a certificate headed “State of Maryland License, 90 County.”  The next line 
says “Orellana Construction Inc.,” followed by an address, a number and some columns itemizing 
costs: $3.75 for registering the construction firm and $2 for issuing a certificate valid for three 
months.  In bold letters at the bottom it warns: “This license must be publicly displayed and 
expires on April 30, 2014.” 
 
Now I have to take out two kinds of insurance.  I already have one for the van but I need 
one for property damage and another for workers’ comp.  Contracts are better paid when you have 
these three but some people want us to have insurance then try to pay us the same as if we didn’t.  
The owner of these apartments is a good boss and pays well.  For the work we’re doing here he’s 
paying $7,000 per apartment just for labor, plus another $11,000 in materials. He gave me a credit 
card and I buy what I need with it but the invoices go to him so he can keep a check.  One time he 
paid me $3,500 to fix a roof, which I did in one day with an assistant.  He’s a senior official for the 
Washington DC subway.  He inherited several apartments from his father and it looks like he’s been 
buying more.  He has apartments all over the city and we do the maintenance. 
At midday we left for DC.  We got a sandwich and coke at a Crown Fried Chicken, located 
on a busy corner between H Street and Northeast 8th.  Once again Kelvin paid for everything.  
Afterward we waited at the door for his employer, who pulled up 40 minutes late in a Ford pickup 
with the Washington Metro emblem.  He handed over the key for the next job and asked for a 
brief progress report on the last one.  A few blocks from the fast food place we went into an 
apartment that was inhabited but in total disarray, with dirty clothing hanging from the table, 
chairs and doorknobs. 
American women live in these apartments and look at that!  She’s left her panties 
scattered about everywhere and she knew we’re coming today to fix her washing machine.  Look 
what they wear.  That’s how gringo women go out, almost naked.  They put on panties with very 
thin straps, so you can see what they’ve got and what they don’t.  But here you can’t make jokes 
about such things.  When I’d just arrived, my cousin told me: ‘Brother-in-law, don’t stare at that 
girl if you don’t want the police picking you up.  Here you can’t go about ogling the girls.’ 
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The tenant entered in gym clothes.  She gave a friendly greeting and went out again, 
confident that her belongings were safe.  After confirming that the problem with the washing 
machine required specialized attention, we returned the key and the respective report to the 
owner, who appeared at the workplace; our day’s work was over. 
The gringo girl asked me if that streak on the roof is dangerous and I told her it’s just tape.  
But the truth is that if we don’t do something soon, the ceiling’s going to come down.  That’s how 
our day is.  Today we had it easy.  Sometimes, when we have to hand over an apartment, Yadira 
helps me with the final clean-up.  And so we go, with one contract after another. The important 
thing is to have the van and papers.  I bought this one second-hand, with 6,800 miles on it.  A van 
like that could cost $4,000.  The windshield was broken and it had other damage.  For another 
$2,000 I had it like new.  Anyone who buys one of these is on his way.  You put the ladder on top 
and fill the inside full of materials.  That’s why there are so many in and around DC.  When you see 
one, look close and you’ll see it’s being driven by a Central American. The papers are necessary.  I 
drove without a driver’s license for five years.  It’s no big deal until a cop stops you for some 
infraction; you can lose your vehicle, the police keep it as a perk.  Now I have a license, a credit card 
and even a license for my construction company.  Undocumented migrants here in Maryland can 
take out a driver’s license as long as they can show they live in Maryland and pay taxes.  While 
papers are important, it’s more important to eat.  And having papers doesn’t help you if you don’t 
have get up and go.  Lots of people have papers but don’t have a job.  Sheer laziness.   
A day in the life of Gisel 
Gisel is Yadira’s older sister by one year.  She was 10 when I knew her in Las Mojarras.  Her life is 
split between two countries.  She turned 31 this year: 19 of those years in Honduras and 12 in the 
US.  She’s had two children.  One lives in Honduras and the other in the US because she’s been 
married twice, once in each country.  I often used to help her grind corn to make tortilla dough.  
Now she helps me figure out where I am in the city using the GPS on her smartphone. She lives in 
Fairfax County, Virginia, an hour by subway from her sisters Yadira and Celia and her brothers 
Wilson and Chico.  She can get to the Pentagon or the White House in less time than it takes to go 
from Las Mojarras to Tocoa or Trujillo, the cities closest to the village where she was born and the 
first access points to a paved road.  She does child care in her own apartment.  We met up at the 
entrance to the East Falls Church subway station with plans to go to the last station in Maryland.  
She came with her smiling, talkative son Carlos, and began talking in the subway car. 
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I told them I’m taking the day off today.  No problem with that.  Occasionally my brothers 
and sisters and I meet up and I use the days I’m entitled to.  I used to have up to two weeks paid 
vacation but now they don’t give vacations; instead they pay me for all the holidays and other days 
I don’t work. I took today off in lieu of a holiday.  I just told the parents ‘I’ll be closed tomorrow’ 
and they look for someone else to mind their child for them.  I give them two days’ notice, which is 
enough time for them to find someone.  I even helped them get another babysitter for today, plus 
which I often help when they have an emergency and have to go out, like when there’s snow and 
they have to go out shopping…  I often do them favors like that.  After all, they’re like my children 
and I take care of them.  That’s why I don’t think twice about doing them a favor.  And they give 
me whatever they can for it.  Here’s our stop... 
 
Yadira picks us up at Shady Grove station, at one end of the red line.  In 15 minutes we’re at a 
supermarket full of Central American products: Honduran red beans (“Really soft beans”) at $3.25 
for a pound and a quarter, rice imported from Thailand and distributed by Distribuidora Cuscatlán 
at $2.59 a pound, pineapple pastries and rice flour quesadillas at $1.25 each, Salvadoran rice cakes 
and shells at $0.79, Honduran hard cheese at $5, coconuts at $3, La Perfecta sour cream at $3.29 a 
pound, pupusas at $2.89 a packet of four, tortillas, corn on the cob, tamales, ground corn 
turnovers called riguas, baked ripe plantains, Central American squashes and vegetables, iguana 
stew, pineapples, mangos and other tropical fruit… even Honduran beers: Salva Vida and Port 
Royal.  Shopping didn’t interrupt the conversation.  
I got married back in Las Mojarras and I left my first son there.  He’s a big boy already.  My 
first husband is here; he came too.  I’m now with a man who loves and respects me and I became a 
Jehovah’s Witness for him.  He gets off work at 3 pm and sometimes helps me with the afternoon 
ones or takes a nap until the children leave.  Together we take the children to the mall so they can 
play, to the park in the summer, or to Chuck E Cheese, a really fun place where they give the 
children pizza.  I earn more than my husband, which is why he sometimes says he’s going to stop 
working.  But he’s just kidding.  We can’t.  It takes almost one complete wage just to pay for the 
apartment. 
From the supermarket we went to Yadira’s apartment where she began making a huge pot 
of soup with the vegetables and beef she bought.  Gisel continued describing her work. 
My job is to mother a handful of children.  I take care of five, sometimes seven kids.  My 
apartment’s small but it’s not a problem because I don’t have all the children at the same time.  I 
  
171 
get two boys at 6:45 am.  One of them goes to school so I get breakfast for him and have to get 
him to the bus stop by 7:30.  After he’s on the bus I stay with the other, who leaves before 12.  A 
girl comes at 10 and stays until 3:30 in the afternoon.  Then the other two children arrive after 
school and I stay with them until 10:30 or 11 at night.  One boy is only two years old and he just 
sleeps when his mother leaves him.  He drinks his milk then sleeps.  He doesn’t wake up until 5:30 
or 6 in the afternoon, which is why he isn’t sleepy at night. I only have two at the weekend; the 
ones who come at 3:30 pm.  So on Saturdays and Sundays I’m free until 3 pm.   Their mothers work 
weekends so I take care of them on Saturdays and Sundays, but they don’t come on Mondays and 
Tuesdays.  These are mothers who have two, three children and aren’t with their husband.  Or they 
are but say they’re single to get aid.  A woman here has to say ‘He doesn’t help me,’ or ‘I don’t 
have a husband’ to get support.  That’s why they apply for it. 
 
I take care of one girl where it’s the father that has her; she’s only seven months old.  They brought 
her to me two weeks ago so I’m getting to know her.  She’s sickly but doesn’t want to eat; it makes 
her stomach hurt.  Once I get to grips with her and she gets used to me, she won’t be any trouble.  I 
have to see if this is one of her little ways or if she’s crying because she wants to cry or wants to be 
held.  I’ll get her to change her ways.  Her mother left her and the government gave him support 
because he’s the father… But they’d rather the baby be with a sitter than with the father, plus he 
has to work.  They take all that into account here.  As he earns very little they gave him aid very 
quickly.  They base it on how little you earn. I try to send this little girl back very clean because I 
know she only has a father and when she gets back with him it won’t be the same.  I always bathe 
her, put on her cream and leave her very clean.  I give her soup with vegetables.  I put it in a little 
machine and half-blend it.  She loves the little soups I make.  I feel sorry for her because she doesn’t 
have a mother.  She looks at me with those little eyes… And I hug her and squeeze her, and pet her 
and kiss her and you should see how I rub her so she can feel the love she doesn’t have; well, I have 
it for her.  But she feels her mother’s absence. 
Yadira intervenes: It makes my hair stand on end.  You leave a man but take the children.  I 
wouldn’t leave any children with the man.  It’s better for him to stay alone and you take the 
children along with you.  But it could be something else: it could be that the government took the 
girl from the mother.  If a woman mistreats her children, they take them away from her.  That’s 
how it is here in the US. 
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 While Yadira prepares some baleadas to tide us over until the soup is ready, Gisel tells the 
story. 
I’ll tell you what happened with this little girl.  They lived in Boston and came here but after 
being here for two months she wanted to leave.  She liked partying and going out a lot and wanted 
to go back because all her drinking buddies were there.  He didn’t want to go and even less did he 
want to go back to that lifestyle.  So she took off and left the baby with him. He seems like a fool 
but he’s not: he quickly went to the welfare office and they gave him aid.  They asked him for proof 
that the mother drank and had abandoned the child, as he claimed.  So you know what he did?  He 
went on Facebook and there on her page was all the information he needed: this Sunday we’re 
going to such a place to drink, everything she was doing …  ‘Here’s the proof,’ he told them.  That’s 
all the evidence they needed. That’s one of the fathers.  I have two others.  I only have three fathers 
and they’re all very easygoing.  It’s nicer with Latinos because you understand them.  Gringo men 
are more problematic, and the blacks, they’re really something; they even want you to supply the 
food for free.   
 
Yadira endorsed this view:  There’s a black woman living below, on the first floor. When we 
came here, we saw the mess but didn’t know what was up.  Who knows what problem she had 
with her husband for him to call the police.   He threw all her stuff out, all her clothes and shoes in 
black bags.  When the police came they found her out there in the street with the bags.  Now the 
police come round all the time because the school bus leaves her kids and they have to go on foot.  
She just wants to stay in the house and doesn’t take them to the bus stop.  Every day I put the boy 
on the bus. 
Gisel continued: That’s why we need baby­sitters so much.  You should see how these 
children are so well-behaved and well-cared for with me.  You’ll see no crying here.  Sometimes the 
mothers bring them to me early because they say they can’t put up with them; the kids are 
desperate to come be here with me.  And why wouldn’t they when they eat better in my house 
than in their own and are better treated? But that’s also why this work is so exhausting.  You see 
the bags under my eyes?  I only have some free time but never a whole day off.  That’s why I don’t 
think I’ll keep going for much longer in this work.  I dream of only working during the day, not at 
night.  The problem is that I can’t increase the number of children because the space is limited, so I 
have to do several shifts. The advantage I have is that I only have one child of my own.  Social 
workers count all the children who’re going to be in the house.  If you have three children, and your 
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space can take eight, you can only mind five more.  It’s also not advisable because one person can’t 
really mind lots of children.  You can control five but more… one person can’t do it alone. That’s 
why there’s both a child limit and a time limit.  A child can’t be more than 12 hours in your home.  
Those I have are never here longer than seven hours.  The county pays me $37 per day for a baby 
and $35 for a 2-year-old.  They pay me $20 just for putting that five-year-old boy who goes to 
school on the bus.  I have him for one hour, give him breakfast and put him on the bus, and my job 
with him is done. And the pay doesn’t go under $30 for the other children.  I get paid from Fairfax 
County and the State of Virginia.  
There are other jobs caring for children with Down’s syndrome but I don’t dare do it.  You 
have to hand feed them and take them to the bathroom and everything.  And some of them come 
out dreadful.  They may already be old and they’re always shouting.  And it would mean further 
training. You have to train to get a permit for this work.  Before getting one I had to go on a 
training course where they taught me how to care for children, how to deal with them, how to play 
with them...  For example, the food: if they don’t want to eat, you can play games with the food, 
make little drawings with it so they eat it.  They also teach you how to prepare healthy foods: 
protein, carbohydrates.  Everything, absolutely everything must be right. The social worker visits 
me every four months about the food:  to see if I’m giving them food, to see if they want it...  I buy 
the food with my own money then they reimburse me at the end of the month.  They give me a 
fixed amount depending on the children I have.  They don’t like me buying the cheapest food and 
the social worker checks on this.  She makes surprise visits.  She just says ‘I’m going to come in 
February’ but not which day.  There you are waiting, expecting the visit, poking about cleaning up 
every corner because she notices cleanliness a lot.   
 Don’t think I only have to give them food.  I have to keep an account of everything.  For 
example, each child has a number and alongside that number I have to note down if they came or 
not, if I gave them the morning or afternoon snack...  I have to write down every little thing.  At the 
end of the month I sign the paper and it’s sent to the county so they can pay me. Each child has a 
folder and that’s where the vaccination  record is kept and there’s a page for emergencies, which I 
have to fill out if the child gets sick, so I can take him to the doctor and show the child’s social 
security number, the parents’ authorization, etc. … I have to have one for each child.  The social 
worker told me it’s very important to have them because if a child gets sick, I can go to the hospital 
or clinic with all the information about the child.  With that they’ll attend to you.  Next week, she 
warned me, I’m going to call and ask you if you’ve done it yet. 
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 And I don’t only have to prepare myself; I also have to have the house ready.  Firefighters 
came to check out if I have fire safety measures and emergency exits.  The social worker comes to 
see how the children will be here: what I’m like, where they might get hurt, if there are dangerous 
things lying about, if the electrical outlets are covered…  The social worker helps me go over how to 
work with children before renewing the annual contract or when children move out of the county.  
Then she works out the contract with me.  She calls and tells me: You’re so-and-so and this guy tells 
me he wants you to take care of his child.  Once she’s spoken to the child’s parent she calls me, as 
she has my number. My name’s on a webpage. People are always looking for the closest sitters.  If 
they drive they can come from a little further away, but those who don’t drive prefer someone 
nearby.  If I have space, the parent comes and calls the social worker.  You may get Americans or 
Latinos or whoever calls.  I’ve only gotten Latinos so far. 
With bachata music playing in the background, we sat down to eat the soup made using 
Miss Fernanda’s recipe.  More food followed. Don’t be ashamed to eat, they urged me.  
‘Remember back there when you rode horses up into the mountain?’  We also recalled when Mr. 
Ceferino made both sisters lick his back, smeared with salt, as punishment for fighting.  Afterwards 
they had to swallow a ball of corn dough to ease the penetrating salt residue. 
Migration documents aren’t needed for this work.  All I had to show was my passport and 
tax ID to start the process and get my permit.  Once I passed everything, the courses, the 
apartment inspection and the checkup by the firefighters and social workers, they said ‘Yes, she 
can mind children,’ then gave me the permit.  They didn’t ask for any papers from Migration.  They 
weren’t interested.  The only thing they asked for was the addresses of whoever else lives in the 
house to be sure they don’t have a police record.  If they find out that anyone in the house has 
problems, they can’t issue the permit.  Because the number I have is legal and they didn’t find 
anything criminal on me, they accepted me even though I’m not a legal resident and also don’t 
have Temporary Protected Status (TPS). I filled out one form for myself and another for my 
husband and sent them in along with all my data and that of those who live in the house: if I have a 
child, how many children and so on.  If the children are 13 or older, they need a paper for each one; 
if they’re minors I don’t have to fill one out.  Then they decide to approve me or not.  I had to fill 
out a bunch of applications and send them in.  These are their rules. 
 They have their rules and you have to follow them. You can’t have a lot of people living in 
the apartment. You have to send in a check for $14-$15 with each application.  What they’re most 
insistent about is that you take the first aid classes so you can help if a child chokes or swallows 
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something or whatever.  It’s an eight-your course and they give us the telephone numbers of 
teachers who are accredited.  The course can cost $80 but if the group is large, it’s cheaper: it 
drops to $50, $40.  But it takes a lot longer if the class is big.  I called a man who charged me $85 
and I passed the course in two and a half hours.  Much quicker.  
 Once you’re in the process, the county sends you papers every month.  For example, they 
send you ones that say on such a day they’re giving some class with three, four hours of credit…  
They don’t charge us for the class or require that we to go to any specific one, but it’s useful to go 
because we learn more.  For example, they gave us a two-hour course on food preparation. While 
you aren’t obliged to take every class, you do have to complete 14 hours of courses each year to 
get your permit renewed, and if you can’t show them a certificate saying you did, they’ll annul your 
permit and take the children away.  You get a certificate from the teachers with your name on it 
and all the classes you’ve passed—they give us tests in the class—and how many hours each class 
is worth.  Everything is free, we’ don’t have to pay anything.  They even sent me congratulations. 
At 3 pm we set aside the feast, which had started at 11 am, to visit another sister.  From 
there I accompanied them to a clinic where they have an appointment with an Indian nutritionist 
who has designed a diet for them.  The number of notices in Spanish on the office walls may be an 
indication of the predominance of a Latino clientele.  So is the list of foods to avoid: chicharrones 
[deep-fried pork skin], tamales, pupusas, riguas, etc.  After paying $90 for the consultation, we go 
on another bout of shopping. 
My social worker is from India too, just like the diet lady.  She helped me when I showed 
interest in the job and told me it’ll work if I want it to and that it’s very valuable work. Now when 
she comes, she asks how many children I have and I tell her five and she’s impressed because it’s a 
lot of work every month. You have to fill out the food forms.  The county makes out the menu.  
They have a nutritionist who prepares it so it’s varied, with vegetables, proteins… The food mustn’t 
be oily, it must be healthy.  They send you a menu and you go ticking it off.  If I have to give the kids 
an apple and don’t have one, I give them a pear or other fruit instead and I mark it down.  If the 
menu says ‘You must give them grilled beef this afternoon’ and I don’t have it, I can give them 
chicken, then I mark in the code for chicken.  They send a copy of the children’s menu for the week 
to the parents too, the same as at school.  That’s how I know the children don’t want to miss class 
on Fridays, because they get pizza that day and they like it. 
 Some people get sick from all this work.  Paola, a fellow babysitter, got stressed out by all 
the paperwork. She got depressed.  Óscar, my husband, told me “You’re going to end up sick too.”  
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He sees all that I do. Yesterday it was his turn to fax in some papers because I couldn’t.  I put some 
in the mail; take others and leave them at the office and others I fax.  I could also send them by 
email, but that’s harder for me because they all have to be done on a computer.  So you know what 
I do?  I just don’t let things pile up.  I start filling out forms, marking and ticking them, in the 
morning.  Before I know it, I’ve finished.  It’s hard at first but you get used to it.  Besides, I’ve 
always liked taking care of children. 
 Are these parents undocumented?  If they are, why does the government spend so much 
on them? 
 The parents are undocumented but the children were born here.  The key isn’t the parents, 
it’s the children.  The parents don’t matter to the government here.  They can do what they want 
but the children are a different story because they’re from this country and they take care of 
children here like you wouldn’t believe.  They don’t care if the parents have papers or not.  It’s the 
children they’re helping. 
Yadira drove, in total control of the steering wheel and the complicated geography of DC 
and surrounding area.  She offered to leave Maryland and take us to our counties in Virginia.  Is 
there some problem? 
 My license is restricted but I can use it to drive anywhere in the country.  It doesn’t let me 
get it in to see Obama. It doesn’t serve as an ID but it does let me drive.  I’m not interested in other 
papers.  I’d just use them for the toilet.  What I’m interested in is having work so my children can 
eat and go to school. 
A day in the life of Lito Melgar 
I met Lito in February 1990, when he was three years old.  He was playing with plastic dolls on a 
dirt floor, next to the room where his grandmother was dying.  He lived in a settlement on a small 
plateau built by Plan Padrino, an NGO, for an agricultural cooperative of people displaced by the 
war.  His father was a guerrilla, who later migrated twice to the United States but after some years 
he returned to El Salvador where he now lives growing corn on just over a sixth of an acre that 
Lito’s paying for at a rate of $80 a month for ten years. Back then Lito had never even heard the 
words “United States,” except perhaps in bitter, contemptuous tones.  Three months before I met 
him the Salvadoran Army, financed and advised by the US government, had led a military 
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counteroffensive that killed thousands of Salvadorans, among whom I specially grieve for six 
young people from this cooperative.  
 I worked in this community for four years as a member of the Jesuit Service for Refugees.  
Our presence was supposed to make the Army realize it had international support and prevent 
threats of further repression.  I spent two or three days a week there, sometimes more, and that’s 
how I became friends with Lino’s family. I’m godfather to two of his sisters and one brother.  I visit 
them almost every year although I wish it were every week.  I watched Lito grow up: go to school, 
pluck piñuela flowers for the porridge, dance at parties, take part in the Way of the Cross, sing 
Chayanne’s songs like any enraptured teenager at his sisters’ 15th birthday parties [considered a 
girl’s “coming of age” in many Latin American countries], go through his first amorous setback, 
walk two hours a day to high school in La Libertad and leave for the United States in November 
2005, a peak deportation year.  In February of this year, exactly 24 years after our first meeting, 
we had a warm father-son embrace in the Vienna metro stop, the end of the orange line in 
Washington, where Lito had come to pick me up “good and early in the morning” as true 
Salvadorans say. 
Do you remember taking me to the port of La Libertad, the last time we saw each other in 
El Salvador?  I asked you then what the United States was like and you said ‘It’s another world.’  
Now I know how true that is. Winter was just starting when I arrived, the hardest for many years.  I 
began going to the stores and understood what another world this all was: the shops, apartments 
all well-painted with carpets, kitchens with cabinets, a sofa, a fireplace… Wow, that’s so cool, I 
thought.  My father, who was here then, took me to a laundry and explained: ‘You wash your 
clothes here in these machines and fold them like this.’  During the day he took me to cut trees in a 
frozen forest.  He used a chainsaw and I carried the logs to the car.  He had loaned me some wet 
gloves that I was ashamed to take off.  I was shivering and all hunched up.  My father said, ‘What’s 
the matter?  Are you cold?  Well, that’s how it is here. Get used to it.  You wanted to come.  Well, 
this is the United States.  Man up.’ 
 People say the first two years here are the hardest.  It’s very different, so lonely.  Here they 
always say the family doesn’t exist.  They say that when you first come, perhaps so you’ll take 
responsibility for yourself.  And little by little you find out that it’s so, and end up agreeing that it’s 
true. My half-brother once told me: ‘Look, Carlos, when you want a car, all you have to do is tell me 
and I’ll get you plates.’  I eventually bought a car and, and as I couldn’t get insurance and plates, I 
asked him to do me the favor since he’s legal.  He’s got a TPS permit and works driving garbage 
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trucks.  He pays $500 to renew his permit every year.  But he told me: ‘My work is very 
complicated, and if anything happens they’ll take my license away.’  So for whatever reason he 
didn’t help me, and he was totally in his right not to.  Now I get it: nobody wants to stick their neck 
out for someone else. When I was in El Salvador I didn’t understand why people here don’t call you 
up.  How come they don’t have five minutes to call and just say: ‘Hey, how are you?’  It’s incredible, 
incomprehensible.  But life here moves very quickly.   You feel so engrossed.    
 Some days I’ve had up to 100 calls on my cell; 100 problems to solve.  I usually eat in the 
car.  I sometimes leave at 5 in the morning and get back at 11 at night.  I leave the children 
sleeping and come home to find them sleeping.  This is what I want to change when I get my 
papers.  My wife is raising the children, she doesn’t work.  All income depends on me.  We want to 
put up a daycare someday.  She knows a lot about it and we need the money. Sometimes I find 
myself sitting here wondering how I got into all this.  I worry just thinking about my credit cards; I 
owe on nearly all of them.  The minimum interest on this one is 16%, and it’s the lowest.  The first 
one I got was Capital One, then American Express and Discovery.  And I did it to prepare myself for 
the future.  In total, I owe these companies $3,000 and then there’s $7,000 for the big car I’m also 
paying for.  The other, smaller one, cost me $3,000, and is already paid for.  Here everybody lives 
like this, in debt. 
We traveled in a pickup truck with the logo “Transfiguración Services Inc.” and the 
inscription: “Reglaze and Refinishing Services, info@transfiguración-services.com, Bathtubs-Sinks-
Vanities-Cabinets-Kitchen Countertops-Tile Walls and Floors.” We headed straight to the 
apartment where Lito had to work that morning. We’d both had breakfast.  Together with a 
Honduran and a Guatemalan—also undocumented—I was staying with, I’d eaten a massive 
cinnamon bun, part of the ration the parish of St. Anthony of Padua in Falls Church distributes 
twice a week to the “homeless,” who are really Latinos who, like me, don’t mind eating day-old 
bread from the exquisite bakeries that can’t sell them and donate them to the churches.  These 
bakery goods and other food we’re so generously given considerably reduced my research costs 
and undoubtedly do the same for the finances of many migrants.  We unloaded the materials and 
Lito began to paint. 
I said to myself that when I got there I was going to get three jobs.  The first one I had, 
some Mexicans picked me up at 6 in the morning and left me back at 10 at night.  They were 
contractors who made houses out of ‘shiroc’ [Sheetrock, or drywall].  My God, what a job!  I was 
wrecked when I got home.  They taught me to use stilts to reach the highest sheets and told me: 
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‘Toughen up, son of a bitch. Break a sweat, don’t be a wimp!’  The hardest part is that Hispanics 
with power are the most racist, whether in the police,  in  organizations or at work.  Another 
Mexican told me about another company: ‘Go with them, they won’t screw you around.’  I went 
there with some others and learned a little more.  Then I worked in air conditioning. Then I went to 
Pennsylvania with another Salvadoran.  They taught me quickly but said they couldn’t pay me 
more.  They got work that paid $18 an hour and only gave me $10 so they turned a nice profit.  I 
left that and got into restaurants, working in a steakhouse at night.  I learned how to cook meat 
there: medium, medium rare, rare, well cooked and almost burned.  I earned $10.70 an hour but 
only worked four hours a day. During the day I cleaned houses with my future mother-in-law. I 
went to help her, to learn how to clean houses  here, because it’s not the same as back there.  With 
that I thought: Man, if I ever get married, I already know how to cook and clean house.  I was fine 
there but a friend was leaving to start up his own Indian restaurant so he told me: ‘Come with me.  
You’ll have Saturdays and Sundays free and earn $700 a week.’ Wow! What a deal!  I started work 
at 10 in the morning and left at 10:30 at night.  That was in Rosslyn, close to Washington, and I 
lived in Manassas.  I commuted every day in my green Nissan.  It was very stressful. I wasn’t used 
to this kind of life.  
 I was stopped by the police twice, once because I fell asleep at the traffic lights.  The light 
turned green, I stayed there and when I woke up it had turned red again.  When I hit the gas, a cop 
was waiting and stopped me.  I have a Maryland license and can’t say I live here in Virginia, so I 
invented a story: ‘I’m coming from work and came to visit some friends here.’   ‘OK, be careful,” 
and he didn’t give me a ticket that time. In fact, they only paid me $350 a week and I did work 
weekends.  I only had Monday or Tuesday free.  It came out at $5 an hour and I did everything: 
cleaning, cooking, chopping, preparing…  The restaurant was just starting up and had to make 
headway.  I finally left; the owner was a decent person but also a sharp businessman. 
 Then came painting bathtubs.  I contacted an undocumented Salvadoran I met named 
Rubén, who’s with a minister named Mr. Miguel, and he got me a job in a company called 
Bluestone, owned by a terrific Venezuelan guy.  I worked there four years and left last year to come 
to Transfiguración, a company Rubén and another boy named Leonardo founded about three years 
ago.  I’m doing okay here. I’m the company supervisor.  It’s complicated because many of them 
don’t accept me since I came in after the company was formed and there are people who’ve been 
working there since day one.  But while they’ve been there longer I have more time than them 
learning the work.  I do the best I can and try to get on well with everyone but there are always 
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those who, seeing only the negatives, try to bring out the Indian in you; make you angry.  But I go 
and check their work and tell them, ‘This isn’t right, you have to do it again.’ I think maybe they put 
me in this job because they know me, but they don’t know me all that well and they also know the 
other boys.  They know a little about my history and I think they believe I’m good because I’m in 
their church, I know how to talk to people and I’m serious and responsible.  It isn’t the same as 
when you’re single, leaving things in God’s hands and doing whatever you want.  You’re more 
focused with a family and two children and think things through before doing anything.  I’ve been 
leading a youth group and I know how to talk to people, how to act with people and say things in a 
way that won’t hurt others.  The man who was here before was very heavy handed and employees 
left.  That’s why the owner found me. 
 I order and distribute the materials, which takes a lot of  my time and is the only bad part.  
I start at seven in the morning and from then I don’t stop getting phone calls: this one doesn’t have 
materials, the lady has a complaint, there’s not enough material to finish, the bathtub got 
damaged… A lot of calls about problems I have to solve, because that’s my job.  I also have to paint 
bathtubs to make more money.  My bosses don’t want me painting bathtubs; they just want me to 
supervise and get more contracts so there’s more work, but then I’ll only earn eight hours a day 
and that’s not enough.  So I paint bathtubs.  Two tubs counts as eight hours, and I can do three and 
even four or more, which means that I can earn 16 hours in a day and only work 8.  That works for 
me, but it’s not steady. It depends on the number of contracts and right now I can’t just be finding 
new contracts because I’m in the process of getting my papers fixed, have a lot of debts and need 
to get together as much money as I can.  I always send a little to my family in El Salvador so we’re 
all living as decently as possible.  Work has gone down a lot lately.  Let’s see what happens.  I hope 
it improves.  We currently have contracts in Maryland, Virginia, DC and even Baltimore, close to 
Philadelphia.  And even in Winchester. 
 Lito spent the morning painting.  He mixed the paint, put protective paper on the walls, 
and activated the extractor.  At midday a group of African Americans entered the apartment led by 
a lady who smiled warmly and was visibly impressed with the work. “That’s amazing,” she kept 
saying.  The people with her were a couple of potential tenants. 
 Only blacks live here in this building.  They don’t leave the house when we paint, they hang 
around.  They like that smell.  I paint bathtubs with a spray gun and the finish is like on a car.  They 
taught me here and now I teach others.  We use masks but the smell is very, very strong…  So 
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strong that if you’re in a bathroom without a mask, you could die.  I want to quit because I feel it’s 
affecting me a lot.  I’ve been doing the work for nearly six years but I haven’t found another, better 
job and furthermore they pay me twice the minimum wage. Transfiguración has a policy of always 
paying over the minimum.  I get $16 an hour, which is the highest pay after Raúl, one of the 
company’s two owners.  The Dominican earns the least, $12 an hour, but as the work is paid by 
completed task and each task is rated at a fixed number of hours, he can earn up to 20 hours a 
day, which equals $240.  The Guatemalan earns $13 an hour.  There are six workers in all. 
 I want to start my own company, make something of myself, but two things I don’t have 
are papers and English.  I began studying third level basic on January 7, a month and a half ago, 
and I go twice a week.  I’m learning English and already know how to say: How are you?  I almost 
never speak English with my wife and if she says something to me in English, I don’t understand 
her.  It’s our fault that we don’t practice but I’m studying to prepare for the future because our 
daughter will soon be starting school and we have to be able to talk to the teachers.  It’s a little 
easier for me because they taught English back in high school—not much but it helps.  Sometimes I 
put on films in English with English subtitles and I’m making progress that way. 
 We headed out to another apartment because Lito got an SOS, asking for more thinner.  
The call was from the Dominican twins and Lito used the opportunity to check their work.  The 
atmosphere became livelier as the Dominicans taunted each other and sprinkled all their words 
with Spanglish: ‘I told him that he shouldn’t tochar that because it was frizado and it would be 
better to move back to continue weldiando.’  We had to work our way around hills of snow to get 
back to the pickup and on the way we continued talking. 
 The boss in the last company was a good person.  For my honeymoon, he gave me tickets 
to Disneyworld in Orlando, Florida, and we went by road because I already had my driver’s license.  
Twelve hours driving.  At that time I liked to drive fast—when you’re young it’s rather exciting—
and I was fined in Georgia for going 99 in a 70 mph zone.  They gave me a $450 ticket.  That was 
tough.  I’ve paid a lot of money to the court for traffic violations.  I‘ve learned a little because I 
haven’t had a ticket for two years now.  Before it was constant and almost always for speeding, 
but I’ve learned and am still learning.  And I’ve always taken the blame: no matter what the police 
nab me for, I tell them okay, but let me go.  It’s how you think when you see a cop:  You want to 
give me a ticket?  Do it then, but let me go.  Whatever.  
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 I understand a lot of English but I don’t speak it.  The problem is that I can’t explain myself 
and that’s why the police do what they want.  I’ve seen that when people speak English and give a 
good explanation, the cop sometimes doesn’t write out the ticket.  Those people can defend 
themselves well and even persuade the police; they aren’t afraid of anything; they talk freely.  I 
want to be like that, to be able to talk, to have the right to say anything. One time the police 
stopped a kid who was going 10, 15 miles over the speed limit and he just told them he’d been 
talking by phone and hadn’t realized he was going at that speed; he thought he was just within the 
limit, and they didn’t give him a ticket.  Another boy, who didn’t speak English, came along that 
same day and they did give him one.  He had a license and everything, but he didn’t speak English 
well and looked Hispanic so they gave him a ticket.  In fact he was following someone who was 
going at the same speed.  The police stopped both of them and gave one a ticket and not the other.  
Both were Salvadorans but the one who didn’t get the ticket was whiter and grew up here, and he 
spoke perfect English. 
 We got to the house and in his comfortable living room Lito told me more about why his 
situation is complicated.  Years ago a traffic cop stopped him saying that the air-freshener hanging 
from the rear view mirror was blocking his view. Mistakenly, on the advice of a supposedly more 
experienced friend, Lito identified himself with a false name.  The cop was distrustful and after a 
careful inspection he found a complete set of false documents: driver’s license, social security card 
and green card.  He arrested Line who was tried for fraud, a felony that stayed on his record like a 
scarlet letter.  Although he’s married to a US citizen of Salvadoran origin, his path to regularization 
has stumbled on this obstacle. 
Many of our rights are violated by being without papers.  You often say nothing or let 
something pass just so they don’t ask if you have papers or not.  You never stop feeling like a 
criminal.  They shout at you when they feel like it and you feel you have a lot less dignity.  That’s 
why I’ve started to take out my papers. I’ve already gone through most of the stages.  I’m 
requesting pardon for having come in illegally and having broken the law.  I’ve already paid more 
than $ 5,000 to a process lawyer to get to the stage of requesting pardon.  If it’s approved, I’ll ask 
for a waiver and will have to go to El Salvador. I didn’t process the papers earlier because I wasn’t 
sure that if I applied I wouldn’t have to go wait in El Salvador for an indefinite period of time.  It 
was very complicated but this situation has been relieved since last year when Obama approved 
legislation that you don’t have to leave to wait for anything. If I go now, I can return and won’t 
have to wait for anything; just take the paperwork to the US embassy in El Salvador.  Let’s see 
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what happens.  It’s been expensive and slow.  I paid $800 twice for a psychological examination to 
show the damage the children would suffer from family separation if I have to go to El Salvador 
and wait for ten years, as the law required. 
My father had told me he wasn’t afraid of the police here and assured me there’s no 
problem with Migration here in Manassas.  But we did have anti-immigrant legislation for a time.  
They began to collaborate with the feds asking for documents about legal status.  Because of it 
migrants began to move to other areas of Virginia and to Maryland, and businesses felt their 
absence.  Supermarkets were empty; diners had no customers, foremen couldn’t find bricklayers.  
The county had to backtrack.  That’s when the opportunity came up to get plates and a driver’s 
license in Maryland.  That improved the situation a lot but for my plans I need residency. 
If I manage to get papers and a high school diploma, it will open many doors for me.  I’ve 
even thought about going into the army after getting my high school diploma.  I can follow any 
dream if I have papers and I’ve heard that those who are serving the country have a lot of 
benefits…  I’ve been thinking about it because I don’t have health insurance. I have a driver’s 
license and tax ID but no social security.  Neither does my wife; only the children.  They have the 
right because they were born here and I think it lasts until they’re 18 years old.  You have to apply 
and qualify because if you earn more than $30,000 or so a year, they’re no longer eligible.  It 
depends on how many family members there are.  They count everything.  And you have to renew 
it every year.  It’s quite a process but, Thank God, that insurance for them is a big help.  
 When Janet was pregnant with Josué she applied for insurance and they helped us with it.  
That insurance covered the whole pregnancy and childbirth. We didn’t have to pay anything.  It 
covered medicine and medical care but not milk.  You have to earn really little in order for them to 
give you food.  You have to be dying of hunger.  We wouldn’t even be able to live here.  You have to 
be in one room with the whole family and earn about $200 a week. My father-in-law manages a 
Greek restaurant and he helped us get this apartment.  It’s in his and my wife’s name because 
when the police caught me with those documents I ended up with a police record for 10 years and 
can’t apply for anything.  I can’t buy a house.  I know I can’t because I tried.  I can’t even buy a car.  
When you go to buy one, they check your credit.  You give your number, they check your credit 
history and everything comes out.  When it came up that I had presented false documents, nobody 
wanted to give me anything.  All this information stays in the system and only they know how it is. 
 We ate some delicious pupusas Janet made with cheese, loroco [a vine flower bud found 
in Central America], beans and shredded pork.  Then we rested.  The next day Lito took me on a 
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tour of several churches.  His friend José Manuel, the Honduran in whose house I’m staying, also 
came, carrying a statue of the Virgin Mary that he placed at the doors to the churches on the table 
where they have leaflets about spiritual retreats. 
 I felt such scorn and humiliation at not having papers but, Thank God, I joined this church 
group and there I understood better what it is to be a person from the spiritual point of view.  
Previously I valued people by what they have.  I was bouncing from job to job but, Thank God, 
joining the church group and then starting to meet good people gave me greater stability and 
helped me not to get lost in drugs and vices.  Everyone in the group is Hispanic.  That’s where I met 
Janet and where we fell in love.  That’s also where I found work.  Transfiguración, the company I 
work for, is owned by two members of Mr. Miguel’s congregation. Mr. Miguel, who was ordained 
when he was 20 years old, encouraged me to begin the legalization process.  Start, he said, 
because otherwise you’ll never do it.  The reason I didn’t begin was that I didn’t have the money so 
he lent us $2,500; that’s how I began to get my papers fixed.  I’m paying him back for that loan.  I 
try to pay regularly to keep the door open.  He also paid to get me out when they held me for the 
false papers and even left $150 so I could get here because they took all the money I had on me 
and the car.  He’s helped us a lot. Lupe, also undocumented, uses the car, which is in Mr. Miguel’s 
name.  Lupe and José Manuel stay in this house; it belongs to the congregation but Mr. Miguel 
doesn’t want you to say anything about that.  He says that if he has a lot of people in the house, 
they could accuse him of promoting trafficking in undocumented migrants.  He doesn’t want 
problems with migration. We go to mass in the All Saints church in Manassas but I move through 
virtually the whole area.  The group I go to promotes silent retreats for men over 18 years of age.  
Previously, I worked directly with Mr. Miguel, who works with adolescents, but now we’ve formed 
a group of married men and work with them on silent retreats.  We’ve seen that society needs 
silence.  Therefore we go around winning men for God so they can have a weekend of silence.  We 
go to several parishes.  I know almost all the churches here in Northern Virginia and we always 
invite the Hispanic community.   
 We stayed up late that night talking about what holiness is, if the army is a good or bad 
option, the uncertainty of the regularization process, his dreams of being independent and 
starting up his own business…  The talks continued over new get-togethers and work days, and 
now through Skype.  And Lito continues to build his history with the materials the world makes 




2.2 Disobedience in the world of work and citizenship through labor 
 
In 1972 the controversial Chicano writer, activist, and lawyer Oscar Zeta Acosta described the 
inhabitants of his California neighborhood thus: “Riverbank is divided into three parts, and in my 
corner of the world there were only three kinds of people: Mexicans, Okies and Americans. 
Catholics, Holy Rollers and Protestants. Peach pickers, cannery workers and clerks.”1 In the past 
forty years the Latinos, who were then almost exclusively Mexicans, have changed religion and 
occupation. They continue to be mostly Catholic, but Catholics are now only 66% of the total.2 And 
most definitely they are no longer only peach pickers. Only 4.5% work in the primary sector. The 
largest number work in restaurants and hotels (14.4%), followed by social services (14.1%), 
construction (13.1%), and manufacturing (11.8%). Central Americans are more concentrated in 
construction (16.2%) and restaurant work (14.7%). The percentage working in construction varies 
by state and by country of origin. In Virginia, for example, 34% of Hondurans work in construction, 
whereas only 2% work in the primary sector, a much smaller percentage than the 7.6% of Mexican 
who do.3  As a result of the greater concentration of Central Americans in the cities and the 
ongoing nature of their migration, they have tended to find work in construction and the services; 
even those with rural origins are working as masons, nannies, domestics, and waiters. 
In 2007 undocumented workers in general reached a peak of 5.4% of the labor force, a 
rate that varies widely from state to state. In Nevada, California, Texas, and New Jersey the 
undocumented in 2012 represented respectively 10.2%, 9.4%, 8.9%, and 8.2% of persons over the 
age of 16 who were working or seeking work. Nor are the unauthorized immigrants mainly peach 
pickers. Only 5% work in agriculture and mining, whereas 13% are employed in manufacturing, 
16% in construction, and 22% as professionals, business people, or service workers. Their absence 
would cause the economic sectors where they are most concentrated to collapse. Such is the case 
in landscaping (where they are 24% of the workforce), domestic work (23%), apparel 
manufacturing (20%), crop production (20%), laundry and dry cleaning (19%), and building 
maintenance (19%).4 I will refer later to some representatives of several of these occupations, 
such as Lito Melgar, who remodels interiors; Kelvin Orellana, who works in construction and 
                                            
1 Acosta, 1989, p.78. 
2 Espinosa, 2014, p.4. 
3 U.S. Census Bureau, 2011-2013 3-Year American Community Survey, S0506: SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS 
OF THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION BY REGION OF BIRTH: LATIN AMERICA. U.S. Census Bureau, 2011-2013 
3-Year American Community Survey, S0201: SELECTED POPULATION PROFILE IN THE UNITED STATES. 
4 Passel, 2015. 
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remodeling; his brother-in-law Chico Guerra, who does landscaping; and the Guatemalan tailors of 
Los Angeles. None of them would have hurt a flea in their native land, but now they live illegally in 
the United States, a country with a police apparatus and a judicial system far more effective than 
the ones that exist in their own countries.  
The substantial role that the undocumented play in the U.S. labor market could be seen 
graphically in the film, “A Day Without a Mexican,” produced by Sergio Arau in 2004. The film’s 
box-office failure does not invalidate its basic premise: the extreme dependency of the U.S. 
economy on Latino (and undocumented) labor. Certain sectors are far more dependent on 
undocumented labor than the overall proportion of unauthorized workers in the labor force (4%) 
would indicate. Although there are many indications of the extent to which U.S. society depends 
on persons who are legally excluded, their economic weight does not always provide them 
opportunities to increase their parrhesia. The world of labor is an arena in which one can never be 
fully a parrhesiast. The immigrants did not exercise that role in their own countries, nor are U.S.-
born citizens always given to parrhesia. There is always something to be gained by holding one’s 
tongue, or at least nothing is lost thereby. However, it cannot be said that the undocumented are 
deprived of the opportunity for parrhesia. Even before the labor struggle calls strikes or takes to 
the streets and the factories, it is fought in other spaces and with other means. Demands 
presented to the Labor Commissioner’s Office are one way of taking advantage of the differing 
regulations from state to state. The right to desert is exercised repeatedly by changing jobs and 
ascending in position and earnings. These are mechanisms for practicing what Heater calls “civil 
citizenship,” that is, the “right to hold property and establish contracts, and the right to justice.”1 
These mechanisms are complemented by other opportunities to practice parrhesia and to give 
more visibility to the work of undocumented immigrants so that its specific contribution will be 
worthily rewarded. This happens especially when their work is valued not only for its quantitative 
weight but also for its qualitative excellence. This distinction finds its inspiration in the twofold 
nature of commodity and labor postulated by Marx: “At first sight a commodity presented itself to 
us as a complex of two things—use value and exchange value. Later on, we saw also that labour, 
too, possesses the same twofold nature.”2  Labor as commodity abstracts from its use value, its 
social utility, its insertion into the social structure. The social relations into which labor is inserted 
are opaque, but they exist, as Marx makes clear: “Commodities come into the world in the shape 
                                            
1 Heater, 2007, p.207. 
2 Marx, 1996, p.51. 
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of use values… and they acquire this reality [as depositories of value] only in so far as they are 
expressions or embodiments of one identical social substance, viz., human labour.”1 This aspect of 
labor I will call “labor as commodity,” whereas the labor in which the social relations are more 
apparent I will call “labor as a structure of collective life.” Every kind of labor has exchange value 
and use value, a quantitative as well as a qualitative weight. It seems to me, however, that the 
opaqueness of labor’s insertion into a structure of social relations is not the same for a restaurant 
employee and a childcare worker, or for someone sewing pants for unknown wearers and a tailor 
who deals face to face with his customers. The latter type of work requires and obtains greater 
complicity in the exercise of performative civil disobedience. I make use of this analytical 
distinction to bring out the different aspects of undocumented labor as performative civil 
disobedience and to demonstrate the characteristics of its social validation. 
2.2.1  The undocumented worker as commodity 
 
Standing argues that “commodification takes place when something is bought and sold without 
agency.”2 The original sense of the word, however, seems to me to refer to labor that is reduced 
simply to its facet of exchange value, that is, to time and effort exchanged for a wage. Marx 
pointed out that “capital as self-expanding value embraces not only class relations, a society of a 
definite character resting on the existence of labour in the form of wage labour. It is a movement 
… it can be understood only as motion, not as a thing at rest.”3 On this basis I will treat of the wage 
relationship and the terms of exchange in this section on labor as commodity. Like many other 
workers, immigrants make an effort to escape from what the mere wage relationship is. Many of 
them make use of social networks to exhibit their work and to provoke commentary about its 
esthetic value. Diego González, for example, displays the dresses he makes in the anonymity of his 
workshop; he takes photos of them and posts them immediately on Facebook. In this way he saves 
his creations from being treated merely as instances of exchange value. He breaks with 
commodification since this takes effect only when “his commodity possesses for himself no 
immediate use value.”4 Diego puts his own stamp on his product: before it can become an abstract 
wage entity, it can be appreciated by hundreds of his networked contacts, and they can give him 
feedback. This process of “personalization” and appropriation of labor happens in a very limited 
                                            
1 Marx, 1996, p.57. 
2 Standing, 2009, p.145. 
3 Marx, 1997, p.110. 
4 Marx, 1997, p.95. 
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way. Most of the links in the commercial chain by which the dress reaches its final user will not 
know who Diego is. The social relations in the chain are opaque: it would appear that his dresses 
“go to market and make exchanges of their own account.”1 In that sense Diego, as a laborer in a 
workshop, has very limited opportunity for parrhesia. That is not the case, however, with childcare 
workers and the self-employed, for whom there can be no abstraction from their use value nor 
any possibility of dissociating the laborers from the social utility of the goods they produce or the 
services they provide. For that reason I treat of them in other sections. 
But that does not mean that parrhesia ceases to exist when labor is a mere commodity. 
The dominated have many forms of discourse, and as Marx has shown, their very position in the 
material world exercises a certain eloquence and has systemic weight. Those diverse modes of 
expressing convictions and exercising political power have been overlooked by some very valuable 
analyses.2 The undocumented workers’ denunciations of oppression are necessary: low salaries, 
poor working conditions, and other types of abuse are very frequent realities, although these are 
not always motivated by lack of documentation. Some studies, with the best of intentions, 
amalgamate the condition of the undocumented and that of unskilled workers, and they identify 
these two vulnerabilities as basic. However, labels such as “unskilled,” “low-skilled,” or “less-
skilled,” which are found even in presumably pro-immigration literature,3 exercise a symbolic 
violence that legitimizes exclusion by branding the labor as dispensable or at least 
interchangeable. Such labels also misrepresent the situation because the migrants bring with them 
highly specialized skills and they learn new ones in order to situate themselves better in the labor 
market.4 Achieving due recognition of their abilities is part of the struggle of the undocumented, 
as is stated clearly in the declarations of pro-immigrant activist Luis Gutiérrez: “Simply because 
you’re a doctor or a dentist or a scientist, your labor is worth something. But you know what is 
also worth something? The labor of that gardener is also worth something. What about the 
harvester? His labor is also worth something. And the women who clean hotels? Their labor is also 
valuable. All kinds of labor are valuable because all human beings are equal, and we demand 
justice for them.”5 
                                            
1 Marx, 1996, p.94. 
2 Chomsky, 2014. De Genova, 2005. 
3 Anderton, 2015, p.4. 
4 It would be more correct to speak of skills acquired apart from formal education. 
5 Coutin, 2007, pp.155-183, p.155. 
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To deny immigrants the full range of employment opportunities by declaring them to be 
merely exploitable economic subjects is equivalent to seeing the entry of women into the labor 
market as just another chance to exploit them; it means denying the reality of the political 
platform provided them by their position as laborers. There is a need to progress from the 
monovalence to the ambivalence and the polyvalence of social realities. Many social scientists 
tend to think that something with an economically regressive valence will also have a politically 
regressive valence: the entry of women into the labor market (which means greater exploitation 
insofar as their paid labor is added on to their domestic labor) was in 1980s Nicaragua the 
platform that opened up greater political space for women. The entry of migrants into the labor 
market, despite conditions of exploitation, is a tool they can use to move themselves closer to 
residency and citizenship. Standing states that “the family and the education system had provided 
mechanisms of social solidarity that gave groups the means of developing agency and a distance 
from market forces.”1 Such networks are of great value, but for the undocumented—who relate to 
market forces in Marx’s sense, as the material for making history—it is not their distance from the 
market forces but their role within them that provides them with potency and agency. 
Marx did not present things in such a flat and linear manner, but rather dialectically. Let us 
consider what he wrote in The Communist Manifesto: “Not only has the bourgeoisie forged the 
weapons that bring death to itself; it has also called into existence the men who are to wield those 
weapons—the modern working class—the proletarians.”2 Here there is a dialectical movement in 
which the master fashions the slave. The originating movement corresponds to the bourgeoisie, 
but it is clear that the incubator of the protagonism of the proletarians is their location in the 
mode of production. That is what happens in genuine politics. The business people who hire the 
immigrants make performative civil disobedience possible. When the Naturalization Act of 1790 
permitted the naturalization only of white migrants but did not prevent employment of non-white 
workers,3 the entry and permanence of workers became the first step toward citizenship. And it 
continues to be that. 
That is why entry into the labor has political significance. In the marketplace the principle 
of sovereignty is more clearly distributed among diverse actors. It is there that migrants achieve 
legitimization, in spite of the process that De Genova calls “illegalization.” The process of 
legitimization takes place through the slow and often painful insertion in a labor market where the 
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immigrants are at first extremely exposed to fraud and low wages. This is an important element of 
my reflection in this section, where I consider wages as the expression of labor as commodity. We 
saw that Lito was defrauded and made a victim of what U.S. writer Thomas Pynchon calls “the 
aggressive dialect of Mexicans in California, with plenty of ‘fucks’ and ‘faggots’.”1 A group of 
Quiché tailors from San Antonio Sija in Totonicapán—Diego González among them—keep trying to 
find their way into the labor market while in the meantime they receive low wages and avoid 
being defrauded. “Our accent betrays us,” one of them told me; “immediately they want to take 
advantage of us.” All those who were defrauded, however, have complained to the Labor 
Commissioner’s Office, including Eladio Ixocteyác, another indigenous Guatemalan of whom I will 
speak later in greater detail. All of them won their cases and were treated in court as if they were 
citizens. Sometimes they had only to pronounce the magic words, “Labor Commissioner’s Office,” 
to make their employers back down from some abuse they were about to commit.  
Ernesto Serna shared with me his employment itinerary: “I had a job where they paid me 
$1,600 a month. I got the customers, I brought them water, and at the end I gave them the bill. 
They taught me how to accept credit cards. After that it was cleaning. The problem was that I was 
working 12 hours a day six days a week, which was the norm, but then the restaurant owner was 
asking me to do a couple of hours extra. Sometimes I was leaving my house at 7 in the morning 
and wasn’t getting home till 10:30 at night. And he never even thanked me. The most he would do 
was take me to a 7-Eleven and buy me a coffee. And the times when they cleaned out the filters in 
the restaurant, which was done every three or four months, we used to finish at one in the 
morning. And they never even gave me advanced warning. I would go in at the normal hour, and 
what would he come out with? He would pat me on the shoulder and tell me: ‘You know, we need 
you to stay here because we’re going to clean, and I’m sick.’ From 10 am until 1 am, and what did 
he give me? Sometimes he gave me 10 dollars, but 10 dollars to be working from 10 in the 
morning until 1 am—do you think that’s pay? I was suffocating. I was here, but I still had some 
social conscience, some idea of exploitation. You let yourself be screwed as long as you want, but 
the moment comes when you decide that if another opportunity arises, you´ll take it. Another 
companion who lives here in this house was telling me that we were getting screwed, that there 
were other job opportunities. And there are.” María García, Lito Melgar, Gisel Morazán, Kelvin 
Orellana, and Fredy Melgar (and other whom I will soon mention: Benjamín Lux, Eladio Ixcoteyac, 
and Reynaldo Campos) have similar stories. They began with poor paying jobs and experienced 
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awful abuse, but they gradually got better paying jobs and appealed to agencies and organizations 
that could help them assert their rights. In such cases there is none of the commodification that 
Guy Standing describes. Ernesto waged a war of attrition, showing how that weapon of the 
dominated is inspired by a whole series of reflections.  
As workers possessing skills that were in demand, they held a position in the labor market 
that outweighed the fact that they were undocumented. They were like the Superman in the Jorge 
Lerma ballad: “He doesn’t have a visa or permission to fly / and I bet not even social security.”1 
Like Ernesto Serra, most immigrants do not use false documents: “I just keep working and moving 
from job to job, and so far I haven’t got my chuecos.2 Here they usually get chuecos to apply for 
work; they cost between 150 and 200 dollars. I didn’t get them so I’m at great risk. I can send that 
150 dollars to my family for food. I’m doing it the hard way, but the whole procedure is really 
stupid. There are companies that require those papers even though they know they’re false. As 
soon as they put them in the system, they know they’re false. Still, they want to have you 
identified. You’re there in the system, with your own name or some other name. Up till now I’ve 
been working without needing documents since I’m paid in cash, so I haven’t got them. Some 
people pay me with checks, but they’re personal checks. I don’t go to the bank to cash them; 
someone cashes them for me. I don’t have any problem, so I haven’t needed the chuecos until 
now.”  Others like Yadira renounce all papers: “The only paper I use is to go to the bathroom. The 
only thing I’m interested in is having work so that my kids can eat and go to school.” Kelvin 
Orellana explains this attitude well: “If you’re not a hard worker and street-smart, the documents 
won’t help you.” Citizenship helps, but it is no guarantee in a society where opportunities open up 
in the world of work. Citizenship cannot supply what work fails to provide. Following the Kantian 
terminology employed by Onfray,3 where legality is the noumenon, we can say that the 
immigrants know that their phenomenological reality (Mexican brown) can negate their noumenal 
reality (citizenship, permanent residency). That is why their best support is their labor reality. The 
undocumented rely on a kind of labor citizenship, which is an aspect of “economic citizenship”.4 
                                            
1 David, 1993, p.411. 
2 Chuecos are false documents. A set of them usually includes a driver’s license, a social security number, 
and a certificate of residency. 
3 Onfray, 1999, p.28. 
4 Sassen uses this concept as theoretical provocation since it is alien to the generally accepted concept of 
citizenship. Sassen coined the concept as a strategic notion for research; it does not form part of the 
historical or theoretical work citizenship as conventionally understood, but it may be considered a possibility 
because of the changes economic globalization has produced in the institution of citizenship. Economic 
citizenship empowers people and demands accountability of governments. According to Sassen, economic 
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Hence the slogans used in the demonstrations of undocumented workers: “I am not a terrorist. I 
am the cook in your favorite restaurant!” 
 
The fraction of abstract labor called taxes: “The IRS says my taxes are legal”1 
 
Labor as commodity, transmuted into wages, is transformed into purchasing power (as I will 
explain below( and into taxes. Taxes make it clear that labor is a structure of collective life, but still 
at an abstract level. If wages are the monetary expression of labor as commodity, then taxes are 
the expression of labor as part of the structures of collective life. Taxes give evidence of the 
immigrants’ insertion into a society that is under the jurisdiction of a nation-state whose tax-policy 
laws they have accepted as a bureaucratic step in their integration process. The undocumented 
are not unaware that the government is committing a performative contradiction in collecting 
taxes from persons whom it has declared illegal. One immigrant formulated this inconsistency by 
sporting a poster in a demonstration that read: “The IRS says my taxes are legal!” The 
undocumented have no problem with this duplicity because being taxpayers confirms their labor 
citizenship and puts them on the road toward full citizenship, as Honduran immigrant Reynaldo 
Campos explained to me: “Paying taxes helps me rent an apartment, but I got my tax ID mainly 
because I wanted to get my documents. I’ve been paying taxes for seven years. The first five years 
I didn’t pay them, or I paid only the state taxes using a phony number, but that doesn’t help you at 
all. When I was earning $24,000 in a supermarket, I was paying $4,000 in taxes. That’s the way 
things go in this country if you want to do things right.” That is why the immigrants say that they 
are “paying a lot of biles [bills].”  
Since the immigration laws require five years’ proof of paying taxes prior to naturalization, 
undocumented workers are motivated to file their annual income tax returns, realizing that it is an 
important step toward citizenship.2 It is estimated that the fiscal contribution of undocumented 
workers each year is between $90 and $140 billion in federal, state, and local taxes.3 A study of the 
Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (ITEP) found that undocumented immigrants 
“contribute significantly to state and local taxes, collectively paying an estimated $11.84 billion in 
                                                                                                                                     
citizenship belongs not to citizens but to “the firms and markets—specifically, the global financial markets—
and it is located not in individuals, not in citizens, but in mostly corporate global economic actors.” Sassen, 
1995, pp. XIII-XIV. I extend his application of the concept. 
1 Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 
2 Lipman, 2006, p.25. 
3 Casey, 2014, p.269. 
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2012.”1 An official estimate is that unauthorized immigrant workers and their employers paid $13 
billion in payroll taxes for Social Security in 2010.2 The projected net benefit to the Social Security 
trust fund is estimated to be almost $500 billion for the years 1998–2022.3 A simple calculation of 
the contribution of undocumented Central Americans gives us an approximate total of between 
$12.8 and $20 billion a year for all taxes (in 2012 state and local taxes alone came to $1.68 billion) 
and $71 billion as the projected net benefit to the Social Security fund.4 
The history of these contributions reveals profound injustice. Social Security numbers 
(SSNs) were issued to workers starting in 1935, and until the early 1980s they could also function 
as Taxpayer Identification Numbers (TINs). Beginning in 1982, Social Security cards issued to 
unauthorized workers were marked “Not Valid for Employment.” According to Lipman, “in an 
effort to stop unauthorized workers from being hired, Congress enacted the Immigration Reform 
and Control Act of 1986. This Act, among other things, required employers to have all new 
employees prove their identity and work authorization with specific documents. Congress listed 
the Social Security card as an acceptable document evidencing proof of work authorization. As a 
result of this mandatory obligation, there is now widespread use of counterfeit Social Security 
cards among unauthorized workers, making it more common and easier than ever for 
undocumented workers to enter and function in the U.S. labor market.”5 A decade later, the Social 
Security Administration (SSA) limited Social Security numbers (SSNs) to citizens and legally 
admitted aliens. However, so as not to lose the growing population of unauthorized workers, the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) introduced a new taxpayer identification number (Individual 
Taxpayer Identification Number, ITIN). To obtain an ITIN it is sufficient to present an original 
passport (or certified copy of same), a driver’s license, a birth certificate, an identity card, or 
immigration documentation. The IRS was careful to warn people that the ITIN is “for tax purposes 
only and [does not] affect immigration status, authorize work in the United States or provide 
eligibility for Social Security benefits.”6 As a result, all the revenue contributed to Social Security by 
the undocumented can end up being money lost; in fact, as of 2001, some $421 billion had 
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accumulated in the fund that did not correspond to valid SSNs.1 There was a radical shift when 
President Bush signed the Social Security Protection Act of 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-203, 118 Stat. 
493). This law reaffirmed that every worker is required to have work authorization at the time the 
SSN is issued, but it added the proviso, “or at some later time”. This meant that if the 
undocumented workers “achieve lawful status, work authorization, and a valid SSN, they may then 
apply for Social Security benefits based on all Social Security-covered earnings regardless of their 
work status during the earning period.”2 Lipman points out that “while confusing and obscure, this 
treatment is clearly separate and unequal.”3 He is quite right, but the present situation also acts as 
an incentive for the undocumented to become legalized, to keep resisting, and to persist in their 
performative civil disobedience, that is, to conduct themselves more and more as if they already 
could exercise all their rights, even though they still have to put up with some of the disadvantages 
of the “not yet.”  
On the other hand, because they are paying taxes and making Social Security payments 
that cannot (for the moment) be recovered, social justice becomes part of their motivation for 
performative civil disobedience: the inclusion of this group of workers must now be formalized 
because the government treasury has contracted a debt with them. Bosniak points out that 
“vindicatory amnesty claims might rest on the idea that, because the receiving society directly 
reaps the benefits provided by the irregular migrant population, it owes these migrants 
recognition and membership in return. The argument focuses mainly, though not exclusively, on 
the economic contribution made by the immigrants to the receiving society. Immigrant rights’ 
organizations commonly call for ‘full legalization for all people who work and pay taxes’. The 
underlying ethic here could be framed as one of contractarian reciprocity.”4 In the vindicatory 
model of amnesty, according to Bosniak, “those to whom amnesty is extended are approached 
now as victims rather than malefactors.”5 But I think that model goes even further: it does not 
present the undocumented workers as victims but as already integrated, because their taxes are a 
“clear and present” realization of their legality; in that sense, demanding regularization on the 
basis of taxes paid is to declare that what the IRS has already declared de facto must also be 
enacted de iure. The taxes are an expression of the diverse relationships they maintain: if they pay 
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taxes, they are inserted into the labor market, they are contributing to the collectivity, and they 
are respecting the law. Amnesty granted on the basis of taxes is vindicatory in the sense that it 
rectifies an anomalous situation of exclusion/inclusion. 
Why are taxes so important? We should remember that one the most commonly used 
arguments of the champions of anti-immigrant policies is that the undocumented are a net burden 
on government: they enjoy public benefits and evade taxes. Stated summarily: since they don’t 
contribute, they don’t deserve to stay. This is the argument that the vindicatory amnesty turns 
upside down: if they do pay taxes, then they are already becoming integrated into society, and we 
owe them citizenship. Vindicatory amnesty is a present-day echo of the revolutionary cry, “No 
taxation without representation!” The fact that some pro-immigrant organizations base their call 
for vindicatory amnesty on the tax contributions of the undocumented is an indication of the 
perlocutionary effect and the effectiveness of their performative civil disobedience. In this case, 
their principal act of rebellion consists in combining their non-compliance with their behavior as 
model citizens who are fully integrated. They manifest their rebelliousness by presenting 
themselves as citizens before a government that denies them that status and by getting the 
government to accept that equivocal situation. Paying taxes is their way of inducing the 
government to accept (along with their money) their condition of citizens in the making. As a 
result of that performative contradiction, that fraction of abstract labor which is taxes crystallizes 
into an element of integration because it shows that labor is also a structure of the collective life.  
 
Included? Between disobedience and assimilation 
The immigrants make serious efforts to become integrated into American society, but not all their 
efforts have the same effectiveness or the same political character, nor do they all correspond to a 
strategy of civil disobedience. For example, Yadira Morazán and Kelvin Orellana, like many other 
immigrants, registered their children with Anglo names: Kimberley, Bryan, and Kevin. These names 
do not even remotely resemble the names of their maternal grandparents, Nicasio and Fidelia. A 
person’s name has a performative efficacy in the sense that it can be transformative, bestowing on 
the person “a certain possibility for social existence”.1 The implications of that power of naming 
have to do with social identity “for the designation is supposed to confer singularity”2 and 
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“constitutes one socially”.1 The implications are also economic, as Levitt and Dubner 
demonstrated when they discovered that “an overwhelming number of parents use a name to 
signal their own expectations of how successful their children will be.”2 It is if they intuitively 
recognized that a correlation exists between a baby’s name and the parents’ socioeconomic 
status, income, and ethnic group. When American parents name their children, they show certain 
patterns that reflect only their level of education, which is the really decisive variable.3 Immigrants 
have mimicked this strategy because they know that the name is a passport that facilitates entry 
or else they feel that their children’s U.S. citizenship demands an Anglo name. 
Education constitutes another strategy of integration. Several indigenous Guatemalans 
from San Antonio Sija, all of them quite young, are finishing secondary school and registering in 
different courses. They accumulate diplomas; the last one they got as a group was obtained in at 
Loyola Marymount University in Los Angeles. Stiglitz stresses the importance of formal education 
for integration: “There may be other important externalities associated with education. Public 
education may have played an important role in integrating new immigrant groups into American 
culture. Public education may have been essential in making the melting pot work. The benefits of 
this accrued not only to individuals but to the nation as a whole.”4 This integrative effect is 
possible because the universities treat the undocumented immigrants as citizens. Since the 
government bureaucracy does not hinder them from entering schools, there is no chain of 
requirements beginning with government approval. In this instance the government cedes its 
sovereignty at least partially so that a space is opened up for the direct sovereignty of civil society. 
However, the foundational act of these other spaces of integration is the immigrants’ insertion 
into the labor market from which they are legally excluded. Only afterward come the educational 
insertion and the diplomas that accredit them in the labor market. 
The immigrants pay taxes, they show themselves to be docile workers, and some even 
baptize their children with Anglo names. They thus appear to have renounced the acts of sabotage 
that form part of the occult practices and discourses of passive resistance and the infrapolitics of 
the dominated. Since they are undocumented, however, this apparent submission is the most 
effective form of rebellion because it leads toward what the system denies them. Their acts are 
the obedience of the disobedient, and it is obedience that knows the requirements for being 
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granted citizenship: paying taxes, behaving properly, learning English. That is why immigrants 
“mimic” those traits and identify themselves in the national censuses as more white or more 
educated than they are. There is a certain level of strategic opportunism here: they yield what 
they must and take what they can. What Lenin said about history in general can be said about the 
history of undocumented migrants: “History as a whole, and the history of revolutions in 
particular, is always richer in content, more varied, more multiform, more lively and ingenious 
than is imagined by even the best parties, the most conscious vanguards of the most advanced 
classes”.1 Even though the government often imposes its controls, such as when it launches raids, 
the undocumented maintain a margin of decision-making power because they operate with the 
same flexibility that Lenin attributes to the revolutionary class (in the text following the just cited 
passage): “In order to accomplish its task the revolutionary class must be able to master all forms 
or aspects of social activity without exception… the revolutionary class must be prepared for the 
most rapid and brusque replacement of one form by another.”2 The immigrants’ alternation 
between complying and not complying is a continuum. The jurisdiction of government is a sphere 
which they enter and which they leave according to their needs. 
All theorists agree that civil disobedience is not a path leading to the creation of an 
entirely new order. The non-compliance of the undocumented, limited to a specific area, is in 
accord with the partial challenging of the system that forms part of the tradition of civil 
disobedience. If all their actions were non-compliant, then their acts of disobedience would cease 
to be an appeal for inclusion and would become instead an option for a permanently marginal 
condition. Such acts would be counterproductive since they would fail to have a persuasive effect 
on the majority, which—according to Rawls, Ebert, and Habermas—should be the principal 
objective of civil disobedience. 
But these concessions to legality do not mean lessening their efforts or becoming less 
radical. Civil disobedience presents daily challenges. Assembling at 7-Elevens or in hardware store 
parking lots—where their presence is only too obvious because everyone knows that they are 
undocumented—is, as Butler states, a way of saying: we are the labor you need, we are the labor 
you rely on, watch what happens to your stores when we don't go to work; we are part of the 
system of production and circulation and distribution and your economy is not functioning without 
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us and that gives us a certain kind of power.”1 And I would add: see what happens if we don’t pay 
our taxes. 
2.2.2  Work as a structure of collective life 
 
The politicization of the world of work is based on what Ranciére calls “the constitution of work as 
a structure of collective life wrested from the sole reign of the law of private interest.”2 This 
politicization forms part of the broadening of the sphere of politics: activities that previously were 
understood as private are now presented as public matters because their multiple connections 
with the life of the community are evident. Wollin stresses other aspects of labor that situate it in 
the political sphere: “Though it begins with need, labor in practice acquires its own value, which is 
expressed in one’s dedication to a professional career, in the pride one takes in a job well done, in 
the sense of camaraderie in the workplace. All these things compete with the values of 
citizenship.”3 In the following section and also in the one dedicated to self-employment, I will 
show still other values of labor which are as important for collective life as those mentioned by 
Wollin and which transform labor into a platform for economic citizenry. All kinds of labor have 
aspects that can be analyzed as elements of the structure of collective life, but that trait is 
especially obvious in some kinds of work, such as childcare. I chose Gisel Morazán’s labor as a 
childcare worker because it allows me to single out those aspects and show how they contribute 
to citizenship in the making. 
 
Childcare worker in Fairfax: Gisel Morazán 
When Gisel crossed the southern border of the United States, in an area near Tucson, the first 
thing she said was: “And this scrubland is the United States?” She went to live in Fairfax County, 
Virginia, a landscape very different from that of Arizona. Gisel of one of the 10,676 Honduran 
women living in Virginia, out of a total of 26,038 native Hondurans. Like half of that population, 
she has not finished secondary school.4 Of the 8,898 persons of Honduran origin who live in Fairfax 
County, Gisel is among the 5,563 who are not citizens, the 5,250 (79%) who are employed, the 
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1,109 with a child under six years of age, the 247 (4.7%) who work for the government, and the 
very small group of 56 (1.1%) who work at home.1 Fairfax is a locality with a low rate of 
unemployment: only 4.1% of the 627,615 persons in the active labor force are without work.2 Gisel 
is one of the 1,312,700 persons working in childcare in the U.S., as recorded by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics in 2012. The average pay in this occupation is $19.38 an hour. Even though Gisel 
does not have the high-school diploma that such work supposedly requires, her annual income is 
above the $19,510 which is the average income of childcare workers in the U.S.3 
Gisel is one of the few undocumented persons who work for the government. Fairfax 
County and the state of Virginia are the entities that contract her services. Her general data can be 
seen on the webpage of the local Fairfax government, along with that of other childcare workers, 
documented or not, immigrants or native-born: 
http://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/ofc/providers/reston.htm. It says nothing there about her being 
undocumented. That is not a matter of concern to those who hire her, to the children she cares 
for, or to the children’s parents. But it is a fact that Gisel does not hide. It is known by the social 
worker that the county government regularly sends to visit her to make sure that she is properly 
trained and is complying with safety and hygiene norms. Her situation is not a neutral datum 
because, although it seems not to matter to the government, the person who embodies the 
government for Gisel (the social worker) does take her migratory status into account and advises 
her accordingly, telling her how to avoid problems with other inspectors, how to resolve problems 
with parents in complicated situations, and how to fill out forms so that her employer does not 
demand more information. There are no hidden transcripts in the disobedience of childcare 
workers. I found evidence of this in the information Gisel gave me about the social worker’s 
openness to her suggestions and the social worker’s sympathy with her situation. I discovered 
more general evidence of this in a study done among immigrant caregivers in the U.K., Ireland, 
Canada, and the U.S. The study revealed that in the U.S. this class of workers suffers less from 
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“lack of assertiveness” even though they have extremely poor English-language skills.1 They are 
allowed a greater margin for parrhesia. 
Childcare is exhausting work, so to avoid problems and delays Gisel relies on the help of 
her husband. Some of the children are from the neighborhood. Her work has made her one of the 
best-known persons there. Many of the children Gisel cares for are children of other unauthorized 
immigrants. The irony is sublime: the government is paying one undocumented person to take 
care of the children of other undocumented persons. She also cares for the children of immigrants 
who have legal migratory status and even for the children of non-Latinos, who have great 
confidence in a Latina nanny. She has become the key figure in a web of relationships. 
Gisel’s labor cannot be commodified. The relationships that it involves resist any form of 
opaqueness. This personalization of services is characteristic of the self-employed, but it is 
especially the case with childcare workers. For the parents, the children, and the social worker, 
Gisel offers a type of labor with distinctive qualities that are not easily replaced. As a service 
provider, Gisel also has a relationship with the government, one that is quite singular, being 
mediated by the regular visit of a state functionary. Gisel’s labor is not seen as an abstract value. 
Marx used a very significant phrase to illustrate the relations underlying all commercial exchange: 
“It is plain that commodities cannot go to market and make exchanges of their own account.”2 In 
the case of the labor of childcare workers like Gisel, these relations cannot be subsumed into a 
wage value. Gisel does not deliver dresses or pants to the marketplace. She is integrally involved in 
her labor as a human being, and she can offer her services only on the condition of establishing 
very close relationships. Her services are offered and consumed simultaneously. There is no way 
that she can be dissociated from her labor. Her qualities and abilities can only be favorable or 
unfavorable, but never neutral. Those who contract caregivers prefer to hire immigrants like Gisel; 
they report that it is hard to find native-born workers with the right skills (60%) and that foreign-
born workers are highly committed to caring occupations (72%).3 
Marx highlights another feature of mercantile relations: exchanges take place within the 
framework of a series of juridical arrangements. The provision of this type of service reveals more 
clearly the nature of exchange and its juridical forms because it is the culminating point of a series 
of acceptance rituals. The government establishes conditions for providing the service: “Childcare 
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workers must meet education and training requirements” and must receive annual training.1 Since 
it says not a word about migratory status, it reinforces the kind of tacit recognition that this 
contractual relationship shares with other forms of legitimization. The government seems willing 
to compartmentalize migratory status and employment status, as if they were no link between 
them, thus purposely ignoring that fact that the contracted person is lacking permission to work. 
The presumably excluded person, who has no permission to work or even to reside in the country, 
nevertheless has a formal relationship with the government, a relationship sanctioned by a law 
that supposedly excludes illegal persons. What we have here is the same type of flagrant 
inconsistency that existed in the French Revolution when, according to Olympe de Gouges, women 
had the right to the tribune because the law recognized their right to the gallows. The 
inconsistency in this case is that the same person who has a right to be deported has gained the 
right to be employed but not the right to citizenship or legal residence. The reverse side of the 
negative aspect is that this is the type of performative contradiction which, according to Butler, 
opens up space for performative effectiveness:2 inclusion (in the labor market) is exercised by 
making use of what is prohibited, namely, work. And here the further legitimization is that the 
excluding institution (the government) becomes the including one. Those who were formerly 
unrecognized gain acknowledgment through a type of labor citizenship. 
Here there are no “shadow lives”: undocumented childcare workers are on the 
government’s webpage. Payment for their services transforms the juridical relationship that the 
government has with them. This is an evident aspect of the consequences of labor outside the 
productive sphere, as noted by Gorz: “what [the worker] does cannot and should not be reduced 
simply to the immediately productive labor act that he performs, abstracting from the 
consequences and secondary effects that this act produces in the social environment.”3 The 
exchange with the government transforms the political position. The local government, intent on 
attending to immediate needs and sensitive to the demands of its electorate, legitimizes 
undocumented childcare workers because their labor makes a valuable contribution to the 
collective life of the community. The relation that Gisel and other childcare workers have with the 
government as service providers is superimposed on the relation they have as lawbreakers. Their 
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situation is similar to that of the African Americans who were not entirely excluded from society; 
rather, they were partially excluded, partially included. 
As Butler wished, this complicates the analysis. However, in this case there is no need to 
leave the perspective of sovereignty, as she proposed, in order to stop making repeatedly the 
same description.1 What she calls the multivalence of power and its tactics opens up here a space 
of legal recognition. The sieve of state employment moves social legitimization closer to juridical 
validation. And in this case the excluded persons—with the aim of ceasing to be such—are not 
avoiding state power but are taking refuge in its principle of sovereignty. By means of taxes and 
state employment, the immigrants are practicing civil disobedience that does not challenge the 
legal apparatus as a whole but only its excluding aspects. According to Butler, if we speak about 
privation of rights only in terms of sovereignty and naked life, we deny ourselves the vocabulary 
that we need to understand other networks of power and its redistribution. In the present case, I 
can keep the argument within the conceptual framework centered on sovereignty, but my aim is 
to show that the principle of sovereignty can include a sovereign divided by dissent which is able 
to grant rights to “illegals” and thus indirectly to give a posteriori legitimization to the 
disobedience of the undocumented. If we accept Raz’s finding that civil disobedience is legitimate 
in a non-liberal order, then there is all the more reason that it should be exercised within a 
political system that behaves erratically, simultaneously excluding persons as citizens but including 
them as taxpayers and service providers. The system should be disobeyed insofar as it denies 
people rights, and at the same time it should be legitimately and legally obeyed insofar as it 
becomes an accomplice of performative civil disobedience by accepting the labor of those who 
have no right to work. The government has collaborated, Bobbio would say, in its own failure to 
achieve its exclusionary objectives. The performative civil disobedience of the undocumented 
receives support from one segment of government, just as happened with the African Americans 
in Little Rock, Arkansas, and in certain aspects with those engaged in the boycott in Montgomery 
County, Alabama. 
Whether labor is considered in its purely mercantile aspect or as a structure of collective 
life, the effectiveness of the world of work as a highway toward integration into American society 
and as a platform for social validation and for the exercise of performative civil disobedience 
receives negative confirmation in the statements of C. Stewart Verdery Jr. a former Homeland 
Security official. Verdery insists that federal officials should focus on making it harder for illegal 
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immigrants to work in the United States: “Where are you going to get the biggest bang for the 
buck? Enforcement of the workplace is probably the best area to invest more dollars.”1 Those of 
us analyzing the situation of the undocumented must give more importance to a sphere that anti-
immigrant forces consider vital: labor in all its modalities is exercising the right that the 
undocumented are demanding, and that is why it is performative civil disobedience. What has 
historically brought about the triumph of civil disobedience is persistence: not yielding your seat to 
whites who entered after you, not paying and then reentering the bus by the back door, using 
buses like any other citizen. For the undocumented it means continuing to produce the 
perlocutionary effect that their presence as labor power has carried as far as the government. 
Because who is going to carry out raids among government employees? Who is going to deprive 
the government of its employees and rob the community of labor that is so intimately woven into 
the structures of collective life? 
2.3 Self-employment and the informal economy in the Free Agent Nation 
 
According to the data of the U.S. Census Bureau employment survey, there are more Central 
American who are self-employed (9.7%) than there are Latinos (8.4%) or American workers 
generally (7.7%).2 From the perspective of the “requiem for the working class” that Rifkin intoned 
in The End of Work, 3 this figure could be seen as an indication of the weak position of the 
undocumented in the labor market. Rifkin mentions the outsourcing of work as a means used by 
employers to avoid unionization, reduce health-care coverage and overhead costs, and lay off 
workers quickly in response to seasonal—or even monthly and weekly—trends in the market.4 
Gorz also notes that a company that resorts to outsourcing keeps its subcontractors in a state of 
dependency which “allows it to impose continual price reductions on them and pass on 
fluctuations in demand.”5 The subcontractors function as peripheral employees whose services the 
company can dispense with at any moment and whose labor charge fluctuates without limits. 
These peripheral workers are “supposedly 'self-employed' operatives, paid on a sessional basis or 
on piece work, whose workload varies according to the needs of the moment. These 'freelancers' 
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are not covered by labour law, have no social insurance and are exposed to all the commercial and 
economic risks which the company offloads onto them.”1 Besides laying bare the social conditions 
of subcontracting, Gorz points out how such subcontracting can overlap with certain kinds of self-
employment and with informal labor more generally. 
A large part of the outsourced work that involves undocumented immigrants consists in 
contracting businesses which they own themselves and in which they are, for all practice 
purposes, their own employers. Some of these are legally registered while others have no more 
“formality” than a calling card and flashy signs on the vehicles the owners use to move around. All 
these businesses involve a rationalization of working conditions which is different from that of 
wage employment.2 In effect, they exist outside the sphere of formality if that is conceived as “a 
world of salaries, monthly mortgage payments, clean credit ratings, fear of the tax authorities, 
regular meals, good health coverage, pension contributions, school fees and summer holidays.”3 
The owners of such businesses form part of that urban sub-proletariat to which Hart referred in 
1973 when he invented the concept of informal economy. This sub-proletariat of the informal 
economy is a grouping that used to be described as “a passive, exploited majority,” but Hart has 
shown it to be—in the case of Ghana—a migrant force that can “look to the prospect of 
accumulation, with or without a job, in the informal economy of the urban slums.”4 
Until recently social theory associated informality with less developed economies and 
“their inability to attain full modernization, to stop excess migration to the cities, and to 
implement universal education and literacy programs.”5 When informality was found in developed 
countries, it was associated with “immigration from the Third World and the replication there of 
survival strategies typical of the home countries of migrant workers.”6 Arguing against those who 
blame immigrants for the growing informalization of U.S. economy and who want to control 
immigration in order to eradicate the informal economy, Sassen maintains that “the conditions in 
the economy at large are primary.”7 For Sassen, the increasing informality is something inevitable 
in the current phase of advanced economies, due mainly “to the decline of the manufacturing-
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dominated industrial complex of the post-war era and the rise of a new, service-dominated 
economic complex.”1 
Informality is not a newcomer to the U.S. economic scene. In 1985 underground economic 
activities accounted for between $300 and $600 billion per year.2 In large part they consisted of 
socially accepted practices such as garage sales, babysitting, and dog-walking. They are 
longstanding, institutionalized modalities for reselling goods and for selling services in ways that 
escape state control. Starting in the 1980s, however, we begin to notice the changes that Sassen 
points out. They ceased to be simply a range of relatively marginal activities and became the main 
source of income for a growing number of households. They became more structured and more 
numerous thanks to the re-engineering of businesses and the dissociation between state 
jurisdiction and effective regulation that some call “liberalization.” According to Aviva Chomsky, 
even “jobs that used to be in the formal sector—like factory jobs—have sunk into the informal 
sector through elaborate systems of subcontracting.”3 Hart states it succinctly: “To the extent that 
neoliberalism has succeeded in reducing state controls, the world economy itself has become 
largely an informal zone.”4 At the beginning of the 1990s the informal economy In the United 
States accounted for between 6.7 and 13.9% of the GDP, depending on the form of calculation, 
and it averaged 9.2% for most of the decade.5 A new estimate of informal activity made in 2011 
yielded a total of $2 trillion, which is equivalent to 18-19% of personal income6 or about 13% of 
GDP for that year.7 Whether the reason is the increase in self-employment or the growth in the 
informal economy (the two realities often overlap), the number of persons applying for an 
Individual Taxpayer Identification Number (ITIN) increased by 1.5 million a year between 2006 and 
2011.8 
Bayat refers to this informal sector as the perfect incarnation of quiet encroachment. One 
of the best examples is that of the vendors who take over the streets. Certainly they have 
developed an industry of tremendous proportions whose economic value is only too obvious: in 
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Los Angeles alone there are 50,000 micro-businesses with street sales of $504 million.1 Its 
accelerated development is assisted by rapid urbanization and by the dynamics that Sassen 
explains. Hart observes that “the hectic growth of cities over the last two centuries could not be 
organized immediately as ruling elites would like. The informal economy is one way of pointing to 
how people devised their own means of survival and sometimes of prosperity in the urban 
markets that spring up spontaneously to meet their needs.”2 When people devise their own 
means in this way, the consequence is what Bayat envisioned: the intensification of “the growth of 
subjectivities, social space, and terrain of political struggles that are coming to characterize the 
cities of the developing world.”3 This is happening as well in the cities of the United States and 
other industrialized countries. That is the sector in which a large number of immigrants find work. 
Considering that a well-established correlation exists between migration and the informal labor 
market4 but also that “conditions in the economy at large are primary,”5 I offer the hypothesis that 
the immigrants create their own possibilities for integration and survival using the very materials 
that their socio-economic conditions provide them. Seizing on the opportunities that come their 
way, they insert themselves into the sectors they can enter most easily since they are highly 
dynamic sectors that have great demand for workers with precisely their characteristics.  
Here qualifications are needed to correct the pejorative way in which the informal sector 
is treated in most analyses. In his most recent book Standing states that “one other factor has 
played a role in expanding the precariat. This is variously known as the shadow, grey or black 
economy… where much of the precariat survives, facing exploitation and oppression.”6 It is not the 
case, however, that informality expands the size of the precariat, nor are the borders between the 
formal and the informal economies neatly drawn. “Informal sector” and “informal zone” are 
expressions that convey an erroneous idea of duality in the market, and for that reason I have 
preferred to avoid them. It is not true either that on one side everything is fine and on the other 
side everything is bad. What distinguishes the two sides is not exploitation or tax evasion; rather, 
it is regulation or its absence. There is exploitation and tax evasion in the formal sector.7 In 
contrast, the exploitation, tax evasion, and precariousness that Vogel associates with informal 
                                            
1 Yen Liu, Burns, and Flaming, 2015. 
2 Hart, 2010, p.152. 
3 Bayat, 2010, p.64. 
4 Bosh and Farré, 2013. 
5 Sassen, 1998, p.155. 
6 Standing, 2011, p.56. 
7 Hart found that “‘formal’ incomes came from regulated economic activities and ‘informal’ incomes, both 
legal and illegal, lay beyond the scope of regulation.” Hart, 2010, p.145. 
  
207 
activities was rarely found among the undocumented immigrants with whom I did my fieldwork.1 
The immigrants sometimes registered their businesses, as was the case with Kelvin, and in all the 
cases I investigated, they paid their taxes. However, they do not follow strict accounting 
procedures, nor do they necessarily report all their revenues to the IRS. They swim in both the 
freshwater lakes of formality and the salty seas of informality. The same is true of their liminal 
legality: they maintain strong relations with some institutions and steer clear of others. Informality 
does not mean low returns: the volume of their income can exceed $6,000 a week for long 
periods, but it is very irregular. Exploitation is not always present, but precariousness is: they may 
earn $4,000 in eight hours for replacing a roof and then go many days without employment. Such 
precariousness, however, is no greater than that of a U.N. consultant or a freelance journalist. 
It is not true either that informality is always illegal or caters only to the poor, as is the case with 
the sale of pirated films or the classic stands that sell hotdogs or tacos in the street. Robert 
Merton associated illegal consumption with the demand for goods and services that are either 
illegal or too expensive to obtain legally; such a demand arises “where the cultural emphasis upon 
pecuniary success has been absorbed” but there is a “relative absence of opportunity for 
achieving…monetary and power types of success.”2 This is sometimes the case, but it is also true 
that many services offered informally are those which were formerly of the “do it yourself” variety 
but which now cannot be done by overworked fathers and mothers who feel strong social 
pressure to dedicate time to raising their children.3 Besides, many of these services are needed 
urgently and are obtained much more quickly through informal channels because they come right 
to the door: shoveling snow, repairing a shower, removing a mountain of leaves, etc. In such cases 
there is not much haggling: the pay is generous because it frees up people’s time. The middle class 
has become one of the great bulwarks of informal businesses. 
Nor is it necessarily true that “few workers join the informal labor force voluntarily—the 
vast majority are recruited primarily through economic desperation unmitigated by even a 
minimal social safety net.”4 Many homes have members working in both sectors in order not to 
put all their eggs in one basket. Or else, as in Kelvin’s case and in other cases we will examine 
below, many undocumented persons have—either permanently or for a time—one person in a 
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regulated business and another in a non-regulated one.1 The first helps to guarantee a regular 
source of income, and the second helps to increase the volume of income. 
Structural pressures toward informalization are very globalized, and immigrants play a role 
in the process. Those who doubt this need only take a look at its ideological and celebratory arm: 
the extensive literature singing the virtues of self-employment. Some titles speak for themselves, 
such as “Born Entrepreneurs? Immigrant Self-Employment in Spain”2 and “A New Brand of 
Expertise: How Independent Consultants and Free Agents are Transforming the World of Work.”3 
Other texts make irresistible offers, such as those of “Tax Power for the Self-Employed: maximize 
your deductions, establish your retirement plan, defer capital gains, qualify for a home office, and 
avoid audits.”4 Obviously not all own-account workers are avoiding regulation, but the fact is that 
the very same services are being offered by both regulated and non-regulated businesses, and we 
know which offers more advantages. If a middle-class couple wants to remodel their kitchen, 
repair their roof, or landscape their yard, contracting an informal business will save them 
thousands of dollars, and they won’t have to sacrifice quality, although they will have to assume 
some risks, as we will see shortly. 
In this economy that is tending strongly toward informalization, therefore, we have 
immigrants who insert themselves into a certain niche that satisfies the market’s systemic need 
for labor that is available only in certain conditions. Many immigrants are among the workers who 
wait every morning for people to hire them in the parking lots of 7-Elevens or hardware stores; 
their wages hardly reach the federal poverty threshold.5 Here I want to refer to a relatively well-off 
segment of this quiet encroachment (thus agreeing with Hart, who does not identify the informal 
economy with a class6), namely, the tailors who are invading Beverly Hills, the Mayan Indians who 
are taking over the soccer fields in the middle of Los Angeles, the gardeners swamped with 
contracts, and the maintenance men who deal with their associates as if they were construction 
magnates. They are all contributing to the restructuring of labor relations in such a way that their 
inclusion in society is validated by their participation in the labor market. My aim now is to show 
how they find support for their performative civil disobedience. 
 
                                            
1 Gold, 2014, pp.167-190, p.168. 
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Reynaldo, a man for all seasons: planting in spring, trimming in summer, raking in autumn, 
shoveling in winter 
Reynaldo Campos is one of the 8,898 Hondurans who live in Fairfax County and one of the 26,038 
persons born in Honduras and now living in the state of Virginia.1 According to the International 
Labor Organization, in 2000 some 58% of the persons working in informal personal and related 
services in the United States were immigrants from Latin America.2 The ILO does not offer more 
recent figures. As a landscape worker, Reynaldo forms part of that 58%, which is perhaps even a 
larger percentage now. He is one of the thousands of workers in that occupation, 24% of whose 
workforce in 2012 was made up of undocumented persons.3 Landscaping is a business with great 
economic potential, and it has been growing steadily since the 1970s. In Los Angeles alone the 
number of gardeners doubled from 1980 to 1990.4 Spending on lawn and landscape services in the 
U.S. jumped from $21 billion in 2001 to $45 billion in 2006, but it was an activity severely affected 
by the economic crisis, falling to only $30 billion in 2009.5 It continues, however, to be a sector 
where demand is high, and there are two reasons for this according to Chomsky: “First, the ranks 
of the super-rich who hire landscaping companies to maintain their palatial grounds have 
increased. Second, middle- and upper-middle-class suburban families, who a generation ago might 
have maintained their own yards, are now busier than ever and contracting out services that they 
used to provide for themselves, or that their children used to provide.”6 The difficulty of the work 
scares many people away, and the pay is quite variable: for regular twice-a-week service, property 
owners usually pay $200-300 a month.7 Among those who are employed by a company, I found 
that wages varied from $10 to $25 an hour.8 
Reynaldo is the owner, manager, administrator, and often the only worker of “Campos 
Landscaping Services,” a company without legal registration or insurance but with all the 
equipment necessary for landscaping and, if needed, for masonry and carpentry as well. His three 
                                            
1 U.S. Census Bureau, 2006-2010 American Community Survey, B01003: TOTAL POPULATION - Universe: 
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vehicles (two pick-ups and a car) are registered in the name of a religious congregation. Reynaldo 
created a logo with the name of his company, which he prints on his business cards and paints on 
his vehicles. This kind of mimicking of the big companies has a healthy effect on his income. 
Reynaldo has personally experienced the kind of stratification described by Hondagneu-Sotelo: 
“Gardening is a stratified occupation, in which some gardeners remain mired in minimum-wage 
jobs, while the ‘route owner’ gardeners who own the trucks and tools earn better incomes by 
combining entrepreneurship and manual labor.”1 In addition to the tools and the vehicles, I would 
include publicity techniques (logos, signs), affable relations, and knowledge of the market’s 
workings: what services to offer, what to charge for them, how to deal with customers, and how 
to make suggestions to them. Certainly in this market niche the immigrants are not unskilled 
workers: anyone who dares to print a card that states “Landscaping Services” is already quite 
expert in the area where he is offering his skills. 
What Hondagneu-Sotelo states about the gardens of California can be said as well about 
the ones in Virginia, where Reynaldo works: “The invisibility of garden labor is reproduced in 
garden books and magazines and is thrown into relief in Southern California, where thousands of 
perfectly manicured gardens are maintained by Latino immigrant gardeners.”2 Several working 
days spent with Reynaldo allowed me to see something of that labor that has been made invisible. 
One morning we went to a middle-class neighborhood where we were welcomed into the 
spacious home of a Pakistani-American couple. As soon as we entered, they offered us something 
to drink and showed us the deference that helps to create a certain degree of horizontality in the 
relationship. Although Reynaldo did everything possible to conceal his primitive English, busily 
measuring the yard and answering questions with not always pertinent monosyllables, the couple 
quickly became aware of his predicament, one that they no doubt were already familiar with. 
Their friendly attitude did not change, and they proceeded to close a deal worth thousands of 
dollars. They had not known Reynaldo previously, but they had been given very good references 
regarding his work. The situation was very relaxed, so that Reynaldo was encouraged to venture 
further phrases in English. Later he told me, “Depending on the situation, I take a few risks.” 
Other visits were quite similar. They were rituals that began to create confidence. There 
are no written contracts for informal labor, so that trust depends completely on the word of both 
parties. Those who think that these agreements are advantageous only for the middle class are 
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forgetting that hiring illegal workers involves countless risks, and more so if an oral contract is 
made with an undocumented person who can be deported at any moment or who may simply 
decide to return to his homeland. Even though there is no possibility of making legal claims with 
regard to oral contracts, their frequency shows that they are by no means unusual. Such contracts 
have even been commended by economists as a mechanism that by relying on informal 
constraints helps to reduce the transaction costs.1 The problem is that the relationship between 
an undocumented gardener and a middle-class U.S. citizen does not provide informal restraints 
that are effective enough to eliminate a high degree of moral hazard. Both sides run great risks. 
What is the advantage? Reynaldo explained it to me: “If they contract a company that is 
completely regulated, they get eaten alive. The company charges whatever is the going rate. 
That’s why they seek out contractors like us. They know we won’t fleece them. Some customers 
are really bad; they pay poorly, and they ask us for three types of insurance. One type is property 
insurance, in case something breaks. Another type is car insurance; since I have a commercial 
vehicle, they want me to have commercial insurance, which covers more than the personal type. 
And the third type of insurance is workmen’s compensation because they don’t want to be 
responsible if a worker is injured. Those types of insurance cover damages up to two million 
dollars.” Most informal companies do not have all those types of insurance. Reynaldo has two: 
vehicle insurance and property insurance. 
The relationship is very similar to the one that was established between the African 
American domestics who took part in the Montgomery bus boycott and their employers. Of 
course, the employers then were motivated by their own personal interests, but their support was 
as effective as the car pools, and it complemented them. In order to understand how the sheer 
force of need produced something more than a change in behavior, one must consider how great 
a break in tradition it was for fine Southern ladies suddenly to become the chauffeurs for their 
domestic servants. Similarly, those who contract informal businesses run by undocumented 
workers are obliged to overcome their prejudices regarding class, ethnicity, and legal status. 
Otherwise there could be no trusting the other’s words. The agreements that I observed did not 
involved unfair advantage to either side; they were mutually beneficial accords whose starting 
point was a recognition of Reynaldo’s right to work and a determination not to exploit. Reynaldo’s 
twofold illegality—migratory and commercial—presupposes a high degree of complicity on the 
                                            
1 North, 1990, p.41. 
  212 
part of his customers, and such complicity validates Reynaldo’s inclusion in American society 
despite government policies. 
Thanks to this complicity and his own tremendous effort, Reynaldo has put together a 
respectable bit of capital: “I started working in a supermarket run by Koreans, earning $6.25 an 
hour, which was then the minimum wage. For overtime they gave me $10.50. That was in 
Maryland, where I lived for seven years. After that I worked for a year in construction. I earned 
good money there because they helped me with expenses. They gave me $1,300 a month for food 
and rent, and my wages were apart from that: $11 an hour and $16.50 for overtime. I did a whole 
lot of overtime. Sometimes I got 20 hours a week of overtime, and my check would come out at 
$700 for the week. I make much more money working now in landscaping. I do whatever work 
comes along, hauling mulch, cutting trees, chopping wood, mowing lawns… Now I want to get my 
business license so that things will go better for me. That way I can get big jobs. In order to carry 
out my project of setting up a company, it’s better to have documents or at least have a partner 
who has them.” Despite his lofty aspirations, Reynaldo is of the same opinion as Kelvin: “A friend 
got his documents as a ‘Dreamer’. He works at Sears, but they give him only 35 hours, and they 
pay poorly. Regarding documents, many people think that their problems will be solved when they 
have them and they won’t have to work hard. What matters is knowing how to work. The 
documents help, but only if you know how to work. If you don’t have documents, you search 
about and you find good work. I’m never lacking work during the year: in spring I sow flowers, in 
summer I trim plants, in autumn I rake leaves, and in winter I shovel snow. Before, the snows left 
me without work, and they seemed to me disastrous. Now I can make hundreds of dollars in one 
day with a good snowfall.” 
The complicity of the customers of the informal businesses is shared by the formal 
businesses that depend on undocumented labor. The California Landscape Contractors Association 
(CLCA), with 2,000 authorized contractors as members, complains about the lack of labor force, a 
problem which could readily be solved by legalizing undocumented workers. Such a move would 
guarantee the workers a minimum of $15-20 an hour plus benefits. The CLCA advocates 
immigration reform that would include a general amnesty. It argues that “the landscaping industry 
relies heavily on an immigrant labor force. Landscaping is physically demanding work. It is 
performed in hot, cold, and sometimes rainy weather. Some landscaping jobs are seasonal. 
American-born workers increasingly are not attracted to such jobs. Because landscaping work 
involves outdoor manual labor, it is to some extent young persons’ work. Yet America has an aging 
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workforce. At the same time, the landscape industry is growing and therefore has a need for more 
workers, partly because this same aging population tends to enlarge the market for landscaping 
services. Immigrants, who tend to be young, address this unmet need for younger workers in the 
landscape industry.”1 The CLCA demands a return to the rule of law, but it makes clear the 
conditions that should prevail: “CLCA supports reasonable enforcement against employers if 
comprehensive immigration reform is achieved.” Having established that the landscaping industry 
now has and, ceteris paribus, will continue to have a structural dependence on immigrant labor, 
the CLCA affirms its posture of disobedience, claiming that it will continue to hire undocumented 
workers. It does not reject legality but will allow “reasonable” application of the law only if the 
proposed change is achieved. And although it does not say so explicitly, it is fighting for that 
change on a daily basis through its massive employment of the undocumented. That labor power 
has systemic force: if an industry that is experiencing a shortage of workers is threatened with 
losing almost a fourth of its manpower, then it has a strong motive to disobey and to make its 
position known. The contractors are acting as spokespersons for the immigrants. They exercise 
their parrhesia indirectly. Although the coincidence of interests is only partial, there is 
nevertheless significant coincidence, and at times there is also extreme complicity in support of 
the disobedience of the undocumented, such as when landscaping contractors advance money to 
the immigrants so that they can pay coyotes who help them travel back to their native countries 
and then return to the U.S. One contractor could only lament the negative effect that deportations 
have had on his company: "I lost a key man," he said, "a skilled stone mason who couldn't get back 
in the country."2 His argument for disobedience was not based on justice or integrity; it was plainly 
materialist: he recognized that he had a skilled worker that he really needed. 
 
Quiché tailoring for Beverly Hills celebrities: the case of Eladio Ixcoteyac 
Persons of Guatemalan origin are a group that is growing rapidly in Los Angeles county. In 2000 
there were 100,341, in 2010 the number had increased to 214,939, and by 2013 they numbered 
261,603, of whom 176,732 were immigrants. Of those born in Guatemala, more than one-third 
(35.5%) entered in the year 2000 or later, and 64.5% entered before 2000. Some 17.4% have their 
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own businesses.1 Just in the city of Los Angeles there are 121,255 Guatemalan immigrants; of 
these, 59% entered before 2000, 55.5% are male, and 21.3% own their own businesses.2 One of 
these is Eladio Ixcoteyac, 35, native of San Antonio Sija, Totonicapán; he is a tailor by trade and 
belongs to a family of tailors. He arrived in Los Angeles in 1995 at the age of 15. He paid a 
thousand dollars to a coyote who had him enter by Nogales and spend three days crossing the 
desert in Arizona: “After that I took a plane from Arizona to Los Angeles. It was easy then, not like 
now after the 9/11 attacks.” Eladio has four children, one in Guatemala and three born and raised 
in Los Angeles. His life is triply precarious due to informal employment, running his own business, 
and lack of documentation. He is one of the many undocumented tailors who in 2012 represented 
some 20% of the labor force in the apparel manufacturing industry, which is another industry that 
would perish if it were not for undocumented workers.3 Undocumented labor sustains not only 
the apparel industry but the whole of Los Angeles’s buoyant informal economy, which in 2005 
absorbed 15% of the labor force. Some 60% of informal workers are undocumented.4  
The apparel manufacturing industry has grown rapidly in Los Angeles, but unfortunately 
most of the hard data come only from the formal sector. In 1944 there were 900 clothing 
manufacturers in the city, employing 28,000 workers; in 1975 there were 2,269 workshops with 
66,000 employees, most of whom were Hispanic women.5 In 1984 there were 81,400 employees 
just in the formal sector. Sales in 1983 reached $3.5 billion, with 30-50% contributed by the 
informal economy.6 In the 1990s there were an estimated 94,634 formal and informal workers, 
47% of whom were undocumented immigrants.7 In 2011 the 30 largest companies were hiring 
45,540 employees, and apparel manufacturing became the second most competitive industry in 
Los Angeles County.8 In the first quarter of 2015 the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that 2,106 
formal establishments with 42,477 employees paid out $359 million in wages.9 The industry is a 
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strong one, sustained both by mass consumption and by high fashion. The immigrants work in 
both economies, formal and informal, and in both industries, mass and elitist. They produce both 
for the masses whose numbers they themselves inflate and for the opulent clientele of a city ever 
awash in the wealth of millionaires.1 Against my intuitions, I found no correlation either between 
formality and luxury or between informality and mass consumption. I found instead every possible 
combination. The small workshops in downtown Los Angeles produce for both the formal and 
informal markets in a complex pulley system that avoids saturation. The informal status of Eladio 
Ixcoteyac does not prevent him from having access to the haute couture market. 
One morning Eladio invited me to his place of work. As my imagination struggled to 
anticipate what it would be like, I visualized a humble workshop at the end of a narrow alley, with 
poor lighting and inadequate ventilation. Eladio picked me up in an enormous van that is 
registered in his name even though he has a Guatemalan license and could lose the vehicle if he 
were stopped by the police. He had already lost three vehicles in the 19 years he had lived in Los 
Angeles, not a bad record. One time he tried to escape, but they located him with a helicopter. 
First he treated me to breakfast, and then we headed to his workshop, which consisted of two 
second-floor rooms with a spectacular view of the most touristic street in Beverly Hills. As we 
conversed, he made alterations on a suit with incredible speed. He disassembled the suit and 
changed its dimensions, making slight incisions with a razor and realigning the stitching and some 
small pads inside the suit. Then he hanged the suit on a rack and covered it with a protective cloth. 
After he had dressed himself quite formally, we took the garment to a Burberry store located just 
150 meters from his workshop. On the way we passed shops of Valentino, Roberto Cavalli, Saint 
Laurent, Stefano Ricci, Cartier, and Bulgari. At Burberry’s the staff welcomed Eladio with all the 
deference due to a trusted, highly skilled acquaintance. While Eladio handed over the suit, I 
amused myself by looking at the $450 scarves that I will never buy. 
As we left I learned what the deal was. Eladio had just turned over the suit of Sylvester 
Stallone, an actor who has one of the biggest mansions in Beverly Hills. This is how the transaction 
went: Stallone arrived at Burberry´s with a suit he had bought in Italy. There was no way that it 
could be a perfect fit for him, and that was where Eladio came in. Whenever they need him, he 
comes ready with his measuring tape. Sometimes he goes directly to the customers’ houses: “I’ve 
been in the house of William Barron Hilton, the hotel guy. I’ve been in the houses of Orlando 
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Bloom and Aaron Paul, as well as movie producers—even the star of that movie where they 
remove the eyes and hearts of children in India. They don’t order suits from me. They buy them in 
Italy, where the best tailors are. They just have me do the alterations. They call the big-name 
stores, and the stores call me. Fine work is appreciated. It’s more difficult to repair a suit than to 
make a new one.” Eladio is the stand-in tailor for several businesses. They pay him quite well, but 
they charge their customers even more. 
The situation of Eladio Ixcoteyac is by no means exceptional. He is not the only immigrant 
making use of his skills to provide luxurious goods and services, nor is clothing is the only industry 
that demands specialized artisans like Eladio. Sassen observes that “high-income gentrification 
generates a demand for goods and services often unsuitable for mass production or mass 
retailing.”1 The effect of that demand is seen in the food products available in upscale grocery 
stores, which are patronized by customers dissatisfied with the standardized products in the 
supermarkets. But we can also include clothing, footwear, ethnic cuisine, and other services 
provided by undocumented immigrants. It is by consuming such items that the elites draw the 
clear line that divides them from the average consumer. In a serious effort to personalize their 
consumption, more and more members of the elites are seeking out traits that distinguish them 
not only as a group but also as individuals: they “like clothes which ‘suit their personality’”.2 That is 
why Bulgari and other upscale retailers contract Eladio, whose alterations personalize clothing so 
that it fits flawlessly. 
The pay is consequently generous, in marked contrast with Guatemala: “We earn in an 
hour here what we would earn in a whole day in Guatemala. On a very bad day the least we earn 
here is eighty dollars. That’s why we came. If a lawyer and a small farmer [in Guatemala] have to 
decide where to live, the lawyer doesn’t want to leave his job, but the small farmer does. He has 
nothing to lose because he earns only enough to feed himself. He cannot support two other 
mouths, and if he tries to do so, all three of them end up malnourished. He comes here, and he 
begins to earn more than the lawyer back home. Working hard is no problem for us. We are 
industrious people accustomed to hard work. Here we also earn well, but there we do a lot of 
unpaid work: hauling water, cutting wood…  All that means time spent with no recompense. Here 
we end up ahead just by not having all that unremunerated work.”  
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Eladio is aware that he made both a quantitative leap (from a low wage to a high one) and 
a qualitative leap (from unremunerated labor to paid labor).1 Actually, Eladio made another 
qualitative leap: from anonymous labor to labor where both the product and the artisan are visible 
and are held in high esteem. The personalized nature of his work has implications that take us 
back to the Marxist critique of the capitalist system. Marx denounced the fact that labor was 
“abstracted from the producers,” an idea he took from “An Inquiry into the Principles of the 
Distribution of Wealth Most Conducive to Human Happiness,” a work by William Thompson, an 
Irish economist and social reformer.2 Personalized consumption breaks with the mass 
consumption that Thompson criticized, as Marx notes in citing him: “The annually produced and 
consumed masses, like the eternal and incalculable waves of a mighty river, roll on and are lost in 
the forgotten ocean of consumption.”3 And it does so because personalization does not allow for 
the “total abstraction from use value” that characterizes the simple exchange of merchandise.4 
Marx adds that “If we make abstraction from [a product’s] use value, we make abstraction at the 
same time from the material elements and shapes that make the product a use value; we see in it 
no longer a table, a house, yarn, or any other useful thing. Its existence as a material thing is put 
out of sight. Neither can it any longer be regarded as the product of the labour of the joiner, the 
mason, the spinner, or of any other definite kind of productive labour.”5 Sometimes Eladio 
remains in the shadows, but often—and ever more frequently—not only his tailoring is visible but 
he is himself. Through the direct contacts he already has he gathers more clients: “I have my own 
clientele. I make clothes for the Mexican boxer Canelo Álvarez and for Ryan Seacrest, the host of 
‘American Idol.’ I have clients who come from Europe: Spain, Italy, Switzerland … Many of them 
are writers and actors.” Eladio can present his own style of work and gather a faithful clientele. 
Gorz argues that the advantages of self-employment are reserved to what Rifkin calls “the 
elite of knowledge workers,” that is, the consultants, business lawyers, computer and other high-
level experts who represent less than one per cent of the workforce. For other workers, unless 
they are well organized, “the post-job era merely means companies are free to fish out from a 
well-stocked pool of service-providers of all kinds those who offer the best service at the lowest 
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  218 
price.”1 We have seen, however, that Reynaldo and especially Eladio have succeeded as self-
employed workers, one providing services for the middle-class and the other for the elites; they 
both have solid incomes and work that gives them some distinction. What Žižek, following Marx, 
calls their objective social position2 shows itself to be a negation of the abstraction of work. That 
negation takes the form of a struggle “as class” and not “between classes.” We should recall that 
for Marx class position places one in a struggle against capital rather than against the bourgeoisie 
(according to E.P. Thompson, this latter form of struggle has occurred only at certain moments of 
history). The class struggle of self-employed workers consists in a struggle against the alienation of 
labor. Abstract labor implies the massification that, according to Bourdieu, “underlies working-
class experience of the world, whereby his labour and the product of his labour, opus proprium, 
present themselves to the worker as opus alienum, ‘alienated’ labour.”3 When the tailor is 
recognized as the creator of a particular work and his clients sing his praises, that is opus proprium.  
On several occasions Eladio Ixoteyac repeated a complaint that reveals how important it 
was for him that his work be distinctive: “They call all of us ‘Mexican people.’ That’s what 
Americans call all of us. We Guatemalans are ‘Mexican people.’ We also inherit labels like 
‘wetbacks’ and ‘welfarers’ because they say that we sponge off the welfare state. But that is not 
true, because the people who come here want to work, and they don’t even know what rights 
they have. Only the ones who speak English and have been here a long time can ask for 
government assistance. Still, they judge us that way. There’s discrimination in Beverly Hills, but it’s 
not that strong. The main thing they want is that a person be presentable and respectful. They 
make room for you. Here I’ve made a name for myself.” 
The advantages that accrue to large companies through informality and outsourcing have 
been profusely and accurately described by Gorz, Rifkin, and many others. This does not mean 
that the informal labor involved is left only with disadvantages. At first Eladio would have 
preferred a formal job that gave him stability and a regular income. That was his situation when he 
had just recently arrived in Los Angeles. He worked in a large clothing chain and attended fashion 
shows where “there were no Latinos, only white models and white designers. Sometimes the 
security agents said to me, ‘Pardon the question, but what are you doing here?’” But later on he 
decided to create his own future with the materials that history made available to him. He has 
rejected offers in the formal sector. As an undocumented person, being “wedded” to one of the 
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big businesses would be a very complicated matter for him because the bigwigs are terrified of 
bad publicity. If they were seen to be hiring undocumented workers, there would be scandal, even 
in this highly hypocritical setting where people pretend that the emperor is fully clothed. Still, 
cooperation is not impossible: Bulgari could hire Eladio and deny that they knew that the social 
security number he gave them was phony. But that would leave Eladio in a position much worse 
than the one he is in now: with more danger and less income. Besides running the risk of being 
caught committing a felony, compared to which being undocumented is a venial sin, Eladio would 
see his net income reduced because he would no longer be able to work for other businesses and 
because his employer would lower his pay to compensate for the cost of social benefits. To top it 
off, he would never be able to make use of his social security contributions, which would end up as 
money lost (for Eladio, though not for the public fund). The contributions would simply be 
fattening an erroneous account, one whose number does not exist or does not agree with the tax 
ID. Accordingly, the most mutually advantageous solution is disobedience on both sides, a 
complicity that compounds migratory irregularity with employment irregularity. Eladio continues 
to clothe the princely figures of Hollywood who do not know, or pretend not to know, that their 
tailor is naked when it comes to documents. 
 
Quiché Indians in the cosmopolis of Los Angeles: Clothing and sports leagues 
Like many other Guatemalans, Benjamín Lux came to work in the clothing factories. Now he is 
partnered with his brother, who owns a small workshop and invests in sports. He knows the three 
different worlds: Guatemala, the factories of Los Angeles, and the autonomy of working for 
oneself. He is an advocate of the informal economy and self-employment. He has his reasons, and 
he explains them: “There in Guatemala, from the time we were young they made us believe that 
we were Indians, we were useless, we couldn’t do anything. I studied in a place called San Carlos. 
The people there have Spanish or European roots. They are tall and blond. My dad used to tell me: 
‘They’ll mistreat you there, and you’ll suffer. Better to stay here.’ But I went anyway, and it’s true, 
they always treated me as an Indian. They did it to humiliate me. That’s why many [Quiché 
speakers] say: ‘I don’t speak that dialect. I don’t even know what that is.’ But as soon as they 
speak, their accent is apparent. It’s true that racism exists here in the United States, but not as 
much as in other countries. If we compare the United States with Europe, there is more racism in 
Europe. I’m well aware of that. If you work with a gringo, he pays you better. He gives you a good 
wage and treats you well. Here the ones who mistreat workers are the Asians, like the Chinese or 
  220 
the Koreans. They exploit people. If we’re talking about the clothing industry, most of the workers 
are indigenous Guatemalans. Of every 10 Indians, 8 are working in clothing, but there are also 
many Mexicans. That’s where we all go when we arrive. The work is poorly paid. They pay so many 
cents per piece. In order to earn 80 or 90 dollars a day you have to turn out 3,000 pieces. It’s very 
hard work. If we complain to the Labor Commission, they close the factory and we’re left without 
work or we lose several days of work. But that work is better than other kinds. The clothing worker 
earns more than someone working in McDonald’s. And a tailor earns even more if he is 
independent. The clothing worker earns according to production. One person does the hem, 
another attaches the collar, still another sews on the buttons… A tailor knows how to do 
everything, and his work is better paid. Even when doing poorly, a tailor earns $180, $200, or $250 
a day as a worker. And if he’s the owner, like Eladio, he earns much more.” 
Benjamín and his brother have learned how to get ahead with businesses that are informal 
but solid: “My brother has a workshop with five employees in Hollywood. He doesn’t have papers, 
but he has a number for paying taxes and social security. He also has two sporting goods stores, 
eight playing fields, and a soccer league registered in his name. The league has four divisions— 
major, super major, premier, and professional—and each division has about 40 teams. So there 
are more than 100 teams, and each team has 20-25 players. Each player has to play about $15, so 
that there’s revenue of $300 for each game. Each game lasts an hour and a half, and they go from 
6am to 9pm. There are several games every day on each one of the eight fields. There’s a lot of 
money coming in. He pays to rent the fields and maintain them. If the teams don’t arrive, there 
are fines. If a player is given a red card, the team owner may have to pay $40 so that he can play in 
the next game.” This type of league is successful, according to Shinn, because “to love futbol is 
essentially to take part in what it means to be, or not be, culturally ‘Latino’ in the Americas.”1 The 
Los Angeles leagues include Latina women (though only about 10%), and they have produced such 
famous players as the Salvadoran Mauricio Cienfuegos, who now plays for the Los Angeles 
Galaxy.2 Of course there are other soccer league entrepreneurs besides Benjamín and his brother. 
“Most U.S. soccer clubs notably reside in metropolitan areas in which Latinos constitute a 
significant proportion of the population: the Los Angeles Galaxy, the New York/New Jersey 
MetroStars, the Miami Fusion, the San Jose Clash, the Chicago Fire, the Dallas Burn, and the D.C. 
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United, among others.”1 To get a better idea of the dimensions of a league with more than 100 
teams and 4,000 players, such as the one managed by Benjamín’s brother, we consider worthy of 
mention the Hispanic League of Seattle with its 36 teams and 600 players (some of them 
Nicaraguan).2 
Before they left Guatemala, the farthest Benjamín and his brother had gone from home 
was to Totonicapán, the capital of the department of the same name. Now they are owners of 
workshops, playing fields, and soccer leagues in the cosmopolis of Los Angeles. They are 
entrepreneurs in the clothing and sports industries. In contrast to Eladio, they work for the 
masses: their clients are immigrants, many of them undocumented. But the services and goods 
they provide them are also relatively personalized. They work in industries where irregular 
migratory status has not prevented them from getting ahead; rather, it did provided them an 
incentive for finding something better than wage labor as a path toward prosperity and 
integration into society and the marketplace. 
 
The adventurous itinerary of Kelvin Orellana: from the cheese-making workshops of Las 
Mojarras to remodeling interiors in the D.C. area 
Kelvin Orellana was born in Honduras and lives now in the state of Maryland; he shares those two 
characteristics with 20,042 other persons. He forms part of the 26% of Hondurans in Maryland 
who work in construction,3 an industry where in 2012 undocumented workers provided 12% of 
the labor.4 Construction is a sector which escapes from government control almost everywhere in 
the world: even in Denmark it stands out for its informality, with 48% of its workers failing to 
report their income in the 12 months prior to a survey done in 2012.5 Kelvin had no experience 
whatsoever in that area. In Honduras he had milked cows and driven a truck for a cheese-making 
concern. Now he works for a D.C. Metro official who owns several apartments and needed 
someone to maintain them. Kelvins job is to replace roofs, remodel interiors, and repair cooling 
and heating units. There are many apartments, and their residents may require emergency service 
at any hour any day of the week: a falling ceiling, a water leak, a broken washing machine, etc. 
Kelvin is generously paid for each intervention. If the owner of the apartments were to contract a 
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large formal business, “he’d be eaten alive,” according to Reynaldo. It is a mutually advantageous 
relationship, but one that obviously does not produce a balance of power. 
Kelvin’s other source of contracts is a large construction company whose manager advised 
him to register his own business. After consulting, Kelvin set up his business, the costs for which 
were covered by his contractor. His construction license, which he shows off with evident pride, 
permits him to offer his services to several of biggest contractors in construction. His business is 
one of the 15,900 construction firms that the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported as registered in 
the state of Maryland in 2015, and of the 2,382 such firms in Montgomery County. As of January 
2015, construction firms were employing 143,745 workers in Maryland and 22,643 in Montgomery 
County, for an average of 9-9.5 workers per firm, a figure that suggests to us that Kelvin’s one-
person enterprise could be a typical case.1 Kelvin sometimes uses the title and sometimes does 
not: he sometimes operates as a formal business and sometimes as an informal one. For the 
Metro official Kelvin is informal. 
Kelvin does these jobs in his free time. His main job is working as a mason for a company 
that pays him by the hour. When there is a heavy flow of contracts, he works exclusively in his own 
business. For the moment his business does not keep him occupied every working day, but it can 
do much more than keep him financially afloat: in an afternoon he can earn several thousand 
dollars. Kelvin’s annual income exceeds $53,450, the average income in 2012 of construction and 
building inspectors, an occupation that requires a high-school diploma or the equivalent.2 He earns 
far more than the $35,210 that is the average pay of general maintenance and repair workers, 
who do the same kind of work I saw Kelvin doing; there are some 1,325,100 such workers in the 
whole country.3 
Kelvin does not appear to feel what Venkatesh calls “the pressures of ownership” in a 
situation where “the choice to participate in the shady world…is made in a social context shaped 
by concentrated poverty, low consumer demand and high commercial insolvency, pervasive 
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institutional discrimination, and neglect by the city.”1 Like many other self-employed persons who 
work informally—and also formally when appropriate—Kelvin has escaped from the anonymity of 
abstract labor and has established highly personalized relationships with the Metro official, with 
the large company that sponsored his construction license, and with other contractors. The trust 
placed in him by these partners compensates for some of the limitations associated with his being 
undocumented. Not only does his contractor heed his suggestions but he provides him with a 
credit card, which involves taking a risk: if Kelvin deceives him or leaves the country, whether 
deported or on his own, the contractor will be unable to sue him for abuse of confidence or 
anything similar. Neither the large company nor the Metro official would want their relationship 
with an undocumented worker to be known, but every day they are supporting his performative 
civil disobedience: his right to work, to set up a business, to earn a decent income, and to feel 
included. By their contracts and the risks they assume, they are voting on a daily basis for the 
inclusion of undocumented persons and are denying the government the power, the right, and the 
ability to exclude persons whom they have already included. They have neutralized the 
exclusionary effects of the principle of territorial sovereignty. It is obvious that they benefit greatly 
from Kelvin’s skilled labor and gain even greater advantage from the fact that his tiny company is 
registered. Such a situation involves risks for Kelvin since it is quite probable that during a severe 
economic crisis he will no longer receive contracts from the construction firm or that the contracts 
will be fewer and less well paid. But the severe crises do not affect only the marginal workers. Few 
jobs are immune, not even those in the public sector, as the last depressive cycle demonstrated. 
For Kelvin and his informal sector businesses, the last, relatively slight crisis had the effect of 
bringing in more contracts because the big businesses opted for more labor flexibility, thus 
preferring to hire workers who have a van and well-developed skills. 
Despite the advantages for contractors in hiring informal workers, it is not a zero-sum 
relationship, and the advantages are not measured only in cash: Kelvin has made a leap toward a 
form of legitimacy. His determination not to be “left behind” and his decision to enter an irregular 
market after an irregular entry into the country have unleashed a perlocutionary effect in key 
actors whose collaboration is essential so that he can practice his performative disobedience. The 
registration of his business and the contracts he receives allow him to behave as if he possessed 
full rights as a member of that society. Kelvin showed me his license as if he were showing me his 
“green card” or his certificate of citizenship. He has all the documents he needs. He can therefore 
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say: “When you have a van like this one, you’re on your way.” Hondagneu-Sotelo says something 
similar about gardeners: “Their tool-laden trucks and mowers and blowers serve as their 
passports.”1 Kelvin has not only his van as his passport but also the registration of his company. 
That is why he can say: “I don’t have documents, but my business does!” 
 
Self-employment and disobedience 
Undocumented persons who are self-employed have reversed the finding that André Gorz made in 
the late 1960s: “The demands of self-management that are born of productive praxis cannot be 
left outside the door of factories, laboratories, or offices. Persons who cannot be given orders in 
their work will not be able to submit indefinitely to orders in their lives as citizens nor will they 
submit to rigid decisions coming from a central administration.”2 Undocumented persons who are 
self-employed did not submit to the decisions of a rigid administration before seeking self-
management. Immigrants do not cause their own informality, but they use it nevertheless as 
material for constructing their future and making their history. Such material is therefore not 
politically fortuitous: both informality and lack of documentation maintain a similar (elusive) 
relationship with government bureaucracy. Informality is the economic correlate of migratory 
irregularity. They are the two aspects in which the migrants are not being regulated by the 
government. This type of analogous correlation does not mean that a majority of the immigrants 
are in the formal sector; it means simply that informal self-employment offers a kind of 
independence—freedom from regulation—that is a good match for migratory irregularity. 
Such an analogy accords well with a very insightful conclusion of Sassen: we can no longer 
speak of regulatory “violations” but only of regulatory “fractures” because they increase the 
extent to which the economic processes diverge from the model for which the regulations were 
designed.3 Migratory irregularity also presupposes regulatory “fractures,” but that is not because 
the migratory regulations were designed for an obsolete migratory model (in the second chapter I 
showed how the banopticon fits well with the investments in security and prisons that have been 
made by powerful groups that have succeeded in molding politics in accord with their interests). 
Rather, the reason is that the regulations fit poorly with the factors of the material world—that is, 
with politics in the Marxist sense—that have the final word about who is to be included and that 
limit the determination to exclude. Informality multiplies those factors. Labor flexibility is the 
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material with which the undocumented have made more supple the rigor of migratory directives. 
The fractures in migratory regulation are widened by the immigrants’ performative civil 
disobedience, which sometimes is reinforced by the fractures in economic regulation. As a result, 
the principal determinant in the process for integrating newcomers is not the legal model for 
regulating migration. Rather, it is a political model in which the performative civil disobedience 
and the social validations of the undocumented have given them a space in which their business 
licenses, their recognized skills, their personalized labor, their financial advances, and the vans 
that serve as their passports make them indispensable and, to that extent, less excludable. They 
granted them economic citizenship. 
It can be assumed that some of the situations described here happen frequently. We 
should not lose sight of the fact that the 9.7% of the Central American labor force in the United 
States that is self-employed means more than 210,000 workers. This quiet encroachment of the 
self-employed is small but it is growing. It may even be larger than the figures suggest: for 
example, Kelkin and Eladio do not describe themselves as self-employed in the census. Those 
working in the informal sector have turned  the stigma into a badge. They have transformed the 
misery of the present into the richness of the possible, to use the words of Gorz, for whom this 
situation is not regrettable: “The work which is disappearing is 'abstract labour', labour that is 
measurable, quantifiable and detachable from the person who 'provides' it; work which can be 
bought and sold in the 'labour market'.”1 If undocumented workers have as much weight in the 
informal sector as is indicated in various studies, it means that the “shady world” of labor 
irregularity removes them from the invisibility and concealment of the “shady world” into which 
they are thrust, according to some authors, by migratory irregularity. By escaping from abstract 
labor and engaging in their opus proprium, they have the chance to stand out as individuals. 
Paradoxically, it is the world of self-employment that makes migrants more visible and more 
indispensable. The immigrants do not stand out as much in the packing plants, the factories, the 
strawberry fields, or even the diners where they cook, bag, and dispense fast-food, as they do 
when they are gardeners, plumbers, electricians, nannies, maids, or shovelers of snow. In such 
occupations they enter into direct contact with a middle-class clientele who are becoming every 
day more aware that these immigrants are lowering the costs of a wide range of goods and 
services and that they are not at all the unskilled workers that news reports say they are. 
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My aim is not to defend self-employment or economic informality but to offer an analysis 
based on empirical evidence. Such evidence reveals that immigrant workers are making progress 
in the world of labor by using the materials left to them by recent history (informality, self-
employment, outsourcing) and also by recognizing that they will achieve political freedom not in 
the absence of restrictions but in knowing how to overcome them. Informality and self-
employment may be accompanied by a certain level of risk and of exclusion from the legal 
mainstream, but they also grant some autonomy and fulfill the dream of independence that many 
immigrants share. It is perhaps for that reason that the political role of the self-employed is more 
difficult to envision. Self-employment is seen as weakening the organizing potential of factory 
workers,1 and the self-employed are seen as defectors from the proletariat, but what Marx said 
applies to them as well: “The domination of capital has created for this mass a common situation, 
common interests.2 And this situation, for better or for worse, is increasingly common; it is as if 
the capitalist tide were now reestablishing the world of artisans that it dismantled when it first 
began to rise. As this situation becomes more common and more widespread, it will constitute the 
non-collective actor to which Bayat refers. In the case of undocumented immigrants, the non-
collective actor is constituted reciprocally with another non-collective actor, namely, the clients 
who recognize them and legitimize them because they want personalized products and because 
they want to deal face to face with those who provide them. It is not clear whether the collective 
actions of this other non-collective actor will be anti-hegemonic or whether they will always sing 
the praises of entrepreneurship, but the support they provide for the non-movement of the 
undocumented, by neutralizing the exclusion imposed by anti-immigrant policies and making the 
undocumented feel included, is a major triumph. It means 365 victories a year. 
2.4 Disobedience in the market and citizenship in consuming 
 
The world of consuming has been assailed for both intellectual and moral reasons. It is associated 
with lack of wisdom and abundance of vices. A broad current of criticism, nourished by traditional 
Christianity’s negative views of commerce and money, has surfaced again and again in the history 
of ideas and of political systems.3 The accumulated diatribes of centuries, reinforced by the 
restricted vision of politics coming from ancient Greece, has maintained belief in the political 
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irrelevance of persons as consumers. The most negative views arise from the dualities of 
consumption/alienation or consumption/conformity, which are modern formulations of the 
classical strategy of “bread and circuses”—portrayed by Juvenal as a way to buy votes and to 
govern the unruly crowds of Remus.1 The resulting tradition, which has become the commonly 
accepted view, has tended to disdain and even demonize consumption. In ordinary language, as 
Néstor García Canclini points out, “consumption is usually associated with useless expenditures 
and irrational compulsions.”2 And he adds: “There are still some who fault the poor for buying 
televisions, video players, and cars when they don't even own a home. How can one make sense 
of families who squander their Christmas bonuses on parties and presents when they don't have 
enough to eat and dress themselves throughout the year? Don't these media addicts know that 
newscasters lie and that telenovelas distort real life?”3 Although Lipovetsky’s characterization of 
the society of hyper-consumption has some merit, one notices in his writings a poorly dissembled 
homiletic moralism—with aristocratic tinges—when he laments that “living better has become a 
passion of the masses” and that political militancy has been supplanted by hedonism, nationalist 
passion by desire for comfort, and revolution by entertainment.4 Illustrious intellectuals take on 
the role of political commissars in their denunciations of the consuming masses. In former times, 
according to Ranciére, people were portrayed as seduced by electrical appliances and by a system 
that at once exploited them and inspired their dreams. In our own day individuals are the ones 
being blamed for the democratic tyranny of consumption, as Ranciére states: “the laws of 
capitalist accumulation, and the type of production and circulation of commodities they require, 
have become the simple consequence of the vices of those who consume these commodities, and 
especially of those who have the least means to consume.” The law of return on capital prevails 
because “democratic man is a being of excesses, an insatiable devourer of commodities, human 
rights and televisual spectacles.”5 
Despite this trend, García Canclini observes the emergence of an opposed tendency: “Men 
and women increasingly feel that many of the questions proper to citizenship—where do I belong, 
what rights accrue to me, how can I get information, who represents my interests?—are being 
answered in the private realm of commodity consumption and the mass media more than in the 
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abstract rules of democracy or collective participation in public spaces.”1 In view of these 
considerations, García Canclini cites the studies of cultural citizenship “in which citizenship is seen 
not only in relation to rights accorded by state institutions to those born within their territorial 
jurisdiction, but also as social and cultural practices that confer a sense of belonging, provide a 
sense of difference, and enable the satisfaction of the needs of those who possess a given 
language and organize themselves in certain ways.”2 
García Canclini’s proposal for conceptualizing consumption was already anticipated by 
Michel de Certeau in his study of contemporary everyday life in France. De Certeau rejected the 
myth of the passive consumer and posited instead “consumption as production,” which 
highlighted people’s creativity in adapting the products of mass consumption (from furniture to TV 
dramas) to their personal needs.3 This conceptual framework recalls the argument made by 
Castells that consumption is another battleground of class conflict, one rooted in unequal 
participation in production but extending also to the distribution and appropriation of 
commodities. André Gorz went further than Castells when he pointed out that capital's 
domination can no longer be exercised directly over living labor by means of hierarchical 
constraints: “The factory and the workplace then cease to be the main arena of the central 
conflict. The battle lines of that conflict will be everywhere: information, language, modes of life, 
tastes and fashions are produced and shaped by the forces of capital, commerce, the state and the 
media; in other words, everywhere the subjectivity and ‘identity’ of individuals, their values and 
their images of themselves and the world, are being continually structured, manufactured and 
shaped.”4 
If we follow the Marxist tradition, therefore, we have to consider that the political scene is 
not only in the factory and that the basic reason for the conflict between the powerful and the 
dominated has not been exclusively wages (which are actually purchasing power) but also the 
world of consuming, at least since the Paris Commune of 1871 and the Glasgow strikes of 1915. 
Both these events began as rent strikes waged against real estate speculators.5 Unfortunately, 
though, their historical reconstruction was injected with much ideology by Marx himself and by 
the correspondents on whom he depended for information. As a result, a municipal revolution 
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provoked by a rent strike and partly led by women was transmuted into a proletarian proto-
revolution, even though at that time Paris, which had few industrial workers among its 
inhabitants, did not measure up to such a reality.1 Perhaps because of the inertial force of that 
original sin, García Canclini conjectures, Marxist studies on consumption continue to exaggerate 
the decisive force exercised by corporations on consumers and audiences.2 
We should nevertheless remember that it was Marx who first made us aware of the power that 
material activities have for helping us to understand what is happening in politics beyond the 
epiphenomena. He laid the groundwork for being as concerned about consumption as we are 
about production. Consuming is competing for what society produces. Consumption becomes 
political from the moment it is linked to the struggle for wages, and its political character is made 
quite explicit in a conventional sense when the candidates in electoral contests promise to reduce 
inflation, broaden access to credit, and lower taxes.3 
Consumption is now a space for interaction among  consumers, who are not passive 
recipients seduced by the siren calls of advertising. There are many ways to explore that 
interaction. One of them is to stress the relevance of being undocumented for the 
citizenship/consumption relationship. Nevertheless, I will not treat in detail the equation 
“citizenship = consumption” even though it is not an entirely mistaken equation. To give just one 
example of it, access to and consumption of certain cultural goods (books, songs, and TV programs 
in English) open up opportunities for integration in a society where mastery of English is as 
important as a U.S. passport—or even more important! (Remember that ICE agents stop U.S. 
citizens who present their passports but do not speak English, and the inverse happens as well: 
undocumented persons who speak English pass through the checkpoints without showing their 
documents). That equation does not suffice, however, because what I want to treat here are acts 
of civil disobedience or acts that function as such. That is why I am emphasizing consumption as a 
means of practicing performative civil disobedience and as an instrument of boycott, or what 
Ebert would respectively call constructive action and confrontative action. As we will see, the 
decisions made by the undocumented about where to live and what to buy are a powerful 
economic stimulus to which the politicians react. That is the source of the constructive and 
confrontative power of the undocumented. Mike Davis has studied home improvements made by 
Latinos as an achievement that has transformed and appropriated the urban landscape of Los 
                                            
1 Castells, 2012, p.16. 
2 García Canclini, 2010, p.39. 
3 García Canclini, 2010, p.39. 
  230 
Angeles.1 It is the Latino version of the appropriation of space that African Americans practiced in 
1927 when they bought lots and organized parties on the beaches of Santa Monica.2 Both cases 
involved performative civil disobedience in the act of consumption, the African Americans by 
making use of beaches traditionally reserved for whites, and the Latinos by remodeling their 
homes even while being undocumented, that is, while being excluded not only from a residential 
zone but from the whole country. 
 
Latinos and the entertainment industry  
The market provides the “Latino menace” with various types of support in areas that are vital to 
the native-born population and the general functioning of the American system. Latinos living in 
the United States represent an important consumer market, and their participation in that market 
has had and continues to have consequences for their status in society. This has been highlighted 
by the academic Frances Negrón-Muntaner: “No one knew it then, but the new Latino cultural 
scene began in 1995, when singer Selena Quintanilla was killed by Yolanda Saldívar, president of 
her fan club. Despite the tragic aspect—in the classic sense—of the episode, the explosion of 
visibility that followed gave many Latinos a new sense of optimism, possibility and self-esteem. 
The editor of People magazine, for example, got a taste of that vast appetite for cultural 
citizenship of more than 30 million Latinos (and their $190 billion of purchasing power) when it 
sold close to a million copies of the special issue dedicated to Selena in just 24 hours. At that 
moment, the glances of capital and the longing for recognition of the Latinos came together in a 
prolonged kiss of possibilities, and the current cultural boom ‘exploded’.”3 That purchasing power 
has also been recognized by the businesses in Pasco, Washington, which are sponsoring soccer 
league teams with names like “Albertsons,” “Budweiser,” or “Best Foods.”4 Mattel has been aware 
of this power since 1968, when it came out with a doll called “Spanish Speaker,” a Barbie with a 
Mexican accent. Later, in 1980, the company launched  its first “Hispanic Barbie,” dressed in a 
pseudo-Spanish costume called “fiesta-style.”5 Similarly, Warner Music Company fell in love with 
                                            
1 Davis, 2001, pp.61-62. 
2 Flamming, 2005, pp.273-274. 
3 Negrón-Muntaner, 2006, pp.129-130. 
4 Shinn, 2002, p.248. 
5 Negrón-Muntaner, 2002, p.54. 
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the Buena Vista Social Club when it realized how profitable it could be to idealize prerevolutionary 
Cuba.1 
There is a very clear connection between that boom and the public stands taken by singers 
and actors on migratory policies. When Jan Brewer, the governor of Arizona signed anti-
immigration law SB 1070 on 23 April 2010, Latinos and their defenders didn’t stand idle with arms 
crossed and mouths shut. Many quickly got on the Internet and sent out messages calling for 
renewal of the boycott against Kimberly Clark (the company behind the Scott, Kotex, Huggies and 
other brand names) for its corporate links with Republican Senator James Sensenbrenner, author 
of the notorious bill HR-4437 (the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration 
Control Act of 2005), more commonly known as the Sensenbrenner bill. There were early displays 
of solidarity from many famous people. Unequivocal declarations came from singers Shakira, Ricky 
Martin, Gloria Estefan, Marco Antonio Muñiz, Danny Rivera and Paulina Rubio. Sharp comments 
were made by actors Eva Longoria, Gael García Bernal and George López. Cinematographer Robert 
Rodríguez even improvised an allusive trailer. We are light years away from the time when 
immigrants bowed down and obeyed the law without talking back. Without calling into question 
the political convictions of these and other artists, one shouldn’t belittle the benefits they reap by 
staying on the good side of the millions of Latinos who consume the cultural goods whose 
production and sale contribute to their fame and fortune. There will be no backpedaling on this 
issue. Other voices will be raised out of devotion either to Latinos or to Lord Lucre, that powerful 
knight who elevates both noble and beggar and makes the outsider his own. Here we have seen in 
action the power of Latinos—millions of whom are undocumented—by virtue of their position, not 
in the system of production, but in that of consumption. It is a force that provokes reactions 
among persons who exercise greater parrhesia and are ready to use it to help the cause of the 
undocumented. A recent contribution of the entertainment industry that benefited the 
undocumented was the film, “Who is Dayani Cristal?” (2013), starring Gael García Bernal. The 
documentary narrates the story of a Honduran migrant who died in the Sonora Desert in Pima 
County after crossing the border. The story of the dead migrant was reconstructed on the basis of 
forensic data, a mapping of his journey, and an enigmatic tattoo that read “Dayani Cristal,” the 
name of one of his daughters. The documentary was widely acclaimed so that its website became 
a platform for collecting the stories of migrants (helping them speak out), for finding migrants who 
had disappeared, and for opposing the system of detention and deportation; it also helped to raise 
                                            
1 Katerí Hernández, 2002, pp.61-72, p.66. 
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funds for the organizations in Tucson that help the undocumented, for the “Hermanos en el 
Camino” shelter, and for those lobbying in favor of work visas.1 
The world of sports offers another example of the intense love affair between capitalist 
enterprise and Latino talent, but it has also produced strong statements on U.S. migration policies. 
The U.S. boxer of Mexican origin, Óscar de la Hoya, whose income depends heavily on the Latin 
market, says in his memoir: “In my 2006 fight against [Nicaraguan] Ricardo Mayorga, I was wearing 
on my shorts a proposal for the coming elections, stating my solidarity with the undocumented 
workers.” Backing proposals similar to those of the Migration Policy Institute but even more 
favorable for the undocumented, de la Hoya insists that his responsibility was like that of “anyone 
caught in the middle of one of the hottest topics in the country: immigration. I can’t turn my back 
on a problem that affects so many people whose roots are just like mine. … The present system is 
not working, and there is tremendous chaos on the border. I am not saying we should open the 
doors and let everybody come who wants to, but neither do I think that we should shut the doors 
permanently. Many of the people crossing the border only want to work and have a better future 
for themselves and their families. It is true that there are a few bad apples who manage to give 
immigrants a bad image, and when that is the case, they should be punished severely. The best 
thing would be to deport them. But I propose a more diplomatic strategy for the rest. … If they 
want to come to work, we should give them documents so that they can work for six months, and 
then they could stay another six months. If after one year they have behaved as good citizens, paid 
their taxes, and contributed to the economy, they could begin the process of becoming citizens. 
Every person should have that possibility. … Regarding the illegal immigrants who are here 
already, I don’t think we should deport them. I’m not saying that we should stamp their passports 
and forget about the past, but we should find same way to legalize them. We should give them an 
opportunity to take part in the system and become citizens so that they can continue pursuing the 
American dream. … Getting immigrants to come out of hiding would be a tremendous 
achievement for all Americans since it would bring security for the undocumented immigrants and 
for the country as a whole. … I believe the people of this country would benefit. I believe the 
economy would also benefit, and so would the different organisms responsible for law 
enforcement, health, and education.”2  
                                            
1 “Who is Dayani Cristal?,” http://whoisdayanicristal.com/ 
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De la Hoya is constantly seeking to find a position midway between being pro-immigration 
and respecting the law. He repeats clichés that everybody knows are false, such as the one about 
“getting immigrants to come out of hiding,” but most importantly, he speaks in terms that are well 
received by his many fans. Although de la Hoya’s Mexican roots make him especially sensitive to 
this issue and shape his opinions in this regard, it cannot be denied that his statements are also 
inspired by economics. Óscar de la Hoya relates that Richard Schaefer, a banker of Swiss origin, 
decided to become his financial adviser in order, he told him, “to get involved in the marvelous 
opportunity you have of being a true Mexican American icon and of capturing this country’s 
growing Hispanic market in a way no one else can.” De la Hoya adds: “I was aware of the increased 
purchasing power of Hispanics in the United States, and I thought that, being Mexican American, I 
would be doubly attractive, both for Anglos and Hispanics.”1 Under Schaefer’s direction, de la 
Hoya invested in sports equipment, sports magazines, tequila brands, Univision (the Hispanic 
television network), and Frontera Productions (a movie-making business whose clientele is the 
Spanish-speaking public).  He also invested in the ImpreMedia corporation, which owns several 
Hispanic newspapers: Hoy Nueva of New York, La Opinión of Los Angeles, La Raza of Chicago, El 
Mensajero of San Francisco, La Prensa of Orlando and Tampa, the Rumbo newspaper chain of 
Texas, and El Diario La Prensa of New York, which was founded around 1913 and is the oldest 
Hispanic newspaper in the United States. Future investments will include a bank and an insurance 
company for Hispanics.2 Óscar de la Hoya´s statements and investments are an excellent scale for 
gauging the economic heft of the niche market created by Latino migrants. 
 
An erupting market: the purchasing power of undocumented Central Americans 
My field work allowed me to witness firsthand the heft of that market. The workdays of 
undocumented immigrants always included purchases at hardware stores, fast-food chains, 
Central American restaurants, supermarkets, and large wholesale and retail stores. Latinos made 
up a large part of the clientele of all these businesses, and in some geographical locations the 
majority of their customers were Central Americans. The breakfasts at 7-Eleven were de rigueur. 
Their Guatemalan coffee and Salvadoran quesadillas could be found in almost all my urban 
excursions with the undocumented. “In all the 7-Elevens there are tons of people,” Fredy Melgar 
told me. “And even more when it gets cold. I’ve never tasted coffee as good as 7-Eleven’s. The 
                                            
1 de la Hoya, 2015, pos.152. 
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thing is, you fix it yourself right there. I used to throw everything in: I added milk, I added those 
little cream things that smell delicious … vanilla. I used to go there every morning to look for work, 
waiting for somebody to hire me.” As Lito told me, that chain is really a “Latino restaurant, a 
gringo bar.” Its parking lot functions as a hiring hall. In the neighborhoods, cities, and counties 
where Central Americans have considerable demographic presence, they constitute the clientele 
and the workforce behind a dynamic economy with not a few aspects of enclave. The streets near 
MacArthur Park in Los Angeles are sprinkled with Central American bakeries selling Salvadoran 
alfajores, Honduran semitas, Guatemalan champurradas, and Nicaraguan polvorones. In 
Hempstead on Long Island (New York) there are many stores with Salvadoran nuégados and 
chocobananos. In San Francisco the Nicaraguan diners have nacatamales and lengua en salsa. In 
Pico Union some grocery stores display large signs advertising “Delicious Nicaraguan chicha.” 
Salvadoran riguas and Honduran baleadas are plentiful in several counties of Virginia and 
Maryland. 
My visit to a supermarket with Gisel and Yadira gave me a chance to observe the 
attractiveness of what I will call the “market basket of memory,” which contains products from 
“there” sold at prices of “here.” Included are such items as Honduran red beans (“really soft 
beans”) at $3.25 for 20 ounces, rice imported from Thailand and distributed by Distribuidora 
Custcatlán at $2.59 a pound, and La Perfecta sour cream from Nicaragua for $3.29 a pound. I 
append here a more detailed list that is by no means exhaustive, but it provides a good idea of the 















Market basket of memory 
 
To these traditional food items must be added the occasional dinners, the weekend visits, 
and the celebrations with family and friends in restaurants that serve from a “Nostalgia Menu.” A 
typical such menu contains items such as those shown in the following table. 
 
Nostalgia Menu 




Beef steak with onions 9.30
Fried mojarra (fish) 10.70
Chicken with onions 8.00






Atol 2.70  
Items Prices in US dollars 
Three mangos 3.60 
Bag of "flor de pito" 3.00 
28 ounces of jocotes 6.60 
One avocado 1.80 
One pound of bananas 0.80 
20 ounces of black beans 2.70 
20 ounces of red silk beans 3.25 
20 ounces of big red beans 2.50 
Five big rosquillas 5.00 
16 ounces of rosquillas 3.20 
8 ounces of quesadillas 3.00 
Four lemons 1.00 
One coconut 2.20 
One melon 2.60 
One papaya 1.20 
8 ounces of marquesote 2.60 
Four champurradas 2.60 
One pound of cheese to make pupusas 5.70 
1.4 pounds of dry cheese 8.00 
One pound of 'hard white' cheese 7.00 
One pound of classic cheese 7.00 
Half pound of cuajada 8.20 
Four tamalitos 4.50 
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The data in the first table were obtained in February 2014 in San Miguel Market and those 
of the second table in San Miguel Café, both located on Leesburg Pike in Arlington County, 
Virginia. They give us some idea of the market that exists for Central American products, and these 
same products, according to Yadira, make up their daily diet. Like other ethnic groups in the U.S., 
Central Americans have managed to reproduce their native diet in the country to which they have 
migrated. Formerly, the “Made in USA” label was a magnet for Central American consumers, and it 
continues to be one for those who are still in Central America. But those who have migrated are 
demanding “homegrown flavor” and are willing to pay $7 for a half-pound of cheese from 
Chontales, $15 for breaded fish filet with tomato sauce, $20 for a tender Nicaraguan-style steak, 
$7.25 for a plate of fried plantain and cheese, $3 for a pound of marquesote, $3.25 for silk beans 
from Morazán, and $2.89 for a frozen package of four “authentic” pupusas from Planes de 
Renderos which were actually produced and packaged in New Jersey by Goya Foods. This diet 
provides a strong stimulus to the food industries, which take the lion’s share of the value added in 
the productive chain and are not necessarily Central American. 
Careful reading of the fine print on the labels reveals that many of these industries import 
their raw materials from different places (including Thailand, which provides the banana leaves 
used for Salvadoran tamales and Nicaraguan nacatamales); the processing and packaging takes 
place in California or Colorado. Goya Foods is one of the largest companies producing Central 
American items; in fact, the inclusion of those items has helped the company to expand the 
number of its products from 900 to 2,200 over the last decade. Founded in Manhattan in 1936 by 
a Spanish immigrant, Goya Foods began by selling olive oil and olives from Spain. Now 
headquartered in New Jersey, it cans and bottles Central American nances, yuccas, pacayas, 
lorocos, refried black beans, silk beans, palmitos, pejivalle, tender mangos, elotes, jocotes, 
Salvadoran curtidos, frozen guava, tortillas, and pipianes. Nearly all of them were most likely 
packed in the 600,000 square-foot plant that Goya Foods opened in New Jersey in return for an 
$82 million tax break. As could only be expected, Goya Foods is a great friend of Latinos: with 
profits of more than a billion dollars a year,1 it supports the National Council of La Raza, an 
association that brings together 268 organizations dedicated to defending the rights of Latinos, 
regularizing their migratory status, and resolving their labor problems. 
Motivated by this appetite for old-time flavors and the sales opportunities it produces, 
Central American companies have followed the migrants. The Pico Union outlet of the Guatemalan 
                                            
1 Morley, 2015. 
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firm “Pollo Campero” shares a gigantic building with the Curacao company. Fully aware of 
Salvadorans’ passion for its products and of the immense possibilities of transnational 
consumption, the company’s latest venture has been hugely successful: “Order here, we deliver in 
El Salvador.” On 23 April 2002, the day that Pollo Campero inaugurated its franchise in Los 
Angeles, hundreds of Central American lined up from early in the morning in order to taste—as 
manager and founder Francisco Pérez de Antón put it—“a piece of their own country in a foreign 
land.” In 48 days the company managed to set a sales record in the fast-food market of one million 
dollars.1 
But there are still many other opportunities in this immigrant market. In order to obtain 
over-the-counter medications without consulting a physician, Central Americans trust in tradition 
and shop at the mini-markets that offer products from the small pharmaceutical companies of the 
region. These products, whose effectiveness has been affirmed by generations of users, include 
Sapuyulo Oil, Bear Oil, Esencia Coronada, Bacaolina, Desempacho, 7 Spirits, Parasitol, SanaTos, 
Angidol, Mentevital Forte, Zorritone, Broncolín, Komilón, Sinestrés, Tiro Seguro (for the treatment 
of pinworms), Neurofosfatón, Neurocampolón, and Globulón. 
Many stores have specialized in typical Mesoamerican articles such as piñatas and all the 
items that are needed for the quinceañera celebrations, including rental of dresses, tables, and 
chairs. Other stores specialize in religious articles, where the most requested images are those of 
the Lord of Esquipulas and the Virgin of Suyapa, but they leave space also for the (no longer 
exclusively) Mexican Santa Muerte devotion, the reading of Tarot cards, spiritual sorcery, 
personalization of amulets, and cleansings with egg, rue, rosemary, fire, or flowers. Strategically 
located near these stores are the ubiquitous offices of the shysters who contrive and arrange 
insurance policies, proofs of paternity, completed income tax forms, marriage certificates, 
permissions for minors, corrected birth certificates, payments of fines, political asylum 
applications, divorce filings, and police records. Their signs—like those that hang outside the 
offices of dentists, nutritionists, and gynecologists—almost always include the three magic words 
that invariably attract Latino clients: “Se habla español.” 
Whether you are strolling around Hempstead, crossing through San Francisco’s Mission 
District on the 48 bus line (Quintara/24th St.), walking down César E. Chávez Avenue, or visiting a 
neighborhood near Echo Park in Los Angeles, on every street you will find various businesses that 
send remittances “in minutes” and that ship packages of all shapes and sizes to Central American 
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countries. With names like “Transportes Jireh,” “Xela Express,” and “Mi Patria Express,” they 
transport blenders, bicycles, stoves, and even vehicles “right to the door of your house.” Prices 
vary according to the size of the package and the destination. A 30” by 30” box costs $200 to ship 
to Guatemala, $250 to El Salvador, and $300 to Honduras. You can also send according to weight, 
at a rate of $7 per pound. 
Central Americans have also helped to invigorate the housing sector, an industry that was 
severely affected by the economic crisis and the rapid deflation of the housing bubble that began 
in the fall of 2005.1 Seven years later David Harvey commented that “the current signs in the 
United States are not encouraging. The housing sector is not reviving, and new housing production 
is depressed and stagnant. There are signs it is heading for a dreaded ‘double-dip’ recession, as 
Federal monies dry up and unemployment remains high. Housing starts have plunged for the first 
time to below pre-1940s levels. As of March 2011, the unemployment rate in construction stood 
above 20 percent, compared to a rate of 9.7 percent in manufacturing that was very close to the 
national average. There is no need to build new homes and fill them with things when so many 
homes stand empty.”2 When applied to the country as a whole, Harvey’s statement is correct: 
between 2000 and 2012 employment in the construction industry rose just 15%, from 8,801,507 
jobs to 10,115,885. The number of occupied dwellings in the United States went from 105,480,101 
to 132,452,249, an increase of only 25.6% in the whole period or 2.13% per year. The impact of 
this crisis—as happens with every crisis—affected people very differently. The construction 
industry is one in which Latinos, especially Central Americans, have a high rate of participation 
both as workers and as consumers. In 2010 construction employed only 6.8% of the U.S. 
population, but provided jobs for 25% of Hondurans, 19% of Guatemalans, 15% of Salvadorans, 
and 11% of Nicaraguans living in the U.S., or a total of 457,111 Central Americans. In 2000 that 
sector employed only 120,490 Central Americans. Thus, in one decade the number of Central 
Americans working in construction increased by 279%, or almost 28% per year, even though the 
industry went through a recession. This increase exceeded the mark reached in Milwaukee, where 
between 1980 and 2000 the number of Latinos working in construction increased 156% (7.8% per 
year).3 The recent boom in employment, despite the crisis, was not due solely to the arrival of 
more Central Americans and to their increased concentration in that sector (in 2000 about 12% of 
Central Americans were employed in construction while in 2010 about 17.5% were). The increased 
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2 Harvey, 2012, p.52. 
3 Pawasarat, Quinn, and Stetzer, 2006, p.11. 
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need for masons, welders, electricians, carpenters, plumbers, and painters derived also from the 
demand for housing generated by the arriving Central Americans. Migration in itself is a multiplier 
of the demand for housing. In just 12 years the housing units occupied by persons born in Central 
America, whether as owners or renters, increased 74%, that is, from 598,650 to 1,039,555.  
 
Housing units occupied by Central American immigrants 
Country of origin 2000 2012 Increase %
El Slavador 278,120 476,470 71
Guatemala 158,000 283,410 79
Honduras 89,915 182,871 103
Nicaragua 72,615 96,804 33
Total 598,650 1039,555 74  
Source: US Census Bureau 
 
When my experienced guides, Kelvin Orellana and Lito Melgar, took me to hardware 
stores in the heart of Washington DC and in several counties of Maryland and Virginia, the sheer 
number of Central American customers showed me firsthand how involved they are in building 
and maintaining houses. New companies are always being born, like Transfiguration Services Inc., 
dedicated to reglazing bathtubs and sinks and refinishing cabinets, kitchen countertops, tile walls, 
and floors of all kinds. For Central American immigrants, construction continues to be a dynamic 
industry, and their demand for rental units is a major stimulus. The statistics of the U.S. Census 
Bureau reveal that 95% of the dwellings occupied by Central Americans are owned or rented by 
migrants. We can conjecture that the impact of the financial crisis would have been much greater 
if it had not been for the migration of Latinos to the U.S. The upheavals that took place in U.S. 
cities during the 1960s, as Harvey explains, were the result of confining minorities to cities and 
denying them access to the prosperity and consumerism of suburbanites.1 What is taking place 
now is a silent upheaval, the kind Bayat describes, as the presence of immigrants in the consuming 
sector acquires more weight and visibility. 
It is difficult to calculate the economic dimensions of what Central Americans consume in 
the sectors of food and housing, but they are in any case impressive. The figure provided by Pollo 
Campero can give us an idea of how much value Central American immigrants add to the food 
market in the cities and counties where they have significant presence. The figures for housing 
expenses can also help us to get an idea of that sector’s importance. Calculations must take into 
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account the fact that in 2010-2011 undocumented consumers made up 55% of all Latino 
immigrants (20,849,710) and 63% of all Central American immigrants (2,481,927).1 This high 
percentage of undocumented persons has had political consequences since those cannot vote at 
the ballot box vote instead with their feet and their wallets. In the following sections we will see 
more clearly how consuming can be politicized when the quiet encroachment of a multitude 
functions as an effective boycott. 
 
The boycott of consumer-voters: Pedro Urdemales in Prince William County 
Prince William County, Virginia, is the seventh richest county in the United States.2 In 2014 it had 
43,850 inhabitants of Central American origin, including 36,746 Salvadorans, 5,962 Hondurans, 
5,240 Guatemalans, and 1,401 Nicaraguans. The Salvadorans nearly doubled the number of 
Mexicans, of whom there were 18,788. Between the census of 2000 and that of 2010 the number 
of Central Americans had increased from 7,400 to 32,334. In 2014 Central Americans made up 8% 
of the county’s total population, 38% of its foreign-born population, and 71% of its Latino 
immigrant population. Thus, being a Latino immigrant in Prince William County meant mainly 
being a Central American. There was a short period, however, when that growing presence of 
Central Americans was interrupted and even reversed. With the same kind of quiet encroachment 
they had used in coming north, the immigrants began to withdraw from the county in reaction to 
changes in immigration policies that were intent on expanding the banopticon within the national 
borders.  
The city of Manassas finds itself within that zone. Between 2000 and 2010 it has seen the 
number of Central Americans grow from 1,410 to 5,529, some 15% of the population. Of these, 
about 70% were Salvadorans, numbering 3,870 and making up 10% of the city’s population. One 
of the Salvadorans was Fredy Melgar, 58, a former guerrilla who had migrated to the U.S. for a 
second time, after returning to his homeland voluntarily for what he thought would be a 
permanent repatriation. It was Fredy who made me aware of how thoroughly the banopticon 
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tactics had penetrated into the country: “When I arrived in 2004, Manassas was a quiet place. 
Things started to turn ugly in 2006 when new laws required the police to cooperate with migration 
authorities. When the police saw small groups walking down the street, they stopped them and 
asked them for their papers. If they didn’t have documents, they were carried off to jail. At that 
time, when you went to jail, you passed by a booth, and immigration was right there. So all we had 
to do was walk down the street, and the police would stop us and ask us for our papers. And since 
we didn’t have any, we were sunk. ‘Come along,’ they would tell us, ‘now you have to deal with 
immigration.’ At night they would go to apartments where there were a lot of migrants, ask for 
papers, and take them away. There were even raids. But that wasn’t happening in other parts of 
Virginia, which is a big place. Fairfax is next to Manassas; a river divides them. Whenever the 
Manassas police arrived, we’d swim across the river and then we were in Fairfax, where the police 
don’t bother people. They just looked at us and didn’t say anything—even when we were drinking. 
The only time they were strict was when we left litter behind. When the Mannasas police were 
gone, we swam back over.” 
Fredy Melgar was referring to the 2007 ordinance approved by the Prince William County 
authorities. In December 2006 the Board of County Supervisors asked for an assessment to be 
made of the cost of county services to illegal immigrants. One month later county supervisor John 
Stirrup had drafted a proposed law which would prevent undocumented persons from having 
access to those services. In July 2007 the county board unanimously passed resolution 07-609, 
which directed the police to inquire about the immigration status of anyone detained for violating 
a state law or county ordinance, including a traffic violation, if there was probable cause to believe 
that the person was violating federal immigration law. The ordinance also directed the police to 
enter into an agreement with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and it required county 
staff to determine legal grounds for restricting illegal immigrants from receiving county-provided 
public benefits and services. In October 2007 the Board of County Supervisors, thinking these 
measures insufficient, passed Resolution 07-894, which authorized 1) the creation of a Criminal 
Alien Unit within the police department, 2) directed staff to implement policies consistent with 
state and county law to prevent business licenses from being issued to persons who cannot 
demonstrate legal status, and 3) further directed staff to develop policies for restricting persons 
who cannot demonstrate legal status from receiving certain county services. 
These directives were only two of the many local reactions to the failure of comprehensive 
immigration reform and in particular to the failure of Republican representative James 
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Sensenbrenner’s initiative (HR 4437) in 2006.1 They were a local echo of the overlapping of 
immigration policies with penal legislation. The federal government had already begun to move in 
that direction before it was clear that comprehensive immigration reform would fail. In November 
2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced a plan called Secure Border 
Initiative, aimed at strengthening the implementation of migration policies to reduce “illegal” 
migration. In April 2006, the DHS revealed a previously unknown feature of the plan: ICE would 
expand its operations to capture all undocumented workers and individuals who might have 
violated immigration laws, including refugees, migrants with permanent legal residency, and those 
who, though permitted to reside in the United States, might have been accused of any of the 
offenses detailed in an extensive list, including non-violent robbery, theft, drug consumption or 
trafficking, counterfeiting, receiving stolen property, perjury, fraud, deceit, or tax evasion. Any of 
these crimes would be sufficient cause for detention and deportation under the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act and the Illegal immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 
two laws that were passed in 1996 but were being fully implemented only ten years later. Legal 
residents were deprived of the hearings to which they could previously turn.  And ICE began to use 
the category of “immigration fugitives”—echoing the category of “fugitive slaves” and recalling the 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850—to refer to those who were given a deportation order but refused to 
obey it. These federal dispositions would remain ineffective without enforcement by a local 
authority, but the ordinances of Prince William county, by merging penal and immigration 
legislation, provided a solid alliance between the police and the DHS that guaranteed 
enforcement. Armando Navarro, an expert in immigration studies, described this policy as another 
of the “efforts to create ‘ethnic cleansing’ legislation” in a number of counties and cities in the “old 
South.”2 
At his moment of triumph in July 2007, John Stirrup, the supervisor of the Gainesville 
district and intellectual author of the resolutions, declared to the media: "Citizens will no longer 
accept that our hands are tied and that responsibility lies with the federal government."3 And in 
another interview he was even more explicit: “I do believe that this does send a strong message to 
those who promote and profit from illegal immigration that Prince William County is no longer 
friendly terrain. This is probably a place we do not want to send our, quote, unquote, ‘our clients’ 
anymore to take advantage of the public services there and the system and the, obviously, what 
                                            
1 Lorentzen, 2014, p.XIV. 
2 Navarro, 2009, p.295. 
3 Miroff, 2007.  
  
243 
they perceived as a friendly atmosphere. And I think that the welcome sign or the welcome mat 
has been pulled in for future illegal aliens to move to the county.”1 Stirrup’s words were music to 
the ears of the members of “Help Save Manassas,” a belligerent association that lobbied against 
immigrants and created a polarized atmosphere. This association, which belonged to a coalition of 
seven anti-immigrant groups called “Save the Old Dominion,” had a legislative committee that 
worked with a member of the Prince William County Board of Supervisors.2 This battle in 
Manassas was won by a sort of refurbished Confederate Army as membership in Help Save 
Mannasas grew from 690 to 1453, “making it by far the largest anti-illegal-immigration group in 
the Washington area.”3 
Help Save Manassas complained of the deterioration in county services because of excess 
demand: there was too much trash in the streets, too many children in the schools, and too much 
time waiting to be treated in the hospitals. Their complaint had some basis: a study indicated that 
the county’s population had doubled between 1980 and 2006. The real cause for alarm, however, 
was that in that same period the number of immigrants had increased fourteen-fold.4 During just 
the six years from 2000 to 2006 the Latino population had tripled. The number of Central 
Americans had increased fivefold; they were attracted by the relatively favorable housing costs, 
which were increasing but were still lower than in northern Virginia. The housing boom 
decentralized the demand for labor regionally because the larger population increased demand in 
the service sector. As a result, the number of jobs in the county grew from 55,000 in 1990 to 
104,000 in 2006. Little by little Central Americans, and Latinos more generally, began to arrive, 
first as workers and soon thereafter as residents, assisted by housing loans.5 Some statistical data 
reveal the evident change in the type of population to be seen on the streets: in the 1980s the 
residents of Prince William County were predominantly non-immigrant whites, but in the period 
2000-2006 the percentage of native whites decreased ten points (from 88% to 78%) while Latino 
increased from 10% to 20% of the population. The prior residents associated the increased Latino 
presence with a decline in the prices of their properties,6 even though the decline was generalized 
and was caused by the bursting of the housing bubble. Politicians reacted, fearing that the 
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increasing Latino coloration of the streets might be an indication that ballot boxes would also 
change in color from Republican red to Democrat blue. Rozell maintains that “in Prince William 
County, anti-immigrant backlashes have resulted in many of the nation’s harshest policies toward 
illegal immigrants. Yet the growth in the Latino population in Prince William County and other 
areas of the state portends some significant shifts in the future for Virginia politics, perhaps 
pushing the state another step away from its former status as a Republican ‘red’ state.”1 
The immigrants reacted quickly. Fredy Melgar related to me the story of non-collective 
actor who became the protagonist of collective political action through various individual actions: 
“In Manassas things were going from bad to worse for me. Then I remembered the story about 
Pedro Urdemales [Mischief-maker]. Pedro and Quevedo were brothers, but Quevedo was worse 
than Pedro for creating mischief. One day they set out in hopes of finding fortune. They talked 
together as they walked along until they come to a crossroad. Pedro said, ‘Dear brother, we have 
to make a decision. Whatever happens, we have to deal with life. Let’s see how things go for us. 
We can’t continue on together because it’s dangerous. I’ll take this road, and you take the other 
one.’ Pedro went one way and came to a cattle ranch. He asked for work, and they gave it to him, 
but to get to where the cattle were he had had to pass through a lot of barriers because the lord 
of that ranch was the king. In order to get through he dressed as a woman, and since he was so 
pretty, they let him pass. … The story is a long one, but what I want to tell you is that I told this 
story to Lito, and I told him that Quevedo and Pedro Urdemales had agreed to meet again three 
years later, at that same crossroad where they had separated. So they met up again at the 
crossroad and so continued with their lives. That’s what I was telling Lito. ‘That’s the same thing 
that’s happening to us today,’ I told him. So this is what we’re going to do: you go live in 
Warrenton because the situation here is miserable. If the immigration police come here, in any 
case … well, if I have to go back to El Salvador, then you stay here. That was how we got 
separated. We got divided from one another because of the law itself. I stayed there, and he went 
to the house in Warrenton that a niece of mine had bought. Warrenton is a ways off, but 
Manassas is packed with Latinos.”  
The strategy devised by Fredy worked, and it was used by many other Latinos as well. 
Fredy was able to describe the strategy by relating it to a folk tale which featured the Renaissance 
poet Quevedo and a fictional character, Pedro Urdemales. It is a classic story about the resistance 
of underdogs, and it has traveled through time and space: from Renaissance Spain it crossed the 
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Atlantic and is being reenacted in 21st-century America. Urdemales is the protagonist in one of the 
comedies of Miguel de Cervantes, who has him traveling to America and returning to Spain, 
stealing alms from priests, and defrauding his masters. Cervantes underscores the cleverness and 
eloquence of Urdemales: he could “enter into difficult situations and, without fear of discredit, 
extract himself by using his tongue with honor, delight, and advantage.”1 The feats by which 
Urdemales confounded the bosses and overseers of the great estates have been recounted in 
every part of Central America. When I was helping with the National Literacy Campaign in 
Nicaragua in 1980, I heard tales of Pedro’s adventures from the peasant farmers in Chontales. 
They usually began with the misfortunes of his brother Juan Dundo [Dummy John], who was easy 
prey for the rapacious greed of unscrupulous bosses. The climax of the stories came with the 
intervention of Pedro Urdemales, who with great ingenuity and eloquence would turn the 
situation completely around so that underdogs triumphed and the oppressors were completely 
devastated. The Urdemales tales belong to those traditions which, according to Thompson, “are 
perpetuated in large part through oral transmission and which include a larger repertory of 
anecdotes and narrative examples.”2 In the present case, it takes the form of a tradition that is 
defying established power; it constitutes resistance on the level of infrapolitics, but it has 
consequences for politics in the traditional sense. Urdemales is a hero in the resistance struggle 
being waged by the dominated. He always gets the better of the boss, even though the boss has 
all the means necessary to crush him. In 2006 the villainous boss was the “migra” and the 
ordinances of Prince William County. 
Fredy was adopting a tradition of resistance much like the ones described by Bajtin. His 
aim was to foil the authorities, or rather, since he and Lito had already foiled them by entering the 
country illegally, his strategy was designed to avoid the authorities’ sanctions and to survive 
unscathed. By drawing on folklore Freddy was able to discern the similarity between the 
predicament in which he and Lito found themselves and the time when Pedro Urdemales and 
Quevedo came to the crossroad of life, expressed as a parting of ways. In this way he is able to 
structure reality, as Lakoff would say, within a coherent conceptual framework with which he is 
quite familiar. By giving new significance to an old story he is able to find a solution to his 
problem.3 In this particular case the tradition helps him to see his disobedience as reasonable and 
to insert it within a moral context that makes it plausible; after all, his strategy is simply the 
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modern equivalent of the picaresque ingenunity of the irreverent and disobedient Urdemales. 
Fredy’s strategy, expressed in terms of popular wisdom, is a form of struggle that emerges from a 
folkloric way of understanding the problem, and it allows him to come up with a solution that has 
the support of tradition. The strategy of Lito and Fredy was adopted by thousands of Latinos, as 
we can see in the following table. 
 
Population in Prince William County by type 
2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2010 2000 to 2010 2006 to 2008
Total 280,813 346,790 357,503 360,411 364,734 402,002 121,189 7,231
Natives 248,627 279,674 279,132 283,996 291,728 316,090 67,463 12,596
Immigrants 32,186 67,116 78,371 76,415 73,006 85,912 53,726 -5,365
Born in Latin America 15,008 39,307 42,216 41,472 37,153 45,278 30,270 -5,063
Born in Central America 7,400 23,345 25,346 23,421 19,938 32,334 24,934 -5,408  
Source: US Census Bureau1 
 
Between 2006 and 2008 the total population of Prince William County, which had been 
increasing by about 12,000 inhabitants a year, grew by only 7,231 despite an increase of 12,596 in 
the native population. The Central Americans, the group with the greatest proportion of 
undocumented persons, were the principal reason for the decline. A simple look at the U.S. Census 
Bureau statistics makes the lopsided impact of immigration policies clear. Similar information can 
be found in a three-year study (2006-09) done by the Prince William County Police Department 
and the University of Virginia. The conclusion of the study, which cost $385,0002 was that “the net 
decrease in illegals could plausibly be anywhere between 3,000 and 6,000 persons.”3 
The directives of Prince William County were only part of a long list of xenophobic actions 
by local governments, and their calamitous effects on the economies under their jurisdiction soon 
made themselves felt. In 2007 Oklahoma passed H1804, which prompted about 90,000 
undocumented migrants to leave the state and caused a loss of about $1.9 billion to the state’s 
economy. In 2006 Georgia passed S529, which caused a shortage of workers in the agriculture and 
hospitality sectors.4 Phil Gordon, who since 2004 has been mayor of Phoenix, the capital and the 
largest city of Arizona, told CNN that the boycotts against Arizona’s SB1070 had cost the state 
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more the $150 million just in the first ten days of May.1 Some of the inhabitants of Prince William 
County remember the damage caused to the local economy by the anti-immigrant ordinance and 
the consequent flight of undocumented persons.2 The Washington Post reported that “Latino 
shops are on the brink of bankruptcy, church groups are hemorrhaging members, neighborhoods 
are dotted with for-sale signs, and once busy strip malls have been transformed into ghost 
towns.”3 According to Aviva Chomsky, “in Prince William County, Virginia, in 2007 a local 
ordinance required police to stop and question anyone they suspected of being undocumented. 
Although the ordinance was eventually repealed, the acrimonious anti-immigrant mobilization 
surrounding it, as well as fear of its implementation, caused many immigrants to leave. As 
businesses closed, schools and neighborhoods emptied, and the housing market collapsed, white 
Americans became more dubious about the supposed benefits of expelling the undocumented.”4 
The consequences of the ordinance are as controversial as the ordinance itself: for groups like 
Help Save Mannasas and for people like Stirrup, the statistics says that the policy was successful; 
for the immigrants, their allies, and business owners (whose profit motives were impugned by 
Stirrup), the policy was a disaster. But there is no doubt that the immigrants’ practice of the “art of 
absence” brought about a change in policies: in April 2008 the Board of County Supervisors 
unanimously passed resolution 08-500, which prohibited police from inquiring into the 
immigration status of a person unless the person was arrested. Apart from the foreseeable costs, 
just the installation of video cameras to protect officers against accusations of racial profiling must 
have cost three million dollars.5  
Bayat maintains that “the massive public demonstration of illegal migrants in Los Angeles 
on March 26, 2006, to demand a legislation to protect them represents perhaps a more striking 
potential of episodic collective protest of the otherwise atomized agents of non-movements. Of 
course it is always possible that the subjects may, instead of engaging in immediate confrontation, 
rationally choose to resort to the ‘war of attrition’—a temporary compliance in times of constraint 
while carrying on with encroachments when the right time arrives.”6 That “war of attrition” 
functioned as a formal boycott (an act of confrontational disobedience) whose conditions of 
possibility were consumer power and diversity of jurisdictions. In 1997 Gorz pointed out that “the 
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front of the conflict extends everywhere, and the radicalization of the conflict in the cultural 
sphere (education, formation, city, leisure, lifestyle) is the condition for its radicalization in the 
sphere of work. Therefore, to be effective, unionization can no longer be centered exclusively on 
the workplace or be concerned mainly with defending workers who have stable employment.”1 
The struggle for inclusion was carried out on the terrain of consumption, using purchasing power 
as a coercive mechanism for neutralizing the rival, as Bobbio would say, to the point not only of 
making it impossible for him to attain his objective but of forcing him to beat a retreat. Today 
Prince William County has more Central Americans and more undocumented inhabitants that it 
had in 2006. The table above shows that the number of Central Americans increased in 2010, 
reaching a total of 32,334. Their return to the county was followed by an increase in housing 
prices.2 Lito returned to Manassas, where he is currently living. He is married to a U.S. citizen of 
Salvadoran origin, and after a torturous journey through the entrails of bureaucracy, he has gained 
permanent residence and is on the way to becoming a citizen. 
What happened in Prince William County (the anti-immigration policies, the flight of the 
immigrants, the economic decline, the change of policies, and the return of the immigrants) was 
an exercise in economic citizenship, a concept which Sassen coined to refer to the power of 
businesses, corporations, and financial markets,3 but which I apply to the broader power exercised 
by workers and consumers. Using Tiebout’s hypothesis about local communities competing with 
each other “to be able to satisfy [consumers] in the same sense that a private goods market 
does,”4 Stiglitz maintains that “communities that provide the services individuals like and provide 
them efficiently will experience an influx of individuals; communities that fail to do so will 
experience an outflux. Such migration (with its consequent effect on property values) provides 
essentially the same kind of signal to city managers that the market provides to a firm’s managers 
(a firm that fails to provide a commodity individuals like will find its sales declining; a firm that 
succeeds will find its sales increasing). Politicians, sometimes under pressure from the electorate, 
respond to these signals in much the same way as a firm’s managers respond to market signals.”5 
The politicians of Prince William County had to respond to the pressure of the economic 
electorate, made up largely of undocumented persons. In this case the immigrants voted with 
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their feet, demanding more considerate treatment of the undocumented. That is why it makes 
sense to talk about “economic citizenship.” By virtue of their position in the market and their 
ability to vote with their feet, the immigrants changed the policies of Prince William County. 
Tiebout knew that his hypothesis was founded on assumptions that exist in reality only in 
a limited, imperfect way: “Consumer-voters do not have perfect knowledge and set preferences, 
nor are they perfectly mobile.”1 And he adds: “There has been very little empirical study of the 
motivations of people in choosing a community.”2 But here we are dealing with a case in which it 
was easy for the consumer-voters to gather the information they needed to make a decision: 
every day the immigration police were sending out clear and distinct signals. The immigrants 
chose to move to less dangerous zones. They voted to move to the places where the local 
politicians offered them the product they wanted: citizenship in the making. Their motivation was 
clear. They were able to maintain their position by means of a boycott—an instrument of civil 
disobedience—which resembled the “car pools” which the African Americans in Montgomery 
County used to boycott public transportation until segregationist policies were changed. The 
Montgomery Bus boycott that Martin Luther King led in 1955 to oppose the policy of racial 
segregation on the public transport system enjoyed support at the national level, and it received 
financial support for the network of car pools that supplied transport services at a cost of $200 a 
day. Churches in New York, Philadelphia, Mobile, Tuscaloosa, Tuskegee, and other localities 
organized collections to support the boycott.3 In the present case of the undocumented Central 
Americans, however, the boycott was not centrally planned, nor was there any financial support 
from funds collected around the country. The “car pools” used by the undocumented were in 
effect the counties that did not enforce policies of exclusion. The protesters did not need 
subsidies: their family networks and their performative civil disobedience covered the costs. Their 
boycott was the work of a non-collective actor: it was carried out by thousands of Pedro 
Urdemales, each of whom designed a strategy, either independently or together with friends or 
close relatives. Despite the lack of close coordination, their diverse actions had all the 
effectiveness of a well organized group that was carrying out carefully laid plans.  
Following Dworkin’s terminology, we can say that the exodus of the undocumented was a 
strategy that was partly persuasive and partly non-persuasive. It forced the Prince William County 
authorities to rescind their anti-immigration measures, but it also sent a very persuasive message 
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to other immigrants and to other municipal authorities, demonstrating to the former the great 
extent of their power and warning the latter about the consequences of adopting measures like 
those of Manassas. What happened in Prince William County was a public exercise of dissent. It 
was quiet encroachment that created a lethal economic vacuum and caused the revenues of the 
local government to drop sharply, thus reducing its ability to govern well. Arendt argued that the 
tacit assent that an individual gives to a set of rules can be called voluntary if there is also the right 
to dissent. By their practice of dissent, the immigrants lent substance to Arendt’s contention that 
the social contract between the individual and the society may not be a mere fiction when both 
the mobile subject and the welcoming community renew it through internal migration.1 In Prince 
William County the local government presumed to withdraw the welcome mat that had been 
extended by part of the society, and the undocumented responded by withdrawing their vital 
presence.  
The market is a cultural route that Latinos will continue to travel. An example from the 
past is the boycott against James Sensenbrenner, great-grandson of the creator of Kotex sanitary 
napkins, heir of Kimberly Clark, Republican representative for the state of Wisconsin since 1978, 
and author of an anti-immigrant bill that caused controversy and fury in 2006.2 The Latino 
immigrants called for a boycott against Kimberly Clark, which markets such brands as Little 
Swimmers, Kleenex, Scott, Huggies, Pull-Ups, Kotex Poise, Viva, Cottonelle, and Depend. That 
organized boycott was not effective. What was effective was the boycott of Prince William County 
because the necessary conditions existed there: the jurisdictional diversity that made it possible 
for the immigrants to use other counties as “car pools” where they could exercise their purchasing 
power. But there was also the pressure of the activists. While the immigrants practiced the art of 
absence, groups of activists issued statements and won favorable coverage in the media. They 
held several demonstrations with T-shirts reading, "Not with my taxes. Not in my name", "Rescind 
the resolution", "Immigrants are part of our community", and "Immigrants are workers."3 Thanks 
to the combination of explicit politics and the infrapolitics of the market boycott, the exclusionary 
policies were eliminated. The art of presence in the market had a decisive effect in bringing about 
the change of policy. But it was not only the local politicians who took part in this affair. When 
Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama visited Manassas on 3 November 2008, he was 
attracted by the symbolism of the place (two great battles against slavery had been waged there), 
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but he no doubt also realized that Prince William County was an anti-immigrant battlefield. He 
“was well aware that he spoke on symbolic ground, hallowed by an ancient war yet incompletely 
redeemed from the legacy of slavery.”1 In his discourse he alluded to the problem only indirectly: 
“Black, white, Hispanic, native American, Asian, Democrats and Republicans, young and old, rich 
and poor, gay and straight, disabled and not disabled, all of us have something to contribute.”2 But 
his campaign had sent clear messages about his commitment to immigration reform. He was in 
the right place at the right time, and he defeated the GOP in a place that took pride in being one of 
the last Republican strongholds in northern Virginia: “Virginia’s voters, including the good 
burghers of Prince William, gave Barack Obama a 52.7 per cent victory in the state, and a 57.6 per 
cent margin in the county—a whopping 12-point improvement over 2004.”3 From 1948 until then, 
Lyndon Johnson had been the only Democratic candidate to gain an electoral victory in that area. 
According to Davis, Obama’s victory both in Virginia and in North Carolina was based on an 
alliance between African Americans and white professionals, reinforced by immigrants and 
university students.4 Latinos also spoke through the ballot box, making their demographic weight 
felt there as well. Their interests coincided with a campaign that presented the democrats as “the 
party of suburban pain as well as ethnic diversity.”5 
 
Consumption as political action 
Bauman has a purely negative view of the role of consumption as a means for social integration: 
“It is ultimately for that reason that the passing of a consumer test is a nonnegotiable condition of 
admission to a society that has been reshaped in the likeness of the marketplace. Passing that test 
is the non-contractual precondition of all the contractual relations that weave and are woven into 
the web of relationships called the ‘society of consumers’. It is that precondition, with no 
exception allowed and no refusal tolerated, that welds the aggregate of seller/buyer transactions 
into an imagined totality; or which, more exactly, allows that aggregate to be experienced as a 
totality called ‘society’ – an entity to which the capacity of ‘making demands’ and of coercing 
actors to obey them can be ascribed – enabling the status of the ‘social fact’ in the Durkheimian 
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sense to be imputed.”1 I agree with him on one point: commercial relations do not exhaust social 
reality. They cannot be presented as the “total social facts” of Durkheim and Mauss. But neither 
can it be denied that they are part of the materials and mechanisms that are available to both 
dominators and dominated for the exercise of power. They are the materials that history has 
placed at the disposition of the dominated so that they can construct their history. To neglect the 
political aspect of consumption and of the role of the dominated as consumers is to squander a 
tremendously rich political realm. What is more, it means yielding to a pre-Marxist interpretation 
of politics, one that assumes that politics exists mainly in some other sphere, one that is different 
from material production and access to what is produced. It basically negates the protagonism of 
the material conditions of life, and in this case of the exchange, the acquisition, the possession, 
and the use of the means of life. 
The world of consuming is the material which is readily available to immigrants and opens 
up for them the way to political citizenship. Each concept and statement in the above quote from 
Bauman speaks of opportunity for the migrants. The immigrants pass the consumer test, which is a 
test they did not seek out but which they in part created since they generate demand for the very 
products that pave the way to social acceptance. Or perhaps we should say that, in a society 
modeled in the image and likeness of the market, their act of consuming significes that they are 
commercially and therefore socially acceptable. Since their lack of documentation places them 
outside the American social contract, they have recourse to the non-contractual preconditions in 
their role as consumers. They enter the hall of political citizenship through the door of 
consumption, as became evident in the impact that naturalized Latinos had in the election of 
Obama. History is full of examples of non-political mechanisms that open the doors of political 
citizenry to outsiders. At the height of the Know Nothing movement, the strong support of the 
Irish for the Democrats was rewarded when the politicians granted market licenses to foreign 
merchants in 1843, thus breaking the business monopoly held by the native-born and setting the 
groundwork for the economic empowerment of the social base of the Democratic Party.2 
Just as in those days commercial licenses were a vital concern, what proves to be 
controversial these days is the granting of driver’s licenses or licenses for companies that work in 
construction or offer services, precisely because these licenses are the bureaucratic authorizations 
that merge the world of work and consuming with the realm of politics. As documents that 
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concede much more than what is bureaucratically established, the licenses are the keys to 
inclusion. The most obvious reason why driver’s licenses are so important is that in many areas 
public transportation is so bad that a vehicle and a license to drive it are essential.1 One study 
about the efforts of immigrants to get driver’s licenses in Tennessee made it clear that the license 
is closely linked to the right to move freely and to have personal identification, so that the “current 
campaigns for access to the driver’s license are one part of a pre-legal, pre-institutional process 
that is helping to incubate novel rights claims appropriate for the new economy.”2 The license is 
not a substitute for the Green Card, but it is another step forward in the “already but not yet.” The 
lack of a driver’s license is usually an indication of irregular migratory status.3 The converse also 
applies: possessing a license is an indication of legal residence. Having a license means in a very 
real way being documented. In fact, many Dominicans enter the United States pretending to be 
Puerto Ricans: since no passport or visa is required for travel between the island and the United 
States, a Puerto Rican driver’s license is sufficient.4 That is why the topic of driver’s licenses has 
caused such great controversy and division in different states of the union. Some states, like North 
Carolina, have come up with compromise solutions that have been criticized, such as giving 
unauthorized immigrants special driver’s licenses that are marked “no lawful status.”5 In 
Tennessee the struggle to get driver’s licenses was successful because “the Latino population had 
reached sufficient critical mass to create free spaces for communication and planning—in places 
like Latino groceries, Hispanic church services, scattered radio stations and small newspapers 
around the state.”6 As a result, “agricultural employers, the Nashville Chamber of Commerce and 
the police chiefs of several major cities were on our side, in addition to more accustomed allies 
like church groups, service providers, civil rights organizations, labor unions and social justice 
groups.”7 But what most helps migrants is their determination to act as if they were already 
citizens, for that is what strengthens the processes of resistance.8  
Consumer society supersedes political society and imposes its own priorities. This facet of 
liquid modernity has its shadowy aspects, as Bauman has often pointed out, but it sets up a force 
field within which migrants can use the market as a tool for attaining political citizenship. In fact, 
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Latino absenteeism in elections may indicate, among other things, that voting is not among their 
highest aspirations. They may be making a political error, but it may also mean that they prefer to 
fight their battles, as Gorz observes, on firmer ground that better known to them; they want to 
play in a game in which they are more skilled. In this arena the immigrants appear more skilled 
because they are playing on a field that allows them more control: they create demand that only 
migrant labor can satisfy. They generate both demand and supply, which mutually fuel and 
legitimize one another: they process the food they consume, they rehab the houses they live in, 
they work in the restaurants they patronize, they stitch together the T-shirts they wear, they 
manage the soccer fields they play on …  Their flow into cities and counties increases the demand 
for housing, but immediately they also supply the labor to build more houses; they increase the 
demand for public services, but they also pay taxes that cover the costs. The Latin immigrants are 
creators of a market—that of nostalgia—which only they can sustain and on which the economic 
growth of entire counties depends. The transnational firms, taking note of this economic muscle, 
flock to the massive gatherings of Central Americans with their gaudy stands: S&W Beans, 
Western Union, Delta, Telscape, IDT, Curacao, Goya, Coleman, and Tigo, to name just a few. The 
Latin immigrants work in those firms and/or consume their products. 
Being a consumer does not mean becoming a citizen, as Bauman stresses quite rightly, but 
being a unauthorized consumer broadens the realm of dissent into a new scenario. There is 
currently open dissent in the Congress, where for more than a decade the Republicans and 
Democrats have been unable to reconcile their differences about what immigration reform should 
look like. The immigrants carry this discussion onto the terrain of consuming: without being legally 
admitted, they continue to live in a country whose market has already incorporated them and 
whose political system and political class are highly sensitive to their vote as consumers. Although 
officially they should not be present at all, they are actively present in the supermarket, in the 
music industry, in the industries that produce for the market of nostalgia, and in countless other 
places. To penetrate further into the meaning of all this, I went back to the concept of “economic 
citizenship” that Sassen uses to refer to the power of businesses, corporations, and financial 
markets.1 By extending its meaning to include the sector of workers/consumers, I argued that 
economic citizenship can also be exercised by those whom Tiebout calls “consumer-voters” but 
who for the same reasons are also producer-voters or, more generally, worker-voters. If the global 
citizenship of businesses is based on their economic role, then it is also possible to say that the 
                                            
1 Sassen, 1995, pp.XIII-XIV and pp.8-9. 
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ways in which the dominated use their economic power—the heft of their art of presence and 
their weight in the market—is economic citizenship, and this is especially true if in their exercise of 
that power they achieve a better position on the political playing field. This economic citizenship 
reveals its facet of civil disobedience in the constructive action of ordinary consuming: the 
immigrant acquires goods in the same way any citizen does. Economic citizenship was exercised as 
confrontative action when the non-movement of the undocumented used their tactic of quiet 
encroachment—which was actually noisy flight—to twist the arms of those imposing anti-
immigrant policies in a very conservative Virginia county. The boycott was carried out without 
meetings, without flyers, without barricades, without shouting in the streets… Voting with wallets 
is a form of suffrage that has been practiced at will ever since boycotts were invented. 
The undocumented made their power prevail in the areas of consumption and production. 
They made use of a force similar to the one used by the elites in C. Wright Mills’s account, but they 
did so in a more authentically political way. As part of the anonymous mass, they have no special 
privileges which allow them just to knock on the door and communicate informally with the big-
time politicians. Nor are they given to palace intrigues that are concocted behind closed doors and 
kept from public scrutiny, thus completely evading politics as understood by Arendt. The 
undocumented exert their force on what Marx considered the proper terrain of politics, the 
terrain where the means for sustaining life are produced and exchanged, but their influence 
reaches party politics also in indirect ways: they provoke dissent—which is for Ranciére the core of 
politics—by means of their perlocutionary effect on the mass media, the NGOs, the churches, and 
the artists who perform in concerts supporting amnesty for immigrants, massive documentation, 
and a stop to deportations. Although the market and the lever of consumption seem to be the 
silent guests in politics, they are also the sphere in which the elites assert and enjoy their power. 
Central Americans do likewise, wielding their consumer power as a tool for embedding themselves 
in the marketplace. Immigrants have shown that, for the exercise of parrhesia, the market is a 
platform that is as effective as the public square—or perhaps more so—and certainly more 
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3. Parrhesia of the disobedient: exercising global citizenry in the church, taking 
over public spaces and publicizing Dreamers in the communications media  
 
In this section I present three examples where the undocumented practice civil disobedience and 
exercise parrhesia in the most explicit way.  They are environments (the church, the street, the 
media/partisan politics) where they express themselves and build actors (church goers, 
artists/demonstrators, Dreamers). These actors are not necessarily ruled by the compulsion for 
material needs, like in the two previous chapters, but resort to countertheatre to power, a sense 
of humor and other resources of the subjugated. The section is built in a way that it maintains a 
certain symmetry and complementarity with the next chapter: the parrhesia of the undocumented 
in confessional spaces has its counterpart in the global citizenry that ecclesial groups are 
promoting, the parrhesia in public spaces is possible in a context of state heterogeneity, and the 
Dreamers´movement, with its multiple exercise of parrhesia, is a sign of the power of the 
organizations of the immigrants. 
3.1 Parrhesia and global citizenry in the churches 
 
The support that the immigrants find in the churches for integrating into US society, and being 
confirmed in their liminal citizenship, or in other words in their performative civil disobedience, 
adopts very different forms: shelters along the way, refuges to avoid deportation, places to meet 
and organize as groups of undocumented, learning English, lobbying to get pro-immigration 
policies, and lawsuits against state institutions that violate human rights, among many other forms 
of daily and episodic support. The details of some of this support and its significance will be 
developed more fully in the next chapter. Here I will focus on the forms in which the 
undocumented exercise parrhesia in virtue of their participation as members of ecclesial 
communities. Parrhesia is a form of civil disobedience in itself: it is the practice of free speech on 
the part of those who, it is not only assumed do not have that right, but should not even be there 
without saying a word. At the heart of this practice is an essential concept that I just mentioned: 
confessional groups constitute ecclesial communities, and in that sense, fulfill some of the 
functions that are the responsibility of the national community.  That is why Walzer identifies 
religious groups as one of the principal entities for the practice of civil disobedience. Their values 
and rules can oppose the values of the State, and their members can prioritize between the two 
sets of values and rules, moving towards those of the ecclesial group. 
  
257 
The minimalist version of this daily practice means that that faithful of a church are not 
asked about their legal migratory status. The ecclesial communities grant, as a minimum, the right 
to stay and integrate themselves, which the State, that governs the national community, has 
denied them. The religious Green Card – maybe I should say naturalization – is within reach of all 
immigrants.  These confessional communities are a segment of the national community that, by 
reason of their practices, has assimilated them and considers them members with full rights. The 
Baptist churches ask their members that they share a creed and a series of rituals, it does not 
matter whether they are Vietnamese or Salvadorans, whether they are citizens or do not have 
papers. The churches practice a type of global citizenship, that obviously has limits, but they do 
not coincide with the political divisions of nation-states, even though sometimes they may take 
them as reference points, like in the case of the dioceses of the Catholic Church. The faithful tend 
to act in accordance with this principle of global citizenship, even though not all may be very 
proactive. 
The maximalist version of this principle means that the undocumented assume a major 
role in the ecclesial community, and that their practices of parrhesia get multipied from there. I 
want to refer to those practices in this chapter, offering examples that I experienced during my 
field work. I am focusing on those examples under the supposition that the passive attendence at 
worship, or the reception of “old” bread (from the previous day), that some churches give out in 
their backyards, do not have the same level of inclusion and parrhesia, as the assumption of posts, 
coordination of groups, representation of the ecclesial institutions in important events, etc. 
Lito Melgar was on the point of becoming a member of a Catholic religious congregation. 
It is a very small congregation, whose only community in the United States is in Virginia. While he 
was in the vocational process, Lito met the woman who is now his spouse and changed his mind. 
But he continues participating in the activities of the congregation. In the youth groups that that 
congregations serves, Lito met his wife, the godgather of his children, a religious who has been like 
a father to him, his work colleagues and even the owners of the business where he works, two of 
whom are members of the congregation. Work, religious practice, affective life and friendships 
have been tightly interwoven in the life of Lito in the United States, and that congregation has 
functioned as a node of connections.  In his ecclesial practice Lito has matured and has become a 
leader. Now he gives speeches, directs retreats and has a Sunday radio program. Compared with 
other faithful of the Catholic Church that limit their religious practice to Sunday mass, or to the big 
  258 
rites of passage like bautisms and funerals, Lito would be not only the equivalent of a citizen, but 
the spokesman for the mayor´s office. 
No other institution nor people supported as much the establishment of Lito in US society 
as that congregation and its members. When he committed a minor traffic infraction – an air-
freshner hung on the rear view mirror – agrravated by having shown false documents, Lito was 
freed from jail and his fine was paid by the members of the congregation. He was able to begin 
and maintain his long road to residency – that was granted in March 2015 – because the 
congregation gave him loans to pay the lawyers office that took on his case. The congregation also 
gave him work in a micro-enterprise that works on remodelling home interiors. The 
employee/employer relationship is not free of tensions, because Lito´s interests as a wage earner 
clash with the business motives of maximizing profits, which the congregation does not apply in 
savage-capitalism style, because it follows the principle of always paying above minimum wage. In 
spite of the tensions, religious practice for Lito has been the terrain on which he has struggled for 
his inclusion up to permanent residency, starting from his condition as an undocumented person 
with the scarlet letter of a felony. Lito cannot rell his story in the United States, his process of 
integration and the regularization of his migratory statu, without explaining all the support that he 
has received from the congregation. 
Reynaldo Campos and Lupe Guerra live in the house that the congregation uses for retreats, 
located in West Falls Church, Fairfax County, Virginia. Both are undocumented, the former from 
Honduras, the latter from Guatemala. Reynaldo has the “Campos Landscaping Services” 
microenterprise, without legal status, without insurance and without any more documents than 
the business cards that he himself printed. But with internet, telephones, three vehicles (two 
pickups and a car), mowers, blowers and leaf shredders, power washers and all the tools that a 
gardener uses. Everything that needs a legal registration is registered as the property of the 
congregation or of the members of the congregation who have regularized their migratory status. 
Lupe works as a waiter in a restaurant, and also has various vehicles that are in the name of the 
superior of the congregation. Cars are the fixed capital of many undocumented people. They are a 
piggy bank that can be taken without much paperwork wherever  they want to establish their 
domicile. The congregation is the front for the undocumented, a role that it tries to play with the 
utmost secrecy. 
The biggest secret is that the retreat house – where they put me up out of solidarity – 
normally is inhabited by the undocumented. The last thing that the superior of the congregation 
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wants is that it be made public that he has a house full of undocumented people. The 
congregation does not want to be associated with the undocumented, in spite of the fact that 
their members, as well as their partners, and the youth that they work with do not even have TPS. 
The congregation does not have a preferential option for the undocumented. It does not even 
have a political position about it. It does not have a position about any political issue, because it is 
an institution with a very conservative religiosity, and it sails under an apolitical flag. It simply 
works with the youth that respond to their announcements. And it happens that they are the non-
authorized immigrants, because the neighborhoods where the congregation works is full of them. 
The congregation does not distinguish between citizens, residents and the undocumented. 
It acts with the criteria of universality of many religious confessions. But it is very aware that it is 
working in a medium – especially in Virginia – where migratory status is a controversial issue, and 
a criteria for selecting to include or exclude. That is why it adopts measures to avoid risks, but it 
continues lodging, including, employing, giving them the voice and being the front for the 
undocumented. Their disobedience of the US legislation is obedience to the commandments of 
the law of God, as Michael Walzer indicated as the inspiration/justification of the groups for 
disobeying. Paradoxically, in this case support for the undocumented derives precisely from 
traditional religiosity: an ideology that could have inspired behavior adapted to the established 
order, but it turns out that it is the basis for the acts in contempt of the law. The dissent that the 
members of the congregation do not show in speech, they express in practice. Sticking strictly to 
the rules of their congregational group, the members of the congregation practice and reinforce 
the performative civil disobedience of the undocumented, in other words, the actions that express 
the “already/not yet”. The political position that the congregation de facto adopts, locating itself 
on the dissent side, consist in the inclusion of the undocumented as if there was no legislation that 
rejected them, but it also consists in a chain of infractions of the law – in the framework of legality 
– to annul the exclusion imposed by the State. So the rupture with the exclusion is a twofold 
rupture, because it includes constructive actions and confrontational actions, even though the 
latter remain as the hidden transcripts that the subjugated use as a weapon. 
One of the more definitely inclusive actions that this congregation does is the radio 
program, where the undocumented have the microphone. It cannot be said that it is a limited 
exercise of parrhesia, because they do not address the topic of undocumented status, nor do they 
criticize immigration policies. But it is an exercise of parrhesia in so far as it is a space where they 
can discuss and report on the experience of culture shock, adaptation to a different society, labor 
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conflicts, legislative novelties and other topics, that in different ways work the polymorphus and 
very broad topic of inclusion. The radio programs is one of the most effective instruments of 
communication among Latinos. They tend to listen while driving to work, cooking dinner, working 
or talking with a group of friends. That is why it is very common among Central Americans to 
express themselves on the radio, be it as a listener that calls in by phone to communicate with the 
host and the rest of the audience, be it as radio hosts that coordinate a program. The group from 
the Dolores Huerta Community Garden, about which I will give more details in the fourth chapter, 
also has their radio program. The Dreamers also have one, whose origin and achievements are the 
topic of the end of this chapter. All are confessional radio programs. The churches not only have 
given them voice in their churches, but they have also multiplied the spaces for expanding the 
perlocutionary effect. On these radio spaces and in the religious ceremonial events, Lito, Reynaldo, 
Lupe and the Dreamers have had and have free speech. And even though the Dreamers – we will 
see why and how – address the topic of their undocumented status, on the radio many 
undocumented Central Americans denounce employers, NGOs and lawyers who have cheated 
them and violated their rights. 
In summary, the churches have been a favorable environment for the development and 
support of the performative civil disobedience of undocumented Central Americans. The 
treatment as citizens, and the creation of spaces to make their parrhesia possible, are elements 
without which the substantial advances in their inclusion in US society could not be conceived. The 
importance of that inclusion in the churches could be very powerful in a society that, according to 
Phillips, is markedly theocratic.1 The practical repercussions of this support are evident in the 
details that I succinctly described, but its ideological impact could be better appreciated in 
underlining the symbolic effectiveness that Bourdieu gives to religion.2 The churches are places of 
legitimation, not just because of the quantity of their members, but also as producers of coherent 
cosmovisions with large followings. Economic citizenship in the churches is reinforced by that 
ecclesial citizenship. To restrict my treatment of this topic to the general purpose of my 
investigation, I have left to one side many ambivalent elements: the churches are a scenario where 
the theatre of power and that of the subjugated is represented. Obviously, not all religious 
practice is emancipatory and inclusive, but in respect to the undocumented, the theatre of 
ecclesial power has broadcast unmistakeable signals. In this chapter I have mentioned the small 
                                            
1 Phillips, 2006, p.88. 
2 Bourdieu, 2009, p.146. 
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daily details by which ecclesial institutions contribute to the “already/not yet” of the citizenship of 
the undocumented Central Americans. The motivations and the meaning of this support and other 
heroic support, as well as a brief history of them will be treated in the first part of the next 
chapter. The scope of ecclesial global citizenship also will be discussed there.  
3.2 Parrhesia in public physical spaces 
 
Performative civil disobedience has more explicit moments when the undocumented take the 
floor and make use of public spaces to – staging insertion – present about their exclusion. Castells 
has insisted recently of the importance of the use and appropriation of space as an instrument of 
protest: “Occupied spaces are not meaningless: they are usually charged with the symbolic power 
of invading sites of state power, or financial institutions. (…) The control of space symbolizes the 
control over people’s lives.” 1 For that reason the mere apparition as non-movement of the 
undocumented is a challenge to the territorial control of the State. In fact, the relationship of the 
undocumented with US state power started as a dispute over space: unauthorized entry, violation 
of the principle of territorial sovereignty, elusion of the patrols and the mechanisms for controlling 
the space. Since it is about a confrontation with a very distinct symbolic dimension, the struggle 
continues with a dramatization of the access, use and appropriation of space.  
In this chapter I will concentrate on two forms of that dramatization of the use of public 
space that also imply the exercise of parrhesia: the murals painted on the streets, and the popular 
festivals with the manifest presence of undocumented Central Americans. Even though both are 
uses of space spread through many cities in the United States, I will focus on the murals of San 
Francisco, and the celebration of independence that the Central Americans organize yearly in Los 
Angeles. Both are forms of occupation and even appropriation of space, with a more permanent 
effect in the case of the murals. Both resort to the histrionic and irreverant elements that Bajtin 
studied as attacks of those subjugated to power. Both are expressions of what Bayat categorized 
as street politics: the expression of conflict in the streets, the participatory use (as opposed to the 
passive use) of space, the visibility of quiet encroachment in public places, and the “wish to gain 
support and solidarity beyond the confines of their institutions among the general public.”2 That 
participatory use, and that visibility, is the type of conflictive expression in itself – in which Butler 
                                            
1 Castells, 2012, pp.10-11. 
2 Bayat, 2010, p.62. 
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finds a performative contradiction “that leads not to impasse but to forms of insurgency” 1- 
because it means that those who should not be there take the microphone in events – or the 
paintbrush in murals – with perlocutionary effect, at times with the tolerance of the authorities, at 
times challenging the bureaucratic norms of the use of the space.2 
3.2.1 Murals: the plasticity of the word, and the esthetics of politics 
 
One of the most representative slogans of May 1968 in Paris was “the walls have the floor” 
because it summarized a vehicle for communication and politization frequently used in that 
struggle.3 The undocumented Central Americans have the floor in the murals of Chicago, New 
York, Los Angeles, San Diego and San Francisco, among other cities. The simple people and artists 
have worked in collaboration so that daily occurences would be the source of the artistic motifs, 
and that the collective would be the authors of the murals that adorn the Latino neighborhoods 
and other zones of these cities. The immigrants have reinvented the metropolis, as Davis 
observed, and their reinventing has politicized them, because the murals are political analysis and 
proposals, like what happened with the frescos of the Italian painter Ambrogio Lorenzetti, whose 
proposals for good government and denouncements of bad government were the object of study 
of Quentin Skinner. The British political scientist focused on the cycle of frescos that Lorenzetti 
painted between 1337 and 1339 in the Sala dei Nove of the Palazzo Pubblico in Siena. In terms of 
the murals, I maintain the same as Skinner asserted about the frescos of Lorenzetti: “Although it is 
obvious that these paintings do not constitute a text of political theory in the conventional sense, 
it is equally obvious even to the casual observer that they are basically intended to convey a series 
of political messages.”4 Orwell had already stated that “All art is propaganda.”5 In that sense, the 
murals are an exercise of parrhesia that complement the site of politics. He takes it from the Greek 
agora, the medieval court or the contemporaneous assemblies of Congress people about street 
demonstrations. The murals are another form of street politics that Bayat analized. But it is a 
street politics that is not limited to being established in a park with a cigaretter or candy stand, but 
that locates its word in the street through plastic arts and exercises politics with esthetics. The 
“Nulla aesthetica sine ethica” is changed in the streets for a “Nulla ethica sine aesthetica”. 
                                            
1 Butler and Spivak, 2007, p.63. 
2 Castells, 2012, p.10. 
3 Besancon, 1970. 
4 Skinner, 2004, p.39. 
5 Orwell, 2009, pos.58. 
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Given that the murals are the fruit of a process – at times communitarian – the murals are 
appropriated by the inhabitants of the neighborhoods, in addition to being a way of appropriating 
the city. Their message is unavoidable, because the murals and graffiti, as Caldiera observed about 
those in São Paulo, “they flood the city, they do not leave any space empty, and in this way they 
keep the citizens from having a place for diverting their gaze.”1 Following Sennett, I maintain that 
the murals belong to one of those uses of disorder that inject life in the cities, and go against the 
puritanism of urban planning that fears and flees the unknown, the divergent, and the 
uncontrollable.2 We can say that if the virtuous and respectable orders of the city are a theatre of 
power, the countertheatre of the subjugated dramatizes a rupture with that puritanism and the 
depersonalization of space, emblematically denounced in graffiti that was in Marburg in the 
beginning of the 90s: “Beton ist Koma” (Concrete is coma).3 The “disorder” of muralism interrupts 
urban planning, and in that way its very presence is an irruption into politics, because they snatch 
the power to administer urban space from capital, the politicians and the technocrats. They are, in 
themselves, an expression of dissent against puritanism in urban planning, and by their content, 
they manifest dissent against various aspects of public policies. 
Duque thinks that “one of the lines that leads to public art comes from romantic 
individuality, that takes the merveilleux to extravagance, either to protest against the circuit of 
production and consumption of art, established and repeated ad nauseam, or to defend those 
“without voice”, lending them its own.”4 Duque brings up Les Misérables of Victor Hugo – 
oscillating between the elitism of the artist moved to pity by the suffering – and populism – more 
or less committed – of the Mexican murals. He compares this art with the hunting trophies hung in 
English mansions. I believe that the design of the contemporaneous murals is more related to the 
distrust of politicians by trade, and the desire to not be the voice of those without voice, but the 
occasion where the people speak their own voice, as Feenberg and Freedman pointed out and 




                                            
1 Caldeira, 2010, p.121. 
2 Sennett, 1992. 
3 Forty, 2005, pp.75-95, p.75. 
4 Duque, 2001, p.111. 
5 Feenberg and Freedman, 2001, p.74. 
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Murals of Central Americans and/or about Central America in Balmy Alley 
The murals that the Chicanos first, and the Central Americas later, have painted on the walls of US 
cities, not only have been a means of reinventing the city1; they have also been the product of a 
process that has included the involvement of the community and/or an insertion of the artists in 
the midst of the immigrants to get steeped in their reality, and communicate the problems of the 
Latinos, from the tribulations that they experience in the neighborhood, to the tormentous 
transformation of their history. With this purpose some muralists in San Francisco have associated 
themselves with Precita Eyes Muralists, located in the heart of the Mission District, an initiative 
that organizes trips through the streets illustrated with murals, grant recognition to the 
outstanding muralists, raise funds from foundations and philantropists, organize talks and courses, 
sell reproductions of murals in portable formats (post cards, posters), negotiate agreements with 
the mayor´s office, and assume responsibility for the restoration and maintenance  of the murals 
when they enter into a phase of deterioration. Certainly Precita Eyes Muralists apply what Chase 
said of the murals of San Francisco, that it “an eminently accessible art form that perfectly reflects 
the city's synergy of ethnic diversity, political activism, artistic talent and financial support.”2 Susan 
Cervantes, author of many of the most beautiful and meaningfull murals, is the lead singer – or the 
principal painter – in this association, that she founded with her husband, who also is a muralist, 
and the sculptor Luis Cervantes. In their website (www.precitaeyes.org) we can appreciate some 
elements of her design that, in the best tradition of muralism, maintains the contact between 
artists and the community: “A mural is a bridge to the community. The artists communicate with 
the people; meetings are held to discuss the issues. The result is a reflection - a mirror of that 
community.” And also: “Precita Eyes is art for the people. Precita's murals are thought-provoking 
and really speak to issues of class struggle, racism, oppression and other relevant issues to 
communities of color.” And finally emphasis is placed on art´s accessibility which is why they are 
committed to murals: “Murals are the people's art, because you don't need to have money to 
appreciate them, just walk down the street and take a look, learn, share and understand the story, 
the message.” 
                                            
1 Davis, 2001, pp.61-62. 




One of the most well known and captivating murals of Susan Cervantes is “Indigenous 
Eyes: War or Peace” that Cervantes painted in 1990 in Balmy Alley on a garage door, inspired by 
the struggles of the Central American indigenous. Latorre states that “On the pupil of the left eye 
we see a skeletal figure dressed as a soldier (…) In the right eye, we find the dove of peace flying 
toward the sky. These two motifs reflect the contradictory life of the contemporary Maya people, 
who are caught between the violence of state repression and the peacefulness of their cultural 
practices.”1 In the form of the content of the pupils appear the actors of good and bad 
government, in the manner of Lorenzetti, in this case embodied in the soldiers that the empire 
finances, and the dove that refers to the Mayan worship of nature, and embodies a widely known 
peace symbol. 
The location of this mural could not be more appropriate. San Francisco is a city with an 
abundance of murals. By 1995 there were 450 public murals documented in San Francisco alone, 
with at least 100 more in the East Bay cities of Oakland and Berkeley, turning that city into what 
one critic has called “the highest per capita mural output in the world." 2 But perhaps the tiny 
Balmy Alley already had then – in 1995 – the greatest concentration of murals per linear meter, 
which motivated Nan Chase of the Washington Post to write, “Balmy Alley, where nearly every 
garage door and back-yard fence has become a canvas for the Latin American community's pride 
and anger -- 40 murals in nearly as many styles.” 3 Balmy Alley is an art gallery. Guisela Latorre 
defines it as “a short and narrow street that stretches from Twenty-fourth to Twenty-fifth Street in 
the Mission, sandwiched between Harrison Street and Treat Avenue. (…)With its close proximity to 
other arts organizations, Balmy Alley contributes to a visibly significant reclamation of the urban 
space.”4 I have known this unique gallery since Lois Lorentzen showed it to me in 2008, a professor 
                                            
1 Latorre, 2008, pp.169-170. 
2 Chase, 1995.  
3 Chase, 1995.  
4 Latorre, 2008, p.164. 
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at the University of San Francisco and an expert in migration. Her explanations allowed me to 
understand the meaning of some murals and the strength with which they resounded for the 
Mission District community. 
More than any other of the street-galleries of San Francisco, Balmy Alley is committed to 
the history of Central America. This is due to the involvement of PLACA, that was developed there 
in 1984, through nine fertile months. Ray Patlan called together 36 artists and neighbors to paint 
murals committed to peace in Central America, and especially the indigenous struggles against 
military regimes strongly controlled or influenced by the US government.1 One of those murals 
was dedicated to the Nicaraguan Literacy Campaign. Jane Norling painted it in 1984, using as a 
model a photograph of the journalist Margaret Randall. It was named “Darles Armas Y También 
Ensenarles a Leer” (Give Them Arms and Also Teach Them to Read), a quote from Carlos Fonseca 
Amador, founder of the FSLN. One day the owner knocied down the wooden fence that had 
served as the canvas for the mural. Norling took her painting, fragmented into as many pieces as 
the fence had planks, and put it in her backyard, where it has been able to survive past its life 
expectancy, and that mural now over thiry years old can be admired by visitors. Another mural 
reproduced – in three languages – a poem of the Nicaragua poet Daysi Zamora. I was able to 
photograph it in 2008, a little before it was removed or replaced. 
 
 
The PLACA project was the fruit of a desire to make known the connections between the 
empire´s geopolitics and the growing Central America diaspora, graphically supporting these 
theses with which asylum was obtained for thousands of Guatemalans and Salvadorans through 
the American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh (ABC) Settlement Agreement. The tradition of 
historicizing Central American immigration and politicizing it through its association with imperial 
geopolitics, even though in decline or even outmoded among grassroots organizations, has been 
                                            
1 Latorre, 2008, pp.165-166. 
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continued by the muralists in Balmy and other streets of San Francisco. The next mural is titled 
“Un Pasado que Aún Vive/A Past That Still Lives”. Joel Bergner painted it after working some 
months as a teacher in El Salvador. According to Ramírez and Perla, “the central image at the far 
left depicts a woman carrying her son in the back of a truck, looking towards a violent past. A 
woman clutches a letter from her husband who has moved to the United States to find work. 
Bergner reminds the viewer of how common families were painfully separated because many 
migrated to the United States in search of jobs, a better quality of life, an issue still relevant 
around the world.”1  
The PLACA project marked a highpoint for the inclusion of Central America in the murals of 
a US city. The key rested in the fact that the tribulations of the Central American indigenous were 
associated with those of Mexican and North American indigenous, and that is why, Latorre points 
out, “Balmy Alley became one of the first mural sites to expound an Indigenist aesthetic that 
transcended a Chicana/o-centric Indigenism while simultaneously making meaningful connections 
between the Central American struggle and the Chicano Movement’s indigenous consciousness.”2 
The arrival of Central American refugees helped to strengthen those connections. One of those 
refugees was the Salvadoran Isaías Mata. He arrived in San Francisco and in 1992 contributed to 
the murals with “500 Years of Resistance”, a mural that covers the lower right quadrant on the 
façade of St. Peter's Church of San Francisco, close to Balmy Alley, a church that served as a 
sanctuary to provide refuge to undocumented migrants that were fleeing the repression in the 
isthmus. Side by side on that mural are rebellious figures from the history of the church in Mexico, 
United States and Central America: Martin Luther King, Monseñor Oscar Arnulfo Romero, Miguel 
Hidalgo y Costilla, Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz and Bartolomé de las Casas. Like other murals, it links 
the tradition of Central American resistance with that of the United States and Mexico, seeking 
empathy and solidarity in the Anglo-Saxon, African American and Chicano communities.  
 
 
                                            
1 Ramírez, 2012. 
2 Latorre, 2008, p.166. 
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Carrying on the tradition started by the PLACA project, the mural segmented into two 
parts between which is placed this paragraph is called “A Tribute to Monseñor Oscar Romero” and 
was painted by Jamie Morgan in 2001. It also deals with good and bad government, as well as 
violence in the country of origin and in the destination place. Sprague describes it this way: 
“Reminiscent of Cervantes’ Indigenous Eyes, a large skeletal soldier dominates the right hand of 
the painting (bottom right), accompanied by fire and neutralized by two adjoining cans of red and 
blue paint, offering art as a solution both for global warfare and local gang violence. The imagery is 
juxtaposed by the blazing sun and thriving agriculture on the right, including symbols of a glowing 
heart and a photographed image of Archbishop Oscar Romero.”1 
 
The new muralists are inspired by the motifs of the most recent local history, the 
migratory policies and the histories that have captured the attention of the journalists. Also 
located in this Central American gallery which is Balmy Alley, the following mural that Josue Rojas 
painted in 2010 is titled “Enrique’s Journey” and was inspired by a book by Sonia Nazario of the 
same title, a book for which Nazario – then a reporter for the Los Angeles Times – won a Pulitizer 
prize, among other recognitions. The book deals with a 17 year old boy who travels from the 
mountains around Tegucigalpa in Honduras to meet up with his mother in the United States.2 The 
mural, according to Sprague, shows Enrique’s journey “from rural Central America (portrayed in 
the right of the mural), to the United States. The boy travels via train, and meets various people 
along the way, and his grandmother (portrayed in a welcoming purple hue), awaits his arrival on 
the other side. Uncle Sam and the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) skeletons reach 
out to grab the young boy (Above left). Enrique is safe, however, as he is guided on his journey by 
an angel (Above right).”3 
                                            
1 Sprague, 2012. 
2 Nazario, 2007, pos.44. 





The mural contributes to the more disseminated image of the unaccompanied Central 
American migrant children, and forms part of a long series of murals that challenge the US 
migration policies and praises the struggles of the undocumented for transforming those policies. 
 
Covering a side wall of a well known Latino cafeteria–Grandmas Deli-that is on Mission 
Street, this mural is representative of the new generation of muralism in San Francisco. The 
complete caption reads “No human being is ilegal”. The fragment that I selected shows the 
detention, along the wall of the southeast border, of a young female migrant by an Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement agent (ICE) that has Latino features, as in fact many agents of the 
Border Patrol have – because they are Latinos. It is a denouncement and a call to ethnic solidarity. 
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Up front appears a Latino showing what is being done and what has to be done against bad 
government: organized struggle, that the mural that I include below also depicts.  
Another fragment of the same mural shows a series of tombs in the desert, that are not 
just the dead by hyperthermia because of the bad policies, as a graffiti that explains the mural 
clarifies: “Dedicated to: The 28 souls that were killed by Border Patrol since 2010, to the 500 
migrants who were swallowed up by the Sonora desert, the 2 million too many migrant people 
deported since 2008 and to all the victims of the OBAMA administration´s ABUSIVE immigration 
policy.” And another fragment shows a woman carrying a microphone and dressed in a shirt with 
the caption “I am Anastasio Rojas”, in memory ofAnastasio Hernández Rojas, an immigrant who it 
is presumed was beaten to death on May 31, 2010 and who, in any case, died on the third day of 
being in the custody of the ICE agents. Even though the final verdict resolved the migration agents 
of any responsibility1, a video shows that it was a police lynching.2 The mural was the work of the 
muralist Pancho Peskador and 16 youth involved in “67 Sueños”, a project directly dedicated to 
the pro-immigrant cause, and inspired by the history of the young undocumented immigrants, 
that are estimated to be 67% of the youth in the Bay Area, they are the Dreamers to whom the 
following section is dedicated.3 The slogan of this initiative is “No human being is illegal and each 
one has a dream.” The proclamation “We have a voice, we have a story” –that heads its website 
(www.67suenos.org)- is a declaration of parrhesia that is exercised on the walls and fences of the 
city. With the murals of the project, the undocumented had a voice and paintbrush, and bestowed 
a esthetical dimension on the ethical and political cause of the Dreamers. They also attracted 
solidarity: Quakers Concerned with Immigration Justice, through the American Friends Service 
Committee, granted 67 Sueños a fund of nearly $40,000 dollars to expand the mural series. Each 
time that 67 Sueños paints a mural, there is a publicity exhibition so that the neighbors and other 
people can witness the process from the beginning to the end, and so they can dialogue with the 
artists and their 50 collaborators.  
The expression and permanence of the discourse in the mural makes it possible for the 
message to be communicated even when the messenger is no longer there to dialogue. The 
following mural transmits an argument similar to that of María García: “We didn’t cross the 
                                            
1 Department of Justice, Federal Officials Close the Investigation into the Death of Anastasio Hernandez-
Rojas, November 6, 2015, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-officials-close-investigation-death-
anastasio-hernandez-rojas 
2 SBCC Media, 2012. 
3 Jobin-Leeds, 2015, pp.90-91. 
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border. The border crossed us!” The murals not only defend the rights of the undocumented, but 
also provide arguments that justify their disobedience of the US law. All those who refer to 
California as Aztlán, the promised land in Aztec mythology, fulfill this function.  
 
Mexican muralism, that arrived in San Francisco at the beginning of the 1930s with Rivera 
y Siqueiros1, has been reintroduced by Central American and/or US muralists that paint motivs 
that we can call Central American, because they refer to the struggles in Central America or those 
that Central American immigrants are fighting – above all undocumented ones – in the United 
States. This new current of muralism has been faithful to the collectivist directives that Siqueiros 
postulated: “It is evident that mural painting, a work of great material proportions, cannot be 
done by just one man, in other words, it cannot be an individual work. It requires many hands.”2 
And not only have they carried out a collective work. The collectivity involved has been the 
inhabitants of the neighborhoods where the murals are painted, and the undocuments immigrant 
youth. The motif and the doers have merged to produce a work that does not give voice to the 
voiceless, but where that is possible because they do have their own voice, and do not need to talk 
through third parties. There is another aspect that the collective production of a mural entails: it is 
also a form of dramatizing who constitute that “we”, what is it that is common, and how a group 
appropriates the city. Like all theatre in the sense of Thompson, its impact is not measured by the 
immediate effectiveness, but by its capacity to transmit a message with a perlocutionary effect, in 
other words, a message that unleashes a series of reactions, some favorable, others hostile, all 
generating policies. And here the medium does become the message, because the very 
establishment by the undocumented makes it be performative – and also a practice of 
performative civil disobedience- the message of one of the most painted slogans in the murals: 
“we are here, and we are not leaving”. 
Bayat maintains that for the multitudes that make up a non-movement “space clearly 
provides the possibility of mutual recognition —a factor that distinguishes them from such 
                                            
1 Stein, 1994, p.74. 
2 Alfaro Siqueiros, 1979, p.40. 
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fragmented groups as illegal immigrants, who may lack the medium of space to facilitate solidarity 
formation unless they come together in the same workplaces, detention centers, or residential 
compounds. These latter groups rely often on mass media, rumors, or distanciated networks— 
that is, knowing someone who knows someone who knows someone in a similar position— a 
process that facilitates building ‘imagined solidarities’”.1 In the United States the spatial mobility of 
the undocumented migrants is not as limited as Bayat assumes, probably influenced by the series 
of suggestive but inexact metaphors that the media and the brochures of the NGOs have 
disseminated with remarkable success: thos who live in the shadows, the invisible, the 
underground, etc. I think that the undocumented not only have the opportunities that Bayat 
mentions to coincide in space and express that mutual recognition: the churches, the 
organizations that they themselves build and those that involve them, the collective 
demonstrations and festivals, among many other occasions of making themselves very visible and 
reinforcing their complicity. The murals are one more space for this recognition, with the 
advantage that the work of making the mural is a stage of mutual immediate recognition, and the 
permanence of the mural is an opportunity for defered recognition. 
 
Gentrification as loss of parrhesia 
A negative proof that the murals are a vehicle for practicing parrhesia, expressing dissent, 
manifesting presence and appropriating space is the effect that the gentrification of the Mission 
District has had on them. In general terms, gentrification has been defined as “the transformation 
of a working-class or vacant area of the central city into middle-class residential and/or 
commercial use.”2 It also has been defined as “the new urban colonialism”.3 The issue is much 
more complex, because gentrification began many years before the word was coined, and it has 
taken numerous forms. They include the revitalization of the city through the acquisition and 
renovation of buildings that were going to be demolished in the 1950s (known as “red-brick chic” 
in San Francisco)4, to the gentrification in Castro street (San Francisco) which was a strategy for 
countering a housing market that broadly discriminated against gays and lesbians.5 The 
gentrification that is taking place in the Mission District is the transformation of a working class 
                                            
1 Bayat, 2010, p.22. 
2 Lees, 2008, p.XV. 
3 Atkinson, 2005. 
4 Lees, Slater, and Wyly, 2008, p.6. 
5 Smith, 2005, p.102. 
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community inhabited by working class and low-income immigrants, and later generations of those 
immigrants’ families, into an area of middle class and upper-middle class residents. In this case I 
agree with DeSena when she says that “gentrifiers create segregation by social class, which 
perpetuates the current system of social stratification and ultimately reproduces social inequality. 
Thus, gentrification creates greater social inequality.”1 One of the more obvious forms in which 
this happens is through the displacement of Latinos, that automatically has repercussions on the 
vitality of the businesses whose owners are Latinos and who see themselves forced to sell their 
better-located places in the Mission District, which reinforces the gentrification. This closing of 
businesses replicates what happened a decade ago in Harlem with the small businesses of African 
Americans.2 
In April 2014 I went through the streets of the Mission Distrcit of San Francisco with the 
sociologist Susanne Jonas, an expert in how imperial geopolitics has affected the history of 
Guatemala and the Misison District, where she lived for a number of years. Jonas showed me the 
sites where the murals have disappeared, and how the Latino community was being gradually 
replaced by the Yuppies. In that trip we saw the gate whose photograph is inserted below. It is 
only 10 streets from Balmy, surrounded by murals, on 239 Osage Street. That fortified residence is 
an example of the transformation of the urban landscape that is taking place in the Mission 
District. 
In many scenes of Mission District we found this type of enclave, more and more 
numerous, at times flanked by simple homes, whose gates still exhibit murals. In this muted 
struggle around who controls space resound echoes of what the African Americans fought at the 
beginning of the 20th century over property, and the use of the beaches of Santa Monica and its 
surroundings. Henry Morales, from El Salvador, ex-gangmember and social promoter of the 
Central American Resource Center (CARECEN) of San Francisco in 2014, explained to me how the 
inhabitants of the Mission District are experiencing gentrification: “Here racism is felt a lot, 
because now we are living alongside someone who has a Mercedes Benz. And right next door is a 
group of Latinos with 10 to 15 people living in two rooms, and the contrast between wealth and 
poverty is seen a lot. They do not want us here. The truth is that they are getting rid of us. And 
since they have the businesses, they can talk to the mayors, the city lawyers and federal officials, 
and tell them, We have these problems here, we want you to get these gangs out of here because 
                                            
1 DeSena, 2009, p.9. 
2 Maurrasse, 2006, p.70. 
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they are affecting our businesses, our commerce.’ That is racism. They grab anything to get rid of 
us. The parents of a friend, who have lived here for more than 20 years, if they make noise, the 
domestic comes over to tell them that this is their last chance.” 
Metzi Henriquez, who came from El Salvador when she was two years old, and works as a 
Mental Health Specialist in the Second Chance Tattoo Removal Program of CARECEN, summarized 
the process: “This neighborhood has changed a lot. Before it was the first place all the immigrants 
would go to, because San Francisco has been and continues being a Sanctuary City. All of us came 
here, we grew up here, but our families can no longer pay the rent. It all began with Silicon Valley 
in the 90s. Many companies came in. Since then, families who have lived here for 15 years, we 
have moved. Then there was a pause because of the depression. Then came Google, Twitter…that 
now is in its peak, and once again there is another wave of removing those who survived the 90s. 
The owners rent out or sell the apartments to corporations and they build completely new 
condominiums, with solar energy and …” Morales adds “…very green. Now it is more expensive to 
live here than in Manhattan. But there is still a lot of poverty here. For me the injustice is that 
there is a lot of money, but no one wants to help the children, nor repair the schools. This happens 
in any country. But here there is a ton of money. Here there are loads of millionaires. There is a 
war against the poor, but not against poverty. This year we have seen many attacks on the murals. 
And they are taggers that are not from the culture of the taggers, that have been here in San 
Francisco for ages and have never touched the murals. And now we see that the taggers are 
painting over the murals, but they are not taggers from the community, they are part of the new 
generation of youth that have come in. They do not understand nor respect muralism, that 
represents our culture, struggles and roots.” 
Henriquez qualifies the attitude of the gentrifier toward the Latinos: “Those who come in 
like the food, the music and this architecture. But they do not like that we are here. It is 
fashionable. Even in the media you see that the gringos like rap. It is happening to us like it did the 
African Americans. They like our traditions, but not us. Right now families are coming in who like 
that their children learn Spanish, and they put them in bilingual schools, they live in the 
neighborhood, they want the Latino woman to take care of their child, they like the murals, they 
go to the pupuserías, but they are throwing us out.” Morales concluded: “There is no cultural 
exchange. That is why we say that it is colonization, because they are buying and evicting. If we 
were indigenous, it would be clearer that we are suffering colonization. But we really are the 
natives here and now we are dipersed. Mission is not going to continue being a politically powerful 
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community. And the politicians cannot help, because what can a politician do against the 
corporations? Not even the mayor can do anything. Big Business is winning. And since Big Business 
is the owner of the prisons, it is in their interest that we lose services and go to jail.” 
The class struggle is a struggle for space that is in a decisive moment in the Mission 
District. CARECEN and other organizations have reacted with programs that reduce the 
stigmatization of Latinos and their vulernability: removing tatoos, gathering them around socially 
acceptable activities and regularizing their migratory status. Muralism continues its expansion, and 
has taken up this banner of struggle. Balmy Alley once again provides space to speech to respond 
to the gentrification. Below are two fragments of one of the most recent Balmy murals, where the 




The mural is the plastic version of what Morales and Henriquez explained to me. Like the 
frescos of Lorenzetti, this mural expresses two stages of bad government: the criminalization of 
the youth because of their involvement – real or just feared – in gangs, and the neighborhood 
once it is gentrified. In the first fragment appears the opening of the process: the stigmatization of 
the Latino youth and their police detention. The principal scene alludes to the Yuppies of Silicon 
Valley, represented by a person who is writing with a computer. On the right, behind the young 
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man with the red shirt with the number 80 on it, is “Discolandia”, a place where Latino youth used 
to gather, now gone as a consequence of the gentrification. The lower fragment shows a moving 
truck and a blond gentrifier who is climbing the stairs of her new home. The houses have acquired 
the typical architecture of the more opulent zones of San Francisco. In the first plane is a 
policeman in an attitude diametrically opposed to the attitude he had toward the Latinos: 
relaxedly drinking coffee – Starbucks type? – next to another blond woman. The persistant poverty 
is represented by the homeless who are resting on the sidewalk on some cardboard, in the face of 
an indifferent community. The “uan wey” and “otro wey” signs are a Spanglish that plays with the 
hispanic spelling of the Anglo Saxon phonics, with the picaresque addition of a taunt toward the 
policeman, because the sign “otro wey” that points to him can also sound like – in hispanic 
phonics – like “otro buey”, a typically Mexican pejorative expression.  The “uan wey” and “otro 
wey” are a round trip into Hispanic and Anglo Saxon phonics and spelling, that mark the shifting 
moment of the community and its ethnic transition. The lush  greenery that frames the mural 
probably alludes to the ecological aspirations of those who buy solar energy, but do not hestitate 
to displace the “natives” that made the Mission District what it is. 
Castells observed that “often, buildings are occupied either for their symbolism or to 
affirm the right of public use of idle, speculative property. By taking and holding urban space, 
citizens reclaim their own city, a city from where they were evicted by real estate speculation and 
municipal bureaucracy.”1 The murals can be taken as an artistic sublimation of a desire for 
occupation. In any case, the muralist movement and the graffitists can snatch the dominion that 
the gentrifiers and new owners claim over their private spaces, because muralists and graffitists, 
Caldiera points out, “proclaim that any surface facing outward is public. (…) So, they challenge the 
limits of private property and the distinctions between public and private.”2 They certainly 
continue being a means to protest over gentrification, a desire to keep a presence in public spaces 
and a way of conserving the Latino character of the neighborhood. Mural experts have maintained 
that “a mural becomes a symbol of a neighborhood, defining its character in the eyes of both its 
residents and outsiders. (…) Murals become landmark, part of the oral geography of an area.”3 The 
murals, therefore, help to define the identity of a neighborhood – whether it is a Latino 
community or Yuppies from Silicon Valley – because they form part of the means with which a 
community is imagined, and a sense of belonging cultivated. In spite of the transformations of 
                                            
1 Castells, 2012, p.11. 
2 Caldeira, 2010, p.121. 
3 Cockcroft, Pitman Weber, and Cockcroft, 1998, p.86. 
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globalization, we continue in a world in which, as Castells wrote, “ethnicity becomes the 
foundation for defensive trenches, then territorialized in local communities.”1 On this shifting 
terrain, the muralists have the word, even though not the only, nor the last word, because Latinos 
continue dwindling, and because the danger of cooptation is strong, as can be inferred from the 
fact that the acceptance of the murals does not go hand in hand with acceptance of Latinos. 
Gentrification gives capital back dominion over urban space, and allows a return to the 
puritanism of urban planning. But also, in a muted but visual territorial battle, gentrification is an 
indicator that the use of the space is an important platform where inclusion and the exercise of 
parrhesia are in play. It is the negative confirmation of the power of muralism that it has served 
the  undocumented to send their message and to not be excluded. It has been a creative, 
irreverent and humorous message, like that analyzed by Bajtin, and generator of an educational 
process about civil disobedience, like Ebert wanted. The murals have been a staging of civil 
disobedience in defense of the undocumented by giving voice to those who it is assumed should 
not have it, and because of the content: denouncements of the “migra” that arrest and murder 
Latinos, proclamations about the rights of the Honduran child to be reunited with his mother, the 
connection between imperial geopolitics and migration.  
There is no doubt that, in spite of its permanent public exposition, the murals – like any other – 
are a vehicle of public discourse with many limitations: they are not always collective, and even in 
the collectives, the inhabitants of the neighborhood had to implement a sketch preconceived by 
the artist (even though with a certain margin for their contributions), they are not always located 
in the most well travelled sites, and even though they may be very expressive, their message is not 
always accessible to the profane. Also the influence of those etched with which Cranach and 
Durero promoted the reform had obvious limits, but that did not keep them from being a type of 
social-media, so that the message of Luther might go viral, as was pointed out by Tom Standage. 
Luther himself remarked that “without images we can neither think nor understand anything.”2 In 
the case of the murals of the undocumented, their effectiveness as an instrument of disobedience 
comes from the fact that they followed the law of May 10, 1968: “First, disobey; then write on the 
walls.” 
 
                                            
1 Castells, 2010, p.63. 
2 Standage, 2013, pos.59. 
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3.2.2 The Street politics of patriot parades 
 
On September 15, 1821 the acts of independence of the Capitanía General of Guatemala were 
signed, under whose jurisdiction were most of the current Central American nations. By happy 
coincidence it happened that on September 16, 1810 the priest, Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla, led an 
indigenous uprising against the Spanish crown, the initial act of Mexican independence known as 
the Cry of Dolores, named after the place where the uprising happened. Chicanos began the 
tradition of celebrating the Cry of Dolores in Las Vegas, New York and Los Angeles. The closeness 
to the date of Central American independence, the similarity of the celebratory costumes, and the 
enormous number of Central Americans in Los Angeles, were factors that came together for 
Central Americans to begin to celebrate independence day in that city. Of the nearly 10 million 
inhabitants of Los Angeles county half are Latinos, of whom 16% are Central Americans: 404,070 
Salvadorans, 254,750 Guatemalans, 49,856 Hondurans, and 42,617 Nicaraguans.1 They are some 
nice numbers to turn any street celebration into a massive event. 
In September 2014 my second stay in Los Angeles coincided with this celebration. On 
September 14 I was exploring the terrain, already very crowded. Opening a path through the 
multitude, my Latin look worked the same effect in each one of my previous incursions into the 
proximities of MacArthur park: I was offered false documents at 80 dollars for Mica, 10 dollars for 
Social Security or a driver´s license. The entire park was an altar to nationalist dieties: flags, 
shields, names of Central American cities, and even of their soccer teams, but no image of the 
heroes of independence. In fact the very word “independence” was not written on any of the 
banners, flyers or floats. The next  day a group of Quiché indigenous from San Antonio Sija invited 
me to accompany them and see them marhc in a parade dressed as indigenous and Spanish 
colonists. With the expert help of a Salvadoran hairdresser, in a tiny place, they put on their 
disguises – dull masks, gigantic sombreros, various capes with sequins and golden ornaments –in 
which they cooked themselves for two hours in a slow walk and a lot of dancing, under an 
inclement sun unhindered by a clear sky.  A politician of Guatemalan origins, alongside whose red 
sports car they had to perform their dances, invited them to what was their first experience as 
participants in a patriotic parade. The exchange did not cease to be ambivalent: an act of 
manipulation, that also was an opportunity to launch into public spaces. Ambivalent or not, the 
                                            
1 U.S. Census Bureau, 2009-2013 5-Year American Community Survey, B03001: HISPANIC OR LATINO ORIGIN 
BY SPECIFIC ORIGIN - Universe: Total population. 
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disguise created a paradox: the indigenous have disguised themselves as their ancestors, even 
though they might not have much in common, not even with their peers that stayed in San 
Antonio Sija. They were dramatized to be what they had quit being, maybe to be it a little bit, in 
their eyes or in the eyes of others. 
 
Folklore for recreating the imagined communities  
This is one of the interpretations that fits and responds to the question that Butler set forth in one 
of his books: “Who sings to the Nation-State?” Those who want to acquire group identity and 
recreate the imagined community of origin sing to it. These singers of the independence day 
celebrations are in a position that appears to be diametrically opposed to that of those who 
motivated Butler´s question: the Latinos in 2006 that recorded a Spanish version of the US 
National anthem, against which George W. Bush hurried to claim that “the national anthem can 
only be sung in English”, and in so doing –according to Butler- he restricted the nation to a 
linguistic majority.1 Bush reacted to the irate protests to the adulteration of a national symbol, 
setting the limits that Spanglish multiculturalism must respect, limits that he himself had crossed 
illegally and without any scruples during his campaign: Phillips states that, when visiting cities like 
Chicago, Milwaukee, or Philadelphia, Bush “would drop in at Hispanic festivals and parties, 
sometimes joining in singing ‘The Star-Spangled Banner’ in Spanish”.2 With these precedents the 
position of the celebrators in Los Angeles to a certain extent is in conflict with those who latinized 
the US national anthem, but it is above all a continuation of a tense dialogue. Now that Latinos 
cannot “assimilate” in their own way the US symbols, the Central Americans took the avenues 
between Pico-Union and MacArthur Park in Los Angeles to reconstitute and proclaim their 
identities of origin. They did not sing the notes of a Central American anthem, because there is 
none. A Pan-Central American identity does not exist in the isthmus (not even a Pan- Mayan one). 
The bureaucratic efforts of the Central American Integration System (SICA) to approximate a 
regional government rest precariously on waning funds from the European Union, go against the 
grain of indifference of the popular sectors, that continue to lack information and enthusiasm 
about it. The hero of regional unity after independence – Francisco Morazán – is remembered 
through the official iconography in Honduras and El Salvador, even though in life his cause did not 
find a reception among the elites of any of these two countries. Nor can it be said that in Los 
                                            
1 Butler and Spivak, 2007, p.59. 
2 Phillips, 2004, p.142. 
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Angeles that regional identity has been promoted. Each float, key chain, flag, banner, stand, tshirt 
and hat bore the name of one nation, pure from any mixture with others. 
Nevertheless, the different nationalities united in one celebration, and in this way spoke 
their say about the nationalist symbology: we are recovering our origins, we sing to – we parade to 
– other Nation-States. The festivity is adapted to the notion of García Canclini of popular cultures 
as the “result of an unequal appropriation of cultural capital, a unique elaboration of their living 
conditions and a conflictive interaction with hegemonic sectors”.1 But in that celebration, except 
for a handmade sign against ARENA, the Salvadoran right wing party, there was no conflictive 
interaction with the powerful of their countries of origin. 
The dialogue was held with a US audience through the celebration that in itself was a 
manifestation of power, through the notable presence of numerous organizations, and through 
their numerous messages, among which the floats suggestive of migratory motifs were the most 
prominent: the evocation of the Bestia (the train on which many migrants cross Mexico), the 
protest that “Freedom has no borders”, the denouncements against ICE, and more.  
The tshirts, headbands and coffee cups for sale complemented the denouncements, but 
took them to a comical plain that the subjugated manage masterfully. Tshirts abound with comical 
and challenging messages, some using contempt of the law as an instrument of civil disobedience, 
and trivilization as a weapon to stand up to power. The sayings on tshirts and cups were a practice 
of parrhesia because they were converted into vehicles for political speech. Clothing became a 
vector in the infection of a new common sense: “I am not an illegal, I am a tourst”, “Would Jesus 
deport?”. In daily objects, transmuted into souvenirs, blasphemy against the established order and 
the exaltment of being Latinos took place.  
The placement of political messages on commercial objects is an act of irreverance in itself 
with the tradition of western political thought, maybe one of the most disseminated modalities 
around the world. The objects that are sold to satisfy material needs, are also the props for 
political messages, they are homemade mass media to communicate a position about migratory 
and other policies. This intersection of political and commercial purposes also became visible in 
some service providers, like the lawyer who presents himself as Dr. Desalojo [Dr. Eviction], in 
reference to the victims of gentrification and those evicted by the banks, that constitute his 
clientele. 
                                            
1 García Canclini, 2002, p.91. 
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This fusion of politics and commerce is carried out in a carnival atmosphere, a kind of high 
moment of “quiet encroachment” that in this context adopted the form of a clamorous 
encroachment, with all the dangers entailed by the broadcast of signs of strength and big 
numbers, that tend to rouse the alarm of individuals and groups disposed to feel themselves 
threatened by the growing presence of Latinos. But also with all its benefits, because the carnival 
legitimizes the presence of the Central Americans who are there not just as an anomymous mass, 
but with associations that represent them and attest to their appropriation of organizational 
cultural capital.  
The carnival, according to Bajtin, was an occasion so that “not only the school children and 
the clerics, but also the hierarchy and the doctors in theology would allow joyful distractions 
during which they would let go of their serious piety”, because the carnival “would force them to a 
certain extent renounce their official condition.”1 In other words, they let go of the mask of 
officials that Scott mentions as the prison of the dominant.2 The politicians who authorize and 
attend the carnival, and the police who ensure its security, play their bureaucratic roles, but 
claiming that they are unaware that those who are participating there, and having fun – like the 
Guatemalans who I joined – are undocumented. Without ignoring it, they contribute to the fact 
that the carnival is turning the world upside down. Their pretense rests on the “fungibility”3 of the 
documented and undocumented Latinos, that on the border, works to the detriment of the 
citizens with the “Mexican Brown” look, and in the interior works to the benefit of those who do 
not have documents. In this way the police participated in this counter-theatre of resistance to the 
anti-immigrant policies, that respond to the theatre of domination that takes place on the border, 
and also in the interior of the country. The Los Angeles police, who were so despised in the 70s by 
the Latino community due to the murder of the journalist Rubén Salazar and their harassment in 
the Latino neighborhoods4, become a tactical ally within the framework of this theatral 
dramatization. This “alliance” has limits, as does the scope of the drama. In a carnival context, it 
constitutes a prefiguration of a different social order in that sacred time that – according to Eliade 
– breaks with ordinary time and its hierarchical limitations5 and that, in this case, emerges as 
rupture from exclusion, even though it be under the form of a temporary interruption. 
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The imagined community becomes flesh in space 
A result of these festivities, derived from their nationalist symbolism and the fact that they are an 
occasion for gathering for those who share a similar origin in the past, and a similar situation in the 
present, is the constitution of a people that are beting on a better future. Žižek insists on the 
potential of popular demonstrations to create a people, regardless of their temporary nature, with 
arguments similar to those of Thompson to recover the strength of the counter-theatre of the 
subjugated: “The issue is not then the displacement of the power relations and domination among 
real social and political agents, the redistribution of social control, etc., but the very fact of 
transcending – or rather of suspending for a moment – that very control, the emergence of a 
completely new terrain of “collective will”, a pure “meaning event” in which all the differences are 
left annulled, become irrelevant.”1 This is what Žižek calls “becoming a People”. The more 
explicitly political demonstrations, which intentionally seek changes in migratory policies, build on 
these festival exercises that recreate the imagined communities. The symbology, the histrionic 
appeals, the dramatization, the intention of parrhesia, the political use of the streets, the tshirts, 
the banners and even the floats are the same. 
If equating undocumentation to clandestinity can have some validity2, it is evident that 
participation in demonstrations, carnivals and massive festivals are forms of leaving clandestinity. 
And even though it is obvious that diluting themselves into a mass of Central Americans or Latinos 
whose legal status is indistinguishable is a way of maintaining clandestinity – because the hidden 
transcript is replaced by a public transcript, but pronounced by a hidden actor -, the event entails a 
very significant challenge in itself. The murals and the celebration of independence are very big 
challenges because they put into question who the territorial sovereign is, who administers the 
use of public spaces. I will come back to this aspect shortly. But the challenge is more significant 
because of the performative contradiction: the migrants fight for a use of the space with free 
mobility, and their tool of the struggle is their demonstration in the space. Butler maintains that 
“once we reject the view that claims that no political position can rest on performative 
contradiction, and allow the performative function as a claim and an act whose effects unfold in 
time, then we can actually entertain the opposite thesis, namely, that there can be no radical 
politics of change without performative contradiction. To exercise a freedom and to assert an 
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equality precisely in relation to an authority that would preclude both, is to show how freedom 
and equality can and must move beyond their positive articulations.”1 This exercise of freedom 
and affirmation of equality that we find in the murals and parades is what I call performative civil 
disobedience. To the extent that these mechanisms are able to be a true exercise of parrhesia, the 
performative contradiction opens the door to a performative effectiveness, or performative 
prefiguration, where the “not yet” only refers to legal validity, but is left subsumed by an “already” 
underpinned by legitimation. Returning to the field of space, Butler recognizes that the singers of 
the anthem in English “are not singing from a state of Nature. They're singing from the streets in 
San Francisco and Los Angeles. And this means that they alter not just the language of the nation 
but its public space as well.”2 We can say the same of the muralists and parade marchers. The 
symbolic and performative effectiveness of their acts is reinforced by the means chosen: the 
public spaces, that are the scenario of state sovereignty. 
Butler adds that there is a gap between the claim of liberty and its exercise, but he also 
points out that “to make the demand on freedom is already to begin its exercise and then to ask 
for its legitimation is to also announce the gap between its exercise and its realization.”3 
Demanding is a beginning of exercising. If freedom is exercised in acts – that also include discourse 
– it fulfills its proclamation, even though the gap might continue existing between the 
“already/but not yet” between its exercise and realization. The habitual exercise, that each day 
wins more legitimacy, is closing the gap. But the existence of the gap is what gives it political force: 
if he who speaks the truth does not have the right to say it, that act of disobeying has a more 
parrhesiatic character, because the one who speaks puts himself in a situation of risk, using a right 
that the law has not recognized he has. 
Nevertheles, the effectiveness of these actions is not guaranteed in itself, and their 
achievements are not irreversible. Even though Latorre maintains that “the Balmy murals continue 
to be, for the most part, testaments of oppositional consciousness and Indigenist aesthetics that 
reflect the still predominantly Chicana/o/Latina/o cultural makeup of the Mission District”4, the 
flood of tourists that visit Balmy Alley can entail a risk of making them politically harmless, just to 
mention one of the possible forms of decaffeinating – incorporating into the mainstream – the 
instruments of counter hegemonic struggle. Murals as well as festivals can suffer the scourge of 
                                            
1 Butler, 2007, pp.66-67. 
2 Butler, 2007, p.67. 
3 Butler, 2007, p.68. 
4 Latorre, 2008, p.165. 
  284 
time and be absorbed as colorful elements of the existing order. Žižek warns about the possibilities 
of cooptation, and shows himself to be pretty skeptical about the carnival expressions that are not 
able to institutionalize themselves: “A democratic explosion reconfigures the hierarchically 
established “political” order of the social space; it offers (…) a different distribution of the public 
space. In the current “society of spectacle”, such esthetic reconfiguration has lost its subversive 
dimension: its appropriation by the existing order is too easy (…) even though everyone likes 
democratic rebellions, spectacular/carnival explosions of the popular will, anxiety becomes 
evident when that will wants to persist, institutionalize itself…”1 
The opportunities for these counterhegemonic acts to become institutionalized are 
limited. But their effectiveness does not depend on that institutionalization. It depends on the 
reactions (the perlocutionary effect) whose direction and dimensions no actor can completely 
control. If the newspapers,  artists, bureaucrats that design and apply the migratory policies, and 
the politicians do not directly access the “words” of the murals and the celebrations of 
independence, those words can get to them through intermediaries: the tourists that pass by, the 
academics that study these expressions, the bureaucrats that have to grant the permits for the 
installation of the murals and the parade routes. The possibility of this effectiveness and a change 
in the policies also depends on the margins for action that the state heterogeneity allows, which I 
will discuss in the fourth chapter. It depends on the imagined community dovetailing with a 
tradition or various traditions in the destination country, and on that terrain I believe that the 
Central Americans have made a commendable effort to take up again the struggles of César 
Chávez, the symbols of the Chicanos and the discourse of a country of immigrants. It also depends 
on a convincing work of publicity, whose greatest achievement – to be discussed in the following 
section – are the Dreamers, a conquest still in process, but that seems irreversible, even though 
limited in its demographic and temporal scope. With all these conditions, the murals and the 
celebrations have made a contribution to the integration of the non-movement of the 
undocumented, to their integration becoming more visible, practicing parrhesia, finding itself and 
recognizing itself as a collective with common interests. 
 
3.3 The undocumented form a movement: Parrhesia and civil disobedience 
explain the Dreamers 
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The “Dreamers” are a particular group of the undocumented, among whom Central Americans 
have a significant presence. The term comes from the DREAM Act (Development, Relief, and 
Education for Alien Minors Act), originally sponsored by Senators Orrin Hatch of Utah and Richard 
Durbin of Illinois in 2001. This bipartisan bill sought to facilitate the entry into institutions of higher 
education those illegal immigrant minors who have obtained a high-school diploma. According to 
Susan Martin, “these students were barred legally from seeking employment and were 
constrained from pursuing additional education because of the high costs of out-of-state tuition. 
The DREAM Act would authorize states to determine residency for higher education purposes, 
regardless of an individual’s immigration status. It also would suspend removal of students who 
were admitted to an institution of higher education or joined the military. After a six-year wait, the 
immigrant could gain permanent residence status.”1 The acronym resonants with known slogans 
like “the American dream”, and “I have a dream” of Martin Luther King. Its purpose was to pave 
the way for the legal education and residence of a segment of the undocumented who show 
tangible signs of potential. The original version of the bill, submitted to a vote in 2006 as part of 
the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006 (CIRA), possibly would have benefitted 2.1 
million undocumented people.2 
This bill did not win a consensus, but led to different bills that imitated its logic: granting 
conditional status to undocumented youth – of proven good conduct –access to in-state tuition for 
university studies, and eventually legal residency. The Congressional Budget Office issued a report 
in which it estimated that the December 7, 2010 version of the DREAM Act (H.R. 9467) would 
increase revenues by $1.7 billion and would reduce deficits by about $2.2 billion over the 2011-
2020 period.3 Referring to the 2011 version (S.952 and H.R.1842), that modified – among other 
parameters – the maximum age and the application cost, a study conducted by the Center for 
American Progress estimated that if passed, the DREAM Act “would add $329 billion to the U.S. 
economy and create 1.4 million new jobs by 2030.”4 One alternative to the DREAM Act was the 
Studying Towards Adjusted Residency Status (STARS) Act of 2012 (H.R. 5869)5, that further 
restricted the group of potential beneficiaries, increasing the application costs and reducing the 
maximum application age from 33 to 19 years of age. Created by the conservative Republican 
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Senator, member of the Tea Party Movement, and current candidate for the Presidency, Marco 
Rubio, the STARS Act also extended the period of conditional status, that is, the time to access 
residency, beyond the end of university studies. One month after the promotion of the STARS Act, 
President Barack Obama announced that his administration would stop deporting young 
undocumented individuals who match certain criteria previously proposed under the DREAM Act. 
So the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program began, that could end up 
benefitting 1.7 million undocumented individuals already present in the United States,1 or up to 
1.76 million, according to another calculation, that estimated 1.3 million beneficiaries from Mexico 
and Central America.2 In reality it could benefit many more, if we take into account that the 
program has been accepting newcomers. 
Prior to this program in July 2011, the state of California enacted the California DREAM 
Act, giving undocumented immigrant students –who entered the USA under the age of 16, and 
have attended school on a regular basis- access to funded financial aid for higher education. A 
Berkeley Law School’s study mentioned that 400,000 undocumented children reside in California, 
the majority of whom were brought to the United States before the age of 12. Few of them can 
get access to Higher education, since the cost of college is the most prohibitive barrier for 
undocumented students. According to this School of Law, only 1,620 undocumented students 
enrolled in 2005 in the University of California and California State University systems benefited 
from in-state tuition provided by California’s Assembly Bill 540. Different studies have emphasized 
the consequences of this legal vulnerability in terms of access to university education and other 
types of training.3 This situation reduces the projected income for this particular population, since 
“a worker with a bachelor’s degree will, on average, earn $1 million more over her lifetime than a 
high school graduate.”4 Therefore, it is assumed that the law that California approved will have a 
domino effect on a more appropriate labor force for future economic challenges, will increase 
consumption, and will provide more tax income. 
 
 
The Dream Acts create a category: the label makes the actor 
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Among the Central Americans who benefitted from DACA is Sofía Villatoro, a 26 year old 
Guatemalan, who I mentioned in the previous chapter. First, she was a beneficiary of the 
Convention Against Torture (CAT), and now is a beneficiary of DACA. But in 2005, to the surprise of 
her teachers and classmates who knew her above all as a dedicated and outstanding student, she 
was on the verge of being deported. Her father entered the country as an undocumented person 
in 1991. Sofía did it eight years later. She came to the United States at the age of nine, fleeing the 
violence, and sent by her grandmother without any accompaniment other than the coyotes who 
she paid for her trip, and who left her at the door of her astonished parents home in the Mission 
District of San Francisco. In 2005 her father wanted to start his own janitorial business. Becoming 
legal was essential, and to achieve it, he paid some thousands of dollars to some shyter lawyers 
who did a terrible job, leaving Sofía on the brink of deportation. Her case attracted the attention 
of the San Francisco Chronicle, and the story on her attracted a chain of favorable reactions. 
But this did not completely solve the problem. She was only one of the 60,000 
undocumented students that graduate each year from secondary school.1 Among the people that 
migrated from Central America, they were in a relatively small group: the relative weight of 
Central Americans with a high school degree goes from 21% of Guatemalans up to 26% of 
Nicaraguans and Hondurans, with Salvadorans at 25%.2 Many do not plan on going on to 
university. Sofía had that dream since she was little. In a dining hall for the staff of the University 
of San Francisco, she told me about her unusual path to higher education, “I always wanted to go 
to this university. I used to help my Dad work, and would come by here on the way to work. We 
are very Christian and that is why my Dad would tell me that if I wanted to go to this school, God 
would make it happen. He would say to me, ´”if you really believe it, I challenge you to get down 
and go pray there next to the wall.”´Sofía was embarassed that passerbys would stare at her. 
“They are going to say that I am crazy. I was 14 years old. But I did it for many years. He would 
stop at Fulton Street and I would get down and put my hands on the wall, “Of course I am going to 
go to this university. I do not know how, nor with what money, because I do not have the money, 
but I am going to come here.” The people looked at me like they were thinking “what´s wrong with 
her?”.  I would pray and my Dad would be looking at me, and that is where he believed me and 
said, “Wow, you really want to go there.” And I applied. They accepted me, and one of the priests 
of the university wanted to meet me. He knew about my case, because in my application I 
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included the article about my case that appeared in the San Francisco Chronicle, so that they 
might see that it was not a lie that I did not have the money. And I got income, a job, everything… 
And I graduated in Psychology last year. It is a dream come true. And now every time I pass by 
Fulton Street, I remember this.” It took Sofía a lot of effort to get her bachelor´s degree, because 
her father got sick, and at night she had to go to work with her family cleaning restaurants, the 
work of her parents, and the only source of income for the family. Now she is studying for a 
Master´s degree, and has a job at the University of San Francisco. 
Sofía undocumented condition awakened a series of reactions of solidarity. In large part 
because she was a Dreamer, a label coined in 2001, but did not get legal validation until 2012. Its 
history is a reflection of the impact created by the best label ever invented by the immigrants and 
their allies, for multiplying their possibilities of social acceptance and legal validation. As Nicolls 
points out, “Before 2001 ´Dreamers´did not exist as a political group. There were hundreds and 
thousands of undocumented youth facing a unique set of problems resulting from their position of 
being ‘in-between’ countries.”1 The Dreamers are a social-political construction that aspires to 
achieve its legal implementation. The Dreamers category has shown itself to be a powerful 
ideological device to fight for the inclusion of the immigrants. In the same way that those 
practicing civil disobedience in the 60s invented a victim of segregation when Rosa Parks went to 
prison, those practicing immigration disobedience invented some victims when they broke the 
Dreamers off from the group of non authorized immigrants. Even though segregation and its 
resistance existed for some time, before Rosa Parks and before the private murdered by the 
police, and even though for the African Americans it was an everyday thing, King as well as the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) realized immediately the 
enomous media potential from the jailing of Rosa Parks. The case of Parks gave them the 
opportunity to present segregation to journalists under a bright light. It was a publicity coup. The 
practice of civil disobedience needed the impact of these jolts. The non-movement of the 
undocumented achieved this jolt through the construction of the figure of the Dreamers. In both 
cases, the labels fulfilled the function of making visible what was passing unnoticed, and 
abnormal, what had become accepted through the inertia of custom. 
As William and Iliana Pérez observed, “most recently, students across the country have 
adopted the label ‘DREAMers’. These new labels and political identities help students not only 
conceal their stigmatized status but also reinforce their merits as students through their activism. 
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Under these new labels, students organize, recruit others, and share resources. Unintentionally, 
AB540 and the DREAM Act have shaped the political identities of undocumented student activists. 
To them, these laws not only represent access to higher education and legal status, but they are 
also a formal recognition of their earned belonging in society and signal support for their 
endeavors.”1 Not since the collective of “sanctuary” was created in the 80s, over which the 
American Baptist Churches and their allies fought the Attorney General in court, has such a 
politically effective label been created. 
We can measure its effectiveness through its effect on the communications media. With 
the ingenious and meaningful title “Covering immigration” the anthropologist Leo Chavez 
published a book in 2001 on the media images and migratory policies. Based on an analysis of 
magazine covers, Chavez shows that the media images both reflect the popular attitude toward 
migration, and mold the national discourse on the issue. Chavez wants to show how the media 
have cultivated the fear that the public feels toward immigration. Their selection of front covers 
and headlines is irrefutable: America’s Uneasy New Melting Pot (Time, 13 June 1983), The World’s 
Poor Flood the U.S., The Economic Consequence of a New Wave (Business Week, 23 June, 1980), 
The New Refugees. Should America Take Them In? (U.S. News and World Report, 23 October, 
1989), What will the U.S. be like when whites are no longer the majority? America’s changing 
colors (Time, 9 April, 1990), Tired? Poor? Huddled? Tempest-Tossed? Try Australia. Rethinking 
Immigration (National Review, 22 June, 1992), Immigration and the new American dilemma: Black 
vs. Browns (The Atlantic, October 1992), Immigration Backlash. A Newsweek poll: 60% Americans 
say immigration is ‘bad for the country’ (Newsweek, 9 August, 1993), Go back where you came 
from. Since the very beginning, many Americans have wanted this to be our immigration policy. Is 
it starting to happen? (American Heritage, March 1994), Border crisis. Illegal aliens out of control? 
(U.S. News and World Report, 25 April, 1977), Time bomb in Mexico. Why there’ll be no end to the 
invasion by “illegals” (U.S. News and World Report, 4 July, 1977, Illegal aliens. Invasion out of 
control? (U.S. News and World Report, 29 January, 1979), Invasion from Mexico (U.S. News and 
World Report, 7 March, 1983), and The disappearing border (U.S. News and World Report, 19 
August, 1985).2 
The above are a pair of the covers that Chavez mentions in his book. The panic over the 
loss of control of the border, the uncomfortable effects of the ethnic melting pot and the – not 
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always hidden – desires for a turn toward some deliberately anti-immigrant policies are Leitmotivs 
of the covers and the articles. This tendency continues and even gets worse after 9/11, as we can 
see in the cover on the left of the two illustrations below. 
That cover is from September 20, 2004, done in a way that it can be said that on the one hand 
reflects a verdict of public scrutiny on Operation Blockade (later renamed “Hold the Line”), Operation 
Gatekeeper, Operation Safeguard and Operation Rio Grande and similar ones that were applied in the 
90s and reinforced after the attacks, tripling the number of Border Patrol agents. On the other hand, it 
advocates for – and justifies – the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention law that 
authorized the contracting of 2,000 new agents per year for the following five fiscal years, and the 
construction of more border barriers. In his next book Chávez mentions this illustration, “In this image, 
the flag represented both the fabric of the nation, which was being torn apart, and the border between 
safety and terrorists trying to enter the country. The implicit message was that this shredding of the 
nation’s border and the flag must be stopped. The new threat of terrorism resulted in calls for 
controlling the border as a means of improving homeland security.”1 In contrast with this image, eight 
years later, Time broke away from its tendency to an image on the right (June 2012). This time the 
magazine did not limit itself to an image and a text. Time proposed the undocumented migrant as their 
person of the year, and for that purpose released a video where a number of undocumented youth 
defended their Americanness in impeccable English. Even though the title was won by Barack Obama, 
the "Undocumented Immigrants" won a very respectable third place.2 
The issue is: To what undocumented migrant was Time referring? The video did not leave room 
for doubt: they were the Dreamers. The political label became a media label. A lot of the media began to 
talk about the “Undocumented Americans”, a term that did not have an official definition, but that the 
American Psychological Association publicized and explained through an eloquent 10 minute video on 
their web site.3 These undocumented Americans are a fragment of those who the Cuban academic and 
immigrant Rubén Rumbaut baptized in the 80s as the 1.5 generation.4 Rumbaut describes them as “born 
abroad but brought at an early age to the United States” and that they “are understandably more likely 
to retain their parents’ nationality as their own self-identification”.5 Since being in school and not having 
entered puberty are relatively floating foundations, the statistical analyses located them as migrants 
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that arrived between 0-12 years of age, the age that Rumbaut himself arrived.1 This has been a very 
useful analytical label. But it alone acquired its capacity to reappear – in a more restricted version – as 
Dreamers. In fact among academics the association of the 1.5 generation with the youth gangs is very 
well established.2 Just as they have been selected by the different versions of the Dream Act, the 
Dreamers are the “healthy” segment of the 1.5 generation. Nevertheless, , even though they may have 
acted as a purging process, the successive Dream Acts were also a politization process. The 1.5 
generation went from being an analytical concept, to functioning as a social-political category that begat 
a movement. From the enormous non-movement of the undocumented, policy makers, activists, 
academics and journalists have broken off a fraction disposed to taking the form of a movement. The 
label has created the actor. And this actor was capable of arousing greater social acceptance than the 
entire group of undocumented, because they condensed a series of shared values and characteristics of 
the good citizen and the assimilated immigrant: effort, good conduct, years of residency, mastery of 
English, educated in the US system and, the most importantly, not having broken even the migration 
laws, because they were “forced” to migrate by their parents when they could not object (this is a topic 
that I will take up again later on). 
But this construction, that first started from activists and policy makers, caused a change in the 
media. Note the contrast between the last two covers of Time magazine. Between one and the other 
movies and documentaries favorable to the undocumented had multiplied, and the entertainment 
industry had acquired greater awareness about the purchasing power of Latinos. The media had moved 
to being a much more propitious terrain for taking up and projecting the “Dreamers” label. Introducing 
the label in the media was as imporrtant or more important than introducing it into Congress. There the 
perlocutionary effect could be multiplied. Castells maintains that the media “are not the Fourth Estate. 
They are much more important: they are the space of power-making. The media constitute the space 
where power relationships are decided between competing political and social actors. Therefore, almost 
all actors and messages must go through the media in order to achieve their goals. They have to accept 
the rules of media engagement, the language of the media, and media interests.”3 The lable played on 
that field and received wide coverage.4 Once catapulted by the media, it produced formidable results. 
The power of the media was such that this sector of the undocumented became a full parresiastes that 
made the journey from “From the Streets to Congress”, as Gleeson significantly titled a paragraph of the 
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article in which he describes different forms of the parrhesia of the Dreamers: “mobilizations for these 
victories have ranged from online petitions, to sit-ins at congressional offices, to mass marches, and 
even to a 540-mile bike ride from UCLA to UC Berkeley to raise scholarship money for undocumented 
students and push for immigration reform.” 1 But right after the debut in the media, this exercise of 
parrhesia occurred, and about which Perez and Perez said: “In efforts to claim rights and a political 
voice, undocumented student activists speak at press conferences; organize petitions; send letters to 
elected officials with their personal stories; testify in favor of in-state tuition laws before legislative 
committees; and stage public actions such as fasting, vigils, and civil disobedience that have received 
broad media coverage. (…) As a result, there are growing numbers of identified undocumented student 
groups across the United States.”2 
The category “Dreamer” was a political, legal and media construction. In the ideological battles 
– that know how to make use of influential archetypes – the effectiveness of this label can be weighed in 
contrast to the associations of war veterans that demonstrate every Sunday, wearing their resplendent 
military uniforms and shiny medals, on the Tijuana/San Diego border and other points along the 
southwest border. The most important group are the “Veterans Without Borders”, that in Tijuana is 
composed of 30 war veterans deported for having committed some crime. All were residents, all 
consider themselves citizens with full rights for having risked their lives for the United States, even 
though now they cannot even collect their military pensions, nor access medical benefits, nor social 
security.3 They asked for an audience with the White House. According to their own declarations, Alex 
Murillo served in the army from 1996 to 2000, is 36 years old and has four children (17, 14, 12 and 8 
years of age). He used to live in Phoenix, Arizona, when he was deported in 2006. “A number of us 
veterans from different countries around the world were deported, but we are Americans. We are 
veterans of the US armed forces. We belong to the United States and we should be at home. Now we 
are fighting to return to our country and our families. The army washes its hands of us, puts the blame 
on the President or the immigration laws. What happens is that when a crime is committed in which 
your sentence is longer than 365 days, and you are not an American citizen, you are deported after 
having paid your debt to society. We are paying the debt with the same society for which we were 
willing to give our lives as members of the armed forces.” Héctor López, a 50 year old veteran deported 
in 2007, adds, “By Federal law, when we die they have to bury us in the veteran´s cementary in the 
United States. We will be able to return dead, but not alive.” I asked him, “What war did you fight in?” 
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He responded, “In Reagan´s.” Never better stated. The war did not appear to be an institutional matter 
of a state, that one day asked them to risk their lives, and now has nothing to do with them. 
The different versions of the DREAM Act have paved the way toward legal residency for the 
unauthorized immigrants who enrolled in college or serve in the military. But also in all its versions it 
includes the requirement of good conduct. Up to two misdemeanors can be tolerated, but the third 
misdemeanor, or just one felony, would be enough to disqualify the applicant. The expelled veterans – 
originally in a better position than the Dreamers – are 3,000 legal residents who ended up being treated 
as the most undesirables of the illegals. They were affected by the excessive overlap between penal 
legislation and migration legislation: once a “foreign born” resident commits a crime, the court reviews 
their migratory history,  and the fact of having been born in another country annuls their right to reside 
in the United States and dismisses the services that they provided in Vietnam, Panama, Kosovo, the Gulf 
War, Iraq and Afganistan. They are another segment of the 1.5 generation. Some arrived as nursing 
babies and had lived in the United States for 30, 40 years. Some had to learn or relearn Spanish. They 
had not obtained parrhesia: the label “Veteran” has not been powerful enough for them to get an 
audience at the White House and their appearances in the media were reduced to an annual 
appearance in the local newspapers. 
 
The Dreamers and civil disobedience on an explicit level 
As soon as the Dreamers differentiated themselves from the mass of the undocumented – when they 
formed a subgroup within that gigantic non-movement – they were able to form themselves into a 
movement. So they began to make use of the parrhesia acquired with the label and its dissemination in 
the media. The Dreamers used the label and their clean record to fight for the undocumented in 
general. Gleeson maintains that “one of the central questions emerging from the undocumented 
student movement has been whether individuals who were brought to the United States as children 
should be ‘punished for the sins of their parents.’” 1 This could have led to a dangerous dicotomy: guilty 
parents and children forced to migrate, parents who do not speak English and children who spoke it like 
any native, parents without education and children with the prospects of being university students. A 
dangerous dividing line was being drawn in the non-movement of the undocumented, one that would 
separate the legalizables ones from the non-legalizables, a line – Nicholls maintains - “between 
immigrants who deserve legalization and those who deserve deportation.”2 But immediately a fight was 
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undertaken to include the parents. That is why “many DREAMers have fought to reframe the typical 
labeling of undocumented students as innocent, versus the undocumented parents who brought them 
as criminal. Recent mobilizations have further complicated the image of high-achieving DREAMers as the 
only subjects worthy of rights. In addition to engaging in civil disobedience to push for legislative reform 
and launching petitions to protest the detention and deportation of fellow DREAMers, activists have also 
highlighted the tragedy of family separation, and the devastating impact of ongoing deportation for 
entire communities.”1 
The Dreamers took advantge of the fact that the support for a segment of the undocumented 
was in the process of becoming politically correct. This was the sign that Time magazine sent with its 
cover, its campaign and its video. The Dreamers were an advance party of the great non-movement of 
the undocumented. They did not allow them to be broken off from the group, because they refused to 
moralize the right to inclusion. As if they had realized that that was the Achilles heel of the deported 
veterans, they have not accepted the dicotomy that politicians, analysts, academics and journalists were 
building, a distinction with moral overtones to branch off the legal fates of the two fractions of the non-
movement of the undocumented. But they did use their label and their acquired parrhesia as a 
movement to speak about the entire whole. Definitely, a segment was able to increase social 
acceptance in a sector of the media and a group of Congresspeople, a movement was formed, and used 
that power to benefit the entire non-movement to which it continues to belong. 
The passage from non-movement to movement implied a leap from performative civil 
disobedience to a civil disobedience that presents itself explicitly as such. In the University of San 
Francisco there is a group of Dreamers who are studying there, meet regularly, and have come to form a 
group, the San Francisco Working Project. Gabriela García belongs to this group, 23 years old, a student 
of international relations there, a beneficiary of DACA. As part of her activism as a Dreamer, Gabriela has 
practiced civil disobedience to pressure the government to stop the deportations and expand coverage 
of DACA. On April 11, 2014 she sat down in the cross section of the principal avenues of San Francisco, 
blocking a major intersection, shaking with fear, but certain she was fulfilling her duty. 
In reality her first act of disobedience was three years before, when she crossed the border as a 
family decision, with her disobedient parents, as she implicitly acknowledged to a journalist who 
covered her defiance of the law and attended the civil disobedience training of Gabriela along with 20 
other Dreamers. “Though García isn't telling her mom about the civil disobedience just yet, she says it’s 
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her mom’s own story that’s making her do it.” 1 Three days later, in an interview that she did on the 
campus of her Alma Mater, Gabriela was more specific, “This, the government has always interested me 
a lot, my situation.  I knew about César Chávez and Dolores Huerta. I would think, “Wow, how cool! But 
if you stop to think about what they achieved, maybe it is not much, because there are still a lot of 
things to change. When they interviewed me, I told them, “I am here showing my face. But this is not 
just my story. This is the story of my parents, that had the courage to cross the border against the 
prohibition. My Mom was the first rebel. Everything I am is because of them, because they never gave 
up.”2 Gabriela establishes the relationship behind her rebellion. She specifies that her civil disobedience 
finds its roots in the defiance of her parents, a chain where some political acts beget others, because the 
decisions of the first generation of immigrants shaped the political condition of the 1.5 generation. 
According to Marquardt and Vásquez, the partial successes – for the moment – of the Dreamers 
(the attention of the Obama administration and the sympathy of many U.S. citizens) “can be attributed 
in large part to the strategic use of practices of peaceful civil disobedience, including marches and sit-
ins, as well as the widespread use of compelling testimonials, which groups like United We Dream 
borrowed from the civil rights movement.”3 The Dreamers knew how to connect to a well established 
tradition of civil disobedience as a tool for struggle to include the excluded. Their passage through the 
school and the university, the relationships that they harvested after the media attention, and their 
protection against deportation as a segment of the undocumented to benefit from DACA, placed them 
in conditions of knowing and practicing civil disobedience. And that practice has kept their presence in 
the media and confirmed for the politicians that they are a political actor of growing importance. This 
recognition they obtained when Nancy Pelosi visited them at the University of San Francisco. She is a 
Democratic Congresswoman who has been characterized by her pro-immigrant positions, even during 
the discussion of thorny issues like the review of the cases of Haitian immigrants and the barriers to 
immigrants with HIV.4 They also got it when Obama said that the Dreamers are “Americans in their 
hearts, in their minds, in every single way but one: on paper”.5 But above all they got it with the success 
in the most costly of their struggles: the expansion of DACA to cover more than half of the non-
movement of the undocumented through an executive order announced on November 20, 2014. In 
short, the non-movement of the undocumented did practice a militant civil disobedience and increased 
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  296 
their freedom of expression for having turned themselves into a movement, emerged from anonymity, 
cultivating a catchy label and exploiting the opportunities of the state heterogeneity, an issue that I will 
develop in the last section of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4. A CITIZENSHIP IN THE MAKING: THREE REALMS OF VALIDATION OF 
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND “ILLEGAL” CITIZENSHIP 
 
The performative civil disobedience of the undocumented needs fertile ground that makes possible its 
daily practice and enactment in forms that connect with policy change. I do not intend to describe all the 
support efforts nor all the steps of the change process.  The objective of this work is to show the force 
for change of the collective actions of these non-collective actors who are the undocumented. This 
chapter pursues that objective. The mention of other actors is not exhaustive, but it is the occasion to 
obtain a fuller vision of a non-movement that would not have the opportunity of operating nor of 
getting out of legal marginality without significant support. In the previous chapter some of this support 
appeared: communications media, universities and academics, artists and other figures of show 
business, organizations and activists, churches, business people, etc. I chose three to illustrate how and 
through whom the performative civil disobedience of the undocumented, through its performative 
effectiveness and that of its supports, is a citizenship in the making. They are supports through whose 
reiteration and impacts, measured through interviews and participatory observation, seem substantial 
to me. Churches and migrant organizations are two of those supports. The other is state heterogeneity, 
a recurrent element that at times has a visible presence and at other times sneaks in subtly or is barely 
in the background.  Addressing it independently allows me to complement the second chapter, where 
the excluding will of the state appears in a presentation true to reality – as can be inferred from the 
collection of data that support it, even though it is not complete. 
Churches, organizations and state heterogeneity are three spheres of legitimation, and the 
latter, one of legal validation. Some legislation and heterogeneous bureaucratic requirements, or 
requirements applied with a certain amount of discretionality, the solidarity work of the churches and 
that of the organizations of the migrants themselves pave the way for neutralizing  the exclusions that I 
analyzed in the second chapter: a policy not much inclined to receive refugees, and subordinated to a 
geopolitical agenda, a partisan politics that blocks the path to massive legalization because the electoral 
quarry is segmented by ethnic niches, and the military industrial complex and the prison industrial 
complex conspire in the manufacture of enemies to justify a persistent rise in profits based on the 
privatization of security.  
Another common denominator of these three platforms and their practices is the 
institutionalization of prior conflicts between unauthorized entry and US migration policies. One 
conclusion is drawn from its lengthy shadow over time. The newcomers come to harvest the 
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crystallizations of past struggles, many of them waged in the 80s: the work of the churches, the total 
sum of the organizations and the institutionalization of their achievements in the state structure. 
Performative civil disobedience has this historical sediment as the condition for its possibility and 
effectiveness. Therefore, adverse policies are not the only elements that history has bequeathed the 
undocumented, but rather an enormous wealth of pro-migrant actors, political culture, ideological 
elaboration, informal and formal norms, leaders, experience and instruments of constructive and 
confrontative peaceful struggle. The actors that support them can appeal – like the disobedient of 
Walzer – to very deep-rooted traditions and to their group belongings and specific creeds. Their 
convictions in favor of the undocumented are founded on their memberships and fidelity to churches, to 
non-confessional organizations and to civic values that operate within a diverse and inclusive state 
apparatus.  
In this chapter I have tried to maintain symmetry with the last section of the previous chapter. 
The religious actors, the state, and the organizations of the immigrants are the fertile ground for the 
undocumented to fight for their integration, and obtain support as church members, civil disobedients 
in the public physical spaces and Dreamers that cannot be deported. The reasons for this symmetry: a) 
what the migrants get in the churches would not be possible without the accumulation – that began in 
the 80s – and the practice of the religious citizenry of the churches; b) what the migrants can achieve in 
their public, physical spaces (murals and demonstrations) is possible because of the state heterogeneity; 
c) the most polished and successful accomplishment of the organizations of migrants is the Dreamers, 
the movement of undocumented with which I concluded the previous chapter. 
1. Religious citizenship and churches in civil disobedience 
 
Undocumented migrants aren’t alone.  They wouldn’t be able to enter and stay in the United States 
without sustained daily support.  Who are the “criminals” who help them violate the law?  Are they 
“coyotes” crouching in the bushes?  Hot-headed anarchists ready to take on the State and rage against 
all authority?  Should we seek them in the shadowy networks of drug traffickers, terrorists and gangs, as 
some suggest?1 Among the main accomplices of those who slip past the border controls and sit at a 
table to which they were not invited are the faithful from different religions.  It makes more sense to 
look toward altars, search in pious brotherhoods, snoop around temples and stir up sacristies than to 
seek them in the shadows.  They are in the churches, confessional NGOs and explicitly Christian 
                                            
1 Fernández Menéndez and Ronquillo, 2007, pp.40 and 178. 
  
299 
universities.  They are priests and nuns, presbyters and pastors, imams and rabbis.  They are the most 
active catechists and worshipers.  They don’t wear the red star but rather rosaries and scapulae.  They 
aren’t moved by the financial gain many seek, nor are they held back by a much feared hell.  They’re 
moved by such diverse motives as only acquire meaning and value through their convergence in a 
political framework of tension between disrespect for the law and the fact of anti-immigrant legislation.  
The significance of their actions is played out in a scenario where the universal citizenship represented 
by belonging to a global church is put to the test by earthly policies that deny and constrict inclusion and 
fraternity in the tight straightjacket of nationality.   
Who are these accomplices of crime?  What do they plot in their rebellious secret councils?  
Why do they work against the law and erode state sovereignty?  Why are they so stubborn and 
disobedient?  What do they think?  I can offer you some answers by doing a quick review of their actions 
on behalf of undocumented migrants.  They all demonstrate political effectiveness and defiance and 
represent merely a sample of hundreds of similar actions throughout the extensive territory of the 
United States.  Regrettably, my direct experience is limited to the spheres of the Catholic Church, but I 
know that Protestant and other churches, as well as many non-Christian groups, share the same ideals 
and do similar work.   
1.1 The Kino Border Initiative 
 
My travels along the routes of the disobedient begin in Nogales, a two-headed metropolis of 235,000 
inhabitants split by the border line.  One head is Nogales, Sonora, in Mexico and the other is Nogales, 
Arizona, in the United States.  One people settled across two nations: more than 21,000 in the United 
States and “the rest” in Mexico, separated by a barrier judged impassable.  On the Mexican side, barely 
a stone’s throw from the Mariposa Gate Port, an entry and exit post in that barrier, is a diner where the 
Marist Missionary Sisters and the Jesuits feed migrants twice a day.  This is the Kino Border Initiative 
diner, coordinated by the Jesuit priest Sean Carroll. On the other side of the street, across which hangs a 
brand new metal sign welcoming you to Nogales, the sisters have a dormitory for women who need to 
stay a relatively long time.   A bit further on, coming into the city center, is the San Juan Bosco hostel, 
which in its 31 years of untiring service has sheltered more than a million migrants. The Christian La 
Roca Hostel, located in another district, was raided by 20 state and municipal police on July 9 last year.   
The police arrived at 11 pm, hooded and armed to the teeth.  They pointed guns at the 20 migrants 
staying there and at the Salvadoran family that runs the hostel.  They made them kneel and with shouts 
of “The first one who moves, we’ll fuck your mother!” stole their money, mobile phones and any 
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valuable belongings.  When they left with the booty, one migrant picked up the phone and reported the 
raid to the nearest police headquarters.  That only ensured that the same crew, alerted to the call by the 
same police, returned to look for the accuser, took photos of all the migrants one by one and 
threatened to kill them if they tried to report them again.1 
The next morning, at the Kino Initiative diner, the haggard and still trembling migrants 
recounted what had happened.  It was just part of that day’s violence, one report among those that 
Sister María Engracia collects daily.  She founded this mission in 2007, a follow-up to the tamales a 
group of women would cook and distribute among the migrants every month.  Sister Engracia recounts, 
“Many migrants used to sleep in the cemetery, on the tombs, because the police didn’t bother them 
there; they used to stay there for up to three months because they didn’t have any money.”  It’s still 
where those who stay in Nogales for longer than the three nights offered them by the San Juan Bosco 
hostel spend the night. 
When it started, the diner was no more than Sister Engracia, handing out lunches she extracted 
in a dizzying blink of an eye from the back of a pick-up truck parked on the hard street with a bridge for 
shade.  That was during the boom era for deportations through this border post.  She fed more than 200 
migrants a day, with the miniscule resources she was able to scrape together. Sister Engracia doesn’t 
succeed in hiding the impetuous and welcoming inner strength inside her diminutive person; it’s as if 
being a native of Jalisco means that tequila fire runs crazily through her veins.  Does she know she risks 
her life daily?  Undoubtedly, but risk is no issue to treat with solemnity.  The closeness and daily 
occurrence of violence give it another flavor.  A migrant in transit tells her that tomorrow he’s going to 
try and cross the border for the second or third time.  “See how it goes,” she says with the experience 
that knows all about danger and fate. She arrived in Nogales after a journey that didn’t anticipate this 
destiny: “I worked in schools, then I looked after my mother for four years.  I went to Brazil and that’s 
where I analyzed my practice.  According to the analysis, I hadn’t been able to do anything because I had 
worked with the lumpen proletariat...  and that isn’t the social class with which one should engage in 
revolution,” she adds with an ironic edge to her voice.  “The revolution must be made with another sort 
of person.   I became convinced it was necessary to work with people from a different level.  So I gave 
Bible classes throughout the country.  Then I was a vicar of my congregation and spent five years in the 
center of power.  But I felt I was getting too comfortable and wanted to return to the edge where I 
started, so that’s how I set off for Nogales to work with migrants.” 
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Working with the bare necessities and occasional volunteers went on for four years.  With 
support from the Society of Jesus and the diocese, the diner now has a building and a substantial team.   
Mariana and Armando are the first to arrive each morning, after getting their children off to school.  
They are a married couple who migrated from Puebla and vibrate with this work.  In a matter of 
minutes, Mariana can scramble seventy eggs in a gigantic frying pan then warm the respective tortillas 
at the same time as supervising the enormous coffee pot.  She’s barely ruffled by the chaos unleashed 
by infinite administrative screw-ups.  Posted at the metal gate with a sturdy, intimidating presence but a 
sweet tone of voice and gentle words, Armando is careful to filter out unsavory human traffickers and 
con men.   His clinical eye never fails.  Once the migrants are seated, Sister Alicia offers a quick prayer 
then leads them in a role-play: they’re sailing on imaginary rafts and have to put on some paper life 
jackets; they must touch their left ear with their right hand and their nose with their left index finger and 
then the other way round.  In surroundings shot through with mortal danger, this triviality seems like a 
surreal afterthought. But it works: everyone laughs, the ice melts, the tension drops, conversations start 
with table companions and for the moment they forget that each one is anyone, dragging past troubles 
and well-founded fears.  At the end of the day, everyone is on the same raft, even though the life jackets 
are as flimsy as paper.  Sister Alicia works a miracle every day: she repeats her role-plays with the same 
passion and fresh pleasantry as the first time. 
Next, Sister Engracia speaks.  She invites them to report violations of their human rights.  This is 
how they collect stories that contribute data to FUNDAR, an investigation center that advocates for 
human rights. This observatory shows that not only unemployment and re-uniting with family moves 
them to seek other lands.  Violence with its many faces from their point of origin—domestic, political, 
institutional, criminal, gangster, mafia—also comes up as a motivating force.  Among Central Americans, 
postwar fangs are still sunk deep into a region that isn’t managing to rise from the depths: drug barons 
with right of entry to the police, sky-high bribes, repressive military bodies from the 1980s recycled into 
cocaine guards, kaibiles training The Zetas in the art of brutal murders as their main persuasive tactic.  In 
Mexico, the violence of drug trafficking is undiminished and even fanned by military operations destined 
to curtail it with the application of an eye for an eye. In the past two presidential terms it developed an 
irresistible ejector force. Other sources tell us that many, although not the majority, travel by train.  
Even those who use this means of transport don’t use it for the entire journey.  Central Americans who 
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cross Mexico by train only account for between 10% and 14% of all Central Americans who cross this 
country.  Buses are the most used and safest means of transport.1 
 Many of those who have already been deported—the biggest group of those served by the 
diner—traveled up the East coast and entered the United States through Tamaulipas into Texas.  Some 
entered via McAllen, others through Laredo.  Nogales, which is now the main crossing point for Central 
Americans rather than the Tucson area, is located in McAllen.  Nonetheless, Tucson, with its terrifying 
desert, is still the area that takes most lives and where many deportations occur given the strategy of 
splitting groups up to discourage them from re-entering.  Some guests at the hostel had been captured 
in Calexico or McAllen, separated from the family and/or friends they were traveling with then 
transported to Nogales to be deported through the Deconcini Gate Port.  They are among the last to be 
deported through this border post.  In October 2014, the Mexican government inaugurated the 
extended Mariposa gate port, the one closest to the diner, which cost $200 million.2  Here they have 
fitted out a kilometer-long tunnel with bars to evacuate those detained by the Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE), otherwise known as “la migra.”  In single file and without a return ticket, men, 
women and children will walk unarmed, in the bowels of a colossal iron cage that seems to have been 
designed to contain the excesses of a legion of Cannibal Hannibals. 
Information such as the above continues to fall in drops as the migrants eat a substantial 
breakfast, served by the Green Valley Samaritans, two Jesuit novices and three young volunteers, one 
from the United States, one US-Colombian and another who came from the faraway Czech Republic; she 
had been a curator at the Prague Castle museum. They all work in other services, and this chopping of 
tomatoes and chilies to better preserve them in the form of a succulent red sauce is neither the least 
deserving nor most humble task.  With their coordinator Marla Conrad, they all carry on fraternal 
conversations with the migrants, treating them not as a mass of deportees but as the human beings 
they once were: mother of two children at high school, musicians in a small band, catechists, 
seamstresses, bakers, children looking for their mothers, taxi drivers looking for a better future...   
Christopher Boitano, one of the novices, tells me how he ended up there: “In the spiritual exercises I 
reflected and discovered that Jesus was a migrant.  That’s why I came here.  I was also concerned about 
the dehumanizing effect of migration: the same words Dominicans use for Haitians are used in the 
United States to refer to Mexicans and Central Americans.  People have a right to migrate.  Borders are 
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nothing more than imaginary lines in the sand.”1 During the conversation, the additional services the 
diner provides get underway.  They distribute personal care items and clothes and shoes in excellent 
condition.  The novice who is also a doctor provides medical care.  The Mexican consul subsidizes return 
tickets for Mexicans, taking their fingerprints and other information because their government will give 
them this gift only once in their life.   
A gringo looking like a member of the beat generation hands out a treasure for walkers: 
shoelaces.  An elderly couple collects milk and other products about to pass their sell-by date donated 
by supermarkets and gas stations.  The organization “No More Deaths,” which must hold the record of 
members in prison for leaving food and water in the desert on the migrants’ route, gives telephone calls 
to those split up by the migra and deported through different exits to facilitate their possibility of 
reuniting. In a flash they cross “to the other side,” the gringo side, to cash the checks the US government 
gives deportees to replace the money they were carrying.  Since the migrants have no way to cash the 
check in Mexico, it effectively represents a confiscation, a compulsory tax exceeding the millions 
obtained by the Zetas through extortion.  Parodying David Harvey’s accumulation by dispossession2, No 
More Deaths discusses this form of dispossession by deportation in its third major human rights report, 
“Shakedown: How Deportation Robs Immigrants of Their Money and Belongings.”  It is a thoroughly 
researched report overflowing with accusations, the most shocking of which is this one: immigration 
authorities failed to return their money and/or other belongings to a third of the 400,000 people they 
deported in 2013.  Most of them lost around $100, but others lost more.  A large part of the money was 
directly stolen by agents and another part was returned in the form of pre-paid debit cards or personal 
checks impossible to cash in Mexico except in greedy banks that charge a 25% commission.  As a result 
of this expropriation, 81% of those interviewed couldn’t buy a return ticket home, 77% couldn’t buy 
food, 69% couldn’t pay for accommodation and 53% were exposed to danger. Those benefiting from this 
accumulation are the US Treasury Department; NUMI Financial, the company that issues the prepaid 
debit cards; and the ICE agents or local police who don’t report the illegally obtained money.  This 
dispossession has occurred in millions of cases, except for the 1,481 attended by the No More Deaths 
Property Recovery Assistance Project between 2011 and 2014.3  If $37,025 was either prevented from 
being lost or was recovered in 165 properly documented cases mentioned in “Shakedown,” we could be 
looking at almost $90 million for the 400,000 deportees in 2013. 
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According to Marla Conrad, No More Deaths has Christian origins.   John Fife, a retired 
Presbyterian minister, who is a co-founder, created the Samaritan patrol as well, to help migrants in 
transit, and also founded the Sanctuary Movement in 1982.1 Sanctuary was born on March 24, 1982, on 
the second anniversary of the assassination of Monsignor Romero, when members of the Tucson 
Presbyterian Church announced to the Reagan government that they were prepared to violate 
migration laws by turning their churches into sanctuaries for Central Americans fleeing the death 
squads.  Fife hid hundreds of Salvadoran and Guatemalan migrants and helped them cross the country 
and get to Canada.  He was spied on and accused in 1986 of “human trafficking” in violation of federal 
laws.  He and nearly a dozen others had 71 charges filed against them, including conspiracy, transporting 
and sheltering illegal aliens and encouraging unauthorized immigration.2  Six of them, including Fife, 
were sentenced in a trial that once again put civil disobedience on the table.3 
In 2004, together with other religious leaders, Fife founded No More Deaths and the “New 
Sanctuary Movement.”4  Since 2008, No More Deaths has been a ministry of the Tucson Unitarian 
Universalist Church.5  Alicia Dinsmore, a No More Deaths promoter and collaborator on the shocking 
Shakedown report6, tells me that they have lawyers fighting deportations in Tucson and that a team 
travels to Mexico to provide different services and items to those who are about to cross the border: 
three telephone calls, Vaseline to reduce friction and prevent blisters, water filters and chlorine so they 
can get rid of bacteria in the water. “I think that to a great extent,” says Alicia, “we’re the reason Central 
Americans and Mexicans migrate so it’s unfair to make the migration process so difficult and deadly.  
The United States is the main one at fault here.  We make the policies that bring them here and we also 
have the jobs that attract them, then we make it almost impossible for them to cross over.  Our laws 
have many ridiculous features in order to exclude them.”7 
The Kino Initiative diner is located in what appears to be a no man’s land, but isn’t.  It has 
owners; two owners.  On the Mexican side the “hawks” monitor even the most minimal movements.  
“Hawks” or “points” are the names given to the cartel operators who lurk around and report on any 
gaps in border vigilance in order to sneak through drug shipments.  They complement their income by 
charging migrants a toll. The US side belongs de facto to the Border Patrol, with a license to dispose of 
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lives and property.  They demonstrate this when they shoot at civilian pedestrians on the Mexican side, 
an increasingly common practice that took the life of José Antonio Elena Rodríguez, a 16-year-old 
student gunned down by a Border Patrol agent.  On the night of October 10, 2012, after a basketball 
game, José Antonio was walking along the sidewalk of Calle Internacional, which runs parallel to the 
border fence.  People in the neighborhood heard between 14 and 30 gunshots.  From a watchtower, an 
agent hit José Antonio with 2 deadly bullets and finished him off with 8 more, most of them in the back.  
The US government hasn’t even disclosed the identity of the killer.1  But the youth’s mother filed a claim 
with support from the American Civil Liberties Union.  Natalia Serna, one of the volunteers from the 
diner, dedicated one of her most beautiful and moving songs to José Antonio.  “My name is José 
Antonio” starts like this: “The country on the other side / is a coward and a thief.  / It stole my life and 
didn’t want to show its face. / How much life they took / on that night of horror.  / They kept my life, / 
but not my heart.”2 
Nogales is dominated by the drug traffickers and Border Patrol, two lethal presences 
representing the migrants’ worst nightmare.  One group due to its concept of duty: the duty to defend a 
dividing line they understand not as a political convention but as a battleground.  The other group due 
to its business model, for whom migrants are merchandise, as Father Alejandro Solalinde puts it so well.  
He is the director of another refuge for migrants, the Brothers on the Road hostel, located in Ixtepec, 
Oaxaca, in southern Mexico:  “They’re victims of human voraciousness.  That’s what it is, more than 
anything else.  They don’t see the migrants, because they haven’t been educated to see them as people, 
to take care of them; rather they see them as merchandise.  So they have to get money out of them in 
any way possible, with beatings, whatever, all to get money out of them.”3 
Between these two fires, the Kino Initiative diner, the women of La Patrona in Veracruz who 
throw lunches to the migrants traveling on the train known as “The Beast,” the San Juan Bosco and 
Hermanos en el Camino hostels, the Posada Belén managed by Father Pedro Pantoja and many others 
are all oases that make it possible for the migrants to disregard the border every day and renew their 
energy and hopes while they are carried by people who risk their skins to breathe life and universal 
fraternity into the world.  Without those supportive people and that route of hostels, which is also a 
route of the disobedient, it would be much harder to cross the fence, that enormous vertical border that 
Mexico represents for Central Americans, and slip through its holes. 
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Before leaving Nogales, I accompany Pete Neeley, the Jesuit Superior in Nogales, to the San 
Miguel School belonging to the Silesians in Tucson.  The project called “The other side” has invited him 
to give a short talk.  Pete starts with a joke about the proverbial enmity Jesuits and Silesians have kept 
up throughout their history and how odd it is that he’s there.  As an observation perhaps a little 
exaggerated, but well suited to catch the students’ attention: here Jesuits and Silesians have a common 
cause with that of the migrants, to get to the other side. 
1.2 A priest in the Sacred Heart parish, Casa Tabor, and Annunciation House in El 
Paso/Ciudad Juárez  
 
At the other end of the border, in El Paso, Texas, is the Sacred Heart parish church, under Jesuit 
responsibility since it was founded in 1893.  The church gives classes in citizenship to those who are 
residents and teaches English to both documented and undocumented.  This is where Father Donald 
Ballinger works as the person in charge of migrant issues.  Following a life devoted to secondary 
education in Jesuit schools, Ballinger was sent to do parish work in Paraguay, where for 15 years he was 
an active and fearless opponent of General Alfredo Stroessner, Paraguay’s dictatorial ruler for 35 years.  
During Pope John Paul II’s visit to that country in May 1988, during Stroessner’s eighth and final term, 
Ballinger was detained along with a group of peasants he was accompanying on a hunger strike 
protesting crimes against human rights.1  At that time he was 60. I met Father Ballinger 16 years later 
when he was the parish priest of Arcatao in Chalatenango, El Salvador.2 He possessed an overwhelming 
energy and used to burst with enthusiasm for his work among the still smoldering scenes of the civil 
war.  A decade later, in March 2014, we met again in El Paso.  Now 86 years old, wearing a Chalatecan 
guayabera, he was still waging far from negligible battles.  I visited Ciudad Juárez several times with him.  
Ballinger crosses the road distractedly while he reads messages on his mobile phone and angry drivers 
shout intricate, point-blank insults about his mother.  He gets on buses with no idea of the cost of the 
fare and is baffled when his frail purse does not contain the required sum.  The driver ends up accepting 
any amount and Ballinger reaches his destination, divorced from the world’s hubbub and its pedestrian 
monetary cares.  In a further, even more roundabout, some would say “miraculous” way, he manages to 
return unharmed and in time for the community Mass, putting divine power and patience to the test.   
In the truck, as they call busses in Mexico, a trendy ballad blares out: “They think that because I 
crossed the line / I’m a drug trafficker / that’s enough of a thousand humiliations / just for being an 
                                            
1 Suro, 1988. 
2 Baxter Magolda and Kind, 2004, p.163. 
  
307 
immigrant / I’m singing for all my people / don’t forget it, bear it in mind / that those who were not 
wanted / are today elected President.”1 In Lomas de Poleo, a greyish slum on the edge of Ciudad Juárez 
where every drop of water is liquid gold devoured by a greedy sun almost as soon as it emerges from 
the faucet, is Casa Tabor, a community of contemplation and political action.  It is as nomadic as its 
founders, the nun Betty Campbell of the Sisters of Mercy and Carmelite priest Peter Hinde, who also 
founded CRISPAZ, Christians for Peace, in El Salvador in 1984, together with a Lutheran pastor and a 
Quaker activist who wanted to provide a refuge for those displaced by the civil war.2  Casa Tabor was 
founded in 1973 in Washington DC, then moved to San Antonio in Texas and found its final resting place, 
at least so far, in Ciudad Juárez in 1995. Hinde tells me there are fewer migrants in Juárez since the wave 
of violence, but they do still come.  At 80 and 91 years old, respectively, Campbell and Hinde belong to 
an endangered generation of revolutionaries.   Hinde, a pilot in the Second World War, crosses El Paso 
every Friday to protest the US government’s military invasions.  In Casa Tabor he and Campbell receive 
pilgrims and teach them about life on the border, lethal US foreign policy and violence in Ciudad Juárez.   
Hinde recommends I read The Beast, the English version of Los migrantes que no importan by 
Oscar Martínez: “If you read his book you get the impression that it’s a miracle anyone can get across 
this border without falling into the hands of Mexican drug traffickers or the ‘security forces,’ who are in 
league with the traffickers.”  Then he tells me a bit about Casa Tabor: “When Casa Tabor, which came 
out of the Christian Base Communities, was in Washington DC at the end of the seventies and start of 
the eighties, we used to receive refugees from Chile, Argentina, Bolivia and then El Salvador and 
Guatemala.  We set up solidarity committees with the different countries.  In 1981 we moved to San 
Antonio, Texas, so we could travel overland to Mexico, and then to Ciudad Juárez.”  It continues to be a 
moral reference point and a mecca to which many leftwing faithful make pilgrimages in search of 
spiritual nourishment and counsel.   Sister Betty shows me the collective murals they are making in 
memory of those murdered in Central America and the dead of Juárez.  They are very expressive 
mosaics. 
“Did you know,” Donald Ballinger asked me when we return, “that when I left El Salvador in 
2005 I was in contact with a people trafficker?  We were negotiating to make the journey from El 
Salvador to the United States with a group of migrants.  At first he asked me for US$5,000.  But I told 
him I wanted to go as chaplain to celebrate Mass with the people and all that.  So he cut the price to 
$1,000.”  Donald burst into one of his resounding guffaws in celebration of his victory.  “The New 
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Orleans Provincial first said no and then he said yes,” Ballinger went on.  “But the Central American 
Provincial told me: ‘No way whatsoever, because if I give you permission, everyone will want to go.’  It 
was my way of going with the migrants, accompanying them.” That’s Donald for you, I thought, a 
leopard that doesn’t change his spots.  His life is as non-conformist as those messages that graffiti artists 
as daring as he have painted on the channel walls of the Rio Bravo/Grande, glimpsable through the 
holes in the fence caging the Paso del Norte international bridge that both unites and separates Ciudad 
Juárez from El Paso:  “Walls can never hold back the spring,” “On this side there are also dreams” 
(signed: Ciudad Juárez Poetry Action), “Rubén was murdered by a migration agent and justice was never 
done, migra assassins.” 
On reaching the other side, we went to Annunciation House1, set up in 1978, according to 
Ballinger, when a group of “young Catholics and idealists met in El Paso looking for a higher purpose, 
something that might make them feel they were fulfilling a mission.”  The Catholic diocese in El Paso 
lent them premises for providing shelter to the homeless. Rubén García, the hostel’s future director and 
at that time director of the diocesan Office for Young Adults, reflects on the unexpected convergence 
between the consequences of geopolitics and his commitment: “The house was set up in 1978, at the 
time when the Sandinistas were overthrowing Somoza in Nicaragua and taking control of the country.  It 
was also when the guerrillas in El Salvador and Guatemala threw themselves into the hope that they too 
could achieve a change in government, which, as we know, didn’t happen.  But the civil war caused a 
flood of exiled migrants and El Paso was one of the border crossings where they arrived; which is why 
we received them here.” The sheltered homeless ended up being the countryless Central Americans 
who fled the civil war.  Currently Annunciation House shelters those fleeing the recent violence in 
Central America, violence that’s an aftereffect of the war and the harvest of the arms industry and drug 
trafficking activity. 
Its mission has placed Annunciation House in such a tense relationship with the immigration 
authorities that one morning the far-reaching claws of violence reached its own doors.   On February 22, 
2003, one of its guests, Juan Patricio Peraza, a 19-year old Mexican from Mexicali, was murdered by 
Border Patrol agents when he was putting out the trash close to the hostel.  Eight agents surrounded the 
young man and one of them, Vernon Billings, pulled the trigger at point-blank range.  Juan Patricio’s 
parents filed a case against the US government, but the Border Patrol went to the police station and 
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threatened to deport the eight witnesses, all guests in Annunciation House.1 In July 2014, in marked 
contrast to this extreme episode, Rubén García got a call from the ICE representative.  The number of 
Central American migrants who were minors detained in the Río Grande area in southern Texas, had 
greatly exceeded the immigration authorities’ capacity to process them.   The agent asked García: 
“Several planes with 140 passengers each are going to arrive at the processing center in El Paso.  We’re 
going to release them on parole.  Can you take in the ones who have nowhere to go?”2 
Since its founding, Annunciation House has received more than 125,000 people in its two 
hostels.  They get about three new migrants a week.  At least half are Central Americans, mostly from 
Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador.  If they come seeking asylum, they can stay several months and 
are referred to the Las Americas legal assistance and the Diocesan Migrant & Refugee Services. Ten 
volunteers look after them and organize the work.  Julia, who is one of them, explains her reasons for 
giving a year of her life to this work: “I was an English teacher at a school in Wisconsin and most of my 
students were migrants who had crossed the border.  That’s how I started to take notice of migration 
and the US immigration system.  I saw a lot of injustice committed by our system.  Who are we to say: 
‘You can’t come into our country’ to those who want to better their lives?  I wanted to change the 
migration system, but as I can’t do that, I looked for a way to help and learn more about the border and 
migration and that’s how come I decided to look for a volunteer program here.”3 
The night before leaving El Paso I met with the Labor Justice Committee, a group of attorneys 
who support migrants in their labor demands and organize protests against the migration authorities’ 
human rights abuses.  They meet once a week in a room in the Sacred Heart parish church. If my 
subconscious hoped to hear some pious statement from them, it was disappointed.  They’re a rather 
warlike group that puts the fragile tools of the law at the service of migrants in an inauspicious field: 
firstly, because the Border Patrol in El Paso has a very aggressive marketing strategy when it comes to 
selling itself as a benefactor of the community and secondly, because Texas enjoys a wage policy that 
allows for paying below the federal minimum level.  Not satisfied with this comparative advantage, the 
region’s employers have committed labor abuses against 98% of undocumented migrants, according to 
the Committee.4 The attorneys organize marches, pickets, fasts and other, ever more media-grabbing 
events against these conditions.  In March, 2014, six of them joined the We Belong Together fast for 
                                            
1 Rocha, April 2010. 
2 Truax, 2014. 
3 Interview with the autor, El Paso, Texas, 14/03/2014. 
4 Arellano, 2013. 
  310 
migration reform and against deportation.1  Carlos León, a counselor and former El Paso police chief, 
accompanied them in the session.   In impeccable Spanglish, he invited them to look for him: “When you 
have a problem, talk to me to get proceedings started.  I know what it is to fight to get a job to maintain 
a family.   I’m not going to say much.  I’m not a good speaker.  If there’s anything I can do...  What I told 
everybody: I’m your employee.  I was elected by you to serve you, not the other way around.  I’m your 
servant.  That’s why I’m here.  I’m going to pass around my card, please, talk to me.  I don’t back 
down.”2 
After the meeting, Donald finished off by clarifying his position: “It doesn’t matter that migrants 
break the law; I’m going to help them get in.  If I can help them, I’ll do it, because people have a right to 
improve their lives.  All people have a right to do that.  I’m coming to the point of view that countries 
shouldn’t exist.   We have the right to cross any border to earn our living.  When an astronaut looks 
down on the world, they don’t see borders.  God made the world without them.”3 
1.3 Resurrection of the Sanctuary Movement 
 
In September, 2014, 40 churches in Illinois and other states declared their support for migrants in 
danger of being deported.  “The movement is gaining strength and we’re not alone in our call to the 
consciences of all those who believe in God,” said the priest José Landaverde of the United American 
Catholic Church.  He added: “It’s a mandate of the Gospel and the Bible” to give sanctuary to those who 
need it: “We should respect God’s orders and call on the federal authorities to declare a moratorium on 
deportations.”4 Dozens of churches have opened their doors to migrants in danger of being deported.  
“To open the doors of a church, a synagogue or a mosque and declare it a sanctuary is a serious matter.  
Religious leaders and their congregations don’t take this decision lightly,” said the Reverend Noel 
Andersen, coordinator of the immigrants’ rights area of Church World Service.5 The eighth person to 
seek refuge in a church was Ángela Navarro, a Honduran resident in Philadelphia.  Captured by the 
migra when she crossed the border in 2003 at age 17 and now after 11 years living in Philadelphia, 
bearing two US children currently 9 and 11 years old, Ángela decided to take refuge in the West 
Kensington Ministry to resist the deportation order that had hung over her head for 10 years.6   After 
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two months and 6,000 signatures of support, her case was reviewed, the deportation was annulled and 
Ángela was able to go back to her family and job. 
It’s no coincidence that churches are giving their support to migrants.  I’ve related some 
examples in Catholicism, but among Protestants, Muslims, Jews and Hindus there are also similar 
approaches, episodes and activities.  The affirmation by Landaverde and Anderson of the divine 
mandate and seriousness of the decision find support in the Judeo-Christian tradition. The entire Torah 
orders it, as does the Bible: “Do not oppress an alien; you yourselves know how it feels to be aliens, 
because you were aliens in Egypt” (Exodus 23, 9).  “When you harvest the grapes in your vineyard, do 
not go over the vines again.  Leave what remains for the alien, the fatherless and the widow.  Remember 
that you were slaves in Egypt.  (Deuteronomy 24: 21).1  They are valuable precepts both for Jews and 
Christians. The specifically Christian tradition returns to this legacy.  The gospel of Matthew includes a 
beatitude for those who help migrants: “Come, you who are blessed by My Father; take your inheritance 
the kingdom prepared for you since the creation of the world.  For… I was a stranger and you invited me 
in.” (Matthew 25, 34-35).2 
Subsequent development of Christian practice and doctrine also took up the torch.  A mandate 
for hospitality towards strangers appears in chapter 53 of the Rule of Saint Benedict: “But let the poor, 
and strangers especially, be diligently entertained with all care, because in them Christ is more truly 
received.  For the simple fear of the rich doth beget them honor.”3 The US Catholic Church received this 
particular task in “Ecclesia in America,” Pope John Paul II’s exhortation to US Catholics: “...  to help them 
settle in their new land and to foster a welcoming attitude among the local population, in the belief that 
a mutual openness will bring enrichment to all.”  It reminds them that “the Church in America must be a 
vigilant advocate, defending against any unjust restriction of the natural right of individual persons to 
move freely within their own nation and from one nation to another.   Attention must be called to the 
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Historical reasons 
Obviously, the degree of commitment varies and all commands for solidarity with the poor and against 
the accumulation of wealth that will be corrupted by moths and woodworm (Matthew 6,19) don’t often 
produce changes in the conduct of the most self-confessed and self-satisfied Christians. “God helps 
those who help themselves” is a condensed version of the popular wisdom regarding believers’ 
ambivalent reaction towards doctrine and the omnipresent gap between theory and practice in the 
religious world.  Religious commands may have several readings and applications, according to each 
context.  In addition to the doctrinal-religious tradition, there is a historical-political tradition with which 
it is interlinked, since this is where one finds its expression and the possibilities of the Kingdom of God 
on earth. 
In the United States a historical link exists between the Catholic Church and recent arrivals: Irish, 
Italians, Polish, Mexicans and now Central Americans.  A long tradition places official Catholicism on the 
side of the migrants.  “Go to any church on a Sunday morning,” a Protestant pastor said in 1887, “and 
you will see lawyers, physicists, traders and businessmen with their families... but the worker and his 
household are not there.” According to historian Arthur Schlesinger, of all the ancient religions only 
Catholics and Jews knew how to attract and keep the workers and immigrants recently arrived in the 
United States at the end of the 19th century.1 The Catholic Church particularly attracted the Irish, 
German, Austro-Hungarians, Italians, Polish and francophone Canadians.2  Between 1850 and 1900 
Catholics in the United States increased from 1.606 million to 12.410 million, a substantial component of 
which was 5 million migrants.3 Fully conscious of immigrants’ potential religiosity, Protestant groups 
started engaging in missionary work in the Atlantic ports to care for the immigrants’ religious needs and 
practices.   Schlesinger writes that in 1883 the interdenominational American Home Missionary Society 
organized specialized departments for Germans, Scandinavians and Slavs.  According to him, the 
Protestant churches became well known for doing philanthropic and educational work among the poor 
and churchless once they took note of their potential as regular practitioners.4 Immigrants have 
represented a fertile field for proselytes that churches cannot ignore on pain of expiry due to the 
decrepitude and shrinking of the faithful.  Put in demographic terms: no church can sustain itself if it 
looks only to mere vegetative growth, often limited to the replacement rate; it needs new acolytes.  The 
migratory and religious history of the United States shows an electrifying dialectic tension in which 
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proselytizing among immigrants responded to a biblical and doctrinal base and the charisma and values 
of inviting strangers in and feeling compassion for the vulnerable fell on very favorable politico-religious 
soil.  This trend makes it possible for the churches’ claim of universality to be updated in a multi-
dimensional theocracy1 that has been revitalized by successive political negotiations and openings.   
 
The political effectiveness of religious citizenship: Religious citizenship vs national citizenship 
The claim of universality has been effective and has enjoyed renewed and creative re-editions.  In God 
Needs No Passport, US sociologist Peggy Levitt maintains that “some people do not live according to an 
atlas, or at least not the sort that most of us are used to.  These people imagine themselves living in a 
religious landscape...  They are not nationals or cosmopolitan, but rather members of faith communities 
made up of those all over the planet who share their creed.  Religious global citizenship implies rights 
and responsibilities that complement, supplement and occasionally contradict other forms of belonging.  
For this group, these rules are more important.”2  Michael Walzer has already pointed out this. They 
don’t ignore political borders, but “they think of themselves as people who live in an alternative 
topography, with residents, rules and landmarks that are more important than their secular 
equivalents.”3 For some people, Levitt tells us, one earth, one membership card and one identity are a 
secular version of the Holy Trinity4, and for many more the sacred spaces are more important than 
current political geography.5  This claim of many memberships, which does not mean dismissing political 
citizenship, assumes an acceptance that more and more people possess religious and global passports as 
well as national ones.6  Because of this, “religious global citizens want the right to live in accordance with 
their interpretation of religious law.”7 
Levitt’s arguments are convincing, her insight about religious landscapes superimposed on 
political ones is thought-provoking and her metaphor of global religious citizenship is powerful and in 
certain circles might find much empirical evidence to support it. But I think that in order to investigate 
what’s happening with this citizenship, it’s necessary to explain that only its collision with political 
citizenship, not its parallel existence with it, could show us its symbolic and political effectiveness.  As 
Bourdieu stated, “the actual symbolic power of the Church can only be effective in relation to certain 
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pre-existing provisions, which are not produced, strictly speaking, by the Church itself.”1 These pre-
existing conditions in the case at hand are migrations as a historical constant, the US political system 
and its opening up to civil disobedience, as well as xenophobic reactions and its other, inseparable face: 
the relationship of patronage created by churches and political parties in ethnic and confessional niches 
of recently arrived migrants. 
The examples Levitt chose to present global religious citizenship don’t immediately manifest 
their conflict with national citizenship because the comments she collected from the mouths of 
Pakistani, Brazilian and Irish migrants in Boston could have been made by any of their fellow 
countrymen or women, without ever having set foot outside their villages: religious authorities are more 
important for them than secular ones: they care more about what the pope or their imam says than 
what the President says; the members of their religious community, not their fellow nationals, are their 
brothers...2 Global citizenship only exists if it’s put to the test, if it’s measured against the constraints of 
political citizenship.  Otherwise, it’s a self-image lacking in political effectiveness.  Because politics, as 
Jacques Ranciere stated, is born of disagreement and in this case it’s a disagreement related to the 
equivocal nature of citizenship: a universally inclusive one vs. a nationally restricted one.  The conditions 
making this disagreement possible are lost in the mists of time. 
From the side of the Christian churches it should be emphasized that many centuries have 
passed since the “Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and unto God the things that are 
God’s” with which the first Christian communities expressed their will to keep separate the two spheres, 
the earthly and the heavenly. The vision of human beings as pilgrims on earth has always been powerful; 
Arendt believes it to be fundamental to any truly Christian philosophy.3 But it ceased to inspire behavior 
regarding political matters when Christians stopped considering the second coming of Christ as 
imminent.  Since then, and even more so with the marriage of Church and State, worldly affairs have 
mattered a lot. When Christians noticed that the Kingdom of God wasn’t just around the corner, they 
began to turn their thoughts more seriously to earthly matters. Their practice had already taken the 
lead.  That’s why it’s necessary to indicate that global religious citizenship emerges as an authentically 
political element not when it ignores national citizenship, as those would do who are no more than 
pilgrims on earth, but rather when it fights to extend itself and undermine national citizenship’s 
exclusive devices. If global religious citizenship exists at a more tangible than metaphorical level of 
                                            
1 Bourdieu, 2009, p.146. 
2 Levitt, 2007, pp.83, 84, and 85. 
3 Arendt, 1995, p.50. 
  
315 
reality, it’s not about simply coexisting with, albeit turning its back on, national citizenship, but rather 
negotiating, challenging or even colliding with it head on.  This is where its political effectiveness lies. 
This occurs beyond the radicalness of the subjects’ positions, which vary hugely because each 
one has reasons that only the heart understands.  The cases of support for migrants are purposefully 
and representationally diverse and the commitment levels of the people involved cover a very wide 
spectrum, ranging at least from Ballinger’s anarcho-cosmopolitanism to the timorous attitude of the 
head of a nearly extinct religious congregation in Virginia that allows undocumented migrants among its 
members, but fails to concern itself in any way with their legal condition. Close to Ballinger’s position is 
that of Alicia Dinsmore and Natalia Serna: one works in one of the most belligerent organizations and 
the other is preparing a CD with songs that descend to incredibly human details without losing the 
thread of the denunciation. Somewhere in the middle is the pious couple that takes milk about to pass 
its use-by date to the Kino diner one day and to an old people’s home another day.   Somewhere else in 
that same middle is the novice who works with migrants because Jesus did, although, as far as we have 
reliable news, this historical Jesus limited his movements to such a restricted geographic constituency, 
without crossing its political territories, that I’m not sure he deserves this accolade.  At yet another point 
is Annunciation House, which started as a hostel for homeless people and by little more than the jerks of 
US geopolitics and its effect on Central America, turned into a hostel for political refugees and thus into 
a project located in the eye of the hurricane in an especially convulsive period. 
All have in common what Levitt calls global religious citizenship and I call a universal claim.  But 
not all are equally aware of the non-observance of US laws their activities on behalf of the migrants are 
charged with. The presence of the most radical and aware in this gamut of actors is not negligible.  It 
gives a good idea of how today’s migrants are benefitting from the organizational solidarity 
infrastructure amassed over decades.  That infrastructure also involves other accumulations.  Veterans 
such as Ballinger, Hinde and Fife, for example, are nourished by their ideology and their revolutionary 
trajectory of the seventies and eighties.  They continue vibrating with the liberation theology that some, 
Peter Hinde among them, learned directly from the inspiring words of Gustavo Gutiérrez in Peru. At the 
same time that the empire was moving its pieces on the great game table of world geopolitics, there 
was a flowering of solidarity organizations with the third world, with Latin and Central America, with 
their refugees and even their guerrilla movements.  With time the requests for asylum lessened and 
geopolitics adopted another script, but those organizations persisted and are now the platform of 
activism for the migrants: CARECEN, Maryland House, Tabor House, Annunciation House... The 
geopolitics of those times produced some antibodies that continue reproducing and challenging the 
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State in other terrains.  It’s curious how geopolitics has become the midwife of a civil disobedience that 
orchestrates the inclusion of those without politics.  The politicized of yesterday paved the way for those 
who aren’t exactly politicized today to move and act. 
This gamut also includes youthful volunteers nourished by their direct contact with the 
migrants.  These young people are inspired by flesh and blood migrants or by those they imagine 
through the idealized versions presented to them by their catechist, parish priest or religious superior. 
They say they don’t encourage the migrants to migrate.  And if you ask, they are all there for 
humanitarian reasons: for their Christian faith, because as children they played with the immigrants 
from their neighborhood, because Jesus was a migrant or because in Minnesota they gave English 
lessons to Latinos and the stories their students told them made them want to come and volunteer. The 
disobedience of Fife and Ballinger goes without saying, while Julia’s is less declaratory and more 
contextual.  And that’s why we see different levels of consciousness and radicalism but similar levels of 
effectiveness and expressiveness. In fact, no organization has anything like a declaration of principles 
about the migrants, yet their petitions—always having to do with the moment rather than with 
structural explanations—contain both explicit and tacit positions regarding very specific aspects.  Their 
track record amounts to a proposal that membership in imagined nations be subordinated to the 
universality of the religious community (that was actually Landaverde’s message).  Such universality is at 
the core of their efficacy. And so is the universality of their message: la migra and other bureaucrats 
who apply the migratory legislation speak—as do neurotics—a very particular jargon that borrows from 
the nationalist vocabulary to legitimize itself.  But by its universality, the language of the religious 
institutions obtains greater effectiveness with respect to social validation.  While there’s no scale to 
measure the weight of that effectiveness, there’s also no doubt that religious pressure was behind the 
migratory relief offered more than 5.2 million undocumented people when President Obama suspended 
their deportation in November of 2014. 
The declarations of many religious officials didn’t conceal what Bourdieu attributes to—and 
presents as a conditio sine qua non of—religious symbolic efficacy, i.e. that religious specialists must 
necessarily hide the fact that their struggles have political interests.1 To the contrary, there was a clear 
call to civil disobedience with the offer of converting churches into refuges for the deportable. The 
declarations of these disobedient activists converted  the implicit civil disobedience of the less 
politicized activists who were practicing daily charity into explicit civil disobedience.  And thus was 
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produced the crucible that founds all civil disobediences: that of the retired priests who are dedicating 
their last energies and years to the undocumented, that of Sister Engracia who left the center of 
religious power to work in the peripheries, that of those old people who simply take milk from US gas 
stations to the diner in Nogales rather than see it thrown out because of its expiration date… They are 
all part of the great refusal to go along with the program designed at the top.  They all inspire and 
breathe life into their religious communities because they give them a cause to fight for, a living Christ, 
always crucified and always resurrected.  They all believe that God needs no Passport.  And that his sons 
and daughters don’t either.  
2. The State: Its heterogeneity and its Street-level Bureaucracy 
 
Bourdieu warns scholars of the danger of being nothing more than an instrument used by the state to 
think about itself, which happens when analysts apply categories constructed by the performance of the 
bureaucracy. It is an astute warning, but suggests that the state is foreign, dissociable, and a net enemy 
of society and each one of the individuals that compose it, excepting maybe those who benefit from 
power, or those who are “imposing a particular vision of the state, a vision in agreement with the 
interests and values associated with the particular position of those who produce them in the emerging 
bureaucratic universe.”1 This proposal assumes that the state is a type of autonomous entity, the only 
independent variable in the political equation that produces itself, and if it does so with our assistance, 
it is because it has formed and manipulated us. In another text Bourdieu presents a proposal more in 
agreement with the basic premise that orients this section, while quoting the thesis of the Neo Marxist 
Joachim Hirsch, who “insists in the fact that the state is the place for the class struggle, that the state is 
not simply the instrument of the hegemony of the dominant class. In the heart of the state there are 
people who support the liberal side, or, in contrast, the state side.  It is a large territory of confrontation. 
If we translate this in terms of political division, we will have the socialists on one side and the liberals 
on the other.” 2 My premise is that confrontation exists in the present, but that it also existed in the past 
with a disagreement among state actors and also between them and those toward whom these policies 
were directed, and that that confrontation has given way to bureaucratic uses, jurisdictional borders, 
distribution of powers and a diversity of policies that have left a variegated state. Therefore, thinking 
with the categories of the state can also be thinking from the struggles that have been waged in that 
state.  
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The US federalists (Madison, Hamilton, Jay) instituted the principle of the division of state power 
inspired by Locke, Bolingbroke and Montesquieu. They sought separation, independence and balance of 
powers.  Tocqueville reflected in extenso about the US political system and proclaimed that that 
separation constituted one of its most distinctive characteristics, because the separation was not limited 
to the three classic powers, but to the power wherever it is found – municipal, regional, national – to 
ensure freedom and prevent abuses through vigilance and reciprocal controls. Separation implies: the 
partition into two of the sovereignty that the constitutional monarchies have applied, while attributing 
to the people the legislative branch, and to the king the executive branch; b) the distinction of functions 
that had emerged with the rationalization of the bureaucracy in the absolute state, but that in the 
United States was not applied as a mere administrative distribution, but as a plurality of autonomous 
branches and balance of functions. The system works so that no branch is imposed on the other 
branches. The independence must be real and formal, in fact and by right.1 That independence happens 
among different arms of the state, between different branches of the executive and between different 
geographical levels and localities. The possibility that the state might be diverse on the geographic and 
corporate plane has resulted in the fact that in its heart different and conflicting postures are displayed. 
Lakoff characterizes them as “Strict Father morality”, and “Nurturant Parent morality”, that I depicted in 
the second chapter. 2 Bellah presents them as utilitarian individualism and expressive individualism. The 
former emphasizes the individual effort directed toward the accumulation of material wealth, the 
sacrifice of everything for professional or business success. Expressive individualism is embodied in the 
immediate enjoyment of life, a life full of experiences, open to all types of people, exuberant in the 
sensual aspect as well as in the intellectual, an “I” identified with other people and nature and 
ultimately with the universe.3 From the former come policies based on a retributive ethos and respect 
for the law. From the latter come policies open to multiculturality. The utilitarian individualist 
emphasizes respect for the law and the obligation of earning citizenship. The expressive individualist is 
more open to cosmopolitanism. Neither exists in its pure state. There are some underground currents 
under the policies. If these and other positions are embodied in policies and bureaucratic procedures, 
we have a situation where state heterogeneity is the disagreement expressed in a spatial and 
institutional distribution. It is temporarily frozen dissent. I am not saying “fossilized dissent”, because 
the locations, levels and issues are open to include change over time. I am going to deal with two forms 
of heterogeneity (horizontal and vertical), and Street-level bureaucracy, that can be considered a 
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heightening of vertical heterogeneity. I will illustrate these three forms of heterogeneity with examples 
taken especially from the previous chapter. 
2.1 Horizontal heterogeneity: Independence of functions and powers between 
federal entities and between geographic zones of an equivalent rank 
 
The most frequent cases of what I call horizontal heterogeneity, those that I witnessed or those that I 
received news about from their protagonists, can be grouped into two types that I call corporate 
heterogeneity and geographic heterogeneity. Corporate heterogeneity is that which happens when 
those who, being pursued by the Department of Homeland Security and lacking permission to work – 
because the migratory authorities would never give it to those who cross the border without 
authorization, or exceed the time they were granted to stay in the country – can go to the Labor 
Commissioner´s Office, be hired by the state as childcare workers, and pay taxes. We could speculate 
that the migrants are benefitting from that which Bourdieu refers to as “the essential ambiguity of the 
state”, which “derives in part from the fact that in its very structure, with the opposition between 
financial ministries and spending ministries, between its paternalist, familialist, protective right hand, 
and its socially oriented left hand, it [the state] reproduces the archetypal division between male and 
female.”1 The Quichés from San Antonio Sija, and Gisel with her hiring as a childcare worker, are some 
examples of how the non-movement of the undocumented supports itself in this heterogeneity. In 
another text Bourdieu maintains that “to understand the interest of the technical bodies in an attitude 
that we could call ´progressive´, you have to suppose that they show an interest of a body linked to 
progressive positions. They are not defending a progressive position because it is progressive, but 
because they belong to a body that is linked to a form of progressive regulation.”2 This applies to the 
Labor Commissioner's Office, which defends the rights of the undocumented because by its nature it is 
committed to the rights of workers, regardless of their migratory status. The state commitment – the 
form of regulation to which it is linked – is the provision of those services.  The hiring of Gisel is a 
collateral effect that has nothing to do with the attitude of the state toward her, but with the 
impossibility of getting sufficient adequate labor force among the natives and authorized migrants. The 
state hired her because it needed her. And the same thing is happening with the millions of 
undocumented who are taxpayers: the financial and masculine arm of the state – treats the migrants as 
if they were not excluded because it needs their money. Thus the heterogeneity can have a bit of 
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corporate progressivism and administrative opportunism whose most exquisite formulation is “The IRS 
agrees my taxes are not illegal”. Regardless of its structural roots in a corporate progressivism or in a 
financial instrumentalization, this heterogeneity makes possible the performative civil disobedience 
because it gives legal backing to the art of presence of the undocumented. 
I call geographic heterogeneity that which results from the diverse relationships between the 
local authorities and the federal authorities, and between their different policies. In terms of the 
migratory policies, we have an enormous array of types of jurisdictions: jurisdictions have sought to 
deter illegal immigration by imposing their own restrictions upon unauthorized aliens’ access to housing, 
employment, or municipal services; jurisdictions have assisted federal authorities in apprehending and 
detaining unauthorized immigrants (including pursuant to 287 agreements with federal immigration 
authorities); jurisdictions have actively sought to deter the presence of illegal immigrants within their 
territory; jurisdiction have communicated on the legal status of its population with federal immigration 
enforcement officers under limited circumstances; and jurisdictions have been unwilling to assist the 
federal government in enforcing measures that distinguish between legal and non-legal residents of the 
community. Among the latter are jurisdictions that have adopted formal or informal policies limiting 
cooperation with federal immigration authorities.1 The failures of comprehensive immigration reform 
have led to more legislative and administrative diversity of migrations that deepens a heterogeneity in 
crescendo. According to Martin, 300 bills were introduced and 38 laws were enacted in 2005, 570 bills 
were introduced and 84 laws were enacted in 2006, and 1,562 bills were introduced and 240 laws were 
enacted in 2007.2 This geographic heterogeneity was taken advantage of by Lito Melgar and the 
thousands of immigrants that moved from Manassas and Prince William County to cities and counties 
that were not collaborating with ICE, or only gave them lukewarm support. It had a theatrical 
dramatization in the skirmishes of Fredy Melgar and his friends, who would cross over to the side of the 
Bull Run River to evade the Prince William County police under their very noses. That is where the first 
great battle of the Civil War took place (the First Battle of Bull Run), 155 years later the migrants 
theatrically fought against a local police ally of the DHS. The murals of San Francisco and other cities are 
possible because the heterogeneity gives space to municipalities that promote them, municipalities that 
do not criminalize them, municipalities that prohibit them, but owners that promote them and have 
legal backing.  
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The most proactive modality for the cause of the non-movement of the undocumented is the 
heterogeneity that turns into sanctuary, that takes place with the existence of sanctuary cities, counties 
and states, so-called because they are jurisdictions where the local authorities refuse to collaborate with 
federal anti-immigrant policies, and even grant a number of rights to the undocumented that cover a 
wide spectrum: from voting to state scholarships, driver´s licenses and many social benefits. These are 
called sanctuary policies, and have been applied since the U.S. Congress passed the illegal immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in 1996. Neither the sanctuary policies nor the 
sanctuary cities are defined by federal statute or regulation.1 Nevertheless, frequently the sanctuary 
policies are written, and adopt the form of a resolution, ordinance or administrative action, general or 
special orders, or departmental policies. The states of Maine and Utah in 2004 and 2011 approved 
directives that allow the undocumented to live and work.2 There are also informal sanctuary policies, 
that are not written, but that are sanctioned by custom: sheriffs that do not collaborate with DHS and 
order their subordinates to do the same, mayors that hire undocumented in public projects, city 
administrators and other officials that denounce the ICE raids. Among the places with sanctuary policies 
are Tucson in Arizona, New York City, the 64 counties of Colorado, nearly 40 cities in California and 14 
cities in Florida. Gerson and Yadira in Maryland, María García in San Diego, and the Dreamers in San 
Francisco benefit from formal sanctuary policies. The Quichés in Los Angeles benefit from informal 
sanctuary policies. 
Sanctuary cities have been denounced in Congressional reports for limiting arrests for federal 
immigration violations, limiting information-sharing with federal immigration authorities, limiting police 
inquiries into persons’ immigration status, declining to honor immigration detainers, shielding 
unlawfully present juveniles from federal detection, modifying criminal sentences to avoid immigration 
consequences.3 That same report located the origin of this bureaucratic contempt: “While state or local 
measures limiting police participation in immigration enforcement existed beforehand, many of the 
recent ‘sanctuary’-type initiatives trace their lineage back to actions by U.S. churches that provided 
refuge to unauthorized Central American aliens fleeing civil unrest in the 1980s. A number of states and 
municipalities issued declarations in support of these churches’ actions. Others went further and 
enacted more substantive measures intended to limit police involvement in federal immigration 
enforcement activities.”4 
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Indeed the sanctuary cities find inspiration in the same concept as the churches that in the 80s 
received Central Americans in their temples whom the government refused to recognize as refugees. 
The churches resumed, to the benefit of the Central Americans, a tradition that – according to Haymes 
and Vidal - in the antebellum era “took the form of an underground railroad that moved fugitive slaves 
to northern free states and Canada. Following World War II, church-based immigrant advocates argued 
for the admission of thousands of displaced persons from Europe, and through voluntary associations 
helped to resettle people leaving countries with communist governments during the Cold War era. 
During the Vietnam War era, sanctuary was offered to war resisters in American churches.”1 The 
support that began in the churches was passed on to local governments. Ordinances and directives 
declared public spaces as sanctuaries. The irregular migrants were able to leave the ecclesial catacombs 
and go into open spaces. Berkeley, California; Madison, Wisconsin; and Cambridge, Massachusetts 
enacted local resolutions declaring sanctuary for Central American refugees. These ordinances suddenly 
extended these benefits to all the unauthorized immigrants, creating a climate of municipal challenges 
to federal policies.2 The sanctuary cities are an institutionalization – crystallization in the state – of the 
old struggles, clearly connected to support for Central American refugees. If the Dreamers in San 
Francisco can hold sit-ins, in part it is because the state apparatus was molded by large waves of the 
non-movement of the undocumented, whose most recent generation is harvesting fruit from old trees. 
In fact the current conquests of the Dreamers vary a lot from one place to another. They depend on the 
material that history – embodied in sanctuary policies – has left at their disposition.  
The sanctuary cities have been harassed and accused; accused that they are a breeding ground 
for crime. But there are studies that show that, in fact, they are safer.3 They are also harassed by a 
reduction in state funds. Some proposals punish jurisdictions that do not provide information to ICE on 
the immigration status of aliens. One such proposal passed the House on July 23, 2015 (Enforce the Law 
for Sanctuary Cities Act, H.R. 3009). The amendments adopted during the House Committee on 
Appropriations mark-up of the FY2016 Department of Homeland Security appropriations bill, and the 
House consideration of the Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016 
(H.R. 2578) will also punish sanctuary cities. According to Kandel and Seghetti, “the former would 
prohibit Federal Emergency Management Agency funds, while the latter would do so for State and Local 
Law Enforcement Assistance grant funds. The Senate is expected to consider the Stop Sanctuary Policies 
and Protect Americans Act (S. 2146). S. 2146 would make sanctuary jurisdictions ineligible for certain 
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federal law enforcement grants and funding from the Community Development Block Grant Program.”1 
Some agencies on the federal level have put a price on the heads of the undocumented, and those who 
continue supporting them have to pay it. The sanctuary cities will have to pay with less access to federal 
funds. It is the same story with the prisons of ICE, but the reverse: they buy the collaboration of poor 
towns installing detention centers, they punish the sanctuary cities denying them resources. This 
situation will turn sanctuary policies into a bigger and more militant challenge. 
 
2.2 Vertical heterogeneity: Between institutions and levels (country, states, counties, 
cities) 
 
Vertical heterogeneity is that which is produced between levels that are connected for the application of 
migration policies. The federal level has preeminence on this issue, but without the support of any local 
policy, no arm of the law is long enough to reach the ground. Policies reach the ground in everyday life, 
neighborhoods, and work centers. Without a bureaucracy that reaches there, the policies are worthless 
pieces of paper. New Orleans is not a sanctuary city. But in 2010 its police department refused to 
collaborate with ICE. Unless it directly sent its agents to do raids – something that rarely happens – ICE 
did not have any chance to get hold of one of the many undocumented that every day look for work on 
the street corners of New Orleans. The same thing happens in Fairfax County, where Fredy Melgar and 
his friends would swim over to keep themselves safe from the police of Prince William County. Fairfax 
County was not, nor is now, a sanctuary county, but their police do not collaborate with ICE. Without 
the collaboration of numerous police departments, and access to their databases, the Secure 
Communities Program had limited results. 
Sassen maintained that “the particular combination of power and legitimacy we call sovereignty 
is being decentered, partly redistributed onto other entities, particularly supranational organizations, 
international agreements on human rights that limit state autonomy, and the emergent private 
international legal regime for business transactions. With all this happening, what is the basis for the 
usual presumption that the state has exclusive authority over the entry of non-nationals?”2 But power 
has also been decentralized downwards: toward lesser territorial entities, like states, counties and 
cities. The distribution of sovereignty, that limits the possibilities of excluding and including, is not 
new in the United States. In 1957 Eisenhower had to send the army to escort the first nine African 
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American students that wanted to use their right to go to a desegregated high school that Brown vs. 
Board of Education granted them. Maybe the inclusive force of local sovereignty is new. In the 
United States the undocumented obtain more rights through downward decentralization (sanctuary 
cities, heterogeneity of local policies, non-collaboration with ICE) than through upwards 
decentralization, like what was expected from the UNHCR and the IOM. 
These local entities are, by omission or commission, those that show tolerance or active 
support for the undocumented. Bayat maintains that “Third World states seem to be more tolerant of 
quiet encroachment than are those in the industrialized countries, such as the United States, where 
similar activities, albeit very limited, also take place. The industrial states are by far better equipped with 
ideological, technological, and institutional apparatuses to conduct surveillance of their populations. In 
other words, people have more room for autonomy under the vulnerable and ‘soft states’ of the global 
South than in the advanced industrialized countries.”1 I hope to have shown that state heterogeneity in 
the United States offers a lot of terrain for quiet encroachment to prosper, and even be strengthened. In 
the USA the undocumented not only are able to avoid controls in the areas where their civil 
disobedience is staged, and not only by effect of tolerance. They also have the complicity of state actors. 
This complicity acquires a more active character, even though less institutional, when the migrants deal 
directly with street-level bureaucrats, a special case of vertical heterogeneity. 
 
The disobedience of street-level-bureaucrats 
If the federal level has a limited capacity for enforcement when it lacks the grounding that the local 
institutions are, their effects can be even more limited – also very diverse – when we descend to the 
street-level bureaucrats. Since Lipsky formulated his thesis on street-level bureaucracy, it has been 
solidly established that teachers, social workers, health workers, public lawyers, superintendents, police 
officers, judges, jailers, and other public employees who provide government services, enforce the law, 
and distribute public benefits to citizens directly, are “de facto policy makers” due to their discretionary 
decisions.2 Since those who form part of the “bureaucratic universe”3 are not one homogenous actor, 
the application of policies has a variation margin from one to another bureaucrat. Not even their 
formation and training achieve complete uniformity. The replacement of their idiosyncratic language by 
the standardization of prepared formulas, and the repetition of procedures that think along the same 
lines, and reject novelties and the rough places of everyday life, do not eliminate the person, their 
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history, their ideology, their judgments and their dissent, that can have even more urgency than what 
Dworkin attributed to integrity-based, justice-based and policy-based disobedience. 1 The bureaucracy is 
never fully the government of anyone, and this Arendt knew through her own experience. She had been 
liberated by an agent of the Gestapo that sympathized with her, although she would not come to 
theorize about that episode maybe for considering it an exception to the norm. 
Bourdieu peeked at this issue when, after pointing out that administrative law proclaims that it 
is neutral and that “any action by a public bureaucracy which individually benefits a private person is 
suspect if not illegal”, observed that “the sociological vision cannot ignore the discrepancy between the 
official norm as stipulated in administrative law, and the reality of bureaucratic practice, with all its 
violations of the obligation of disinterestedness, all the cases of ‘private use of public services’ (from the 
diversion of public goods and functions to graft and corruption). Nor can it ignore the more perverse 
abuses of law and the administrative tolerances, exemptions, bartering of favors, that result from the 
faulty implementation or from the transgression of the law.”2 Bourdieu coincides with Castells in that 
“democracy as a social and institutional practice is not the same as the ideology of democracy, let alone 
the equivalent of the ideals of liberal democracy.”3 But Bourdieu only presented examples where the 
bureaucratic practice is at the service of corruption and the margin of freedom of officials was damaging 
to the public good. 
Field work among the undocumented revealed to me that the bureaucrats also can use their 
discretional power for altruistic purposes, or for the purpose of countervening the letter of the law so 
that its spirit might prevail. Gisel Morazán receives support from the social worker who visits her that 
goes beyond the functions that she has been assigned. Jesús López, who informed me about the tactics 
of the drug dealers, now lives in Virginia and benefitted from the discretionality of street-level 
bureaucrats: “I had recently arrived when my daughter got sick. They had to operate on her. It was a 
complicated operation on her brain. And I did not have neither papers nor a job. No social security. The 
operation costed many thousands of dollars. Dozens of thousands. They told me to go to the social 
worker. I went and she asked me many questions. She felt sorry for me. In the end I only had to pay like 
a thousand dollars, in payments, when I was able.” Lito Melgar was saved from tickets and from being 
turned over to ICE thanks to police who did not collaborate. On one occasion he was saved from the fine 
because the young man who was his co-driver spoke English: the command of English is an essential tool 
for dealing better with street-level bureaucrats. 
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In my crossing through the desert in a bus that went from Nogales to Tucson, a young, 
undocumented Guatemalan woman and her two children were headed to San Bernardino, California. 
They had been detained by ICE, and were awaiting to be summoned by the migration court that would 
assess their petitions for asylum. They were not supposed to travel. When we got to a check point, two 
Border Control agents got on to check the documents. I could hear that the agent was telling the young 
woman in a friendly way that she should not be traveling, while he gave her a nice look and gave her the 
paper that ICE had issued her. Something similar was experienced by María García: “The one who told 
me that I was not from Mexico was serious, but with a half-smile. And I had a half-smile on my face as 
well, that I had fooled him and that I had not fooled him, because he grabbed me to separate me from 
all the immigrants that they were taking in a truck like caged prisoners for deportation. He grabbed me 
like that from behind and told me, ‘I want you to know that you have not fooled me’. I pretended I was 
not understanding him; I played stupid. And he looked the other way.” 
Examples like this are multiple and daily. They are not a novelty. With his irreverent and 
provocative style, the Chicano lawyer and writer Oscar “Zeta” Acosta left documentary proof of his 
discretionality in the 70s when he was a public lawyer in Los Angeles and helped single mothers that 
were not able to get help from the state: “Once the lie is put before the court, the divorce is granted. 
Just like that. I have won every single case. And now the poor old woman with the cane can apply for 
welfare assistance for her kids… which is all she wanted in the first place. She hasn’t seen her old man in 
five years, but the social worker told her she couldn’t apply unless she filed for a divorce first. This social 
worker logic I no longer contest. When I first passed my Bar I tried to obey the law. But that was twelve 
months ago. Now I simply ask a few questions and my secretary does the rest.”1 
But just as the street-level bureaucracy can benefit, it also harms migrants, like when the Border Control 
shoot at migrants or rape them. These are not cases of contempt or discretional application of the law, 
but of a bureaucrat that applies an extrajudicial penalty, or commits an offense, abusing the position of 
power that their responsibility confers on them. The most prevalent cases of authentic discretionality 
damaging the immigrants are the rulings of judges. Kanstroom registers that over 30% of the nearly 
600,000 cases sent to the immigration judges in 2003-2004 involved some form of discretional 
assistance. Many judges tend to be generous to ensure they aren’t making a mistake. But the system 
exerts pressure and looks suspiciously on judicial generosity, so they can’t go too far in granting 
discretionary assistance. Of the 36,000 asylum cases presented to the immigration courts in 2004, 74% 
were rejected. Only 3% of the applications of the Convention against Torture—whose deliberation 
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implies a high degree of discretion—are successful, and the figures vary alarmingly from one judge to 
another, and one region to another.1 
It is the street-level bureaucracy and not the legislature that defines the severity – and the 
arbitrariness – with which the migratory legislation is applied. The law gets part of its legitimacy, or is 
denied its legitimacy, depending on whether it is applied with more or less zeal. Its enforcement is the 
second to last link of social validation (the last is the public in general). Bureaucrats’ daily decisions are 
the amendments that the law receives over time, perhaps because, as Howard Zinn wrote, “You can't be 
neutral on a moving train.” The lack of obedience of the street-level bureaucrats is the day to day 
dissent, exercised by state officials who Kant wanted to be obedient, but who take advantage of the 
margin that the law provides them to apply it according to their interpretation. On that street level is 
defined whether the migrant is a total outsider, an illegal to capture and penalize, or a quasi-citizen, 
whose liminal citizenship has rights, and whose performative civil disobedience achieves its objective. 
 
2.3 Heterogeneity, disobedience and liminal citizenry 
 
As I pointed out when I presented Dworkin’s theories, a form of civil disobedience consists in supporting 
itself on geographic or corporate state entities that ignore legal status, or concede the same rights to 
the undocumented, residents and citizens. The existence of such a possibility automatically puts the law 
into question. Laws can be questioned not by reference to a hypothetical change in the future, but to 
the change that already occurred in another state or in the neighboring city. If a law is in doubt, Dworkin 
says, the person who does not obey it because they follow their own judgment, does not commit an 
unjust act, and the government has the duty to protect them, even though it does not ensure them 
immunity.2 State heterogeneity issues unambiguous signals that plant uncertainty: the laws that 
penalize the unauthorized are questionable laws. If in Maryland the state issues driver’s licenses for the 
undocumented, and in Arizona lucrative fines on those who transport them in their vehicles, it is 
obvious that both states manage their treatment toward the undocumented by divergent principles. The 
heterogeneity plants the doubt that justifies the disobedience. What is the correct principle? People 
have to refer to their own judgment. And that is what the bureaucrats, natives and the undocumented 
are doing in daily life.  
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Dworkin highlights a characteristic of civil disobedience that matches the relationship that the 
migrants have with state heterogeneity: “Civil disobedience involves those who do not challenge 
authority in so fundamental a way. They do not think of themselves –and they do not ask others to think 
of them- as seeking any basic rupture or constitutional reorganization. They accept the fundamental 
legitimacy of both government and community.”1 The disobedience of the undocumented is not total. It 
is not a total rejection of the state, an art of not being governed and a form of relationship with power 
that evades its control, like what James C. Scott proposes.  The undocumented violate some state laws – 
out of obedience to the dictates of their conscience, some values and some needs -, but they recognize 
the authority of the state. That is why I characterize their resistance as an act of civil disobedience: they 
are not betting on a rupture or a disavowal, but rather an inclusion. 
I do not believe, in contrast to Bayat, that success is in operating at the margins of the state “in a 
quest for an informal life.” As I tried to present in the previous chapter, it is not true that the 
undocumented – who are an extreme case among those who elude state control – are some marginals 
that “tend to function as much as possible outside the boundaries of the state and modern bureaucratic 
institutions.”2 The “already but not yet” requires a skillful game, like what Lenin suggests. This does not 
mean supposing that the concentration of the legal capital of the state3 has everything to say when we 
talk about citizenship in the making, but that it does have the word that confers legal validation, and 
that establishes many of the coordinates in which social legitimation can be displayed. 
If the concepts of informal citizenship or liminal citizenship have anything to say about the 
reality, it can only be by reference not just to an expansion of the concept of formal citizenship and the 
spaces in which inclusion is obtained, but also by reference to state heterogeneity. Because the 
heterogeneity is the invalidation of the argument that the philosopher Michel Onfray puts in the mouth 
of Eichmann: “when the law legally organizes the juridical extraterritoriality of certain individuals or a 
category of individuals, those individuals or that category cannot expect to benefit from the law´s help 
or appeals”.4 State heterogeneity opens the door so that the undocumented can appeal to the law.  
To take up the peculiar relationship that the undocumented migrants have with the US state 
apparatus we must keep in mind that the undocumented pay taxes, in Maryland they can vote in local 
elections and are counted in the census that serves as the basis for the assignment of subsidies, taxes 
and the number of representatives in the House. The excluded and illegal are partially included and have 
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a liminal legality. In the judgment of Habermas, civil disobedience must move in that uncertain 
threshold between legality and legitimacy. 1 This threshold describes appropriately the liminal situation 
of the undocumented. During the boycott in Montgomery County the drivers of the car pools were 
taken to court and absolved. The African Americans were able to take advantage of the fact that the 
deprivation of their rights was not complete. There is a lot that is in play in the margins of that partial 
use of rights and public institutions. That is the terrain on which the undocumented move. The 
heterogeneity are the “spaces that are available to enhance their life-chances” that the undocumented, 
in their quiet encroachment, use with “courage and creativity to assert collective will in spite of all odds, 
to circumvent constraints.”2 In the USA the undocumented use state heterogeneity to exercise rights 
and make their art of presence be a citizenship in the making. 
3. Three organizations of Central Americans in the USA: between movements and 
non-movements 
 
Organizations providing undocumented immigrants with real, ongoing support have been recognized—
and rightly so—as areas that resist exclusion and smooth the way to alternative forms of citizenship 
because they offer empowerment, community and inclusion on a daily basis.3  Anti-immigrant forces have 
identified them as an opposing force with an agenda and actions that help neutralize the implementation 
of immigration policies. A government report to the US Congress established that the activities of pro-
undocumented immigrant organizations “concern those who believe that the humanitarian aid, no 
matter how well intentioned, assists unauthorized immigrants in their efforts to subvert immigration laws 
and enter the country.…  A possible oversight issue for Congress concerns whether some of the activities 
of these humanitarian groups present an obstacle to the Border Patrol as it carries out its enforcement of 
immigration laws along the border. If so, Congress may decide what, if anything, can be done to curtail 
those specific activities by civilian border groups that negatively impact the Border Patrol.”4  In this sense, 
these groups are a very visible challenge to the State.  If these findings apply to organizations working 
“with” immigrants, then they much more logically and forcibly apply to associations “of” immigrants. 
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Central American immigrants who came to the US in the 1980s adopted a long-standing US civil 
tradition: they created associations so as to become more visible and audible, form a community and 
lobby for inclusion.  Some brought organizational experience honed in the hostile terrain of 
authoritarian regimes.  Others were novices.  All embraced a tradition that had caught the attention of 
French liberal political thinker and historian Alexis de Tocqueville in 1831.  Tocqueville acknowledged US 
associations as platforms for competing and persuading through arguments and legal activities.1 As an 
aristocrat who still remembered with fear and trembling the mobs of sans-culottes, he saw association 
as a buttress against the tyranny and excesses of the all-powerful masses.2  In all events, he knew he 
was up against a world-class political force. 
3.1 Associations and their challenge to the state 
 
According to the prominent US political theorist Michael Walzer, these associations are the bedrock of 
civil disobedience because they cultivate a sense of loyalty to their regulations that trumps the 
obedience due to the State’s laws.3  If that’s the case, Tocqueville’s prediction would be fulfilled: 
associations can weaken the State.4 This proposition partly agrees with a finding by German historian 
Reinhart Koselleck, who said that in the 16th century, “Putting aside ethical values or religious beliefs in 
the private sphere reinforced the State’s power, which confiscated and absorbed the res publica.”5 The 
State was strengthened but also became more vulnerable: values rationalized in the private sphere 
could undermine the authority of the prince, the principles of his government and the logic of the State.  
In fact, Roger Chartier, a French historian, noted that new forms of sociability in the 18th century, 
particularly the Masonic lodges, were built on moral tenets, applying to the State the same moral 
criteria that the State had relegated to the private sphere.  The distinction between individual 
conscience and state authority thus turns against the very mechanism it had installed.6 Koselleck found 
that “apolitical” venues (such as stock exchanges, clubs, salons, cafés and colleges) not subject to State 
authority, turned into institutions that gained “a powerful political character and, insofar as they now 
influence state policy and legislation, they became indirect political powers.”7 
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The State’s appropriation of public areas and the concomitant and paradoxical politicization of 
the private area Koselleck found in Europe were even more dynamic in the United States, where the 
craving for association had several impetuses.  The political incentive was the struggle against the 
tyranny of the masses, but there was also a religious incentive, highlighted by US sociologist Theda 
Skocpol: competition to win over converts in a nation that had emerged without a State-confirmed 
church monopoly.  The Methodists were pioneers in organizing an itinerant clergy that moved from one 
town to the next identifying local leaders who they guided on how to establish and maintain new 
congregations. Their methodology was soon cloned by other religious and non-religious groups.1 
Volunteer groups and other kinds of civil associations have taken many forms in the US: moral reform 
movements, laborers and farmers’ unions, philanthropic fraternities, independent women’s 
associations, veterans groups and ethnic associations.  They continue to be considered an important 
factor, critical to US democratic vitality.2 The membership of more than 50 of these associations 
exceeded 1% of US adults at some point.  Even those groups in the big leagues have quite varied 
motivations, as can be inferred just from their names: Ancient and Accepted Free Masons (founded in 
1733), Independent Order of Good Templars (1851), National Teachers Association (1857), National Rifle 
Association (1871), Women’s Christian Temperance Union (1874), American Bowling Congress (1895), 
Aid Association for Lutherans (1902), Boy Scouts of America (1910), Greenpeace USA (1971) and 
Mothers Against Drunk Driving (1980).  Others, now extinct, were also large and diverse: American 
Temperance Society (1826-1865), American Anti-Slavery Society (1833-1870), National American 
Women’s Suffrage Association (1890-1920), German American National Alliance (1901-1918) and the 
second manifestation of the Ku Klux Klan (1915-1944).3 
The good health of these associations and a generalized craving for associating were the subject 
of Robert D. Putnam’s book (2000) Bowling Alone: The collapse and revival of American Community.   He 
asked: Are US Americans losing interest in associating?4 Theda Skocpol gave a rather discouraging reply 
in 2002: “Average Americans also had chances to participate and work their way up in associations that 
built bridges across classes and places, between local and translocal affairs.  Now the bridges are 
eroding.  Ordinary citizens have fewer venues for membership in associations with real clout.  
Meanwhile, the most powerful Americans are interacting—and arguing—almost exclusively with one 
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another.”1 Skocpol laments that inter-class associations aren’t emerging, because formerly “Most classic 
U.S. voluntary groups recruited members across class lines.”2  But this isn’t entirely true.  On the one 
hand, churches still practice a mixed recruitment approach.  Although the geographic jurisdiction of the 
parishes often reproduces residential segregation, the growing trend of congregating in mega-churches 
is a return to a sort of social melting-pot where the impersonality of the mammoth religious services is 
balanced by participation in activities in small cells.  On the other hand, participation in multi-class 
groups isn’t the only way to influence politics. This is what I want to stress in the following pages by 
explaining the experience of three immigrant organizations. 
Grassroots organizations working with or made up of immigrants can be studied from different 
angles.  One is their contribution to the process by which immigrants acquire more rights and, in that 
sense, are approaching citizenship.  Their contribution, like that of religious organizations, is 
indispensable to the effectiveness of immigrants’ civil disobedience.  They are, therefore, platforms 
challenging immigration policies and the determination to exclude. In the case of the United States, 
these organizations are communication channels to other influential sectors.  For example, they can 
connect undocumented immigrants with academia, the media and party politics or link the movements 
of and by immigrants with undocumented immigrants’ non-movements. The movements are major 
initiatives and organizations, generally led by second-generation or already established first-generation 
immigrants: the Immigrant Rights Movement with its 2006 marches of 3.7 to 5 million immigrants in 160 
cities against the Sensenbrenner bill3, the Dream Activist Network and Dreamers Adrift with its 
www.thedreamisnow.org4, the Labor Immigrant Organizing Network (LION)5, the Coalition for Humane 
Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles (CHIRLA) and The Earth is for Everyone.6   
The non-movement concept was coined by Iranian sociologist Asef Bayat to refer to “the 
collective actions of non-collective actors; they embody shared practices of large numbers of ordinary 
people whose fragmented but similar activities trigger much social change”7—such as needy people who 
gradually take over vacant lots in a city center or immigrants who cross the border and settle in the 
United States without permission.  Because their actions are in unison they have the force of a 
concerted act and sometimes appear to result from well-planned collusion, although each of those 
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involved is acting separately, without a program or ideology and with a rather cursory knowledge of the 
accumulated effect and added value of their actions.   That’s why non-movements are more flexible and 
fluid and their strategy is self-generated.1  Theirs is a practical not a political protest.  Although not in a 
sustained way, some Central American organizations interweave this massive force of non-movements 
with acts led by the movements or a hybrid combining features of both. Let’s look more closely at some 
of the most important organizations. 
3.2 The Central American Resource Center (CARECEN) in Los Angeles and San 
Francisco 
 
CARECEN began in 1981 as the Central American Refugee Center in the city of Washington. Founded by 
Salvadoran refugees to secure legal status for many thousands of Central Americans who fled from civil 
war in the 1980s, CARECEN is the best known and most transnational of the Salvadoran organizations, 
followed by El Rescate (The Rescue) and The Romero Clinic, three organizations that reflected factions in 
the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN).2 CARECEN opened offices in Los Angeles in 1983 
and started branches in San Francisco, Houston and New York in 1985.  It was renamed the Central 
American Resource Center when the issue of refuge took second place to the more urgent need of 
diversifying services to the very voluminous immigrant population.   It’s a non-profit organization that 
currently offers low-cost legal services, counseling on housing, community education programs, group 
organization (parents, young people, workers, etc.) and advocacy on immigration policies, educational 
reform and labor rights.3 Decades ago it extended its attention and links to Guatemalans, with an 
alliance between CARECEN-Los Angeles and the Association of Guatemalan Fraternities (AFG), which has 
a political action committee that nominates local election candidates.4 It has currently expanded even 
further, to the point where Lariza Dugan-Cuadra, of Nicaraguan-Irish extraction, is the executive director 
of CARECEN-San Francisco. 
The journalist and political scientist Ricardo Calderón, former dean of journalism and secretary 
general in the University of El Salvador and one of the historic founders of CARECEN-San Francisco, 
recalls that this branch of the organization was conceived in 1985 but actually came into being in 1986: 
“The idea arose of reviewing the situation of immigrants here, especially of Salvadorans.   Three of us—
Salvadorans, former university professionals—joined together with three Anglo professional women, 
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one of them a lawyer, to see what we could do for the community. It was a terrible time in the civil war 
in El Salvador.  We wanted to create something that would enable our communities here to fix their 
immigration status, partly because we saw that notaries were making money at the expense of our 
people without doing the proper preparation.  They even invented stories and evidence to present as 
proof for political asylum, which was what the people applied for.”1  With some lies, those notaries 
managed to stitch up asylum cases.  Once the case was presented, the immigration authorities—
inundated by the avalanche of applications and urged to provide at least a temporary decision—would 
issue a work permit.  But it was just a temporary solution that could end in deportation.  CARECEN’s 
arrival in the midst of the shysters’ apparent success created hostility in the community, among lawyers 
and between organizations.  It only survived thanks to bargain-basement office equipment based on 
second-hand typewriters and two years of voluntary work by its founders.  They began by earning 
nothing.  Later, they earned just $600 a month.  At the beginning the salaries didn’t reflect hierarchy or 
responsibility.  A director’s income was the same as that of an employee who was a single mother with 
three children.  This austerity gave them the edge over other institutions with large salaries and 
gleaming equipment.  And so began a journey that has now been going for 30 years, overcoming 
financial obstacles and national, ideological and organizational differences, including those reflecting its 
members’ affinities with different FMLN organizations. 
CARECEN had established links with the Farabundo Marti Liberation People’s Forces (FPL) and 
other insurgent groups.  The researcher Eric Popkin noted that CARECEN supported the FMLN, 
mobilizing voters against the US government’s intervention in El Salvador.2 These links created 
dilemmas, for example whether or not to help Nicaraguans fleeing from the Sandinista regime.  Later 
on, said Calderón, “We had another conflict: Temporary Protection Status (TPS) for Salvadorans in 1991 
and growing remittances.  Helping Salvadorans here meant helping the Nationalist Republican Alliance 
(ARENA) in El Salvador.  How?  Through remittances, because ARENA was in power and remittances 
benefitted its administration.  We had this conflict and other organizations attacked us about it: you’re 
helping ARENA, they told us.” The only way out of this conflict was either to start arguing or to walk 
away from the issue and just fight for the welfare of the Central American community in the US. 
In order to help the community, its members had to be given legal status.  They had thousands 
of applications and started to resolve them one by one.  Legal advice consisted of carefully reviewing the 
case to put together all the evidence required for granting asylum.  Once the package was ready, it was 
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sent to law firms who handled such cases pro bono. Nowadays it’s less common to find experienced 
lawyers who are willing not to charge.  Those remaining are former activists and collaborators, like 
Robert Foss, who was a lawyer for CARECEN-Los Angeles and now has his own firm and directs the legal 
services of the International Institute of Los Angeles, founded in 1914 to help recently arrived 
immigrants. When we and a group of Guatemalan Mayas had dinner together, I asked him how much he 
charged.  “When I meet someone like this,” he replied, putting his hand on the shoulder of one of the 
boys, “with the face of a good person, coming from Guatemala or El Salvador and perhaps linked to 
some organization, I don’t charge.” CARECEN and other similar organizations cultivate links with these 
increasingly scarce lawyers because legal work is still the most important.  In CARECEN-Los Angeles, 67% 
of the staff works in legal services, compared to 12.5% in administration, 10% in the education and 
community organization team, 6% with parents and young people, and 4% on labor organization.1 
The one-by-one solution wasn’t good enough in the 1980s and it still isn’t.  In the 1980s 
CARECEN found it very hard to lead an advocacy initiative for those fleeing the war because the stigma 
of being associated with guerillas hampered their most overtly political activities. According to Calderón, 
“We had a fantastic relationship with the religious sector and the Baptist churches told us ‘We can do it.’  
They threw themselves into putting together the ABC proposal [so called because it was the American 
Baptist Churches that sued the attorney general and the Immigration and Naturalization Service for not 
granting asylum to Salvadorans and Guatemalans] as an anti-immigration lawsuit.  We recommended 
lawyers but didn’t have to participate directly.  Incidentally, they won the ABC suit in 1990 and the TPS 
for Salvadorans was also passed in the 1990s.  We went into 1991 with two eligibility programs for 
Salvadorans.”  They later pushed for the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act 
(NACARA) which was less generous with Salvadorans than with Nicaraguans and Cubans. 
Calderón stressed that CARECEN retains grassroots popularity through its closeness to the 
people, its unassuming promoters “who wear baseball caps and are seen as comrades” and its lawyers—
”two young women who deal with legal cases in the Court.  They strongly identify and even suffer with 
people when they hear their stories.  They cry and everything.  ‘And you, why don’t you cry?’ they ask 
me.  I’ve been in this thing for 27 years now but there have been times when they’ve made me suffer.  
I’ve now got a shell like a turtle or an armadillo.” At the other extreme are the funding agencies that 
“see the client as a statistic.  We don’t like it but we need the funding and have to add up the numbers.  
The rest of it doesn’t matter to them.  For example, we have three sensational cases: people who were 
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to be deported and we’ve managed to stop it happening.  This represents hours and hours of work, 
reviewing the law, making contact with Immigration and city officials to stop the deportation; all for just 
two people.  It takes up a lot of our time but it has to be done.  It was the right thing.” The other 
problem is the media shows the agencies sometimes want CARECEN to put on or the kind of cases they 
suggest it take on, such as those related to homophobia or domestic violence, which aren’t part of 
CARECEN’s accumulated knowledge although it’s gradually gaining experience about them.  
Nevertheless, CARECEN manages to stick to its agenda and its links with city and county politics.  Thanks 
to local government support, CARECEN-San Francisco managed to get legal status.  It has also, 
unwittingly, been the platform for building political careers, as is evident in the case of a former 
executive director who successfully stood as an alternate local government candidate. 
3.3 The CASA of Maryland and its links to partisan politics 
This organization began 20 years ago as the Central American Solidarity Association of Maryland, 
founded by US and Central Americans to provide assistance to people fleeing from war in El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua in the 1980s. The current executive director is Gustavo Torres, a 
Colombian by birth.  The fact that he spent time in Nicaragua during the 1980s is exploited by anti-
immigrant sectors with gross distortions, such as that of Ann Corcoran in an article from the Potomac 
Tea Party Report titled “Gustavo Torres: Just your friendly Sandinista warrior next door,” in which her 
venomous pen screamed: “The Sandinistas are communists, they are in the United States, they are in 
Maryland. Gustavo Torres is one of them.”1 Corcoran based her article on information in an interesting 
but very ambivalent article in The Washington Post headlined “A man with a plan,” a very eloquent title 
but one designed to make the anti-immigrants’ skin crawl.   In this report David Montgomery mentioned 
Torres’ activism in Colombia and his years in Nicaragua as a collaborator in the Center for Research and 
Studies on Agrarian Reform (CIERA) and in El Tayacán, a weekly publication about grassroots education 
that was Christian-inspired and sympathetic to the revolutionary process.2 
 Gustavo Torres came to pick me up on March 5 of last year at the Takoma metro station, near 
the CASA of Maryland headquarters. He had just been in a meeting with Nancy Pelosi, Minority Leader 
of the US House of Representatives, which is perhaps why our conversation immediately zeroed in on 
immigration policy’s major issues.  In those days expectations about immigration reform were running 
hot (we later found out that Obama’s people were preparing the decree to stop the deportation of over 
5 million undocumented immigrants, thus opening the first door to their legal residence). “Immigration 
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reform is our main priority at this time,” explained Torres at that time.  “There are 500,000 
undocumented immigrants close to the metropolitan area and many of them are our members.  
Because our priority is to pass immigration reforms, we organize big civil disobedience marches at the 
White House and the Capitol.  We’ll have a large civil disobedience march in front of the White House on 
May 1 because we think the President has a key role to play and stopping deportations is easy.  He can 
use his executive power to do it. Immigration reform is the final solution.  It can only be passed by 
Congress but the President can stop deportations tomorrow, just as he did with the Dreamers in 2012 
because of the pressure we put on but also because it was a crucial political moment.  We were all over 
the electoral process.  It was crucial for him to promote, encourage and motivate the Latino community 
to vote for him and 71% of us did because of what he did for the Dreamers.  At that time, in 2012, he 
stopped the deportations and about a million young people have benefitted. We did a legal analysis and 
have already given it to him.  We found that, as President, he has the administrative discretion to 
implement laws in a certain way; in this case, he can decide that these people won’t be deported 
because they don’t have a criminal record, or have been here for some time, are the Dreamers’ parents, 
have children in this country…  We proposed various categories.  We had already done the math.  
Basically, if the President issues a decree in favor of all the categories I just mentioned, almost nine 
million people won’t be deported until the President leaves office in 2016.  And by then we hope to 
have already passed the immigration reform.  That’s our strategy.” 
 The strategy Gustavo Torres described that day was only partially successful.  The proposal was 
essentially the one Obama ended up implementing the following November, but with considerably less 
coverage—five instead of nine million.  Obama sent memorandums to the immigration authorities to 
stop the deportations of undocumented persons who are the parents of US Americans, don’t have 
police records and pay taxes.  CASA of Maryland showed that it has the President’s ear.  Former CASA 
president Thomas Pérez is the current labor secretary and Cecilia Muñoz, a former CASA board member, 
is the director of the White House Domestic Policy Council and previously served as the White House 
Director of Intergovernmental Affairs, the main link between Obama and state, local and tribal 
governments. This relationship has facilitated work with the Obama administration and undoubtedly 
helped them.  But it’s not enough: Obama’s memos were challenged and his administration maintained 
the rapid deportation rate so as not to lose credibility.  Muñoz has been booed by Latinos and activists 
because the deportations continue imprisoning children and separating families.1 Working with the 
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Republicans is still essential. And in fact, against all odds, the work with Bush wasn’t fruitless.  Torres is 
more positive than other activists about Bush’s position on the immigration issue:  “Bush was very pro-
immigrant.  The reason was simple: he’s from Texas, where the Latino community is immense and he’s 
been living and working with the Latino community.  He’s sincerely pro-immigrant and this is very 
important.” 
The CASA of Maryland experience shows that Latinos’ demographic clout and their participation 
in the labor market are determining factors for achievements favoring undocumented immigrants, as 
are politicians with a vision that transcends the local area to encompass national objectives: “We 
haven’t achieved immigration reform because we still don’t have the power and capacity to influence 
the Republican Party in some states controlled by whites.  In many districts 90-95% of voters are white 
and they don’t give a fig about immigration.  They just care about their district’s issues.  Missouri’s 
District 18 is totally white.  If you go and talk to its representative about voting for the reform, he’ll die 
laughing.  Because we Latinos have no presence in his district, He’ll tell you ‘Illegal, I don’t want to talk 
to you.’  It’s the voters from that district who will elect him and they have no relationship with 
immigrants and zero interest in immigration reform. Those representatives have a totally localized 
focus, but others have a national vision.  They know that if they want access to the White House, they 
have to at least say ‘Welcome’ to the Latinos.  It’s not because that’ll get them reelected, but it enables 
them to say ‘Look, we’re not that bad.’” 
 The clout CASA of Maryland has acquired, encouraged from its humble beginnings by CARECEN, 
has made it an inexorable political mouthpiece with a national perspective. The new CASA of Maryland’s 
headquarters is imposing: a Georgian Revival mansion built in 1924 by a prominent Washington 
architect for the McCormick-Goodharts, a similarly prominent family whose fortune started with the 
invention of the McCormick Reaper in 1834.  The mansion remained in the family until 1947 and in 1963 
was bought by a real estate syndicate that turned it into an apartment complex.  Over time the 
surrounding 565-acre estate belonging to the family, which they named Langley Park, was subdivided 
into a community of low-income residences that took on the mansion’s name and has become home to 
an extremely diverse immigrant community—72% foreign occupation.  While the mansion itself was of 
sound construction, neglect, vandalism and water damage made it a poor real estate deal, although an 
inventory conducted by the Historic Preservation Commission described it as being “of considerable 
historical and architectural significance…one of the last great country houses of the 1920’s.” After 
Sawyer Realty LLC donated the almost 3,372-square-yard mansion to CASA of Maryland (to be precise, 
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sold it for one dollar), they began to renovate it.  With $13.8 million raised during the economic crisis, a 
mixture of governmental and corporate funding such as from Adventist Healthcare and the Bank of 
America, the ostentatious mansion had been converted into offices, classrooms for teaching English, job 
training and legal advice.1  The National Trust for Historical Preservation describes it as “a state of the 
art, ‘green’ Multicultural Center offering educational, vocational, and advocacy services to 
disadvantaged immigrant populations’ adding that “this LEED Gold-certified project features geo-
thermal energy and a green roof.” 
The new CASA headquarters opened its doors for business in 2010.2  By the following year the 
organization boasted more than 90 employees and an annual budget of $6 million.  Most of its funding 
comes from large foundations but it also has contributions from 50,000 associated members3 which, at 
US$25 a year per head, gives CASA of Maryland a solid, independent base to operate from and to 
maintain its services, outstanding among which are—to the pride of some and scandal of others—legal 
assistance to over a thousand cases a year and its employment bureau, which placed 18,989 
undocumented workers in temporary jobs and 248 in permanent ones in 2010.4 Its large stash of 
independent funding created CASA in Action, a $100,000 project that backs political candidates with 
pro-immigrant programs.  This compartmentalization, free from the ties of state funding, enables more 
aggressive incursions into party politics.  Perhaps these are the kind of tactics that earned Torres his evil 
genius fame.5 
During the March 5, 2014, interview, Gustavo Torres told me that political work has afforded 
them notable achievements: “For example, last year we managed to pass the Development, Relief and 
Education for Alien Minors Act (known as Dreamers), which ensures that undocumented young people 
can go to university without being charged out-of-state fees.  When you’re within the state they charge 
you a fee but if you come from outside they charge you an additional $6-8,000, an enormous difference.  
It was actually passed via a referendum.  We took it to the elections and 60% of the population, 
1,800,000 people, voted in favor.  “Another victory related to advocacy is the minimum wage.  We 
passed it in February 2014 in Montgomery County—the 4th richest county in the country—and here in 
Prince George County, where we have our headquarters.  We succeeded thanks to a large coalition of 
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Afro-Americans, progressive whites and Latinos.  As you know, the minimum wage here is $7.50 an 
hour.  We’re getting it to rise by annual increments of $1 until it hits $11.50 an hour by 2017.  It’s 
another big victory for our people, regardless of their immigration status.”1 
The work of CASA of Maryland, in coalition with other organizations and State Governor Martin 
O’Malley’s interest in pleasing the growing Latino population, has resulted in conditions unparalleled in 
other states: irrespective of their immigration status, immigrants in Maryland are entitled to a lawyer 
and to vote in local elections. But achievements come at a price.  CASA of Maryland has been bitterly 
criticized.  As it receives funds from different governmental levels, it has been accused of using 
taxpayers’ contributions to support undocumented immigrants and, in this sense, sponsoring the 
breaking of laws.  That is to say, it supports unauthorized immigrants’ everyday civil disobedience. Its 
advocacy work, the publication of pamphlets informing undocumented immigrants of their rights, 
peaceful street protests and the defense of workers’ rights have been enough for CASA of Maryland to 
rack up innumerable enemies.  They are not above inventing links between CASA of Maryland and the 
American Communist Party, Free the Cuban Five Committee, the FMLN, Socialist Workers Party, Black 
Panther Party, the Muslim Brotherhood and even with Hugo Chávez, among many other “dangerous 
liaisons.”2 This might seem like comical nonsense.  In fact, they seem like a new version of the joke 
where a man is stopped for drunken driving and tells the officer a bizarre story about dismembered 
bodies in his trunk, resulting in such an absurd-sounding police report that the police chief lets the 
offender go free.  But the nonsense in this case has inspired literally incendiary behavior: the CASA of 
Maryland offices in Shady Grove were subject to an arson attack in their first month of functioning.3  A 
line often wrongly attributed to Don Quixote, although he had enough reasons for saying it, could well 
be used by Torres: “They’re barking, Sancho; a sign we’re on horseback.” 
3.4 The “Dolores Huerta Community Garden” as a place of resistance and political 
meetings 
 
The 1980s’ organizational belligerence left a residue of Guatemalan organizations in the US that usually 
worked in isolation and were often sectarian.  Some were created by activists linked to the Guatemalan 
National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) while others had religious or ethnic affiliations.4 Such insularity 
surely became unviable for organizations with large aspirations and dwindled funding as Guatemala 
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stopped being front page news.  But that accumulated capital fed a series of networks that eventually 
managed to join forces in a common cause: the legalization of Guatemalan immigrants.  In January 1998 
Guatemalan activists organized the first national march for immigrants’ rights, attracting 3,000 
participants. That same month they organized an assembly in Chicago that included organizations from 
the most varied ideological and ethnic spectrum: CORN-Maya in Indiantown (Florida); fraternities 
(hometown associations) from Massachusetts and Los Angeles; the Anastasio Tzúl/Guatemala Support 
Network of Houston and Anastasio Tzúl/Casa Guatemala of Chicago refugee organizations; the 
Guatemalan American Chamber of Commerce (Chicago), the Guatemalan American Committee of Long 
Island, NY; the Guatemalan American Association (AGA) of Miami; the Association of United 
Guatemalans (AGU) of San Francisco and the Guatemalan Unity Information Agency (GUIA) with offices 
in Los Angeles and Washington. According to researchers Susanne Jonas and Nestor Rodríguez, the 
latter organization was founded on the initiative of the Guatemalan consul in Los Angeles and that 
government link marked a contrast with the refugee organizations whose members had arrived in the 
US fleeing Guatemalan army repression.1 Nonetheless, they joined forces to form GUATENET, a network 
of agencies that fell apart the following year, floundering between ethnic and ideological differences.  
Some of its organizations and others soon formed the Coalition of Guatemalan Immigrants in the US 
(CONGUATE), which still exists. Aside from CONGUATE, there are a great many community networks 
with Maya identity, among them the Bi-National/International Maya League headquartered in Vermont 
and its counterpart in Guatemala, the Organization of Maya in Exile in Florida and the Maya Various 
Interpreting Services and Indigenous Organizing Network, which provides translation services in asylum 
application hearings. As Jonas and Rodríguez observed, these groups deal with social and cultural issues, 
not political campaigns for legalization, but they do work on the exercise of rights and legal immigration 
services.  Their ethnic and national coverage has expanded and their issue range has varied.2  Both the 
more varied range of their services and their limited ideologizing are symptoms of a turnabout, perhaps 
a transformation, that responds to new needs or greater attention to the everyday ones of those who 
have a clearer future in the United States. 
Despite their insertion in Los Angeles, it can’t be said they’ve been uprooted, to use the 
metaphor of US historian Oscar Handlin.3 Their place of origin continues to exert a gravitational force.  
Guatemalans in Los Angeles have many organizations patterned on the geographical divisions of their 
home villages.  Indigenous Guatemalans from San Antonio Sija are divided by parajes, the territorial 
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units in Maya villages.  They regularly invest in communal assets back home: cobbling the streets and 
paving the roads, buying land for schools and the cemetery, enlarging their Catholic church and 
repairing two convents, improving the football field, building communal rooms and a retaining wall in 
Chonimacorral.1  They have financed the celebration of Independence Day every September 15 in 
Camposeco, Pajul and Chonimacorral. Since 1991 associations help their native communities celebrate 
their patron saints’ festivals with plenty of funding for Mexican and Guatemalan musical groups whose 
fame transcends the borders: Lalo Tzul and his marimba orchestra Ecos Manzaneros, Fidel Funes, Los 
Internacionales Conejos, Alma Tuneca, Checha y su India Maya Caballero, etc.   Each concert costs US$4-
6,000, depending on whether the group is Mexican or Guatemalan.2 
These investments in cultural events, construction and buying land in their villages show the 
importance of their origins.  No less symptomatic of this importance is the fact that the institution that 
overwhelmingly attracts and unites them is the fund for taking the dead back to their homeland, the 
only one with regular, undeniable contributions that guarantee the return of deceased members to 
“where their umbilical cord was buried.”  If US associations distinguished themselves by rising from local 
to national level without losing their roots, these groups manage to be binational/local, i.e. very locally 
focused but with a presence and activities in two nations.  In this they differ from typical US 
associations, whose structure reproduces the local/state/national one of the US federal government.3 
These kinds of socially and culturally motivated organizations opened the way to the new 
generation’s more flexible groups, which from the outset seemed to be entities without ideological 
orientation or political alignment. Perhaps also, as often happens, the upcoming generation noted the 
adults’ organizational resource and its many possibilities, but found no space in it for their activism so 
created their own organization… their own way.  An example is the association I’ll call the Dolores 
Huerta Community Garden, a pseudonym used by the sociologist Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo in her 
book Paradise transplanted to refer not to the group but to its garden.4 It brings together more than 30 
Mayan young people between 16 and 30 years of age, most of them ethnically Quiché from the village 
of San Antonio Sija.  It’s a very informal organization, halfway between a movement and a non-
movement.  It doesn’t have legal status.  It was created with ties to the Catholic Church, but is non-
                                            
1 González y González, 2006, pp.68-69. 
2 González y González, 2012, p.30. 
3 Skocpol, 2002, p.105. 
4 Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2014, p.118. 
  
343 
denominational.  And it doesn’t have a formally established hierarchical structure or a mission that 
transcends its members or guides their activities towards a utopian goal.    
The obligations of both female and male members aren’t specified in a code.  Its agenda is 
extremely fluid, often ad hoc in nature and unconstrained by specific programs.  Although there are 
regular scheduled meetings, the members mostly interact during spontaneous encounters, in an ice-
cream parlor or a Thai restaurant, where the number of participants varies and their experiences of the 
day lead to a very horizontal discussion in which veterans may explain how they confronted similar 
problems but never pontificate about the best behavior. They have all the ideological plurality of a non-
movement.  The iconography the group puts on its Facebook page combines the most traditional 
religious motifs with allusions to the struggles of the 1980s and a belligerent veneration of Monsignor 
Romero. Sometimes its discourse reflects a sexual morality marked by extreme Catholic conservatism, 
but this doesn’t stop the men from putting hundreds of selfies on their Facebook pages together with 
the myriad Miss Guatemala candidates with voluptuous cleavage produced by every neighborhood, 
event and business enterprise.  Nor does it preclude any girl from switching boyfriends or regularly 
going out with a member of the group while clearly telling him—to his extreme perplexity—that she has 
no intention of establishing a formal or exclusive relationship. The Italian Marxist theoretician Antonio 
Gramsci identified this kind of disconnection—not practicing what one preaches—as an unequivocal 
sign of a newly emerging hegemony.1  There’s surely plenty of that in this duplicity, in this particular 
case reflecting a cultural gap between a supportive yet burdensome past and a hard-to-assimilate 
present.  We need to recognize that these young people have made a transition from a rural village of 
6,641 inhabitants in 2002 to the mega-city of Los Angeles with its 3,792,621 inhabitants in 2010.2 The 
change is similar to the one Nestor Rodríguez alludes to with the stark contrast between San Cristóbal 
de Totonicapán, a rural village of artisans and farmers, and Houston, an area of advanced 
industrialization,  the starting and settlement points for another Quiché group.3  
As members of the 1.5 generation (born in Guatemala but migrated as children), some of these 
young people “appear more concerned with their lives and prospects in the United States and, at this 
point, do not seem likely to continue to sustain long-term ties to their parental homeland,” as Cecilia 
Menjívar rightly pointed out in Living in two worlds: Guatemalan-origin children in the United States and 
                                            
1 Gramsci, 2007, p.165. 
2 González y González, 2002, p.8. US Census Bureau, American FactFinder, 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml 
3 Rodríguez and Hagan, 2000, p.197. 
  344 
emerging transnationalism.1  They are in a state of cultural liminality (a time-space ambiguity when on 
the threshold of political and cultural transition) in which the old hierarchies are suspended.2  This 
creates many disorienting implications for their learned moral code: new practices that don’t match the 
old discourse. 
A non-movement accommodates a wide range of positions, perhaps very appropriate for young 
people in liminality who are groping for an emancipation without an ideology to provide a substitute 
lifeline.  It leaves individual women and men to examine what their own pressing needs are, using the 
means their own personal history affords them. The French philosopher and social theorist Michel 
Foucault said that “identities are defined by personal history.”3  For the young men and women of the 
Dolores Huerta Community Garden, their group is an opportunity to meet those with very similar 
histories, allowing them to form a community together in the liminality.  They are no longer chapines 
(from Guatemala) or Mayas from the Guatemalan highlands, or even Quichés from San Antonio Sija. I 
suspect that their predominant problems wouldn’t be understood by their contemporaries back home: 
how to avoid the immigration authorities; when to go to the Labor Ministry; what to do about the 
inundation of pornography that’s circulating; how to act to around girls who are not the shy, 
domineered ones they’re familiar with; what to tell bully-boys who want submission like back home and 
how to react when encountering a polymorphous family that could take the form of a heterosexual 
couple without children, lesbians who adopt, permanent bachelors, or homes where the woman earns 
as much as her husband. However, they aren’t Angelinos either.  Although a city that fascinates them, 
Los Angeles is too immense a sprawling metropolis with too complex a history for young people who 
came here less than a decade ago to assimilate.  There’s no name for their and other Central Americans’ 
liminality, something akin to Chicanos, long applied to Mexican immigrations from the same 
generational/migratory bracket. 
I must acknowledge that my expectation of meeting young people confined to a geographical 
ghetto and caught up in relationships marked by inbreeding was shattered by the evidence of multiple 
relationships and extensive knowledge of Los Angeles’ most extreme hidden corners, from those of 
honored academics to German millionaires, from Sylvester Stallone’s house in Beverly Hills to the flop 
houses where the wandering lumpenproletariat pass around hard drugs. Considering that most of them 
aren’t fluent in English and some feel that their Quiché accent betrays them with every word they speak 
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in Spanish, this broad spectrum is impressive.  I think this urban erudition and colorful range of 
relationships is the group’s achievement.  The Dolores Huerta Community Garden has been a platform 
to deal with this cultural liminality and the liminality of their immigration status, cultivating more than 
just incipient integration. 
 The support young people receive from William Pérez, a Salvadoran catechist who came to Los 
Angeles fleeing military repression in the early 1980s, is multifaceted.  His role in the group is extremely 
subtle.  He can be a counsellor with invaluable experience, a public relations manager or just another 
comrade talking about his intimate problems.  William infuses the meetings with a relaxed approach and 
a lot of humor. The informal talks address the boys’ pressing problems: being adolescents, being 
indigenous Mayas who live in a very different cultural milieu, regaining their roots, promiscuity, 
harassment from youth gangs, girls from their village who behave differently now they’re in Los Angeles.  
Also the problems they encounter in the world of work, the stigma they feel for having practically zero 
English fluency and not much in Spanish, speaking with an unmistakable accent, all of which is music to 
the ears of swindlers and unscrupulous bosses. 
The fact that their program isn’t constrained doesn’t mean they don’t have one.  Their regular 
activities bear witness to that: Friday meetings, training courses, catechism, collective gardening as an 
exercise in psychological therapy, self-esteem and spirituality workshops such as the one called “Healing 
the Inner Child” given by a visiting psychologist from San Francisco el Alto…  The group is consistent 
even in its spontaneous encounters and informal meetings. 
This garden is located in the heart of Pico Union, one of the most densely populated areas of Los 
Angeles and even anywhere else in the United States1; also very close to the birthplace of Maras 13 and 
18.  The garden isn’t exclusively their idea; the city has a tradition of communal gardens, where 
Mexicans, Salvadorans and Guatemalans have managed to reproduce their countries’ vegetables, fruits, 
herbs and medicinal plants: chayotes, pápalos, chipilíns, epazote, bananas, papayas and mangos, among 
others.2 They are semi-spontaneous platforms for getting together for different reasons, as happens 
with non-movements.  As Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo and José Miguel Ruiz noted in “Illegality” and 
Spaces of Sanctuary “: these gardens serve as palliative sanctuaries for lives steeped in marginality and 
illegality (…) provide sites where people alleviate the hardships and suffering of illegality.”3  They 
obviously fulfill a nostalgic need too and, as in this case, may also have a religious, economic or 
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psychological appeal. To these must be added another dimension: geography professor Adrian J. Bailey, 
who has written extensively on transnational migration and migrant identity, argues that illegality is 
accompanied by spatial acts of strategic visibility.1  Hondagneu-Sotelo and Ruiz point out that because 
illegality is related to other exclusions—class, ethnicity, gender, nation—these spaces are important as 
reinvented places for engaging in resistance.2 Urbanist Mike Davis talked about this reinvention 15 years 
ago, offering the example of Los Angeles neighborhoods that had been revitalized and tropicalized 
through the remodeling of houses by Mexicans and Salvadorans in the 1980s and 1990s.3  The gardens 
are yet another way to reinvent and appropriate the city, a way to force inclusion and thus a resistance I 
call civil disobedience, which is acting as if they were citizens, accentuated by acts seeking strategic 
visibility. Because of illegality’s spatial aspect, the transformation of neighborhoods and gardens are 
platforms for engaging in alternative ways of belonging.4  In this sense they are political places because 
there people can enjoy integration and visibility not envisaged in the status imposed by the State’s 
bureaucracy.   These areas acquire greater political implications and are more necessary in a context 
where restrictive immigration legislation isn’t only applied on the border but also within the country.5 
They are more controversial areas when the determination to expel and all the devices of the 
banopticon (where profiling technologies are used to determine who to put under surveillance) have 
greater geographic penetration. Hondagneu-Sotelo and Ruiz mention that these gardens are meeting 
places for undocumented immigrants and Central Americans with different immigration status.  I 
emphasize what’s most obviously deduced from their research: they are areas for encounters with 
academics, people well established in US society, with sound and magnificent credentials in the world of 
work, consumption, higher education, the exercise of rights and legal status.  People who can say 
everything they think (parrhesia) and know how to say it; citizens with exceedingly good connections 
with other citizens and institutions, and who therefore sometimes act as communication hubs and 
channels. 
Among other activities, I accompanied the boys—the bichos (brats) as William Pérez calls them, 
in Salvadoran slang—to a presentation of the book Paradise transplanted, a fundraiser for the Dolores 
Huerta Community Garden, which took place in author Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo’s home.  The activity 
was set within a cozy garden of cactus and succulents, very appropriate for a city where a large part of 
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the water travels hundreds of miles in aqueducts from the Colorado River and the Sierra Nevada 
mountains.  Stones from its rivers still ring from old disputes between Southern and Northern California 
and with Arizona, brawls filled with corrupt incidents such as the one “more syncretic than fictional”–as 
Mike Davis called it in his book City of Quartz. Excavating the Future of Los Angeles—as dramatized in 
Roman Polanski’s film Chinatown1, or the massive closure of wells (40% contaminated) in the late 1980s, 
which it was estimated would cost US $2-40 billion and take three decades to clean.2 We got to this 
garden, which looks like a bonsai version of an oasis, at five in the afternoon on the hottest day of the 
year.  I think the boys and I all felt a little like fish out of water or perhaps I did more because the boys 
had been there before; or maybe I’m only projecting my own feelings of strangeness.  Little by little 
Pierrette’s colleagues began to arrive, most of them teachers at the University of Southern California, 
maybe some were neighbors.  There were drinks and some Mexican-style snacks on two tables, and a 
place for selling the book (the revenues went to the Dolores Huerta Community Garden). 
The presentation ceremony was small and pleasant.  Pierrette was introduced by her husband 
and spoke about the book with great modesty, especially for a prize-winning researcher with a C. Wright 
Mills Award among other honors.   At the end she opened the floor to the boys and William, who talked 
about their efforts to insert themselves in the United States and the importance of the garden. 
Afterwards we spread out around the garden tables and talked.  Time was set aside for the academics to 
learn about the life of young, undocumented Mayas in Los Angeles.  But the relaxed conversation, 
wandering over various subjects, was—like the whole event—a setting for the “right now but still not 
yet” used in scatological reflections about the Kingdom of God: it’s being built but still hasn’t been fully 
realized.  This happens with integration: it’s being built now but doesn’t get as far as legal validity. 
Perhaps the contrast with other countries highlights the rationale behind these kinds of 
encounters: in neither Germany nor Nicaragua would the house of a university professor be used as a 
meeting and fundraising venue to aid a group of undocumented immigrants.  What does this mean?  If 
gardens are places for neutralizing a determination to exclude, their effectiveness is even more evident 
in the contact with academics who consider them places of resistance and subsequently carry their 
commitment into extracurricular areas: inviting the immigrants into their homes, presenting them to 
their friends, fundraising, etc. To the extent that they bring about a series of actions undermining 
bureaucracy’s  excluding preserves, these gardens aren’t only what Hondagneu-Sotelo and Ruiz call 
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“seeds for resistance and social transformation”1, but also sites of political struggle.  That’s where the 
immigrants’ lack of respect and their aspirations to inclusion have an impact, creating a domino effect of 
events with multiple ramifications.  These encounters succeed in giving the academics a grounding and 
greater awareness of everyday demands. 
They also succeed in eventually getting practical demands met.  Some of these boys migrated 
because of violence and sometimes they make surveys about their credentials in order to qualify as 
candidates for asylum.   My farewell dinner, organized in a Pico Union fast food place, was attended by 
all the boys I had interviewed and more, as well as by the lawyer Robert Foss.  While the rest of us were 
wrapped up in a noisy and chaotic talk, he raised his voice like a medical expert who identifies the 
disease from a few symptoms and knows the remedy, and said: “William, we’ve got a DACA [Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals] program case here.” 
3.5 Immigrant organizations as communication hubs and channels toward partisan 
politics, academy, and mass media 
 
Much of the activism in favor of Central Americans—both their own organizations and those run by third 
parties to benefit them—is rooted in the struggles of the 1980s. Their knowledge and social capital were 
accumulated in interesting times. Some started out linked to insurgent movements from their countries 
of origin but over time they have been diversifying.  The end of the Cold War ushered in a new era of the 
Pax Americana where most of the conflicts previously attributed to racism, inequality, exploitation and 
injustice, are now presented, according to Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek, as problems of 
intolerance.2 Liberalism’s change of direction—in order to sweep the conflicts under the carpet, along 
with a make-over and reinforcement of domination—has a positive consequence in the variety of 
activists who we would never have formerly thought to find working side by side and/or for the same 
cause: men who daily attend Mass, women lawyers from Berkeley, disenchanted former guerrillas, 
lifelong activists, inveterate hippies, muralists, Salvadoran journalists, grassroots educators, Maya tailors 
and many others. I deliberately inserted the colossal CASA of Maryland into the same article as the tiny 
Dolores Huerta Community Garden: the first is a mixture of a movement and a top-down organization; 
the second falls within the boundaries of a non-movement.  This array has produced a variety of 
organisms and profiles: different in size, financial movement, levels of formalization, membership and 
services.  
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But they have one thing in common: all these organizations were formed from the bottom up—
the Dolores Huerta Community Garden was even formed from the bottom sideways, and CASA of 
Maryland from the bottom to very much up—motivated by common interests, elaborating on a feature 
Gramsci identified over fifty years ago: “Today, by contrast, collective man is formed essentially from 
the bottom up, on the basis of the position that the collectivity occupies in the world of production.”1 
These organizations’ members are united by their position in production, the consumer world, ethnic 
identity and, above all, their situation as undocumented immigrants who have the courage to act as if 
they weren’t undocumented.  That’s why they succeed in creating institutions close to the interests of 
the excluded, grounded and responsive to the needs of individual women and men.  If they have to 
undermine the hegemony, they’ll do it from far below.  But this grounding has led to some break-ups.  
For CARECEN the struggle by Central Americans in the US meant breaking from ideological ties that 
anchored it in a time and a region. Its willingness to “devote itself to the community” was an expression 
of the tensions coming from a dual sense of belonging, reflecting the confinement in the national 
panorama and the methodological nationalism that Ulrich Beck challenges because it limits perspective 
by conceiving of modern society and politics as organized in a nation-State.2  In this case, that meant 
assuming that political struggles primarily or even exclusively gravitate around the country of origin.  
There has been tension between ideological and party loyalty and the imperative of responding to the 
needs of individual women and men whose lack of documentation made them subject to political 
exclusion. The Dolores Huerta Community Garden, newly minted and free from ideological constraints 
as a non-movement, didn’t experience this tension. CASA of Maryland experiences it permanently, 
although not as a tension between a national and transnational framework, but through its dual 
character as an organization with grassroots and grasstops features. 
It’s possible that the closer they keep their condition to that of a non-movement, the greater 
their sensitivity and flexibility.  The Dolores Huerta Community Garden is much more autonomous and 
self-managing than CARECEN and CASA of Maryland, which now depend on many foundations with 
interests that influence their agenda.  The Garden’s small size enables it to rapidly and effectively put 
together the “operations” its members need to move towards inclusion. The traditional religiosity of 
their language can be misleading. The symbolic framework of traditional religiosity can be the lingua 
franca of the dominated.  It’s a language used to create fellowship among young people in liminality, but 
doesn’t necessarily reflect their practice.  It’s often the language of conformity that lightly varnishes 
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over an everyday life punctuated by acts of disobedience: staying without documents, avoiding the 
round-ups protected by a crucifix, crossing immigration check points clinging to a rosary, etc. 
The bottom-up origins of CASA of Maryland and CARECEN, or the Dolores Huerta Community 
Garden’s bottom-up origins with sideways expansion and impact, empower them in their role as a hinge 
between the mass of undocumented immigrants and the large organizations and well-structured 
activities, such as the immigrants’ large movements, demonstrations, NGOs, academia and the media. 
Their function as a hub is to react to the demands of the non-movements and cause reactions in 
institutions and persons in positions of power with possibilities of making their voice heard and getting 
their message across, thus practicing parrhesia. The event in Pierrette’s home had a lot of theatricality: 
it was a setting for the including anti-establishment to challenge the excluding power.  That’s where it 
derives its effectiveness to produce an impact and spark reactions, and where it gets the clout that 
enables undocumented immigrants to have their say in different areas.  The links that many groups 
(Border Angels, the Dolores Huerta Community Garden, the Líderes Campesinas group1) have with 
academia, the links and political effectiveness of CASA of Maryland, and the media impact of the 
Dreamers’ associations represent a counter-attack that contains some elements of movement and 
others of non-movement, some of concerted activities and a lot of spontaneous actions.  It’s a counter-
attack on conservative thinking’s very calculated ideological production denounced by Susan George in 
Hijacking America: How the Secular and Religious Right Changed What Americans think, in which she 
reveals their multimillion dollar funding. These groups are undertaking an unequal battle in this war of 
ideas, because even CASA of Maryland doesn’t have remotely comparable financial resources to those 
of the large conservative agencies such as the Templeton, Bradley, Olin, Scaife and Smith-Richardson 
foundations.2  But it has triggered a far-reaching domino effect in time, space and subjects.  We can 
easily trace the “illegalization of immigrants,” “religious citizenship” and “liminal legality” concepts that 
sprang from the personal experiences and direct contacts of Nicholas De Genova3, Peggy Levitt4 and 
Cecilia Menjívar5 with groups of undocumented immigrants, some very similar to the Dolores Huerta 
Community Garden.  With these and other links immigrants are engaging in freedom exactly as Marx 
understood it: not as an absence of constrictions but as the ability to fight against them. 
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Through these groups, immigrants manage to go further in their challenge to the State, using 
their political right to organize, establishing alliances between immigrants with different immigration 
statuses and of different generations, keeping within the law but promoting the inclusion of those who 
have been illegalized. If they are more explicitly politicized, like CASA of Maryland, they channel the 
immigrant non-movements’ force towards the offices of high-ranking politicians and their spontaneous 
force into media acts, expressing them in the language progressive politicians understand.  They do it 
through the peaceful resistance German theorist Theodor Ebert calls “civil usurpation,” a set of 
constructive actions contained in the sanctuary movement and other initiatives that don’t enable the 
State’s excluding hand to act effectively, and that sends it signals. 
None of these associations justify the apprehensions that inspired Tocqueville, as an aristocrat 
fearful of the Jacobin and Cordeliers clubs, regarding the concept of associations: they neither pose a 
threat to the State that can lead to anarchy nor do their members adhere to them with the acritical 
submission of those who abdicate their free will and accept a tyranny more unbearable than that of the 
government.1 But they do confirm Kosellek’s findings: they are “apolitical” groups whose values 
question the State and limit its capacity to exercise power.  Theirs are disobedient actions—sometimes 
explicit, like Gustavo Torres’—that contain legal changes towards apprentice citizenship and/or frustrate 
actions rejecting undocumented immigrants. They procure what Norberto Bobbio recognizes as the 
main objective of peaceful rebellion: to neutralize the opponent, place the adversary in difficulties 
rather than debase or destroy it, preventing or hampering it from achieving its ends.  These actions 
don’t confront power with a counter-power, they reduce it to impotence. The report to Congress isn’t 
therefore so very misguided: these groups do negatively affect excluding policies on the border and 
within the country. 
 
 
                                            
1 Tocqueville, 2014, pp.211-212. 
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FINAL REMARKS 
 
“12 million undocumented” speaks to us of discrimination. But that gross figure, waving like a flag of 
denunciation, does not speak to us of the levels and scope of discrimination, and much less of the 
challenge, resistance and support, spaces and instruments of insertion. In order to see that, I have 
reframed the illegal crossing of the Mexico-United States border and the unauthorized stay in United 
States territory as a political action: as a very specific act of civil disobedience. In so doing, I tried to 
contribute to the theories that state that citizenship, membership and documentation in the United 
States is not an “all-or-nothing affair”. This text interprets the actions of migrants using a political and 
legal category that is legitimate for the citizens of the destination society and has been a historic tool to 
fight for inclusion. There are two predominant interpretations of the recent undocumented migration to 
the United States (the first two I mentioned in the introduction). One of them explains this migration as 
a series of actions that form part of the dynamics of expulsion/attraction generated by the expansion of 
capital, the new geographical location of the means of production and the battle to expand markets. 
Usually, this interpretation is complemented by an analysis of the effects of illegalizing immigration on 
the labor rights of undocumented immigrants whose vulnerability derives in lower salaries and reduced 
access to social services, which are precise traits of capital’s unscrupulous search for higher profit. 
Another perspective –a liberal one- views migration within the framework of the globalization of labor 
markets in an increasingly interconnected world, but one that still does not anticipate this type of 
change and is not well prepared to deal with it. The speed of this transformation demands social 
engineering changes to increase the governability of migrations through public policies that promote 
temporary work programs, circular migration, selective amnesties and other legal instruments oriented 
towards a compromise between some of the affected human rights of migrants, and the right of a 
nation state to preserve the sovereign use of its territory. 
Both focuses share a common emphasis: migrant populations emerge as the playing pieces of a 
backwards and barely understandable chess game of structural forces. Polls reveal that migrants are 
pushed to migrate for economic reasons, and due to the habitual violence and political instability in 
their countries of origin, thus it is most “natural” to see them as silent instruments of these structural 
forces. A long tradition of western thought, that belittles actions derived from the compulsion to 
survive, nourishes this perspective. These actions are not examined in political terms. Although the 
paradigm of a rational person, one who takes sensible economic decisions guided by cost/benefit 
calculations, may attempt to go beyond the structuralist vision, the traditional perspective continues, 
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constricting the meaning of these types of actions to that of economic compulsion, in which actions to 
survive are only intelligible according to an economic rationale. In both traditions, vital needs and their 
closeness with animal instinct obscure the political aspects of everyday life. 
These views on migration neglect the political aspects of its massive illegality: more than 60 
percent of the immigrants from Mexico and Central America that presently reside in the United States 
are undocumented.1  The undocumented population has a relatively important impact in the areas 
where they are concentrated: in 2010, this group represented more than six percent of the population 
in the states of Nevada, California, Texas, New Jersey and Arizona2. In these locations, six percent of the 
inhabitants do not live within the legal system, and these large numbers of people can narrate a history 
of ongoing rebellion. Nevertheless, a vision focused exclusively on the origins and the economic nature 
of migration overlooks the insistence and flagrancy of these transgressions.  
Hannah Arendt observed that the public meanings of acts are not determined by individual 
actions but by the context in which these actions occur, in the summation of acts and their effects. No 
single person is the absolute owner of the meaning of his or her actions. Taking Arendt’s theory, I 
sustain that, seen in its totality, the microeconomic decisions to migrate and to remain in the United 
States without documents represent a challenge to the sovereignty of the United States. The legal 
context of the United States bestows new meaning to the acts of survival. Nicholas de Genova and Aviva 
Chomsky noted the long process of illegalization of migrations. The result of the process is a changing 
context that grants new meaning to migrating without documents, which far from diminishing, only 
accentuates the challenge of entering a national territory without the authorization of the bureaucracy 
in charge of selecting the individuals (and the number of individuals) that are welcome. 
In this process of illegalization, migrants have taken on that illegality, with its risks and 
challenges. Some intellectuals, activists and religious leaders appeal to universal citizenship, and fight a 
semantic battle against the stigma of “illegals” applied to undocumented immigrants by the 
government, a label which they attempt to eliminate or delegitimize, showing its spurious origin. 
Nonetheless, this does not erase the fact that the starting point of the relationship established between 
undocumented migrants with the United States is based on the transgression of the laws of that 
country. The rituals of legal admission, at a later stage, take on that infraction, obliging residency 
candidates to wash their original sin by requesting pardon, and stating their contrition for having 
entered without authorization. 
                                            
1 Hoefer, Rytina, and Baker, 2012, p.5 
2 Passel and Cohn, 2011, p.14. 
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Nevertheless, such actions of good faith delete the political nature of the insertion of 
unauthorized migrants. The appeal to that true although demagogical statement by Woodrow Wilson, 
that the United States is a nation of immigrants, ignores the terrible fact that it is also a Deportation 
Nation (as states the title of Daniel Kanstroom’s book), which recurrently has imposed rigorous filters to 
successive waves of immigrants. The United States, since its foundation and on a path bristling with 
obstacles, is a nation that is open to dissent: a republic according to Arendt’s definition.  The presence of 
undocumented migrants appeals precisely to this dissent and to the precarious balance of powers and 
counter-powers. 
One cannot affirm that undocumented migration dramatizes a lack of obligation to the legal 
system of the country where people seek residence. The unauthorized entrance and stay of migrants is 
an act of disobedience and adaptation, a challenge to – and the acceptance of – certain rules, because it 
is not a revolutionary act. It does not aspire to (or have a possibility of) constructing a new system. It 
only rehearses a political game, and faces the consequences of certain given rules. However, it 
constitutes a challenge to a medullar aspect, the territorial control that any state demands as an 
expression of its sovereign power. Undocumented migration also represents a challenge to the powers 
that oppose undocumented migration: the anti-immigration legislation; the ferociously xenophobic –but 
mostly theatrical- sheriffs such as Joe Arpaio; opportunist businessmen; paramilitary groups such as the 
Minute Men; racist propaganda; the rigid bureaucracies that take laws literally instead of understanding 
their meanings; and the ominous lobby of powerful military-industrial complex and the prison-industrial 
complex (the economic forces of the banoptic) that seek to profit from managing private prisons and 
selling surveillance devices and services which view these almost twelve million undocumented persons 
as potential clients and targets. 
Nevertheless, despite this challenge, migrants are not abandoned to their fate. They enjoy the 
daily support of common citizens and the tenacious work of activists, NGOs and churches, academic 
investigations, aided by images developed in some of the mass media, including movies, theater and 
music, among others. No less important is the fact that migrants carry their own weight in the labor 
market, in the sustainability of the system of social security and in the consumption of goods and 
services. To interpret the tension between challenge and adaptation, between transgression and 
insertion, I framed their everyday acts as civil disobedience, a category of the United States political and 
legal system. 
The explanatory power of this phenomenon is circumscribed to, and potentiated by, the context 
described, as it would not be in other circumstances. The explanation would not suffice in a nation 
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where the access to the full realization of citizenship – of the government’s recognition of rights – had 
not resulted from political actions that included civil disobedience as a resource that the government 
and an important number of citizens resisted, but also legitimized. The explanation would fail in a 
context in which civil disobedience had not generated social change or expressed the tension between 
rejection and acceptance of a political system. The United States philosopher John Rawls reflected 
broadly and sharply on civil disobedience in his book A Theory of Justice. He sustained that “by acting in 
this way one addresses the sense of justice of the majority of the community and declares that in one’s 
considered opinion the principles of social cooperation among free and equal men are not being 
respected.”1 We could therefore affirm that the conditions of inclusion are not respected. 
Undocumented migration presents the same tenor of resistance to adaptation as civil disobedience, 
because, in Rawls’ words, civil disobedience “expresses disobedience to law within the limits of fidelity 
to law, although it is at the outer edge thereof. The law is broken, but fidelity to law is expressed by the 
public and nonviolent nature of the act, by the willingness to accept the legal consequences of one’s 
conduct.”2 
Rawls sustains that the person who is civilly disobedient calls to abolish fundamental principles 
that were trampled by laws and policies, through the action of disobedience. In the case of migrants, 
they seek to halt the application of certain laws. For migrants, their hope is that the system will 
reconsider or take special measures to modify their legal status. That is why an act of civil disobedience 
seeks a perlocutionary effect. Habermas posited that a political or legal state disposition can have “legal 
validity” while lacking “legitimacy”. The first comes from passing a law, and the second occurs when the 
law or the policy emerges from consensus, taking into account diverse interests. Legitimacy is the basis 
of any stable political system because policies and laws, if they transcend the formality, should result 
from inter-subjective negotiations. The members of the legal community, with their multiple interests 
and values, should endorse state dispositions so that these can be sustainable as an embodiment of 
political will. The jobs (including works in the state), hospitality, memberships in churches, militancy in 
organizations, and all the support given to these transgressors, undocumented persons, can be 
understood as a type of dissent that discredits the government policies that seek their punishment 
through the restriction of their freedoms and rights, and eventually through their removal. The support 
given to migrant persons refers to a constellation of actions that legitimizes their unauthorized 
presence, thus it constitutes a social authorization that confronts a government prohibition. Here there 
                                            
1 Rawls, 1999, p.320. 
2 Rawls, 1999, p.322. 
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is a point of convergence between Rawls, Ebert, Dworkin, Bobbio, and Habermas: social validation 
legitimizes a behavior and that validation is fundamental to the success of civil disobedience.   
This support is political in that it confronts the government, and its power of validation, by the 
stance it takes on a public issue, going against state dispositions to favor of a group of non-citizens who 
violated the laws. This social validation is visible in diverse ways. The ordinary citizens who allow 
undocumented persons to stay or work in their homes, or who treat their undocumented neighbors 
politely and with solidarity, are enacting social validation. An employer supports undocumented 
immigrants when he or she does not take advantage of the vulnerability of an unauthorized migratory 
status by reducing the workers’ rights or cutting their salaries. There is also the social validation of the 
faithful from different religious denominations who embrace undocumented persons in their small 
communities and even undertake actions to facilitate their efforts to gain citizenship. Priests, pastors, 
imams and rabbis construct legitimacy when they preach the rights of migrants or implement programs 
to favor them. Activists on migratory reform practice civil disobedience in favor of undocumented 
immigrants in their efforts to transform the greater United States community into a niche of welcoming 
and protection of those who immigrate, even when the government does not give that right. On a daily 
basis, these individuals and collectives defy the anti-immigrant government dispositions and endorse 
undocumented persons’ acts of civil disobedience. They grant religious, informal, illegal and economic 
citizenship in everyday life. All these acts of social validation recognize that undocumented persons did 
not commit a crime –a common violation of the law- but carried out an act of disobedience appealing to 
a greater good, and about which the nation should pronounce in daily life and through advocacy work to 
change public policies. 
The support to migrants amounts to a street-level or neighborhood-level referendum. All of 
them make citizenship not to be an “all-or-nothing affair” and construct spaces of membership and 
inclusion. The conjunction of these expressions of inclusiveness is validation on a day-to-day level and 
consolidates multiple levels of validation with an enormous political potential. For example, this support 
takes on a very public form in the interest shown towards murals – such as the well-developed ones in 
the city of San Francisco – where migrants can have parrhesia by expressing their stories and their 
current struggles, and through them, become part of these cities, transform them and communicate 
with their inhabitants to produce a perlocutionary effect. The everyday support converges in the 
validation of grass-root and non-governmental organizations that serve as a platform in the struggle for 
citizenship. The support of employers is the foundation of economic validation and economic 
citizenship. Likewise, the social validation undoubtedly sustains the growing support to migrants on 
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behalf of the cultural industry and the media –although commercial interests are also involved–, 
establishing a meaningful tendency to construct a favorable image for undocumented immigrants (for 
example, the June 25, 2012 cover of Time Magazine read: “We are Americans: Just not Legally.”) 
Another validation that derives from this support is visible in partisan politics, which regards migrants as 
a political force that is clearly capable of awarding or punishing political positions on undocumented 
persons, migratory reform and the route to citizenship it offers to the almost twelve million 
undocumented persons. There is also the validation by academics, whose historical, sociological, 
political and economic arguments seek to dismantle xenophobic myths, monitor the rights of migrants 
and support the legitimacy of their presence and integration. 
These multiple validations have crystalized –through complex communicating vessels– within 
the government-level heterogeneity that is manifested in actions of legal and political legitimation 
which reflect historic struggles: sanctuary cities, the refusal to apply e-verify in California, the granting of 
driver’s licenses to undocumented persons in different states of the union, the access of undocumented 
youth to higher education and state scholarships, the rights granted to the Dreamers, the support from 
street-level bureaucrats, among others. On a historical level, diverse actors and constellations of actors 
have confronted the government in order to make that heterogeneity possible. The support of those –
and with those- who confront the state is of a political nature. It is not merely an act of assistance. 
Assistance-based support alone has a highly beneficial effect on immigrants, but when it directly assists 
those proscribed by the law, it acquires political characteristics, since it implies a position on public 
administration and directly confronts those who condemn it. Rawls points out that the final appeals 
court is not the Supreme Court, Congress or the president, but the entire electorate. He who is civilly 
disobedient appeals to this body. Obviously, once immigrants evade migratory controls, they are 
appealing to this highest level of social tribunal: the businesses that hire them, the NGOs that defend 
them, the activists that take the streets to defend their rights and the academics that applaud the 
cultural wealth nourished by their presence, among many others. 
They make this appeal in the day to day and in actions that are not taken as political actions, but 
as acts of necessity. Drop by drop a series of unconnected actions converge to represent a greater 
challenge to the principle of territorial sovereignty. This accumulation of individual acts is what erects a 
challenge and creates dissent, because you provoke support and rejection in that supreme tribunal. That 
tribunal is “forced” to pronounce its daily verdict in the face of the quiet encroachment of the 
undocumented. Its verdict is not issued in the courts, but in the work place, in the murals of the city, in 
the recognition –through making specific products- of new subjects in the market, and even in the 
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swings of local politics, that are highly sensitive to the opinion of their current and potential electorate. 
Their actions mould the form of being interpellated. According to Butler, “interpellation is an act of 
speech whose ‘content’ is neither true nor false: it does not have description as its primary task. Its 
purpose is to indicate and establish a subject in subjection, to produce its social contours in space and 
time. Its reiterative operation has the effect of sedimenting its ‘positionality’ over time.”1 The actions of 
material life and also in other spheres are changing the interpellation, replacing the label “illegals” with 
workers, consumers, refugees, muralists, etc. The world of the reproduction of life moulds the form of 
interpellating. Promoting positive appeals, the migrants in the demonstrations hold posters that read, “I 
am not an illegal. I am the cook that prepares your favorite food.” 
Bayat refers this way to the accomplishments that this art of presence is constructing in 
different spheres: “This kind of spread-out and encroachment reflects in some way the non-movements 
of the international illegal migrants. There exist now a massive border check, barriers, fences, walls, and 
police patrols. And yet they keep flooding— through the air, sea, road, hidden in the back of trucks, 
trains, or simply on foot. They spread, expand, and grow in the cities of the global North; they settle, 
find jobs, acquire homes, form families, and struggle to get legal protection. They build communities, 
churches or mosque groups, cultural collectives, and visibly flood the public spaces. As they feel safe and 
secure, they assert their physical, social and cultural presence in the host societies.”2 This belligerancy, 
in the case of the United States as destination and the Central American region as the place of origin 
affected by violence, means that the migrants decided to grant themselves the asylum that the state 
denied them. They forced that state – that had already entered into a relationship with them in their 
countries of origin by effect of the violence in which it was implicated – to re-enter into a relationship 
with them in the territory under its jurisdiction. They are not indifferent to the state, and therefore are 
not reduced to their biological side, which  is characterized by the absence of the political side. The state 
tracks them and expels them, tries to stop their entry through walls and traps, but also defends their 
rights in the face of unscrupulous employers, shyster crooks, abusive husbands and greedy landlords; it 
offers them jobs, medical assistance and free education; it issues driver´s licenses to their benefit, 
legalizes their construction businesses and recognizes their unions as stable de facto unions; and even in 
some regions they allow them to vote. Neither in a negative nor in a positive sense do the 
undocumented live in the margins of the state. Their undocumentation is not just positive, nor just 
negative. It is an in-between category, between legal and illegal, that expresses the dissent within the 
                                            
1 Butler, 1997, pp.33-34. 
2 Bayat, 2010, p.15. 
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state and society. But that does not reduce them to bare lives. The support and state heterogeneity do 
not result in bare lives. Agamben coined the term “bare life” as a conceptual horizon for understanding 
better the trending lack of rights of the refugees. I propose civil disobedience to reframe the actions of 
the migrants in contempt of the law, to show their political nature and to show the tendency to gestate 
a citizenship and the negotiations game that takes place in the streets, markets, work places, murals, 
headlines and front pages of the communications media. As workers and as consumers they cannot 
have bare lives. Nor as members of churches and organizations, as muralists in community and as 
demonstrators. In all these spaces they have a word to express. There is where they can exercise 
parrhesia, without which there is no active participation in politics. With parrhesia there is citizenship in 
the making. From the theories of James Scott, I reclaim above all the idea that political speech can have 
multiple forms of expression. Parrhesia is not limited to formal grassroots organizations, political 
tribunals and parlaments. Murals, festivals, demonstrations and consumer boycotts are other forms of 
“pronouncing” a speech. 
Incorporating these speech forms and other political actions presumes a rupture with the 
tradition of western political thought. This thinking started with an elitist vision of who makes history 
and politics: the transforming actor was always an elite or an elite-actor. The mass-actor, above all if 
he/she does not belong to an organization, is left at the margins of politics. I have endeavored to have 
my research distance itself from that vision with the support of the rupture that Marx undertook, a 
necessary rupture to avoid the waste of political experience. My way of addressing that rupture again is 
understanding the presence of the undocumented in the world of work and consumption as an act of 
civil disobedience. The daily actions – of survival – of the migrants that submit their case to the opinion 
of the tribunal of US society are those that constitute a performative civil disobedience: the contempt of 
the law that consists in acting as if the excluding policies had already been abolished and, in this way, 
produce an inclusive perlocutionary effect.  They are actions that produce an “already, but not yet” of 
citizenship, that expand the intermediate zones between citizenship and their undocumentation. 
According to the distinctions of Bobbio, the migrants practice a positive disobedience by commission, 
and avoid the negative disobedience by omission, because they fulfill all their civic obligations, including 
the payment of taxes. In the terminology of Ebert, that disobedience resorts to constructive strategies 
(creation of small businesses, creation of employment and all types of work, above all work useful to the 
state), and confrontational strategies (unauthorized crossing of the border, abrupt changes in residence 
to avoid raids, boycotts against places with excluding legislation). The purpose of the disobedience of 
the undocumented is to change the law, or, in the least successful of cases, keep an unjust and 
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discriminatory law from being applied, through a behavior that denies -but does not ignore- the 
existence of such laws. In the labor field, disobedience does not always have the same meaning. Labor is 
not developed the same way in all trades and industries. The variety of types of work makes the fact of 
hiring migrants have different political connotations. The annulment of abstract work where the 
employee is left invisible makes certain jobs to more clearly be platforms for exercising parrhesia on a 
daily basis. 
If we listen to the justifications and cases of civil disobedience that Dworkin presents, a 
theoretician of civil disobedience, we will see that the invalidity of the law is the key principle. Dworkin 
does not require that the consciencious objectors have certainty about the fact that the law they are not 
following lacks validity. The important thing is that the objectors have beliefs that provide firm support 
to the conviction that the law is on their side. If they do not formulate it this way, it is due to the fact, in 
most cases, that they do not have legal knowledge. Dworkin only requires that the person that disobeys 
believes that he/she is acting correctly in not respecting a law whose goal is doubtful, like the case of 
Ernesto Serna, who believes that there is no right to detain people, and allows the merchandize to pass 
through. Or the case of María García, who denies the right of possession of the US territory to those 
who are neither indigenous nor Mexican. Dworkin goes beyond that, and points out that nothing 
authorizes us to make a distinction between more and less informed disobedients.1 Consequently, even 
though we might think that Ernesto and María are not representative cases because of their cultural 
capital, Dworkin´s theory only asks of the practice of civil disobedience the conviction that they are 
acting correctly by crossing the border and working in the United States. And that is a very 
representative conviction. 
With the theory of Raz something similar occurs: it does not matter whether the actor conceives 
himself/herself or not as a civil disobedient. It only matters that they present themselves as someone 
who is convinced of having acted well, because the majority of the disobedient fall into the category of 
“cases of occasional disobedience”: violations of the law that the people think are normally permitted 
due to the circumstances.2 But here there is a nuance to make to Raz´s theory. In line with western 
political tradition, Raz deals with disobedience with explicit moral motivations. The acts of the migrants 
do not lack moral motivation – ensuring that the children study, supporting a community project, taking 
care of small children or sick family members – but they are “contaminated” by need. Nevertheless, the 
disobedience of the migrants can also be conceived as an act with moral motivation according to the 
                                            
1 Dworkin, 1978, p.215. 
2 Raz, 1979, p.263. 
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assumptions of Raz. This author distinguishes between liberal societies and non liberal ones.  In the 
latter, the right to political participation is not protected by law. In this context, Raz recognizes the right 
to ignore the legal dispositions that transgress that moral right: “members of the illiberal state do have a 
right to civil disobedience which is roughly that part of their moral right to political participation which is 
not recognized in law.”1 Something similar happens with the migrants: they moved to a society whose 
Nation-state does not recognize their political rights. They are part of a society with a liberal state that 
treats the undocumented as members of an illiberal state. In this situation of “illiberality” they make use 
of their moral right to ignore the legal dispositions that prohibit them from working, housing 
themselves, driving vehicles, owning businesses, etc. Consequently, we can say that the undocumented 
can base their right to civil disobedience on the two arguments which in the theory of Raz are presented 
as valid justifications: in liberal societies (in the justice of their objective) and in non liberal societies (in 
the moral right to not recognize legal dispositions that deny them their political rights). With this state 
that, in part, functions like an illiberal state with them, the migrants negotiate, but their negotiations do 
not take place in the courts, but above all in the streets, markets and work places. What is not 
negotiated in the street, will not be able to be obtained in the courts. What happens there, in the quiet 
encroachment and with the art of presence, is the raw material for the changes toward inclusion. 
Without this, there is nothing. And that is a lot. It is the basis for change, and in large measure is the 
change itself, if we are to believe what Castells says about the process being the aim.2 If we consider it 
for a moment, we will see that in this case it is, because there is no more radical parrhesia – and at the 
same time, sign of disobedience – than taking the floor where it has not been conceded. 
This disobedience could be considered as transnational civil disobedience, taking into account 
that the immigrants are disobeying the law of a Nation-state whose nationality they do not have. I think 
that this reason is only partially valid for adding the adjective “transnational” to that disobedience. In 
the beginning of my research I considered, following social contract theory, that in the case of migrants, 
it’s not about certain individuals violating the contract as a way of renouncing it, but rather of forcing 
their inclusion against the contract’s reluctance to let them in. As a result, the argument for classifying 
migrants’ irregular entry as civil disobedience could be framed in a paradigm in which such acts are set 
within the context of a transnationalization of civil disobedience. This cosmopolitan conception involves 
a transposition of civil disobedience to a transnational legal scenario. That transposition cannot be 
based on a supranational authority to which migrants can appeal—the United Nations, for example, 
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2 Castells, 2012, p.144. 
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doesn’t defend them against abuses of the untouchable national legislation. What Sassen maintains in 
Losing Control is not so much what is happening: that the supranational organizations are impacting 
state policies and their implementation. The UNHCR is not able to even have an impact on the quotas of 
refugees and has shown itself to not have much influence on the defense of the unaccompanied Central 
American minors. But it does happen that that discourse on transnational rights is taken up by some 
migrants as a justification. Ernesto and others maintain that there should not be borders, that they 
should have the same rights regardless of their migratory status. The discourse has permeated more 
than the practice. The migrants have not been in contact with the UNHCR, nor with other United 
Nations agencies, but they do have contact with the discourse of the universality of rights, some of them 
in religious realms. Just as the French revolution was preceded by a dissemination of discourses that 
undermined the divine basis for monarchical authority1, the disobedience of the migrants is 
accompanied by a discourse that undermines the sovereign rights to deny entry and permanence. In 
that sense we can talk about transnational civil disobedience. 
But currently the undocumented immigrants are appealing to the country’s citizenry and also to 
a Nation-state. The immigrants are not appealing only to the population, but to the law and customs in 
force in the territory under the jurisdiction of a state. They appeal to an entity that sustains and applies 
that juridical body: the state. In synthesis, the civil disobedience is transnational because those who 
practice it come from another nation – the transnational character goes that far – but not because their 
universal rights are going to be validated by a supranational body. Those rights are validated by national 
political actors. As disobedients, their lack of formal citizenship does not invalidate them for disobeying 
a state that is not extraneous to them since they stepped on US soil. That is why I have placed my 
support on a theoretical constellation that considers that formal citizenship is only one form of 
citizenship, and that the state is not the only one empowered in practice to accredit membership. There 
are other aspects of citizenship that cannot be granted by the state, or that can be granted only in a 
formal way by the state. There is another reason to argue that that state is not extraneous to them: in 
the course of the investigation I found that the state has such a degree of heterogeneity – in general and 
in its relationship with the immigrants – that its recognition of the rights of the undocumented and their 
membership is so blatant in some of its branches that neither can it be said that the state opts 
monolithically for exclusion, but rather that it expresses dissent within itself. The state, therefore, 
recognizes them – even in a fragmented fashion – as members of the national community. 
                                            
1 Statobinski, 1988. 
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This disobedience begins by being performative and not explicit. It is an art of presence that 
acquires a great part of its legitimacy in the world of the material reproduction of life, in the world of 
needs, whose political nature Marx revealed. Bayat observed that “the struggles…of the international 
migrants constitutes neither an organized and self-conscious social movement nor a coping mechanism, 
since people’s survival is not at the cost of themselves but of other groups or classes. These practices 
also move beyond simple acts of everyday resistance, for they engage in surreptitious and incremental 
encroachments to further their claims.”1 The sum of encroachments leads to a non-movement. As we 
saw, a fraction of this non-movement was able to form itself into a movement and explicitly practice 
civil disobedience with the help of several actors. 
Some of these actors and their purview are: the churches with the practice of religious 
citizenship, the organizations of the migrants, halfway between movements and non-movements (they 
partially were the inventors of the “Dreamers” category, a Trojan horse), the state heterogeneity 
(without this heterogeneity, that reflects an accumulation of accomplishments obtained in old battles, 
the Unites States’ political system would not find room for the margin of action of the performative civil 
disobedience of the migrants, nor of the actors who validate them). Just as in the Arab Spring uprisings 
the evolution of each movement depended in large measure on the reaction of the state2, the 
possibilities of the disobedience of the undocumented depends in part on the composition of the state, 
and the possibilities of obtaining their objectives will depend on the reactions of the state. That 
transformation was the effect of the support of the undocumented in the churches, organizations and in 
the favorable terrain of state heterogeneity. On those supports emerged an image of a sector of the 
undocumented that many communications media publicized, even those who previously did not have a 
pro-immigrant commitment, or that even tended to be anti-immigrant. The Dreamers were a fantastic 
segmentation to make the undocumentation “digestible”: the undocumented that arrived as children 
and that are going or aspire to go to college. They are more acceptable, and after their legalization 
comes that of their parents, and they are so acceptable that for the first time in history magazines like 
Time – liberal but that always has condemned illegal migration – have presented some undocumented 
under a very favorable light. In this way the collective, unorganic disobedience moved to collective 
action and from proto-civil disobedience to explicit civil disobedience.  
At the moment of finishing this text, Immigration and Customs Enforcement is welcoming 2016 
with a new operative of raids in Latino neighborhoods throughout the country. The objective is to 
                                            
1 Bayat, 2010, p.16. 
2 Castells, 2012, p.96. 
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deport Central American families to discourage the migration of Central American children, a not very 
credible justification taking into account the decrease of unaccompanied minors apprehended in 2014-
15, a period in which the Salvadorans decreased from 16,404 to 9,389, Guatemalans from 17,057 to 
13,589, and Hondurans went from 18,244 to 5,409.1 The measure does not satisfy neither Tyrians nor 
Trojans: “pro-immigration groups that called it heartless, and anti-immigration advocates who dismissed 
it as window dressing”.2 Maybe the latter are not mistaken: it is a theatre, but one that produces a lot of 
pain. The operatives will not produce a significant reduction of immigrants. But they will sow perplexity 
among that group of potential voters that both parties want to capture. A perplexity and a distrust like 
that that Ernesto Serna shared with me, “Meanwhile they [the politicians] are in their politics and in 
their power struggle, fighting and devouring one another, saying that they want and they do not want to 
approve migratory reform that would be beneficial for the undocumented. It will have to be seen what 
type of reform they want to promote. In reality they do not want to promote any reform. They continue 
giving it to one another there. They are like in Honduras or Nicaragua where they strike a blow on the 
nationals and the liberals, the Republican and Democrats are like that, some hit others and the others 
hit them back. If Obama wanted to, he could. What you have there is a ton of excuses. They say yes, but 
in reality it is no. Have you heard the song of Ricardo Arjona? He says “give me a no, but that really is a 
yes.” And they say yes, but it is a no. That is how I see this game.” 
                                            
1 U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Children Statistics FY 2015, 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-children/fy-2015 
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